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In the present mainpart, the thesis is introduced. In Chapter I the objective of the study and the 
methodology is outlined, as is a review of recent literature. In Chapter 2 an overview is provided 




" ... since the natural law is so called from nature, that is, it is that which natural reason directs and 
that which is written in the natura! reason, since according to this way of speaking, reason is itself 
nature. so in the same way, it is possible to take nature as nature, or nature as reason."1 Seeing 
nature and reason in such a close interrelation appears to be quite problematic in a contemporary 
setting. This idea might have been endorsed in a medieval context, but in contemporary philosophy 
and theology it may be discarded as obsolete. Arguments of a similar kind as this often dominate 
contemporary philosophy and theology. The prevalence oftbis mode ofthought calls fora critical 
assessment. Such a critique is the primary aim ofthe present study. In what sense may the nation 
of nature be said to hold normative implications? How is this the case for the concept ofreason? 
Can ane argue for the interrelatedness of nature and reason as the basis of normativity? 
1.1 The Objective ofthe Study 
Since the beginning of Western philosophical and Christian ethical thought, the relation between 
nature and reason as the basis of normativity has been discussed. It constitutes ane ofthe classical 
problems of Western ethical thought. One area where this discussion also today marks a central 
point of discussion is in the debate on natura! law and the different attempts to formulate plausible 
theories of environrnental ethics. In the present thesis it is the attempt to give a critical analysis of 
select theories of natura! law and environmental ethics, and outline a reconstruction of these 
notions as part of natura! law thought and environmental ethics. In arder to give an outline of the 
objective of the study, firstly, the main question of the thesis is defined, and, secondly, a synopsis 
of the thesis is provided. 




1.1 .1 Framing the Question 
The reader of just a few books on environmental ethics is well aquainted with the pessimistic 
accounts of the decline of nature, aften found in this literature during the 80'ties and 90'ties. 
Although ane might agree with same of these viewpoints, there has been a remarkable change in 
the amitude to the environmental crisis during the last few years. It seems that we are no longer 
speaking of an ecological crisis, but rather a challenge raised by environmental problems. Even if 
this change in tone may be seen as an expression ofthe change in empirical conditions for nature, 
the main focus of the present thesis is not a critical assessment of empirical facts. Rather, the 
primary concem here is the theoretical discussion on the relation between nature and reason. 
In many attempts to develop an environmental ethic, the concept of the rights of nature 
are emphasized. It is said that the concept of natura! rights now has broadened, so that it must 
include nature as well.2 Few attempts, however, try to appropriate the nation of natura! law, as 
this idea is conceived of as impossible to defend in a contemporary setting. This is regrettable, as 
this idea holds significant implications for a renewed understanding of man' s relation to nature, 
as it will be argued in the present thesis. Consequently, the thesis takes up two challenges to 
theological and philosophical ethics. One is the claim that natura! law no longer can be maintained, 
due to its obsolete metaphysical framework. The other challenge is the ongoing discussion within 
environmental ethics on the basis of ethics. Here it is aften claimed that environmental ethics must 
proceed in completely new ways. The problems of man's relation to nature are considered a 
consequence of a dominant Western theological and philosophical scheme of thought, why a 
rectification of these nations necessitate a fundamentally new course. 3 
It is aften claimed that environmental ethics is something very different from the previous 
tradition and that it is necessary to undertake a revision of our history of theology and philosophy. 
The present thesis claims that this is a somewhat hastened conclusion. In arder for environmental 
ethics to develop a stable and enduring theoretical basis, it is necessary to take the historical 
2 Cf. e.g. Nash 1989 fora historical demonstration ofthe expansive tendency ofthe notion ofnatural 
rights. 
3 Cf. e.g. Passmore I 974. 
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setting into account.4 In the present thesis tllis course if facilitated by a focus on natural law as one 
of the fundamental notions ofWestem moral theology and philosophy. The natural law tradition 
offers a very helpful background for a theory of man' s relation to nature. The natura! law thought 
as well as the environmental ethical theories all reflect on the concepts of nature and reason and 
discuss their distinctiveness and relationsllip to each other. Is there an irnplied morality within the 
being of nature, which man is a part of as a natura! being? What does this imply for the moral 
regard for other natural beings than man? Is reason the crucial moral factor, endowing man with 
a special moral status as a rational being? What does this imply for the moral regard for other 
natural beings than man? These are some ofthe leading questions that will be raised to the tllinkers 
of the thesis. Hopefully this will show that even if there is a different concem in natural law 
thought and environmental ethics, there still seems to be a similar grounding of morality. The 
metaethical basis seems to be the same in natura! law and environmental ethics. 
This brings about the theses of the present thesis: 
• There seems to be a remarkable metaethical similarity between the basis of the (i) 
premodern and early modem Protestant natura! law thought and (ii) contemporary 
environmenta1 ethics. It seems that two distinct modes of argumentation can be 
demonstrated in both ofthese discourses, i.e. a naturalist, ontological scheme of thought 
on the one hand and a con·structivist, voluntarist on the other. This seems to bring the 
justification of the two discourses close to each other, making it possible to use the 
mutual insights as basis of a natural law/environmental ethics theory. 
4 This claim is, of course, also shared by several other environmental ethicists. Cf. e.g. Attfield 
1983, and Hargove I 989 for arguments also endorsing the necessary historical foundation of environmental 
ethics. Krebs represents the opposite standpoint in emphasizing the argumentative approach, rejecting the 
relevance of studies on classical positions. Krebs argues that her study " ... searches for conceptual distinctions 
and arguments which help to sol ve this problem [i.e. the problem of orienting our conduct toward nature] ( ... ) 
What is needed at present are concepts and arguments which anyone interested in what is at stake in this 
debate can understand and accept and which do not appeal exclusively to Kantians or Heideggerians" ( 1999, 
3). Even ifl am sympathetic to Kreb's approach, it seems that she forgets that she is also part ofa tradition, 
namely the tradition of analytical philosophy. Thus, her approach may especially appeal to thinkers being in 
fa vor ofthis way of doing philosophy. It seems tome that we can never escape some degree of alliance to 
some tradition. Rather than obscure this hermeneutical condition, I believe one should attempt to make it clear. 
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• Furthem1ore, it is asswned that on the basis of a metaethical reevaluation of the Lutheran 
natural law thought in the light of the insights of environmental ethics it may prove 
possible to argue for a renewed use of this ethical theory within ethics in general and 
within environmental ethics in particular. 
The thesis hopes to argue for these theses by focusing on the concepts of nature and reason within 
the mentioned premodem and early modem Lutheran natura! law tradition and contemporary 
environmental ethics. 
Having established the main question and theses of the present study, a synopsis of the 
argument will further an introductory overview of the thesis. 
1.1.2 Synopsis of the Thesis 
The thesis is composed offour parts. The first part is introductory. The second and third part form 
the substantive main parts of the thesis, analyzing the nations of nature and reason within natura! 
law and environmental ethics. The fourth part is a constructive summary. The second and third 
part are viewed as separate studies that are brought together in the last part. The mainlines of the 
argument of the thesis runs as follows. 
The introductory part of the thesis gives an initiatory overview of the subject ofthe thesis 
and the means ofundertaking the work. Moreover, an account is given of the metaethical main 
concepts that will be appropriated in the study. 
The primary persons in the natura! law part (i.e. the second main part) of the thesis are: 
Philipp Melanchthon (Chapter 3), Christian Wolff (Chapter 4), Martin Luther (Chapter 5), and 
Immanuel Kant (Chapter 6). Thus, the thesis focuses on a particular natura! law tradition, namely 
the Lutheran-Kantian tradition. Briefly, other thinkers will be included in discussion on the natura! 
law thought, but will not be treated as main figures and serve only as perspectives. The thesis 
analyzes the metaethical basis of these natura! law theories, presuming that Melanchton and Wolff 
both emphasize the concept of nature as normative, whereas it is assumed that Luther and Kant 
accentuate the idea ofreason more. For all of them it is essential to determine the relation between 
nature and reason as the basis of natura! law. 
In the part (main part three) on environmental ethics, the primary persons are: Holmes 
6 
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Rolston, III (Chapter 7), J. Baird Callicott (Chapter 8), Paul Taylor (Chapter 9), Bryan Norton 
(Chapter 10), Mark Sagoff (Chapter 11), and Robin Attfield (Chapter 12). As in the case ofthe 
natura! law tradition, it has been attempted to include representative thinkers, enabling us toget 
a varied and yet representative picture of this tradition. Furthermore, it is also here the 
presumption that nature has a predominant position among the first three in the basis of 
normativity, and that reason holds an equivalent position in the last three. Moreover, the relation 
between nature and reason as the basis of normativity is also an essential concern here. 
In the mentioned section on natura! law thought and environmental ethics, it is attempted 
to enhance the possibility of a comparative reading of the metaethical implications by structuring 
the chapters in similar ways. This is intended to provide the possibility of the constructive 
summary of the last part (main part four). This part will draw upon the findings of the thesis, 
giving a brief summary. These findings will serve as the basis of this concluding part of the thesis. 
However, as the intention is also to form a systematic, constructive reflection on the nations of 
nature and reason within natura] law and environmental ethics (even if only tentatively), other 
thinkers will also be included in this part. Firstly, a critical assessment ofthe notion of nature as 
the basis of natura! law and environmental ethics is provided (Chapter 13). Secondly, the idea of 
the normativity ofreason within these same discourses is critically evaluated (Chapter 14). Lastly, 
it is attempted to give an account ofthe mutuality of nature and reason as the basis of natura! law 
and environmental ethics. Thereby, it is the intention to provide plausible tenets of a reformulation 
of the natura! law tradition treated in the thesis and to argue plausibly for the appropriation of this 
notion of natura! law within environmental ethics (Chapter 15). 
The thesis is concluded with a Danish sumrnary (Sammenfatning). 
The wide scope of the thesis in terms of difference in terminology among the included 
thinkers, not to mention the difference in temporal and intellectual setting of the select thinkers, 
necessitates a comment on the appropriated method and terrninology. 
1.2 Remarks on methodology and terminology 
The rather disparate nature and historical setting of the premodem and early modem German 
Lutheran natural law thought and the contemporary environmental ethical thought necessitates a 
remark on the reading and justification of this attempt. 
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When one deals with the question of methodology, it is necessary to keep two distinctly 
different meanings of this nation in mind. According to one, the question of the method of a 
particular work refers to the selfunderstanding ofthis work.5 Here, the question is how one makes 
theology or ethics. The other main nation of methodology refers more to the reading and 
application of textual material. A leading question in this regard is the understanding and use of 
the background texts, in a systematic theological work this is often referred to as a distinction 
between the historical and systematic reading.6 These two methods are, of course, closely related 
to each other. The inner selfunderstanding of a work has an important influence on the chosen 
approach to the textual material. 
The present study is a systematic theological work on Christian ethics. This means that 
this work conceives of itself as having its basis within a conceptual, Christian framework. 
However, the object ofthe thesis carries the argument beyond self-description, as the notion of 
natura! law holds an inherent claim of universal validity. Consequently, the thesis purports to hold 
an argument which is plausible in terms of philosophy in general. This is not the least the case for 
the concluding part of the thesis, where it is attempted to construct a normative understanding of 
nature and reason. 7 
In terms of the approach to the textual sources of the thesis, it has been attempted to give 
a critical analysis of the nations of nature and reason within central texts of the included thinkers. 
Thereby it has been the intention to focus on the argumentative basis ofthese ideas, rather than 
5 This understanding of method appears to be the goveming notion in Frei's account offive different 
types ofChristian theology (1992, 28ff.). These diff'erent types oftheology are defined with respect to the 
degree of which they consider themselves as Christian self-descriptions. According to Frei, e.g. Kaufmann 
is taken as a representative ofa type where theology becomes a philosophical discipline. The emphasis is on 
the general criteria oftheology and the distinction between extemal and internal description becomes basically 
unimportant (28ft). D. Z. Phillips represents an opposite type, where the Christian self-description outrules 
the relevance ofphilosophy. Here, the distinction between outside and inside is rather clear (46ff.). 
6 Cf. e.g. Prenter 1946, l 2ff. where this distinction is made in relation to Lutherstudies, and where 
a combination ofthese approaches is advocated in relation to a proper reading ofLuther. 
7 Even if this terminology may all ude to an inspiration from the Kantian based methodological 
approach to theology which is found in Kaufman (19792), the inspiration is only moderate. It is not the 
argument of the present thesis that nations as e.g. God are basically constructs grounded in publically 
available criteria. Rather the chosen tenninology is an expression of an inspiration from a Rawlsian, Kantian 
inspired understanding of ethical constructivism (cf 2.2). It is one ofthe arguments ofthe thesis, that this 
understanding of practical rationality lies deeply within a Lutheran natura] law thought. 
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their historical, genetic basis. As the textual material consists of thinkers very different in time and 
scope, the thesis defines some metaethical nations which repeatedly are referred to. Therefore, the 
aim of the critical analysis is to determine the understanding of the normativity of nature and 
reason in the included thinkers, with reference to the metaethical main concepts. This approach 
is intended to make a comparitive account ofthese various understandings feasible. This provides 
the basis for the constructive .approach of the last part, where central tenets of these ideas are 
critically compared. Throughout the thesis, however, it will be attempted to minimize the 
comparisons between the included thinkers, referring this comparison to the last part and 
restricting the reading of the included thinkers to a critical analysis of the key notions.8 
As the thesis has a conceptual approach, it is the nations of nature and reason that are 
the pi votal points of focus throughout the thesis. However, a purely conceptual approach is in 
danger of an ad hoc argumentation. If one does not refer the conceptual analysis to particular 
thinkers, the argument may easily become rather desultory. The focus on particular thinkers has 
the advantage of making the premisses of the argument as clear as possible. However, this 
approach also holds implications for the textual basis of the thesis. Tue conceptual approach leads 
to a focus on selected primary sources of the included thinkers, as it is not the primary aim to 
provide a new reading of these thinkers. The thesis is not e.g. a Wolff- or a Lutherstudy. lf new 
insights with regard to the individuals theories occur, these are to be regarded as welcome, but 
unintended merits of the study. 
As for terminology it is necessary to give a precise definition of the notions of nature and 
reason as they are applied in the thesis. In what sense does the thesis speak of nature? Or reason? 
Both concepts generally hold many different meanings, the notion of nature not the least. "'In der 
gesamten Naturphilosophie gibt es kaum ein zweideutigeres und aquivoqueres Wort als jenes, was 
8 Referring to Dieter Henrich, Andersen 1983, 17 distinguishes between three ways of commenting 
on philosophical texts. (1) The "paraphrasierend-erlautemde" method gives an account ofthe text, even if it 
does not analyze the argumentative structure, as it is presumed that this structure is apparent on the basis of 
the text ofthe author. (2) The "genetische" approach demonstrates causes of the text, even if it does not come 
to terms with the text itself. (3) The "argumentierende Rekonstruktion" unlocks the text as it tries to replace 
ambiguous concepts with definitions, isolates premisses and arguments and attempts conclusions that 
correspond to the text. With reference to these methods, the present applies the first and third method in the 
analysis of the theories of natura] law and environmental ethics. The primary aim is to explain the 
understanding ofnature ofreason within these theories. However, as the focus is on the argumentative basis, 
the third method is also applied. In the last part of the thesis a decidedly constructive approach is undertaken. 
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ibr den Namen gegeben hat, das Wort cpua1<;, das die Lateiner mit dem Wort natura wiedergeben.' 
Dies schreibt Christoph Sturmius 1689 und schliigt, iihnlich wie zu gleicher Zeit Robert Boyle vor, 
auf den Gebrauch des Wortes ganz zu verzichten."9 The concept of nature has been a disputed 
term throughout the history of philosophy and is also conceived of in various terms in a 
contemporary setting. 10 Rather than attempt to give an account of all these understandings of 
nature, I define the use of the concept in the present context. Nature is here used in a double 
sense. (I) It is used in amore expanded, inclusive sense, referring to human and nonhuman, living 
and inanimate nature. Furthermore, there is no sharp distinction between this inclusive sense of 
nature and an inclusive concept of creation. Although, when the latter is used, it holds intended 
connotations to a theological belief in God as Creator. Nature in this sense comes close to the 
understanding of nature which is found in a recent study on "Ethics of Nature". Here nature is 
used as opposite to artefact. Nature is that which has not been made by human beings. 11 (2) Nature 
in the second sense is understood as human nature. This notion of nature is important in the critical 
analysis of natura! law. This sense of nature refers to the character and essence of the human 
being, as in the understanding ofthe benevolent nature ofthe human being. It is believed that the 
different use of these two notions is mostly obvious in the context. However, when a clarification 
is needed, the notion of "nonhuman nature" refers to the first sense of nature, whereas "human 
nature" refers to the latter. 
The concept of reason also holds different meanings, even if it is not quite as ambiguous 
as the notion of nature. 12 However, just as with "nature" the intention here is not to give a 
summary of different meanings of "reason", but to define its use in the present thesis. 13 The 
primary concem here is the notion of moral reason. This concept of reason is inspired by Rawls' 
understanding of reason, when he relates it to the notion of rationality. Reason characterizes the 
9 Cf. Spaemann 1973, 956f. 
1° For a cornprehensive study on and survey of the different understandings of nature from the 
beginning of Western philosophy and in conternporary philosphy, cf. Gloy 1995; 1996. For an excellent 
surnmary of main philosophical understandings ofthis notion, cf. Spaemann I 973. 
11 Cf. Krebs 1999, 6. 
12 Cf. Grotefeld 1997 for a survey of different concepts of rationality within conternporary 
philosophy and theology. Andersen 1997a gives a good historical overview ofthe notion ofpractical reason. 
13 Fora surnrnary ofthe historical background and use indifferent contexts, cf. Whittaker 1918. 
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willingness openly to discuss moral issues in arder to determine what js moral ly right and wrong. 
Reason in this sense is a moral reflection on right and wrong with the aim of formulating moral 
principles. Rationality, on the other hand, is goaloriented. The rational being seeks the most 
expedient way of satisfying his or her needs. 14 Therefore, when the thesis attempts to establish a 
no1mative concept of reason, it is the role of reason as basis of normativity which is in focus. The 
concern is to determine the understanding of moral reason as the source of normativity. 
For an account of metaethical main nations, see Chapter 2. 
With regard to style of reference, the thesis refers to contemporary writers with indication 
of name, year ofpublication and page (e.g. Norton 1999, 158ff.). References to classical primary 
sources refer to standard editions of these works and follow the standard style of reference 
accordingly (in e.g. Luther the references are to the Die Weimarer Ausgabe of his works with 
indication ofvolume, page and occasionally lines (e.g. WA 11 , 251, 4ff.)). The two discourses of 
natura! law thought and environmental ethics are very different in terms of secondary literature, 
as the representatives of the latter are not established fields ofresearch in the same sense as e.g. 
Luther and Kant are. Whereas there is an enormous literature on thinkers like Luther and Kant, 
the relevant literature which can be included in a critical assessment of e.g. Rolston and Norton 
is aften not specifically related to these thinkers. In arder for the thesis to aim at a homogenous 
appearance the focus will be on primary sources. However, same secondary sources and critical 
texts have been included in arder to put the discussion in perspective. 
1.3 A Review ofRecent Literature 
The intention in this review is not to give a complete overview of sources or literature on natura! 
law and environmental ethics. Likewise, it is not the intention to give an overview of all the 
secondary literature and other texts which may be related to the various thinkers of the thesis. 
Such aims would lead this overview far beyond the appropriate purpose of an introductory 
14 Rawls 1996, 49f.: "Persons are reasonable in one basic aspect when, among equals say, they are 
ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given 
the assurance that others will likewise do so. Those norms they view as reasonable for everyone to accept and 
therefore as justifiable to them; and they are ready to discuss the fair terms that others propose ( ... ) The 
rational is, however, a distinct idea from the reasonable and applies to a single, unified agent (either an 
individual or corporate person) with the powers of judgment and deliberation in seeking ends and interests 
peculiarly its own." 
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overview. Rather, the intention is to give an overview of the literature directly related to the 
overall intention of the thesis. In doing so, the focus will first be on natura! law thought. Secondly, 
the relevant literature on environmental ethics will be commented. Hopefully this overview will 
demonstrate, where the thesis hopes to provide a contribution within these fields. 
Within the thinkers of natura! law there is a comprehensive list of relevant literature 
related more specifically to the individual thinkers. Each chapter in the thesis is introduced with 
brief comments on this literature. For the present purpose, however, it ought to suffice to note that 
this literature is focused on the individual thinkers and does not provide an analysis of the 
Lutheran-Kantian natura! law thought as such. This tradition is also overlooked in the more 
general studies of natura! law, cf. e.g. Welzel ( 1951 ), D'Entreves ( 1951 ), Crowe (1977), Tuck 
( 1979), Tiemey ( 1997) and Haakonssen ( 1999). For some peculiar reason it is as if this tradition 
is not considered relevant for the study on natura! law. 15 In the mentioned works on individual 
thinkers and the overall views of natura! law thought, it has not been the intention to reformulate 
this notion as a viable basis for contemporary ethics. Within Catholic theology several such 
attempts are made to reformulate a classical notion of natura! law, cf. e.g. Grisez (1981; 1993), 
Finnis ( 1980) and Porter ( 1999) as some of the main representatives. These attempts lie, however, 
outside the field of inquiry for the present thesis. Within protestant theology there are only few, 
relatively recent attempts at a reformulation of natura! law, cf. e.g. Ramsey (1966), Little ( 1968) 
and Macquarrie (1970). In a critical discussion with H. L. A. Hart, Rarnsey develops an 
understanding of natura! law which fundarnentally accords with the moral principles ofR. M. Hare 
(390). In relating this discussion to Christian ethics, Ramsey argues that Christian ethics has a 
logic which accords with natura! law (392), concluding that "If the morality ofNatural Law and 
Christian morality are alike exploratory, if their principles point to as they arise from a moral 
obligation and commitment which they presuppose and must preserve, the edge is immediately 
taken off most of the several objections which we listed at the start. For instance, whatever 
diversification of moral principles we findindifferent societies, and however difficult it may be to 
elucidate principles suited to complex decisions in a time of rapid social change, there will 
15 Samuel von Pufendorf and Christian Thomasius seem to be exceptions to this tendency. In 
contrast to most other natura! law thinkers of this tradition, Pufendorf and Thomasius receive quite some 
attention. Cf. E.g. Haakonssen 1999 fora collection of articles dealing with these thinkers. 
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nevertheless be some principles which are so stable as to be virtually sacrosanct as long as human 
beings remain broadly what they now are." (394) On the basis of his study on Calvin, Little 
attempts to assess Calvin' s understanding of natural law in the light of contemporary ethics. Even 
if Little finds several points where it appears possible to appropriate Calvin's thought, he 
concludes that the natura! law theory never must be too all-encompassing. Christian ethics is 
always in need of Christian revelation (196). Based on various sources, without any references 
to the protestant reformers, Macquarrie argues that " ... there is no conflict between the ideals of 
a Christian ethic and the moral ideals to be found in humanity at large" (110). During the work on 
the present thesis no work dealing explicitly with this issue in a substantial way has come to my 
awareness. Toere are several historical studies and several studies on various natura! law thinkers 
within a protestant tradition, but I know of no comprehensive contribution to a reformulation of 
a protestant natura! law theory. However, among works dealing with themes of an indirect 
relevance to natural law thought, one could mention several works. An overview of such works 
would include studiies dealing with questions of human nature, the relation between the human 
being and the order of creation (cf. E.g. Gustafson 1981 ; 1984 and O'Donovan 1994), the relation 
between ethics and science (cf. e.g. Clark 2000) and theories of practical reasoning (cf. e.g. 
Andersen 1997a; 1997b). Clearly, such an overview would go far beyond the reasonable limits of 
the present overview. For the present purpose the overview has demonstrated that there appears 
to be no works within protestant theological ethics dealing with the issue in focus in the present 
thesis. Regrettably, this has had the consequence that this tradition is often overlooked as a natura! 
law tradition. Thinkers as e.g. Melanchthon and Wolff may be regarded as natura! law theorists, 
but the tradition as such is overlooked. The thesis hopes to provide a partial overview of this line 
of tradition, focusing on their stances on nature and reason as normative concepts. 
In environmental ethics tbere are several works on the rights of nature. We cannot 
present them all here, but merely point to e.g. Nash (1989) fora study on the history of the idea 
ofrights of nature. Nash gives an account ofthis idea as part of American liberalism and describes 
how the notion of rights has an expansive tendency. Due to this tendendcy of expansion, 
nonhuman nature is also regarded as having rights. Nash 's study provides a comprehensive 
overview of the development of the understanding of the legal and moral rights of nature. As one 
of the classical positions, claiming the legal rights of nature, Stone (1972) must be mentioned. 
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Stone argues that e.g. valleys and trees can be seen as legal persons and therefore can have rights 
in legal dispute. Singer ( 1973) is maybe the hest example of one of the early arguments in favor 
of the moral rights of animals. Singer compares the need of liberationism of animals with 
liberationist movements for ethnic or sexual minorities among humans. The oppression of animals 
is just as morally reprehensible as the oppression ofthese groups. However, as the notion ofrights 
of nature does not hold a central place in the present study, these ti ties do not serve as important 
points of discussion. Natural law as a basis of environmental ethics has not had the same degree 
of attention. However, within Catholic theology there has been quite a few attempts to appropriate 
this notion, cf. e.g. Schrnitz (1987), Korff (1987a; 1998), Brown (1990) and French (1994). 
Outside Catholic theology there has been only very few attempts to appropriate natura! law as a 
basis of environmental ethics. Asa more substantial contribution to this approach, I am only aware 
of Michael Northcott ' s The Environment & Christian Ethics (1996). In this important study, 
Northcott first gives an account ofthe environmental crisis (chapter one) and the reasons behind 
it (chapter two). He then describes the turn to nature during Romanticism as a response to an 
estrangement from nature. This romantic reaction is taken up in recent environmental ethics, it is 
argued. Consequently, this chapter is concerned with a presentation of and a discussion with 
leading philosophical environmental ethical theories (chapterthree). In the subsequent chapter, 
Northcott tums to an account of theological reflections on these issues (chapter four), leading him 
to formulate his own theory. In the fifth chapter he outlines " ... a relational and ecological account 
of the human self-in-relation and of the non-human world" (163) which is based upon reading of 
attitudes to the created world which is found in the Hebrew Bible. In the next chapter ( chapter 
six) he develops this theme of relationality further in the light of essential theological deliberations 
and attempts '' ... to outline an environmental ethic which draws on insights about the relational 
character of created order and the moral life which we may find in the Jewish and Christian 
tradition of natura! law." (ibid.). In the last chapter (chapter seven) this natura! law approach to 
environmental ethics is developed further with regard to contemporary political and economic 
practices. Northcott' s account of this theme ofrelationality is highly relevant to the present thesis. 
As we shall see, the notion of community (and thereby relation) marks an important point of 
reference between naturalistic theories of natura! law and theories of environmental ethics. 
However, Northcott's study refers more generally to natura! law thought. His nation of natura! 
14 
Introduet ion 
law is based upon Biblical sources, Aquinas and the Anglican Richard Hooker. This also implies 
a critical stance on the influence of the ethics of the Reformers, as it is argued that "The Reformers 
sought to construct an ethic which was exclusively based on revelation in scripture instead of the 
duality of nature and revelation obtaining in the natural law perspective." (233). Such an 
assessment of the Reformers' stance on natural law is only much tao characteristic of the 
deficiency of the general understanding of the relevance of the natura! law thought of the 
reformers, already noted. The present thesis hopes to provide a partial contribution to a renewed 
understanding of the potentials within this tradition. 
On the basis of this overview of literature, it may be concluded that the main intention 
of the present study relates to questions which are in need of a thorough analysis. It appears that 
the main aims of the thesis have not been discussed in other recent works. Therefore, it is the hope 
that the thesis will contribute with following new insights: ( l) An overview of leading premodern 
and early modem natura! law theories in a Lutheran-Kantian tradition, demonstrating two main 
schemes of thought. (2) A critical analysis of leading theories of environmental ethics within 
Anglo-American philosophy, demonstrating underlying natural law tenets. Lastly, (3) a tentative 
contribution to a reformulation of protestant natura! law thought and an outline of an appropria-
tion of protestant natural law thought as a basis of environmental ethics. 
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Nature and Reason. A Metaethical Overview 
In the present chapter an overview of the main types of the metaethical nations which appear in 
the thesis will be given. The intention of this overview is not to give a contribution to a critical 
assessment of these metaethical positions, just as it is not the aim to refine these conceptions 
further. Rather, the objective is to provide a definition of these terms as they are used in the thesis, 
i.e. an account of how these metaethical ideas are conceived. Such an overview is necessary, as 
these terms will be referred to repeatedly along the course of the thesis. 
The overview will be given by focusing on two main types of metaethics, one arguing that 
there is an objective basis ofmorality, the other endorsing the construction of normativity as the 
proper basis. Within tbe former, the nations of realism, naturalism, and the ontological grounding 
of morality will be described. Theories of sensibility, constructivsm, and the voluntarist grounding 
of moral i ty form the concem of the latter. 16 
2.1 Nature as Basis of Morality 
Several metaethical theories of morality argue that moral normativity has an objective basis. These 
theories are highly relevant for the purpose of this thesis, as this objective basis also can refer to 
nature as the basis of morality. 
Realism is to a wide extent understood as synonymous with naturalism, which is treated 
below. For both morality has an objective, realist basis. In the present thesis the concept of realism 
is used to refer to an understanding of morality, where it is conceived of as a given faet. Morality 
has the same kind of objectivity as natura! sciences. Just as one can <liseover scientific facts, one 
16 This distinction between two main categories of metaethics corresponds somewhat to the 
distinction given by Darwall et al 1997, 8f., where they refer to two broad trends in contemporary moral 
theory. One approach attempts to demonstrate " ... that moral judgments are factual in the paradigm sense 
afforded by empirical or theoreticaljudgments in the natura( sciences." The other approach seeks to argue that 
there is " ... some substantial contrast or discontinuity between facts (at least, facts of the paradigm sort treated 
of in natura I science) and norms or values." 
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can also discover morality. By means of analysis, one can give an account of the objective parts, 
constituting the basis of morality. Morality in this sense is seen as being in continuity with the 
sciences. Consequently, Boyd also gives the following definition of moral realism, after having 
explained his understanding of scientific realism as the notion of scientific theories as constituting 
the possibility of aquiring approximate knowledge ofreal phenomerna 17: 
According to moral realism: 




express propositions which are) true or false (or approximately true, 
largely false, etc.); 
The truth or falsity (approxirnate truth ... ) of moral statements is 
largely independent or our moral opinions, theories, etc.; 
Ordinary canons of moral reasoning - together with ordinary canons 
of scientific and everyday factual reasoning - constitute, under many 
circumstances at least, a reliable method for obtaining and improving 
(approximate) moral knowledge. 18 
The counterparts of moral realism are, therefore, nations of cognitivism, i.e. the view that " .. . 
moraljudgements express our beliefs about what these moral facts are, and that we can come to 
discover what these facts are by engaging in moral argument and reflection."19 When referring to 
moral realism in the thesis, it is intended to differentiate this nation from naturalism. Even if 
naturalism also holds the view that there is an objective basis of morality, the concept of realism 
will be used to refer to such notions, which base the objectivity of morality on other notions than 
empirical nature. As will be demonstrated, this is the case e.g. in Melanchthon, where it will be 
argued that natura! law has a real, objective basis which is not primarily understood by means of 
observations of physical nature. 
The objective basis of morality is also shared by metaethical naturalism. Naturalism also 
holds that moral propositions are of such a character that one can judge them as either true or 
false. As judgments that can be verified or falsified, one can come to actual knowledge about 
moral propositions. Thus, naturalism is" ... a cognitivist doctrine ( or family of doctrines). It states 
17 Boyd 1997, 105. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Smith 1993, 402. 
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that moral j udgments are propositions, capable of truth and fals i ty. Moral judgments purport to 
tel1 it like it is. Naturalism is thus opposed to non-cognitivism, to emotivism and prescriptivism, 
which represent moral judgments variously as exclamations, psychological prods and quasi-
commands. It is also (in a weak sense) a realist doctrine; that is, it takes some moral judgments 
to be true."20 Morality, therefore, is neither fiction, a mistake or a myth. Rather, it is a collection 
ofknowledge and/or information. A characteristic feature of naturalism is the claim that any moral 
proposition can be reduced to nonmoral properties. Thus, moral concepts, such as "the good", can 
be explained by reference to nonmoral facts. Morality does not hold a factual realm of its own, 
which is separate from nonmoral facts. Rather, it can always be explained by a reduction to 
nonmoral properties. The following figure from Pigden 1993, 422 gives a concise illustration of 
central tenets of the naturalist position: 
Naturalism 
states 
I Moral judgements are 
propositions. (They are 
true or false.) 
2 Some moral judgements 
are true. (Morality not a 
fiction.) 
Non-cognitivism in its various 
-+ forms (emotivism and 
prescriptivism) is false. 
Nihilism (or the 'error-theory') 
-+ is false. 
No irreducible moral facts -+ lntuitionism (Moore's doctrine) 
or properties. is false. 
Even if naturalism refers to diffent nations of nonmoral facts to which the moral propositions can 
be reduced, due to Moore's account of naturalistic ethics (see below), the primary focus in the 
present thesis will be concepts of naturalism which re fer to nature as this obj ective basis. In the 
natura! law thought which is being treated in the thesis, this idea will appear, as is the case in some 
of the concepts of environmental ethics. As will be apparent, various understandings of e.g. a kind 
of lawfullness in nonhuman nature or human nature will serve as the basis for morality. These 
factual concepts of nature will serve as the basis for the endorsement of the factual character of 
moral propositions. 
Somewhat in line with the realist and naturalist understanding of the basis of morality is 
the ontological grounding o.f morality. Tue concept of ontology, however, is quite open to various 
interpretation. Therefore, a short comment on its present use is necessary. When referring to the 
20 Pigden 1993, 421. 
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ontological basis of morality I refer to a notion very similar to the realist and naturalist 
understandings. When this term is used, it is due to the terminology of the secondary literature on 
some of the natura! law thinkers included in the thesis. Dating from the stoic understanding of 
natural law, an understanding of a lawfullness of physical nature as analogous to the lawfullness 
of the moral order has been seen as characteristic of Western natura! law thought. This 
understanding points to an analogy ofbeing (analogia entis) between the natura! and moral order.21 
Understanding the concept of ontology in terms ofbeing, this idea has also been referred to as the 
ontological basis of natura] law, i.e. of morality. In the present thesis this term is used in a similar 
way, i.e. refening to an existent order oflawfullness which constitutes the analogous basis of the 
physcial as well as the moral reality. 
2.2 Reason and the Construction ofNormativity 
The naturalist position is challenged by the claim that it is not possible to derive ought/ought not 
from is/is not. Likewise it is claimed that the notion of goodness is a simple, indefinable concept. 
As such it is a fallacy to refer to other notions in order to define this idea. These two critical 
comments to naturalist metaethics were originally formulated by David Hume and G. E. Moore 
respectively, why a short account of their arguments seems appropriate. 
In A Treatise o.f Human Nature Hume argues that morals cannot be deri ved from reason. 
ln close relation to his empiricist epistemology, he argues for decisions concerning morals as 
perceptions. This implies the rejection of reason as the basis of morals, why he claims that feelings 
or sentiments should be understood as the proper basis of morals.22 The argument for the 
exclusion of reason as the basis of morals is its inability to account for the passions and affections 
which arise in questions of morals. Morals have an impact on feelings, which is not possible for 
reason.23 The concern of reason is something quite different, namely the truth and falsehood. This 
21 Cf. e.g. Wolf 1960, 136lf. for an account of how this is the case in Thomas Aquinas. Fora 
somewhat different understanding of the ontological basis of ethics, cf. Løgstrup 1971 , 211. 
22 Hume 1740, 470: "Our decisions concerning moral rectitude and depravity are evidently 
perceptions; and as all perceptions are either impressions or ideas, the exclusion of the one is a convincing 
argument for the other. Morality, therefore, is more properly felt thanjudg'd of; tho' this feeling or sentiment 
is commonly so soft and gentle, that we are apt to confound it with an idea, according to our common custom 
of taking all things for the same, which have any near resemblance to each other." 
13 !dem, 457. 
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question, however, is different from the concern of morals. The question of truth and falsehood 
is a matter of real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact.24 But the recognition 
of this relation neither produces actions, nor does it concern the moral character of actions. For 
this purpose, reason is unsuitable.25 Moreover, in line of this argument, the basis of morals cannot 
be explained by a reduction of morals to some nonmoral entity. This also applies to the question 
of nature as the basis of morals. Ifthe argument is accepted, claiming that feelings constitute the 
source of morality, a further question is the nature of these feelings . Hurne discusses this in 
relation to the notion of nature. After having demonstrated various definitions of nature, he 
concludes that it is irnpossible that nature has anything to do with morals.16 In this case, as in any 
other, the reduction of morals to nonmoral terms does not prove possible. Hume also demontrates 
this with relation to the existence of God and observations concering human affairs. This 
description of facts does not suffice as an explanation of morals. There is no satisfactory 
explanation of how the normative ought is deri ved from the factual is. This is where we find the 
famous rejection of deriving ought from is. 
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always 
remark' d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of 
reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes obervations concering 
human affairs; when of a sudden I am supriz' d to find, that instead of the usual 
copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not 
connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, 
however, of the las consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses 
some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and 
explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems 
altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, 
2~ !dem, 458. 
25 Ibid.: " ... as reason can never immediately prevent or produce any action by contradicting or 
approving of it, it cannot be the source of the distinction betwixt moral good and evil, which are found to have 
that intluence. Actions may be laudable or blameable; but they cannot be reasonable or unreasonable ( ... ) 
Reason is wholly inactive, and can never be the source of so active a principle as conscience, or a sense of 
morals." 
26 ldem, 475: "Mean while it may not be amiss to observe from these definitions of natura/ and 
unnatural [i.e. the definitions given previously], that nothing can be more unphilosophical than those systems, 
which assert, that virtue is the same with what is natura!, and vice with what is unnatural ( ... ) 'Tis impossible, 
therefore, that the character of natura! and unnatural can ever, in any sense, mark the boundaries ofvice and 
virtue." 
20 
Nature and Reason. A Metaethical Overview 
which are entirely different from it.17 
Obviously this understanding represents a sharp critique of the naturalist notion. For naturalism 
the very possiblity ofthis reduction of morals to nonmoral notions is the very basis of normativity. 
As will be apparent in the thesis, a similar reduction is advocated by some of the included natura! 
law thinkers as well as in some of the theories of environmental ethics. However, Hume is not the 
one who is the source of the term "naturalism". The reason for this term is rather to be found in 
Moore. 
Approximately 150 years later, Moore formulated a similar argument in Principia Ethica, 
even ifthe differences are important. The leading question in Moore was the meaning of the notion 
ofthe good. This notion is widely misunderstood, he claimed. The misunderstanding ofthe notion 
of the good tums on the definition of this concept. In any definition there must be some simple, 
indefinable parts, by which the defined is composed. In arder for any definition to make sense, 
there must be same such simple parts which cannot be defined. Good is such a notion. It is a 
simple, indefinable part, by which other nations are defined. "'Good,' then, if we mean by it that 
quality which we assert to belong to a thing, when we say that the thing is good, is incapable of 
any definition, in the most important sense of that word. "28 Good is not composed of any parts, 
which can be substituted for it.29 This is precisely where the naturalistic fallacy has been made. 
Good has been defined by pointing to some other parts which were identified with good. It has 
been believed that one could define good by reference to these other parts, not being aware that 
these other parts constitute something quite different.30 
It may be true that all things which are good are also something else, just as it 
is true that all things which are yellow produce a certain kind of vibration in the 
light. And it is a faet, that Ethics aims at discovering what are those other 
properties belonging to all things which are good. But far too many philo-
sophers have thought that when they named those other properties they were 
actually defining good; that these properties, in faet, were simply not 'other,' 
27 !dem, 469. 
Js Moore I 903, § I 0. 
29 ldem, § 8. 
30 !dem, § I 0. 
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but absolutely and entirely the same with goodness. This view I propose to call 
the ' naturalistic fallacy ' ... "31 
This notion of the naturalistic fallacy is not understood in a narrow sense. It is not confined to 
reflections on the relation between the observable nature and ethics. Rather, the term naturalism 
is applied more broadly to theories that define the good in relation to empirical objects as well as 
to objects existing in a supersensible real world.32 Thus, naturalism describes a particular approach 
to ethics - an approach which is fundamentally irreconcilable with ethics as such. This method 
consists in the substitution of 'good' with some other natura! property in natura! objects. 
Consequently, ethics is replaced by natura! science, social science or any other science. It is no 
longer ethics in the sense of giving a satisfying account of the 'good' .33 
I have thus appropriated the name Naturalism to a particular method of 
approaching Ethics - a method which, strictly understood, is inconsistent with 
the possibility of any Ethics whatsoever. This method consists in substituting for 
··good" some one property of a natura! object or of a collection of natura! 
objects; and in thus replacing Ethics by some one of the natura! sciences ( ... ) 
The name then is perfectly general; for, no matter what the something is that 
good is held to mean, the theory is still Naturalism. Whether good be defined 
as yellow or green or blue, as loud or soft, as round or square, as sweet or 
bitter, as productive of life or productive of pleasure, as willed or desired or 
felt: whichever of these or of any other object in the world, good may be held 
to mean, the theory, which holds it to mean them, will be a naturalistic theory.34 
In tb.is sense of naturalism, Moore's critique applies to several ofthe theories which are treated 
in the thesis. Whether the reference is to the will of God or the lawfullness of the natura! order as 
the basis of natura! law, this still constitutes a fallacy, when read in the light of Moore. When the 
basis of moral i ty is referred to the ecological arder or bio tic whole, as we find it in the included 
theories of environmental ethics, a naturalistic fallacy is cornmitted. 
Moore refers to the notion of living in accordance with nature as the most common 
31 Ibid. 
31 !dem, § 25. 
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naturalistic fallacy. As Moore says, this notion dates back to the Stoics and can also be found in 
Rousseau.35 As will be apparent, this notion is also apparent in several of the theories in the 
present thesis. This notion makes the fallacy quite clear, according to Moore. This theory gives 
no account of the good, but merely identifies the good with the natural. Such an identification, 
however. is completely insatisfactory. "If everything natural is equally good, then certainly Ethics, 
as it is ordinarily understood, disappears: for nothing is more certain, from an ethical point of 
view, than that some things are bad and others good; the object ofEthics is, indeed, in chief part, 
to give you general rules whereby you may avoid the one and secure the other."36 If one considers 
health as an example - many would claim health to be natura!. But diseases are also natura!, in the 
sense that they are part of natura! life. What is really meant is normal. Health is the normal 
condition. But a reduction of ethics to the normal excludes many instances of good, which are not 
considered normal. Sometimes, the anormal is good. Consequently, there can be no identification 
of natura! with good. "We must not, therefore, be frightened by the assertion that a thing is natura! 
into the admission that it is good; good does not, by definition, mean anything that is natura!; and 
it is therefore always an open question whether anything that is natura! is good."37 
The constructivist position is defined with reference to a Rawlsian reading of the 
methodology ofKant' s philosophy. The Kantian constructivism argues that the princip les of justice 
are the result of a procedure of construction. The premisses of this procedure are determined by 
what appears as reasonable requirements. Within this procedure, rational agents agree on the 
principles of justice.38 The essential difference to naturalism is the notion that there is no prior 
order, which determines the right and the wrong. Constructivism implies no realist or verificatio-
nist detem1ination of truth. Constructivism requires a procedure of construction to identify the first 
principles of justice. Therefore, the principles of justice defined in accordance with the 
35 ldem, § 27. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Rawls J 997, 247: "What distinguishes the Kantian fonn of constructivism is essentially 
this: it specifies a particular conception of the person as an element in a reasonable procedure of 
construction, the outcome of which determines the content of the first principles of justice. 
Expressed in another way: this kind of view sets up a certain procedure of construction, which 
answers to certain reasonable requirements, and within this procedure persons characterized as 
rational agents of construction specify, through their agreements, the first principles of justice." 
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constructivist method are in theory constantly open to change.39 Essential to the constructivist 
notion is the idea that rational autonomous persons in the original position decide upon principles 
of justice which express public notions ofright and wrong. In that sense the principles of justice 
are considered a public conception of justice.40 
This idea of constructivism also represents a critique of the notion of objectivity which 
is characteristic of naturalist positions. Constructivism rejects the idea of objectivity in the sense 
of given moral facts which are to be uncovered. In that sense, constructivism also represents a 
critique of cognitivism. The moral person is not to be conceived of as knower of moral concepts.41 
Objectivity is rather to be understood as reasonableness in the determination of the public 
conception of justice which accords with the ideas of the person and human nature, which are 
present in that culture.-12 Rather than referring to a knowledge of a given order, objectivity should 
be understood with reference to a social point of view. "Objectivity is to be understood by 
reference to a suitably constructed social point of view, an example of which is the framework 
provided by the procedure of the original position. "43 
When referring to the voluntarist grouding of morality in the thesis, the reference is to 
the will of God. The notion is seen in a theological perspective. As we shall see, especially Luther 
endorses the will of God as the basis of normativity. It is believed that the will of God is the source 
of normativity. There is no necessary notion of goodness. The good is not defined per se, but must 
have its basis in the will of God. However, this does not mean that the idea of the necessity of 
reason is discarded of. Rather, the moral ability of man is an expression of this ability as being in 
accordance with the will of God. On account of its emphasis on the will of God, this idea is 
39 !dem, 260. 
JO !dem, 248. 
41 !dem, 255f. 
-1
2 !dem, 262. 
JJ Idem, 263. Fora further account of Rawls understanding ofthe original position and how this 
forms the basis of his political constructivism, cf. Rawls 1971 , l 18ff.; 1996, 89ff. One problem with the 
given account is, of course, as Rawls also admits (1996, 90 (note 1 )), that he doesn' t distinguish sufficiently 
between political and moral constructivism. However, the procedure of constructing the principles ofjustice 
also appear to be appl icable to principles of morals as such. It is this latter aspect ofthe Rawlsian theory 
which is the primary concem in the present thesis. for an account of Kant's moral constructivism, cf. Rawls 
1996, 99ff. 
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markedly different from a realist understanding of good as an objective notion. According to the 
voluntarist idea the good is nota given faet. The good does not hold its norrnativity in itself. In 
this sense, the vo1untaristic notion of normativity may be said to commit the naturalistic fallacy, 
even if it must be included in this latter group of metaethical notions. This is due to its rejection 
of deri ving the basis of moral norrnativity from a concept of an independent ord er of nature. Even 
if there may be pointed to a given order of nature, this order is conceived of as upheld by God. 
Therefore. even if there are given moral facts, these cannot be seen as independent moral facts. 




Nature and Reason in Natural Law Thought 
In this part we tum to four theories of natural law. All these theories are within the Lutheran-
Kantian tradition. It is argued that one can find two modes of natura! law thought within this 
tradition, i.e. a naturalistic and a constructivist. The first two chapters are devoted to the former, 
whereas the latter forms the concem of the two subsequent chapters. 

Part II.I 
Nature as Basis of Morality 
In this part we focus on the two natura} theories of Philipp Melanchthon (Chapter 3) and Christian 
Wolff (Chapter 4). Even if different in many respects, these two theories appear to endorse a 
similar grounding of normativity. 

Chapter 3 
The Light of Nature 
In this and the following chapter the focus will be on two representatives of natural law thought, 
where the concept of nature serves as a basis of nonnativity. In the present chapter the protestant, 
Lutheran refonner Philipp Melanchthon serves as an exponent of a conception of natura! law 
which draws upon classical arguments of the relation between nature and reason, the natura! and 
Di vine law. Melanchthon's use of classical sources demonstrates one ofthe challenges in a proper 
understanding ofhis thought, as this testifies to his humanistic legacy. Melanchthon's thought is 
characterized by the simultaneousness of theological and humanistic traits. This causes a 
development as well as a tension within his thought, which also can be detected in his understan-
ding ofnatural law. From the early Loci communes in 1521, where he admits ofanatural law, 
even if it somewhat appears as a heterogeneous element until his late Loci pracecipui theologici 
in 1559, where it has become a constitutive element of his thought44, a marked development has 
occurred. Even if there is such a marked development, Melanchthon already in his early reflections 
on the natura! law speaks of it as a Divine light of nature in reason of man. However, as will be 
demonstrated, this nation is further developed and Melanchthon sustains this idea with reflections 
on creation and nature.45 In the following the focus will be on his later thought, even if 
44 Cf. also Bauer 1951, 64. 
45 In the present analysis ofMelanchthon the focus is on Melanchthon 's theological writings. As 
his lociversions are the most important and influential within his theological treatises, they serve as the 
primary textual basis. Within these, the first ( 1521) and third ( 1559) version are given most attention, as they 
represent the early and late Melancthon respectively. In addition to these locitexts, some minor theological 
writings are also included, as are some ofhis humanistic writings. In the studies on Melanchthon, his natura! 
law thought has often been in focus. Among the ol der references, Bauer ( 1950; 1951) stands out. In 1950 
Bauer focused on the early Melanchthon and argued that the notion of natura! law appeared as a somewhat 
irreconcilable part within his theology as a whole (255). In the later study, Bauer believed that the doctrine 
of natura! law had become a constitutive and necessary part ofthe later Melanchthon' s theology (64). This 
was shown by an analysis ofMelanchthon's understandingofproofs ofGod's existence, the order ofcreation, 
the human being as created in the image of God, the notion of law etc. Apart from Bauer' s studies there are 
no older references that specifically deal with Melanchthon's understanding of natura! law. However, it is 
31 
The Light af Nature 
perspectives to his earlier understanding repeatedly recurs.46 
3 .1 The ord er of Creation as the Basis of N atural Law 
The understanding of the order of Creation in Melanchthon is deeply related to his notion of 
natura! law. Asa precondition to a proper understanding of the latter, same introductory remarks 
to this idea must be made. 
The Creation is understood in philosophical and theological categories. The principles 
of the laws of nature are a testimony of God's presence in Creation. That the things in nature 
happen according to a certain order testifies to " ... an etemal mind, an architect, a good and 
righteous One who watches over and judges the deeds of men."47 That one can find Jess 
ambiguous testimonies in the church and elsewhere, does not exclude the testimony of nature. 
Rather, they are to be considered as an aid to the weakened understanding.48 Therefore, 
Melanchthon also rejects nations of nature which argue that God has nothing to do with nature 
included in the studies of e.g. HUbner (1936) and Lindstrom (! 944). During the last years several studies on 
Melanchthon have appeared. Among these the most comprehensive are Frank ( 1995) and Kusukawa (1995). 
Frank's dissertation focuses on the relation between philosophy and theology in Melanchthon. It is argued that 
Melanchtons philosophical interests have been overshadowed by an interest in his theology. In the studies 
dealing with his philosophical thought, there has been quite different conclusions. Frank, therefore, wishes 
to reconstruct Melanchthon 's philosophical theology and the implied conception ofphilosophy. In his analysis 
of Melanchthon 's natura! law thought it is argued that his nation of the notitiae natura/es have 
'"systembegri.indenden Charakter" ( 112). Melanchthon 's natura! law thought is conceived of as a consistent 
doctrine. based on platonic intluence, having its basis in reason rather than in ontology. On this basis, even 
ifone may point to continuities in several respects, Melanchthon represents a new kind ofnatural law (] 55ff.). 
Kusukawa's ph.d. thesis focuses on Melanchthon's nation ofnatural philosophy, arguing that this concept 
has undergone a significant transformation at the bands of Melanchthon. Melanchthon transformed the 
traditional concept of natura! philosophy into a Lutheran understanding in order to consolidate Lutheran 
theology (6). Unfortunately, Kusukawa is not very detailed on natura! law. The most recent contribution to 
studies on Melanchthon 's understanding of natura! law is Kre/3 ( 1998). In this article Krel3 is particularly 
concemed with the contemporary significance ofMelanchthon's concem. Regrettably this has the consequence 
that his interpretation ofMelanchthon becomes quite superficial. However, his point that Melanchton's 
natura! law thought raises an appeal to the conscience and ethical reasoning of every man which has 
contemporary significance (] 06f.), is worth noticing. 
-1
6 Parts of the foliowing is revised material from Nissen 1996, 77ff., where his understanding of 
natura I law was discussed in relation to his nation of the legitimacy of the State. 
-1
7 StA 2, 240: ·'Voluit Deus innotescere et se conspici. Ideo et condidit omnes creaturas et miram 
artem adhibuit. ut convinceret nos non extitisse res casu, sed esse aeternam mentem, architectatricem, bonam, 
iustam, spectantem hominum fa.eta et iudicantem.'' 
.is StA 2, 240f. 
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and that God has left his work just as the carpenter leaves the ship, when he is finished building 
it.-19 
Zum andem Ist hoch notig zum Trost und zur anruffung dabey zu wissen, das 
bey der Erschaffung sol die Erhaltung der Creaturen auch verstanden werden. 
Denn Gott ist nicht von seinem werck weg gangen, wie ein Zimmermann vom 
Schiff, das er gebawet hat, weg gebet und lest es damach andere regiren und 
flicken. Sonder er bleibet bey seinen Creatum, bey Himel und Erden, Engeln 
und Menschen, und macht die Erden jerlich fruchtbar, gi bet allen gewechsen, 
thi em und Menschen krafft und Leben. 50 
It is important to maintain that " ... not only have things been created by God but that the substance 
of things is forever preserved and sustained by God. God makes the earth fruitful with annua! 
crops, He produces fruit from the earth. He commands Iife to living things".51 In Melanchthon, 
God is present in creation. God acts in creation and guides nature.52 But this does not mean that 
God is restricted by the laws of nature. God acts in complete freedom with regard to nature, which 
is also demonstrated by many examples in the Bible.53 
Because God is present in creation and manifests this presence with revelations of 
Himselfto the human race, it is useful and beneficial to see how the created world works and seek 
~
9 StA 2, 241: ·'Jnfinnitas humana, etiamsi cogitat Deum esse conditorem, tamen postea i maginatur, 
ut faber discedit a navi extructa et relinquit eam nautis, ita Deum discedere a suo opere et relinqui creaturas 
tantum propriae gubernationi. Haec imaginatio magnam caliginem offundit animis et parit dubitationes." 
50 StA 6, 181 
51 StA 2, 242: ·' ... statuendum est non solum conditas esse res a Deo, sed etiam perpetuo servari 
ae sustentari a Deo rerum substantias.Quotannis foecundat Deus terram, procreat fruges ex terra, impertit 
vi tam viventibus." 
51 StA 2, 242: ''Adest Deus suae creaturae, sed non adest ut Stoicus Deus, sed ut agens liberrimum, 
sustentans creaturam et sua immensa misericordia moderans, dans bona, adiuvans aut impediens causas 
secundas. De hac distinctione admoneri pios necesse est. Teneantur ergo testimonia, quae docent adesse Deum 
naturae rerum et gubernatorem eius et moderatorem esse ... " 
53 In the foliowing chapter, it will be demonstrated how Wolff understands God's relation to nature 
in a very different way. Whereas Melanchthon claims that God govems nature and as such is a totally free 
being, Wolff argues that God cannot be in contradiction to the laws ofnature. Once God has created the world 
as the best possible world, it is not possible for him to change this created order. God limits himself by the 
lawful lness of Creation which he has created. See 4.1.2 and 4.2.1 fora further discussion on this aspect of 
Wolffs natura] law thought. 
33 
The Light af Nature 
in it the signs of God' s presence and the testimonies of the intention of creation. 54 Therefore, the 
whole purpose of nature is the witness to the existence of God.55 Ifthe minds ofmen had retained 
the first light, this recognition of God's existence would have been much clearer. But same 
examples still bear witness to this character of creation. One of these examples is the arder of 
nature, which is a witness of its basis in a mind which understands order.56 Another example is the 
nature of the human mind. The mind of man must have same cause outside itself, an intelligent 
cause. Thus, the necessity of God' s existence must be endorsed. 57 
The most important (to our present purpose) witness to God's existence, however, is the 
awareness of the human mind of the difference between the noble and the base. The ability to 
distinguish between the honorable and the shameful cannot be coincidential. lt must have a cause, 
which is not purely material. The human mind and the light of reason witnesses to the existence 
of God in creation. 
Third, we have proof from the difference between the noble and the base, and 
from other signs, orders, and numbers in nature. It is impossible to believe that 
the distinction between the honorable and the shameful aspects in the human 
mind exist only by accident or have a purely material origin, or that the 
indication of arder and nurnbers are only fortuitous. Thus there must be same 
mind of a grand architect ( ... ) Moreover, it is worth consideration to remember 
that the human mind and this light which is planted in the mind are a special 
testimony conceming God in nature.58 
5
~ StA 2, 246. 
55 Here Melanchthon demonstrates an influence from an Aristotelian teleological conception. 
Creation is understood in terms of its purpose. In Melanchthon, the purpose of Creation is cl ose ly related to 
God's work in creation. This is also a point in Lindstrom 1944, 26: " ... Guds allmanna verkan konstituerar 
skapelsen som en andamålsenligt helt. Det råder ett organisk! sammanhang i skapelsen. som icke ar byggt 
nedifrån uran uppifrån, bestamt och sammanhållet av dena, att Gud verkar i skapelsen, an Gud ar narvarande 
och forverkligar sin vilja i varje enskilt ting( ... ) Skapelsens inre andamålsenliga sammanhang ar bestamt 
uppifrån av Guds allmanna verkan". 
56 StA 2, 247f.: "lmpossible est ordinem perpetuum in natura casu ortum esse et casu manere aut 
tantum a materia ortum esse( ... ) Ergo natura non extitit casu, sed a mente al iqua orta est, quae ordinem 
i ntel I igit" 
57 StA 2, 248. 
58 StA 2, 248: ·'Tertia a discrimine honestorum et turpium et aliis notitiis naturalibus, ordinis et 
numerorum. lmpossible est discrimen honestorum et turpium in mente casu aut a materia ortum esse, item 
notitias ordinis et numerorum fo1tuitas esse. Ergo necesse est aliquam mentem architectatricem esse( ... ) 
Estque dignum consideratione, quod humana mens et illa lux menti insita praecipuum de Deo testimonium 
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This third proof of God's presence within His creation demonstrates the unity between 
Melanchthon 's understanding of the doctrine of Creation and his nation of natural law. His 
understanding of the created order is supported by the awareness of the moral law in the human 
mind. And yet, his concept of creation also supports his understanding of natura! law, as the notion 
of natura! law cannot be separated from his understanding of Creation.59 
3.2 The Law ofNatural Reason 
Having examined Melanchthon's understanding of Creation as the basis ofhis concept of natura! 
law, we now turn to a more explicit consideration of natural law. Firstly, we tum to his 
understanding of natura! law as an expression of the light of nature. Secondly, we ask about the 
influence ofthe Fall on the human being's knowledge of natura! law. 
3.2.1 Natura! Law as Light of Nature 
Melanchthon's understanding ofthe close relation between natura! law (lex naturae) and light of 
nature (lumen naturale) forms an essen ti al part of his understanding of the basis of natura! law. In 
the relation between lex narurae, lumen naturale and Melanchthon's concept of man as created 
in the image of God, we may say to find his nation of natura! law in nuce. 60 The foliowing account 
is intended to shed same light on the relation between these concepts. 
est in natura ... " 
;
9 Cf. also Bauer 1951, 67: " ... die Schopfungsordnung erscheint sozusagen ais der beherrschende 
theologische Systemgedanke. Die lex naturae ist einerseits Einsicht in den zentralen Bereich der 
Schopfungsordnung, Bewusstsein der Existenz einer Ordnung des menschlichen Bereiches, und sie ist 
andererseits eben gerade diese Ordnung, ais Ordnung der zwischenmenschlichen Beziehungen und ais 
Ordnung der Beziehungen Schopfergott-Mensch und ais solche Teil der Schopfungsordnung". Furthennore, 
cf. Elert 1953, 48f., who argues that Melanchthon understood the order of Creation as a closed system 
(geschlossenes System) and that this system formed the basis of his understanding of natura! law. 
60 This is also pointed out indirectly by Gunter Frank, when he says that Melanchthon 's theological 
understanding ofthe human mind fonns the context ofhis understanding ofthe close relation between these 
not ions as expressed in his idea of man as created in the image of God. "Sofern fur Melanchthon in der 
lntelligibilitiit des menschlichen Geistes, genauer: in den "nattirlichen Kenntnissen", in den Ideen ais Ergebnis 
der Geisttiitigkeit, im ''lumen naturale" und im Naturrecht die Gottebenbildlichkeit des Menschen ihren 
hochsten Ausdruck findet, bi Idet diese Geistphilosophie Dreh- und Angelpunkt seiner Anthropologie und 
1heologischen Philosophie" ( 1995, 140). 
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human nature.67 In this sense God is understood as the originator of natural law, its auctor.68 
Even ifthis understanding ofthe will of God continues as an essential part of Melanch-
thon's understanding ofthe basis of natura! law, his later account gives more space to naturalistic 
ideas. These ideas are expressed in two ways, both as an understanding of man as created in the 
image of God and as a conception of the light of nature in the mind of man. Whereas one can 
speak of a theological aspect in the case of the former, the latter is derived from the more 
philosophical side of Melanchthon's thought. 
As created in the image of God the human being has a knowledge of God and a sirnilarity 
to the Di vine mind, enabling the human being to distinguish between the honorable and the base. 
Furthermore, the powers ofthe human being confom1 with this knowledge.69 
The law of nature is the knowledge of the di vine law which has been gra:fted 
into the nature of man. For this reason man is said to have been created in the 
image of God, because in him shone the image, that is the knowledge of God 
and the likeness to the mind of God, that is, the understanding of the difference 
between the honorable and the shameful; and the powers of man concurred or 
agreed with this knowledge.70 
In his understanding of the natura] light (lumen naturale) in human reason, Melanchthon refers to 
67 StA 2, 56: "Quod vero dico leges naturae a deo impressas mentibus humanis, volo earum 
cognitionem esse quosdam, ut isti loquuntur, habitus concreatos, non inventam a nostris ingeniis, sed insitam 
[my italics] nobis adeo regulam iudicandi de mori bus"; 2, 347f.: "Est ergo vera definitio Legis naturae Legern 
naturae esse notitiam Legis divinae naturae hominis insitam [my italics]". 
68 StA 2,353: ''ldeo autem de coelo sonuit Lex divina, ut Deus testaretur se esse auctorem naturalis 
notitiae et postulare obedientiam iuxta eam notitiam ... " 
69 Cf. Frank 1995, 147: ''Das Naturrecht (lex naturae) im eigentlichen Sinn nennt Melanchthon 
die ·'Kenntnis des gottlichen Gesetzes, das der menschlichen Natur eingestiftet ist". Als [nhalte des 
menschlichen Geistes haben die "notitiae naturales" insgesarnt ihren Ursprung in der Schopfung. Sie sind ein 
bleibender Ausdruck der Gottebenbildlichkeit (imago), weil in ihnen die gottliche Weisheit selbst prasent ist." 
Cf. Bauer 1951, 68 and Frank 1995, I 05ff. fora furthet account ofthis theological argument ofthe basis of 
natura! law. 
70 StA 2, 347f.: "Est ergo vera definitio Legis naturae Legem naturae esse notitiam Legis divinae 
naturae hominis insitam. ldeo enim dicitur homo ad imaginem Dei conditus esse, quia in eo lucebat imago, 
hoc est, notitia Dei et similitudo quaedam mentis divinae, id est, discrimen honestorum et turpium, et cum his 
notitiis congruebant vires hominis." 
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It may be disputed whether Melanchthon actually represents a naturalistic understanding 
of natural law.61 Certainly, this understanding is not characteristic ofthe early Melanchthon. In the 
Loci communes we find a hesistant acceptance of the concept of natural law. Melanchthon appears 
to be influenced by Luther in his sceptical attitude to the abilities of human reason. Speaking of 
human reason as captivated, blinded and deceived, he doubts whether reason can apprehend 
natural law.62 But he maintains the idea, because St. Paul speaks of this very idea in Romans 2, 
15.63 Due to St. Paul's mentioning ofthis idea, Melanchthon acknowledges this notion, which is 
fully in accordance with the opening remarks of the loci. In the opening of the loci Melanchthon 
states that he wishes to draw his readers to Scripture, rather than to obscure and complicated 
discussions.64 But, even if he holds this critical stance on the possibility of the apprehension of 
natural law, he already here speaks of common principles within ethics, which are laws given by 
nature.65 So even if the naturalistic understanding of natura! law is not characteristic of the early 
Melanchthon, it is not completely absent. 
In continuation to his reference to Scripture, Melanchthon further asserts the notion of 
natura! law on the basis of his understanding of Creation. Natura! law is conceived of as the 
common notion. which is shared by all human beings and whjch God has engraved in the mind of 
everybody, whereby good morals are formed.66 Hereby Melanchthon makes a case for the 
voluntaristic basis of natura! law. Natura! law is not conceived of as a necessary part of human 
nature. but is to be seen as dependent upon the will of God. Natura! law is only part of human 
reason to the extent that God wills that it should be so. God writes, implants natural law into 
61 Cf e.g. Frank I 995, l l 9ff. Here it is argued that Melanchthon is influenced by Platonic tenets, 
leading to a subjective rum in Melanchthon with an emphasis on reason as the source of knowledge. 
62 StA 2, 56: "Est enim in universum fallax humani captus iudicium propter cognatam caecitatem, 
ita ut. etiamsi sint in animos nostros insculptae quaedam fonnae morum, tamen eae deprehendi vix possint." 
63 StA 2, 55f.: "Porro esse in nobis !egern naturae Paulus mire eleganti et arguto enthymemate in 
secundo capite ad Romanos docet ... " 
64 StA 2, 17. 
65 StA 2, 56. 
66 StA 2, 56: ·'Est itaque lex naturae sententia communis, cui omnes homines pari ter adsentimur 
atque adeo quam deus insculpsit cuiusque animo, ad formandos mores accommodata." 
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the notitiae principiorum of human reason.71 In distinguishing between the theoretical and 
practical abilities of reason, he ties the principia practica of reason to the recognition of natural 
law. 
72 
This light and these notitiae Melanchthon relates to his understanding of the immutability 
of natural law and di vine wisdom. Therefore, he can also speak of these notitiae as rays of di vine 
wisdom and justice in human reason. 
Therefore, it is true when it is said that natura! law is unalterable, as it not only 
remains as the light of the eyes as long as the human nature is unharmed, why 
the natural knowledge remains in the same way. But the knowledge is even 
more firm, as it is a radiation of Di vine light, congruent with the Di vine norm 
of the etemal and unalterable reason, which God definitely does not want to be 
changed.73 
Concluding the remarks on Melanchthon's understanding ofthe basis of natural law, the question 
on the role of reason becomes important. The naturalistic argument for the natura! law, which was 
the most important for the later Melanchthon, appears to imply a notion of reason, where reason 
is considered unaffected by the Fall of man. Furthermore, similar implications seem to arise with 
regard to the will of man. Therefore, we now tum to the question on the influence of the Fall on 
the will of man and the knowledge of natura! law. 
3.2.2 The Knowledge of Natural Law 
Melanchthon' s understanding of man as created in the image of God becomes important, when 
the ability of reason to discem natura! law is discussed. Here, one finds a doublesided understan-
ding in Melanchthon. At one hand he admits of the consequences of the Fall for man, why there 
is a distinction between the situation of man before and after the Fall.74 On the other band, maybe 
71 CR 16, 184; 16, 321; StA 2, 346: "Ut lumen oculis divinitus inditum est, ita sunt quaedam 
notitiae mentibus humanis inditae, quibus agnoscunt et iudicant pleraque. Philosophi hoc lumen vocant 
notitiam principiorum". 
n CR 16. 384; 22. 256; StA 2, 346. 
73 CR 16. 228: ·'Recte autem dicitur, ius naturale esse immutabile, quia non solum ut lumen in oculis 
manet idem, donec natura hominis est incolumis: ita notitia naturalis in mente manet eadem. Sed maior etiam 
finnitas est notitiae, quia est radius divinae lucis, congruens cum norma divinae mentis aetema et imrnota, 
quam Deus nequaquarn vult mutari". 
74 StA 2, 31 ff.; 2, 253f.; 2, 285f.; 2, 346f. 
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due to his humanist interests, he still maintains an understanding of the soundness of the nature 
ofman. 
Befare the Fall, the will of man was filled with love toward God and his mind was filled 
with true knowledge of God. The desire to worship and obey God was a witness of man as 
created in the image of God. Aft:er the Fall, man still holds the knowledge of God, even if it does 
not shine as befare, but the will contends against it and doubt about God ' providence prevails. 
The will had been turned to God befare the Fall, the true knowledge of God 
glowed in man's mind, and in his will was love toward God. His heart assented 
to the true knowledge of God without any doubt. This knowledge established 
for us that we had been created to know and worship God and to obey Him as 
our Lord who had made us, cared for us, and had impressed his image upon us, 
who demanded and gave His approval to what was righteous, and on the 
contrary condernned and punished unrighteousness. Although in this corruption 
of our nature the image of God has been so deformed that the knowledge of 
Him does not shine forth like it did, yet the knowledge does remain, but our 
heart contends against it and our doubts arise because of certain things which 
seem to conflict with this knowledge. 75 
This doublesided understanding of the consequences ofthe Fall mark a characteristic feature of 
Melanchthon 's understanding of natura! law. However, if Melanchthon distinguishes between 
natura! law befare and after the Fall, the question arises, does this distinction primarily refer to the 
recognition of natura! law or the relation of the will to the demands of natura! law? Or, does the 
Fall influence both reason and the will? 
Even if Melanchthon admits of the influence of the Fall on the ability of reason to 
apprehend natural law, it is important to him that man still maintains a recognition of natural law 
which can serve as the basis of a natural morality for man. 76 The human being retains the ability 
of judging on honourable deeds and the ability to aet accordingly in extemal actions. This freedom 
75 StA 2, 315: ·'Yoluntas erat conversa ad Deum ante lapsum, ardebant et in mente verae notitiae 
et in voluntate amor erga Deum, et assentiebantur corda sine ulla dubitatione veris notitiis ae statuebant nos 
conditos esse ad agnoscendum et celebrandum Deum et ad obiendum huic Domino, qui nos condidit, alit, 
impressit i magi nem sui, qui iusta postulat et approbat, econtra vero damnat et punit iniusta. Quamquam autem 
in hac naturae corruptione defonnata imagine Dei non ita fulgent notitiae, manent tamen, sed cor repugnat et 
incurrunt dubitationes propter quaedam, quae pugnare videntur cum illis notitiis." 
76 CR 16, 288; 16, 536; BSLK, 186. 
39 
The Light of Nature 
differentiates the human being from animals.77 
3.3 Human Nature and Natura} Law 
Even if it is argued that Melanchthon endorses a naturalistic conception of natural law, this does 
not mean that he di se ards of the Protestant understanding of the depraved nature of man, as we 
have seen. However, he still maintains the soundness of human nature, even if marked by the Fall. 
How these two aspects of his w1derstanding of natural law are to be understood, is the primary 
question in the foliowing paragraph. 
3.3.1 Natura} Law and Moral Freedom 
With relation to the will, Melanchthon also here argues that even if it is impaired, it is not totally 
depraved.78 The will still maintains a freedom, which is important for Melanchthon's understanding 
ofthe moral responsibility of the individual. The will is subjected to the moral knowledge of man, 
which it either obeys or fights. In this respect the will holds a freedom, why Melanchthon also can 
speak of a liberum arbitrium.79 
Man has the ability ofknowing and judging, which is called the mind or intellect 
or rational i ty in which part the knowledge is. Another part of which is seeking 
is called the will, which either obeys or resists judgment ( ... ) Furthermore, it is 
called a free will (liberum arbitrium) when the mind and the will are joined 
together. Or free choice (liberum arbitrium) is the term for the faculty of the will 
for choosing and seeking those things which have been demonstrated to it, or 
to reject them ... 80 
77 CR 16, 339: "In mente manet reetum iudieium de honestis aetionibus, praesertim eivilibus. Huie 
obtemperare potest homo in externis actionibus, sieut artifieis manus ipsius eogitationi in externo opere 
faeiendo obtemperare potest. Haee libertas mansit etiam in hae eorrupta natura, et diseernit hominem a 
peeudibus." 
78 StA 2, 263ff. 
79 Obviously, this is a point where the humanistie legaey ofMelanehthon's thought brings him close 
to being at varianee with Luther. For a diseusssion on this point and the relation between Luther and 
Melanehthon, ef Lindstrom 1944, 61 ff. 
80 StA 2, 237: ·'Jn homine est pars eognoseens ae iudieans, quae voeatur mens vel intelleetus vel 
ratio, in hae parte sunt notitiae. Altera pars appetens voeatur voluntas, quae vel obtemperat iudicio vel 
repugnat ( ... ) Voeantur autem liberum arbitrium mens et voluntas eoniunetae. Aut voeatur liberum arbitrium 
faeultas voluntatis ad eligendum ae expetendum ea, quae monstrata sunt, et ad reiieiendurn eadem ... " 
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Because of this freedom of the will, Melanchthon also speaks of the moral obligation of man to 
live according to natura! law. 81 Therefore, Melanchthon also accentuates the freedom of the will 
in external affairs, i.e. in matters pertaining to political justice (iustitia civilis).82 
Answering the raised questions conceming the impact of the Fall on reason and will, 
Melanchthon understands both as marked by the Fall. Both, however, also hold sufficient 
soundness to serve as the basis of man's moral life.83 
Since there remains in the nature ofman a certainjudgment and desire forthings 
which are opposed to his reason and senses, there also remains a desire for 
extemal civil works. Thus the human will can by its own powers and without 
regeneration perform to some degree the extemal works of the law. This is the 
freedom of the will which the philosophers correctly attribute to man. 84 
These remarks on Melanchthon's understanding of reason and will with regard to his naturalistic 
basis of natural law need to be further elaborated on by including some comments on his 
understanding of the social nature of man. 
3.3.2 The Social Nature ofMan 
Melanchthon' s concept of the nature of man is particularly important in his social ethics. It is no 
coincidence, therefore, when Melanchthon's notion of natura! law has been called a doctrina 
politica. 85 In his understanding ofthe basis of society and the nature of man, some ofthe influence 
from Melanchthon' s studies on Aristotle becomes clear. Melanchthon follows Aristotle in his 
81 CR 16, 539 
82 Cf. also Koltzsch 1889, 89: "Der Mensch hat ein sittliches Wissen und Urteil, das ausreicht, ihn 
i.iber den Unterscheid von gut und bose zu belehren und ihm zu sagen, was er zu thun und zu lassen hat. Und 
der Mensch hat zum andern so vie! Willensfreiheit, um diesem sittlichen Urteil folgen und gehorchen zu 
konnen und so wenigstens ( ... ) die bi.irgerliche Sittlichkeit, die disciplina, teisten zu konnen." 
83 CR 16, 288; StA 2, 265. 
84 StA 2, 265: ··Cum in natura hominis reliquum sit iudicium et delectus quidam rerum, quae sunt 
subiectae ration i aut sensui, reliquus est etiam delectus extemorum operum civilium. Quare voluntas humana 
potest suis vi ri bus sine renovatione aliquo modo extema Legis opera facere. Haec est libertas voluntatis, quam 
Philosophi recte tribuunt homini." 
85 Cf. Bauer 1951 , 91. 
41 
The Lighr af Nature 
understanding of man as a social being and of the political order as being in accordance with 
human nature.86 
Just as natura! causes are impressed on nature which lead us to honor society, 
so we know that a cause is impressed on human nature which leads us to 
constitute empires and to obey the magistrate. 87 
Because the political order is understood in this way, the human being is also perceived as marked 
by a natura! sociability.88 Furthermore, Melanchthon conceives of the political arder as present in 
the rational creature.89 Therefore, the human being also has a rational recognition of the goodness 
of the political order. If it hadn't been for the Fall, the human being would have assented to the 
political order bumingly. 
There is no understanding of this arder among beasts, but the knowledge of 
good order has been ingrafted into man. If man's nature had not been corrupted 
by sin, also the love of keeping good arder toward God and our fellow men 
would be attachted to us as something truly burning in our hearts.90 
For the present purpose, however, the nation of the political arder as consistent with human 
nature, wouldn't be all that interesting, if Melanchthon did not claim that human nature in this 
respect was in agreement with natura! law as well, which he actually does claim. Human nature 
and natura! law are in agreement.91 This is clear in Melanchthon's understanding of the difference 
86 CR 16, 390; 16, 424; StA 2, 754. 
87 CR 16, 424: --ut igitur impressae sunt in naturam causae, quae nos ad societatem colendam 
ducunt, ita sciamus etiam impressas esse causas naturae hominis, quae nos ducant ad imperia constituenda, 
et ad parendum magistratibus." 
88 CR 16, 390. 
89 StA 6, 241. 
90 StA 2, 737: ·'Non est ordinis intellectus in bestiis, sed homini impressa est ordinis notitia, cum 
qua, si natura hominum non corrupta esset peccato, etiam amor ordinis tuendi erga Deum et homines, verus 
et ardens in pectoribus, coniunctus esset." 
9 1 This is a point in Melanchthon' s thought, where the naturalistic basis of his understanding of 
natura! law becomes clear. Natura! law is an expression ofhuman nature, and vice versa. Therefore, even if 
Kref3 1998 speaks of the ··vernunftnatur" as the source of obligation in Melanchthon (] 03), he seems to 
overemphasize the rational aspect, when he speaks of Melanchthon as responsible for the ongoing notion of 
moral reason: ·'Es war vor allem Melanchthon, der zumindest ft.ir den lutherischen Raum das Anliegen des 
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between same first principles of natura! law, which are immutable, and same derived laws of 
nature. which have amore contingent character. The immutable principles of the natura! law are 
constitutive. They cannot be given up, without discarding the whole concept of natura! law. In 
Loci communes ( 1521) three such laws are mentioned. Among these is that humans are bom into 
a life society and therefore should not harm anyone. This is clear from the common conditions, 
whereby all human beings from birth are related and united to one another.92 Therefore, natural 
law demands the social life which accords with human nature. 
Even if Melanchthon is careful to isolate this understanding of natural law from the 
natura! instincts which are cornmon with animals,93 the interdependence that Melanchthon 
describes seems to makeup a point where human beings and animals have similar life conditions. 
Here Melanchthon formulates a basis for an understanding of sociality and relationality in relation 
to natura! law, which not only has political implications, but also important implications for the 
relation to nonhuman nature. The relationality and cornmunity is also important in relation to 
nonhuman nature. This idea appears to be a ethically fundamental condition which counts in 
relation between humans and in relation to nonhuman nature and raises crucial demands in both 
relations. However, whereas the dependency on ressources and life conditions carries with it an 
analogy between nonhuman nature and human beings, the moral demand breaks with this analogy. 
The moral demand has a onesided character. It is only raised in relation to the human being. It is 
only the human being which is morally demanded to take care ofthe dependence of the other part 
on these basic life conditions.9-1 
Naturrechts ais einer Theorie der ethischen Yernunft wachgehalten hat. Die Ethikgeschichte der Neuzeit bis 
hin zu Kant hat sich dieses naturrechtliche Denkmotiv zu eigen gemacht, es fortentwickelt und mit Inhalt 
gefUllt" ( I 03 ). Rather, it is important to maintain that Melanchthon represents an understanding of a 
compiementary relation between nature and reason. Reason apprehends the demand ofthe natura! iaw which 
is in agreeement with human nature. Rather than pointing to a line from Melanchthon to Kant, it wouid be 
more plausible to point to a line from Melanchthon to Grotius and the protestant orthodoxy and scholasticism. 
This is a line which leads to Christian Woiff rather than to Immanuel Kant, as is aiso argued in the present 
thesis. 
92 StA 2, 59: ·'Quia nascimur in quandam communem vitae societatem, neminem !aede, sed officiis 
quosvis iuvato.'' 
93 StA 2, 56f. 
94 Cf. 13.1 fora further discussion on the interdependency and communitarian aspects in natura! 
law and environmental ethics. Here it is argued that Melanchthon's natura! iaw thought comes quite cl ose to 
basic tenets of land ethics. 
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3 .4 Conclusion 
The analysis of Melanchthon's natura! law thought has demonstrated a naturalist scheme of 
thought. Melanchthon argues that the order of creation serves as the basis of natural law. Creation 
is pern1eated by an order which is reflected in the theoretical and practical reason of man. Natural 
law, therefore. is seen as a light of nature present in the human mind. Due to the endowment of 
man with rational abilities and man's being created in the image of God, man has a knowledge of 
natural law. In this sense, the awareness of natura! law is seen as an ex pression of the Di vine rays 
of wisdom permeating the order of creation and the human mind. This unity between the order of 
creation and man' s abilities of moral reasoning suggests the ontological grounding of morality in 
Melanchthon. Natura! law is an expression of the constituent principles of being. Moral reason 
reflects the order which is present in creation. Furthermore, it has been argued that this 
understanding ofMelanchthon is substantiated in his understanding of the relation between human 
nature and natura! law. Especially in the later Melanchthon, human nature is seen as being in 
accordance with natura! law. However, this does not imply a rejection of the nation of the freedom 
of the moral agent. On the basis of the dignity of man it is argued that he has a free will with 
regard to moral obligation. 
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The Beneficent Human Nature 
Along with Melanchthon, the present chapter on Christian Wolff serves as an analysis of 
representatives of a natura! law thought, where there is a close link between nature and reason in 
the basis of moral i ty. As already demonstrated, Melanchthon understands practical reason as a 
reflection of the Di vine order of nature. The order of nature is the basis of morality. Reason 
provides the means for humans to live according to this lawfullness. In Wolff we find an 
understanding of natural law with several similarities to Melanchthon's. Without pre-empting the 
tindings of the foliowing enquiry, it may be recognized that Wolff also perceives nature as the 
basis of morality. The laws of nature as constitutive of physical nature are considered as the basis 
of morality, and the role ofreason is to perceive these laws and guide human beings accordingly.95 
95 In the discussion on Wolff, the focus will be on his German moral philosophical writings. Apart 
from the overwhelming size ofhis eight volume Latin Jus naturae, the reason for this focus is based on the 
similar course taken by Schroer (1 988). Schroer's study is the most comprehensive, recent account of the 
basis of Wolff s moral philosophy. The aim of Schroer's study is not the analysis of a particular thesis in 
relation to Wolffs concept of nature. Rather, the intention is to give an account of this concept in relation to 
(I) the grounding ofhis moral philosopy and (2) Kant's use ofthe concept of nature. Schroer concludes his 
srudy by arguing that Wolff does not have nature as the primary basis ofhis moral philosophy. According to 
Schri:ier, Wolff avoids the possible charge of committing the natura I istic fa! lacy by having reason as the source 
of moral obligation (222). Before Schroer, Joesten ( 1931) had already argued that even if Wolff endorses the 
concept ofnature as the normative basis ofnatural law, this does not mean that only nature obliges humans 
ro aet accordingly. In difference to Schroer, Joesten speaks of a double obligation, i.e. a passive and an active 
one. Nature obliges in a passive way, and yet the character ofthe human being as a rational being also implies 
an active obligation (22ff). Bissinger ( 1983) is also focused on the question of the grounding of Wolff s moral 
philosophy. For Bissinger the central issue is to determine Wolffs conception of autonomy. Bissinger 
concludes that reason holds a central position in Wolff, serving as the basis of autonomy. This is i.a. 
exempl ified in the deduction of ethical norms from natura! law ( 15 Sff. ). Final ly, two works of Bachmann must 
be mentioned. In 1977 Bachmann publishes a book on the natura! law foundation of Wolffs conception of 
the State. In this work Bachmann discusses the doubleness of Wolffs understanding of the relation between 
the necessity of nature and the freedom of the rational being, as was also raised in Joesten. This same 
doubleness is the underlying theme in the article ofBachmann in 1983. It is the task of the human being as 
a rational being to deduce the moral law from the physical law ofnature (161). In the present chapter the 
double aspect ofthe natura! law in Wolffwill also be endorsed as the right interpretation. However, it wi ll also 
be argued that reason appears to have a subordinate role to nature. Reason is thought of as the means of 
retlecting the laws of nature in the physical sense. In this sense the law of nature in the physical sense is the 
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4.1 Premisses of Wolff's Moral Philosophy 
A characteristic of Wolff is the inner consistency ofthe systematic shape ofhis moral philosophy. 
Therefore it is necessary to introduce the discussion on his natural law thought with a presentation 
of concepts of essential importance to a proper understanding. After having introduced these key 
concepts, the focus will be devoted to Wolffs natura! law thought, focusing on the questions of 
the origins of natura! law, its basis in human nature and the role of reason. 
4.1.1 Methodology 
In Wolff the question of methodology is of fundamental importance. His method has determinative 
impact on the shape of his thought. Wolff applies the mathematical method. This method Wolff 
sees as suitable for philosophical thinking because of its deductive and inductive stringency and 
its consequent necessity of terminological clarity. This relates to his concept of science. For Wolff 
it is important that ethics is understood as science, and in order to qualify as such, it needs the 
mathematical method as its basis.96 For Wolff the use of the mathematical method implies a clear 
account of the meaning of the essential notions of his moral philosophy as well as systematic 
structure, where no argun1ent can be made without a preceding terminological explanation of all 
the concepts involved.97 This understanding ofthe application ofthe mathematical method is partly 
due to an understanding of order, which Wolff finds in the writings of Euclid. 
[ ... ] Viele sagen Euclides habe seine Bticher unordentlich geschrieben [ ... ] Wer 
aber die Sache genauer einsiehet, der findet, es habe ein jeder Satz dieses mit 
dem andern gemein, daB er sich aus denen, die vorhergehen, erweisen Hisset, 
nicht aber wurde konnen erwiesen werden, wenn man ihn vor andere setzte, und 
daB solchergestalt die Stelle eines jeden dadurch determiniert wird, daB er sich 
source ofthe law of nature in the normative sense. Fora further discussion on the literature on Wolff, see 
Schroer 1988, 14 ff. 
96 Cf. Bissinger 1983, 149: "Die Bestimmung der Ethik ais Wissenschaft zeigt, wie sehr Wolffsich 
von der Tradition der Schulphilosophie entfernt und sich dem cartesianischen Denken offnet. Sein 
Wissenschaftsbegriff ist vom mathematischen Erkenntnisideal bestimmt. Eine Disziplin verdient nur dann 
den Namen Wissenschaft, wenn ihre Aussagen bewiesen werden und zwar nach der von der Mathematik 
Ubernommenen Methode." 
97 Cf. Schroer 1988, 20: "Uberall [i.e. in all of Wolff s German and Latin moral philosophical 
writings] gilt der Grundsatz, da13 alle Aussagen auf das zurUckgefuhrt werden konnen, was zuvor eingefuhrt, 
erklart und bewiesen worden ist." 
46 
The Beneficen! Human Nature 
nun durch die vorhergehenden erweisen Hisset. Also tindet man in den Blichem 
Euclids eine Ordnung.98 
However, this does not lead to a merely deductive method. Rather, Wo1ffs method implies 
deductive as well as inductive, synthetic as well as analytic components.99 
Wolff's methodological basis also implies two basic principles of knowledge, i.e. the 
principle of contradiction (principium contradictionis) and the principle of sufficient reason 
(principium rationis sufficientis). 100 According to the former, it is an impossibility, a contradiction 
to claim that something is and yet is not. "Es kan etwas nicht zugleich seyn und auch nicht seyn. 
Diesen Satz nennen wir den Grund des Widerspruchs". 101 This principle is closely related to 
Wolff s method, as this principle necessitates the mentioned terminological clarity. In arder to 
prevent a contradictory use of the terminology included in one' s moral philosophical argumenta-
tion, it is necessary to have a very precise determination of the meaning of these concepts. Only 
when this determination is clear, can ane have a sufficient ground of recognition of this concept. 
This leads Wolff to his second principle, the principle of sufficiency. Where something is, there 
must be a sufficient ground for an acknowledgment thereof. Therefore, when something is not, 
there is nothing that ane can conceive of. Followingly, if something which is not, is to be seen as 
something which is, it must have a sufficient reason, why something which is not can c01ne out of 
nothing, and become something which is. However, as it is impossible that something can come 
into being out of nothing, it must have a sufficient reason, why it is. 102 
Da nun unmoglich ist, da13 aus Nichts etwas werden kan [ ... L so muB auch alles, 
was ist, seinen zureichenden Grund haben, warum es ist, das ist, es muB allezeit 
etwas seyn, daraus man vestehen kan, warum es wlirklich werden kan [ ... ] . 
Diesen Satz wollen wir den Satz des zureichenden Grundes nennen. 103 
98 DM§ 137. 
99 Cf. Schroer 1988, 22. 
100 DM§§ !Off.;§§ 30ff.; Anm.§§ 14f. 
101 DM§ 10. 
102 DM§ 30. 
103 DM§ 30. 
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Having shortly explained some of the basic methodological assumptions and principles, 104 
hopefully it is clear, why an analysis of Wolffs natura! law thought must be introduced not only 
by comments on his method, but also on same of the key nations which form a necessary basis of 
his nation of natura! law. Therefore, we now tum to same of these basic concepts. 
4.1.2 Basic Concepts in Wolff's Moral Philosophy 
The nations of consistency (Zusammenstimmen) and perfection (Vollkommenheit) hold a 
fundamental importance. The perfection of a given thing or matter consists in the correspondence 
of the manifold with one. Correspondence in this sense implies the determination of all parts with 
respect to the preservation of a certain kind. This kind of perfection can be exemplified with a 
watch, where all the parts of the watch come together in the same purpose in telling the precise 
time.105 The same can be said ofthe conduct (der Wandel) ofman. It consists ofmany acts. When 
these correspond, i.e. are united in a comrnon cause, they are consistent. When they are contrary 
to each other, their inner inconsistency deems the conduct imperfect. 106 When perfection is 
reached. pure order comes into being. For when there is perfection, all things relate to a common 
ground, why the reason of the coexistence of different things can be declared. 107 As is apparent, 
the nation of Zusammenstimmen and Vollkommenheit are closely linked. The Zusammenstimmen 
of the various parts makes the Vollkommenheit. For Wolff these nations are fundamental to his 
ethics and consequently play a crucial role also in his understanding of natural law. 
The actions of the individual are evaluated in the light of these criteria. Actions change 
the condition (Zustand) of the agent. The condition is understood as " ... wenn veranderliche 
IO-l Fora further account of Wolfrs method, cf. Stephanitz 1970, 84:ff., Bachmann 1977, 57ff. and 
Schroer 1988, 19ff.. Fora comparison with Kant's understanding of these same principles, see Heimsoeth 
1956, 6ff. 
105 DM§ 152; GNV § 9. 
106 DE§ 144: ·'Wenn der Mensch sein Thun und Lassendergestalt einrichtet, daf3 er nichts ohne 
Absichten vornimmet, eine jede Absicht aber ein Mitte! anderer und alle insgesammt ein Mitte I zur Haupt-
Absicht sind; so stimmet in seinem Wandel alles mit einander u(e)berein, und nichts hindert das andere. 
Derowegen da die Ubereinstimmung des mannigfaltigen die Vollkomrnenheit ausmachet, so ist in diesem Falle 
der Wandel des Menschen vollkommen"; DM § 152. 
107 DM § 156: ''In der Vollkommenheit ist lauter Ordnung. Denn wo eine Vollkommenheit ist, da 
beziehet sich alles aufeinen gemeinen Grund. daraus man erkla(e)ren kan, warum eines neben dem andern 
zugleich da ist, oder eines auf das andere folget"; §§ 7 I 7ff. 
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Bestimmungen (Dinge), d.i. diejenigen die auch anders beschaffen seyn konnen, mit einerley 
bestandigen Bestimmungen (Dingen), die nicht anders beschaffen seyn konnen, wtircklich sind."108 
The good actions make the condition more perfect, the bad actions worsen tbe condition.109 
Consequently. nature obliges (verbindet) one to do what furthers one' s condition and prevent what 
worsens it. 110 This serves as the basis for the general rule of action: "Thue was dich und deinen 
oder anderer Zustand vollkommener macht; unterlaB, was ihn unvollkomrnener macht". 111 This 
perfection and imperfection concerns both inner and outer conditions ofthe human being, and the 
faet that these conditions are either improved or aggravated has its basis in the intrincity of 
morality, i.e. that it is good or bad in itself. 
Wir finden unsem innem Zustand des Leibes und der Seele so beschaffen, daf3 
er kan vollkommener und unvollkommener werden, und gleiche Bewandnis hat 
es mit dem ausseren, als mit unserer Ehre, mit dem Vermogen, mit Freunden 
und Feinden: und die Handlungen des Menschen, die er nach seinem Gefallen 
determiniren kan, sind so beschaffen, daf3 sie die Vollkommenheit und 
Unvol!kommenheit befordem, auch beyde erhalten und hindem konnen; und 
hierinnen grundet sich ihre intrinseca moralitas, oder daf3 sie vor und an sich 
selbst gut oder bose sind, und nicht erst durch den Willen eines Oberen, der uns 
zu befehlen hat, dazu gemacht werden. 111 
108 GNY§ 8. 
109 DE§ 12; GNY§ 12: "Da man alles dasjenige gut nennet, was den Menschen und seinen Zustand 
vollkommener machet; bo(e)se order u(e)bel aber, was denselben unvollkommener rnacht; so sind diejenigen 
freyen handlungen gut, die zur Yollkornmenheit des Menschen und seines Zustands behu(e)ltlich sind( ... ) 
Bo(e)se aber sind diejenigen, welche auf die Unvollkommenheit des Menschen und seines Zustandes 
abzielen." 
110 GNY § 43. In his nation of the obligation of nature, Wolff cornes very cl ose to an endorsement 
ofnature as a dete1minant of the actions of human beings ( cf. DE § 27). The necessity of commentators to 
argue forthe possibility offreedom in Wolff(cf Joesten 193 1, 34ff.) is an expression ofhow close Wolff 
cornes to take such a deterministic standpoint. However, it is also important to keep in mind that "obligation" 
is a poor translation of the German ''Yerbindung", even if it has been chosen as the better option. In Wollf's 
nation of'·Yerbindung", it is important that he does not speak of an obligation which is laid upon the human 
being extrincically. Rather, it is a nation wich expresses the motivational force of the moral good (DE§ 8). 
·'Yerbindung" is understood as intrinsically related to human nature. Therefore, even when humans are 
'"verbunden" to certain acts in accordance with their nature, they can still be considered as free moral beings. 
The obligation arises as the motivation of the individual moral agent. Cf Schroer 1988, l 42ff. fora further 
analysis ofthe concept ofnatural obligation. 
111 DE§l2. 
112 Anm. § I 34. 
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In this respect, Wolff follows the classical realist understanding ofthe relation between on the one 
band the good and bad and on the other hand the will of God. The good and bad holds this quality 
in itself, per se. 113 In relation to God, Wolff therefore says that God does not determine what is 
good and bad. But because God is a wise being, he commands to be done what is good and to be 
avoided what is bad. 11-1 
As the good perfects one's condition, the good also causes pleasure, which is due to its 
character as a natura! good. 11 5 Therefore, due to the human nature the good is desired, whereas 
the bad is detested. The good holds in itself a reason for the human being to will it, whereas the 
contrary is trne of the bad.116 Hereby the apparent good is also distinguished from the true good. 
The true good can never give cause to displeasure. 117 Quite the opposite is then true for the bad. 
The bad causes displeasure, which is also due to the natura! character ofthe bad, whereby one can 
also distinguish the seeming from the real bad. II8 To the extent the condition is perfected, humans 
achieve happiness. Wolffs ethic is teleological in the sense, that the aim of morality is the 
perfection of the condition and thereby the happiness. Natura! law is understood as the means for 
this achievement. I I9 The transgression of the natura! law brings with it unhappiness~20 Man is 
supposed to arder his life in accordance with natura] law and its demand of perfection. "Das 
113 DE§5. 
11
~ Anm. § 134. 
115 DM§ 423: ·'Weil das Gute uns und unseren Zustand vollkommen machet, das Anschauen der 
Vollkommenheit aber Lust erreget; so mufi die anschauende Erka(e)ntniB des Guten Lust erregen, wenn wir 
es nehmlich ais gut einsehen. Deswegen nennen wir natu(e)rlich gut, was Lust bringet." 
116 GNV § 15: '·Weil die Natur des Menschen so beschaffen ist, daJ3 er das Gute begehret, das 
Bo(e)se aber verabscheuet; so sind die in sich guten, oder bo(e)sen Handlungen an und vor sich selbst 
begehrens- oder verabscheuungswu( e )rdig." 
117 DM§ 424. 
118 DM§ § 427f. 
119 DE§ 57: •"Da nun die wahren Gu(e)tereine wahre Vollkommenheit im Menschen oder in seinem 
a(e)usserlichen Zustande zum Grunde haben, keinesweges aber die Scheingu(e)ter; so kan blo/3 dasjenige den 
Menschen glu(e)ckseelig machen, was eine wahre Vollkommenheit in ihm und seinem a(e)usserlichen 
Zustande zum Grunde hat, keines Weges aber wovon dieselbe entfernet ist. Derowegen weil man durch 
Beobachtung des Gesetzes der Natur die Vollkommenheit seiner Natur und seines a(e)ussern Zustandes 
erha(e)lt; so ist das Gesetze der Natur das Mitte! seine Glu(e)ckseeligkeit zu erhalten." 
120 DE§ 62. 
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Gesetze der Natur ist das Mittel, dadurch der Mensch seine Gltickseeligkeit erlanget, deren er 
durch seine nattirliche Kraffte in diesem Leben fåhig ist". 121 Thus, natural law holds a fundamental 
position in Wolffs moral philosophy, why we now tum to this concept. 
4.2 Nature as the Source of Moral Reason 
As mentioned. Wolff appears to understand nature and reason as mutually related in his notion of 
the grounding of morality. On one hand nature seems to be understood as constituted by physical 
lawfullness, of which reason merely is understood as an expression. On the other hand, reason 
apparently is the source of natural law in the normative sense. The question therefore arises, does 
Wolff understood nature or reason as the source of normativity in his understanding of natural 
law? What is the relation between natural law as physical law and as amoral law? Firstly, we turn 
to his understanding of the normative implications of his notion of nature. Secondly, we 
con centrate on his understanding of freedom and moral reason. 
4.2.1 The Obligation ofNature 
Wolffs method implies the necessity of a clear definition of the discussed concepts. In relation to 
his understanding of natural law, the importance of this methodological approach becomes clear, 
as his definition of natura! law signifies important aspects of this notion. "Insonderheit aber wird 
eine Regel ein Gesetze der Natur genennet, wenn uns die Natur verbindet unsere freye Handlungen 
damach einzurichten ... ". 122 Very much the same definition can be found in the later writings. "Ein 
Gesetz nennt man die Vorschrift, nach welcher wir unsere Handlungen einzurichten verbunden 
sind. Man nennt dasjenige ein nattirliches Gesetz, welches seinen hinreichenden Grund selbst in 
der natur des Menschen und der Dinge hat."123 As is clear from these definitions, the focus in 
111 DE§ 139. 
111 DE§ 17. 
ln comparison to the following definition of natura! law in GNY, Wolff's definition in DE is more 
dialectical. Whereas GNY speaks more onesided about nature as the determinative basis of the acts of man, 
DE speaks of nature's determination ofthe "freye Handlungen". Hereby the doublesided understanding in 
Wolff is indicated. Even ifnature determines the acts ofhumans, Wolffcan still regard them as free acts. 
Furthermore, cf. 4.2.2. 
113 GNY§ 39. 
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Wolff is on the concept of nature. Nature obliges humans to do good. 124 Nature is the 
detem1inative basis ofthe natura! law, i.e. the nature, not only of humans, but also ofthings. In 
other words, natura! law as a moral law and as a physical law are two sides of the same thing. 
Hereby Wolff becomes a classical representative of the position attacked by proponents of the 
<langer of infen-ing from is to ought. 115 In the metaethical terminology of the present thesis, Wolff 
becomes a representative of a naturalistic grounding of morality in his conception of the natural 
law.126 
Natura! law obliges one to further the perfection of one's condition, according to the 
general rule of action. As this rule applies to all free acts of man, there is no need of any additional 
laws of natw-e why all laws must be demonstrated as deri ved from this rule. Consequently, this 
rule is understood as the complete basis of all laws of nature. 
114 DE§ 9: "Da nun dasjenige was aus den Handlungen der Menschen erfolget und sie entweder gut 
oder bo( e )se machet, von dem Wesen und der Natur herkommet; das gute und schlimme aber, was wir in den 
Handlungen antreffen die Bewegungsgru(e)nde des Wollens und Nichtwollens sind; so hat mit den vor sich 
guten und bo(e)sen Handlungen der Menschen die Natur die Bewegungsgru(e)nde verknu(e)pffet. Und 
solchergestalt verbindet uns die Natur der dinge und unsere eigene das vor sich gute zu thun, und das vor sich 
bo(e)se zu unterlassen." 
115 Cf. also Bissinger 1983, 15 1: ''Fur Wolff stel It sich die Frage nach Zusammenhang bzw. 
Obergang von Sein zu Sollen nicht. Seinsgesetze sind fur ihn fraglos auch Sollensgesetze. Dies ergibt sich 
aus der ontologischen Gleichsetzung von Wesen und Ziel". The question on the inference from is to ought is 
discussed throughout the thesis. See 13.3 for the constructive summary of the thesis' discussion on this 
problem. 
116 This close relation between the physical and moral entity in Wolff is also pointed out by 
Bachmann 1983, 161: "Wie es dem erkennenden Menschen gegeben ist, Gesetzma/3igkeiten der physischen 
Natur zu emratseln, erhebt der Mensch mit der Darlegung eines Natur-Rechts den Anspruch, auch die Gesetze 
der dieser physischen Welt (entia physica) gegentiberstehenden moralischen Welt (entia moralia) 
aufzuklaren". Even if my reading is very similar to Bachmann's on this point, I must admit I find it difficult 
to follow him when he describes the startingpoint of man's recognition ofthe natura] law as atomistic. "Der 
Ausgangspunkt ist eindeutig atomistisch, d.h. der Mensch selbst ist vor die Aufgabe gestellt, mittels der ihm 
gegebenen Vernunft sich des eigentl ichen Sinns seines Seins und der ihn umgebenden Dinge bewu/3t zu 
werden" ( 161 ). Even ifthe individual holds such a position in Wolff, reason is not conceived of as something 
atomistic. Rather, it is something intrinsically related to human nature, i.e. the essence ofthe human being. 
Reason understood in this sense is rather to be conceived of as an exercise with common features among 
reflecting individuals. Even if this admits of the reflective role ofthe individual, it appears to be quite different 
from a position which may be called ·'eindeutig atomistisch". Bissinger seems to come close to a reading 
similar to my own, when he speaks ofthe imbeddedness ofthe human being in the physical nature as the basis 
of a cosmological dimension to Wolff's ethics ( 1983. I 52). In this naturalistic foundation of normativity, 
Wolffrepresents an understanding which holds sign ificant resemblances to e.g. the environmental thought 
of Rolston (Chapter 7) and Cal licott (Chapter 8). 
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Weil uns die Natur verbindet zu thun, was uns w1d unseren Zustand vollkomrne-
ner machet und zu unterlassen, was uns und unseren Zustand unvollkomrnener 
machet; so ist die Regel: Thue, was dich und deinen Zustand vollkommener 
machet und unterlaB, was dich und deinen Zustand unvollkommener machet ein 
Gesetze der Natur. Da nun diese Regel sich auf alle freye Handlungen der 
Menschen erstrecket; so hat man kein anderes Gesetze der Natur mehr nothig 
sondem alle besondere Gesetze milssen daraus erwiesen werden auf die Art und 
Weise, wie schon erinnert worden. Und also ist diese Regel ein vollstandiger 
Grund aller natilrlichen Gesetze.117 
This paragraph demonstrates Wolff's naturalistic understanding of natural law. Natura! law as a 
physical law is understood as a parallel to its character as moral law. It is the nature of the human 
being which determines what is good - and good is here understood in physical and moral terms. 
That which is good for humans in a physical sense also determines what is good in a moral sense. 
It is as such that natural law obliges the human to perfection of human nature. 128 What makes the 
condition of the human being imperfect is against human nature. What promotes the perfection 
of this condition is in accordance with human nature. Therefore, as natura! law wants that done 
which furthers this perfection, Wolff argues for natural law as corresponding to human nature. 
Was uns und unseren Zustand unvollkommener machet, ist unserer Natur zu 
wieder, und kommet also mit ihr nicht ilberein. Hingegen was uns und unseren 
Zustand vollkommener machet, ist unserer Natur nicht zu wieder, sondem 
stimmet vielmehr mit ihr zusarnmen. Derowegen weil das Gesetze der Natur will 
gethan wissen, was uns und unseren Zustand vollkomrnener machet; hingegen 
unterlassen, was ihn unvollkommener machet; so haben diejenigeen nicht 
unrecht geredet, welche gesaget, das Gesetze der Natur beruhe auf der 
127 DE§ 19. 
128 DE§ 19; GNY§ 43. 
In his understanding ofthe promotion of the condition ofthe humans as the criteria on the good, 
Wolff makes use of an explicitly teleologi ca I argument. Characteristically, Wolffs teleology is not only 
essential to his moral philosophy, but is also a constitutive part ofhis understanding ofnature. The notion of 
the teleological order of nature serves as a basis for his understanding of the criteria of normativity. This 
applies to his concept of normativity in the moral sense, but also in the legal sense. Therefore, NeusOB is also 
fundamentally correct, when he can say: "Wie Leibniz an die vollkommene Ordnung des Universums glaubte, 
so hane auch fur Wolff alles Seiende Kraft des gottlichen Plans einen seinem Wesen entsprechenden Zweck, 
der mit dem Zweck aller Obrigen Wesen Obereinstimmte. Auf diesem teleologischen Weltverstiindnis beruhte 
Wolffs Lehre vom Recht. Haben alle Dinge ihre nattirlichen, von Gott zum Zusammenklang alles Seienden 
bestimmten Absichten, ergibt sich aus der Einordnung des Menschen in das Universum die Ptlicht eines jeden, 
seiner nattirlichen Absicht gemiiB zu leben" (1970, 40). 
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Ubereinstimmung unserer Handlungen mit unserer Natur. 129 
This emphasis on human nature as the basis of natura! law is also apparent in his understanding 
of human nature as constituted in such a way that it always prefers the higher to the !esser good. 
Consequently, natura! law can also be understood as a law of perfection (lex perfectiva), as it 
always makes humans favour that which perfects its nature. "Die Natur des Menschen ist so 
beschaffen, daB er dasjenige dem andem vorzieht, von welchem er erkennet, daB es besser sey, 
ais das andere [ ... ); daher verbindet uns auch das Gesetz der Natur, dasjenige, was besser ist, dem 
andern vorzuziehen; und in so weit, ais es uns hierzu verbindet, wird es ein volkommenmachendes 
Gesetz (lex perfectiva) genennet". 130 Therefore, as natura! law is a rneans to perfection, it also 
serves as a means to aquirement of happiness. 131 
As this rule is a law, due to its compulsory character, and as this compulsion stems from 
nature, the law of nature would take place, even if human beings had no superiors, i.e. even if 
there was no God. "Wiederum weil diese Regul wegen der Verbindlichkeit ein Gesetze wird, die 
Verbindlichkeit aber von der Natur kommet; so ist das Gesetze der natur durch die Natur fest 
gestellet worden, und wtirde stat finden, wenn auch gleich der Mensch keinen Oberen hatte, der 
ihn dazu verbinden konte: ja es wtirde statt finden, wenn auch gleich kein Gott ware".132 It is in 
this sense, that nature serves as the common basis of the natura! law, which makes it irrelevant if 
there is a God and if the actor is atheist. 133 However, even if Wolff in Deutsche Ethik held this 
position, in Grundstitze des Natur- und Volkerrechts he seems to allow fora greater role of the 
Di vine will, when he speaks of God as the author of the natura! law. 
Da das Wesen und die Natur des Menschen und der Dinge von Gott ihren 
Ursprung haben, und man, bey deren Annehmung, sogleich das Gesetz der 
Natur und desselben Verbindlichkeit annehmen muB; so ist der Urheber des 
119 DE § 28. 
l3U GNY§ 48. 
13 1 DE § 57; § 139. 
131 DE§ 20. 
133 DE § 21. This socalled ''impious hypothesis" has often been traced to Hugo Grotius. However, 
already within scholastic theology this idea had been fonnulated. Cf. Crowe 1977, 223ff. fora discussion on 
this notion. 
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Gesetzes der Natur Gott selbst, der den Menschen verbindet, seine Handlungen 
demselben gemafi einzurichten; und also ist die natilrliche Verbindlichkeit auch 
eine gottliche; und das natilrliche Gesetz ist auch ein gottliches. 134 
This notion of the Divine character of the natura! law was not as explicit in Deutsche Ethik as he 
felt it necesssary to make it in Grundsatze des Natur- und Volkerrechts . This may partly be due 
to the criticism raised against him by pietistic theologians for tuming away from the true Christian 
doctrine and for favoring atheism. 135 However, it appears that there is something quite close to a 
paradox in Wolff at this point. When he argues that God is the author ( der Urheber) of the natura! 
law, this does not imply that God by a pure will determines what is to be the natura1 law. In Wolff 
God cannot be in contradiction to the natura! law, as the natura! law is good per se and God 
necessarily must will what is good. However, God is still seen as the author of the natura! law, 
thereby emphasizing the point that the natura! law is consistent with the Divine will. If this was a 
point already implicit in Deutsche Ethik, 136 Wolff did not assist his readers in finding this notion. 
Here, he apparently speaks of the natura!, Di vine, and human law as different entities, 137 reducing 
the question of the relation between the natura! and Di vine law to the question of the motivation 
of humans to follow the natura! law. Compared to his la ter understanding, there is a stronger focus 
on the natura! law as preceeding the will of God.138 Consequently, in his early writings, he was less 
hesistant to argue that the natura! law had its basis in nature. In his later writings, he did not 
abandon this idea, but contended that nature as a basis of the natura! law did not imply an 
13
~ GNY§ 41. 
135 Cf. Wunner 1968, 9. Wunners work in general gives a good account ofthe historical background 
of Wolffs natura! law thought, even if the systematic critique in the end of his work does not appear 
convincing (31 f.). The mere reference to a contemporary widespread understanding ofthe difference between 
the real ms of (I) nature and (2) law and ethics does not sufficiently justify this understand ing. Wunner 
disappointedly reso11s to a mere postulation of the intrinsic difference of these two realms. Therefore, 
Wunner"s abandonment of the plausibility of a contemporary maintainment of natura! law seems rather 
shallow, not the least because he has a quite reductionist understanding of natura! law as mere ly based on 
nature. His own anempt of overcoming natura I law by referring to reasoning as the basis of political law (32), 
may just as well be seen as an expression of natura! law. 
136 DE§§ 34f. 
137 DE §§ l 7ff. 
138 DE §§ 29ff. 
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inconsistency with the Divine will. 139 
4.2.2 The Freedom of the Human Being 
Due to the basis of the natura! law, it is considered as a necessary and immutable law. According 
to Wolff s ontology, necessity and immutability are both implied in his understanding of the 
essence and nature as the basis of natural law. This is closely related to his understanding of the 
good in itself. As already demonstrated, the good in itself is asserted on the basis ofhis conception 
of the normativity of nature. As the actions that are good in themselves, consequently are 
necesssary good 140 they are also eternally good (i.e. immutably) good.141 "Das Gesetz der natur 
ist unveranderlich und nothwending. Denn weil das Gesetz der Natur den hinreichenden Grund 
in der Natur des Menschen und der Dinge selbst hat; und also eine natilrliche Verbindlichkeit in 
sich fasset, diese aber unveranderlich und nothwendig ist; so muB es auch das Gesetz der Natur 
seyn."1n As it is necessary and immutable, it is also common to all mankind. It is a constituent 
part ofhuman nature. Therefore, the natural law obliges all human beings and no human being can 
be exempted from this natural obligation.143 The implications of this point was one of the notions 
that were strongly criticized in Wolff by some of his contemporaries. This is due to his further 
statement on the completeness of the natura! law. The natura! law covers all actions of human 
beings. Therefore, everything that a human being does is determined by natural law and cannot be 
different. In Deutsche Et hik he comes very close to a deterministic understanding of the human 
moral life. 
139 Cf. Bissinger 1983, 153ff. fora discussion of Wolffs basis of the natura! law along lines 
somewhat similar to the account given here. However, with relation to the Divine selfcontradiction, Bissinger 
argues that because ofthe nature ofman. created by God, God cannot command man to follow a will contrary 
to this nature, which is an expression of the natura! law. 
140 DE § 25. 
141 DE§ 26. 
141 GNY§ 40. 
143 GNY§ 42: ·'Auf gleiche weise beweisen wir, daf3 das Gesetz der Natur alle Menschen verbinde; 
und daf3 von der natu(e)rlichen Yerbindlichkeit kein Mensch befreyt werden ko(e)nne; weil na(e)mlich das 
natu(e)rliche Gesetz den hinreichenden Grund in der Natur des Menschen und der Dinge selbst hat, und die 
Yerbindlichkeit, welche dasselbe in sich begreift, also bald statt tindet, wenn man die Natur und das Wesen 
der Menschen und der u(e)bringen Dinge annimt." 
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Dieses ewige Gesetz erstrecket sich auf a11e Handlungen der Menschen in allen 
Fallen. Denn was in einem jeden vorkommenden Falle unter denen sich 
ereignenden Umstanden erfolget, das ist durch die natur der Dinge determiniret, 
daJ3 es kommen muB. Da nun die handlungen der Menschen durch das, was aus 
ihnen nothwendig erfolget gut oder hose werden; so sind alle Handlungen der 
Menschen von der Natur determiniret, ob sie gut oder hose sind. Und demnach 
befiehlet das Gesetze der Natur in einem jeden vorkommenden Falle, was der 
Mensch unter denen sich ereignenden Umstanden thun oder lasse soli. 144 
Some of Wolffs contemporaries wamed against the implications of this understanding, claiming 
that it implied a dissolvement of human responsibility. The consequence ofWolffs philosophy, 
it was argued, would be that one could no longer make the individual responsible for their acts. 145 
Even if Wolff modified this standpoint in his later writings, obviously this is a point where he 
differs strongly from Immanuel Kant's nation of autonomy.146 In Kant the laws of the physical 
nature are fundamentally different from the moral law. The moral law is a law of reason, whereby 
the human being as a rational being is its own lawgiver. Hereby Kant stresses the importance of 
the autonomy of the moral agent. The moral agent does not aet in accordance with a law of nature 
which disposes the individual to certain acts, rather the moral agent acts on account of duty to the 
moral law of reason. 147 Also Wolff can speak of the duties. But in Wolff the natura! duty is an aet, 
which is in accordance with natura! law, to which human beings are bound. 148 
However, even if Wolff emphasizes nature as the determinative basis of the moral life, 
this does not mean that he discards the freedom ofthe individual. Only is this understood in close 
IH DE§ 27. 
145 Cf. Wunner 1968, 20. 
146 This is also the reason why the tenninology used by Bissinger is misleading, when he speaks of 
the ·'Verpflichtungscharakter" of Wolffs reflections on perfection and the general rule ofaction in Wolff as 
a moral imperative. ·'Die Aussage, der Mensch mache sich durch sein freies Handeln notwendigerweise 
vollkommener bzw. unvollkommener, ist nicht nur ais Feststellung auzusehen, sondem bringt zugleich einen 
Verpjlichtungscharakter zum Ausdruck. Aus dem Wesen eines Dings bzw. einer Handlung ergibt sich 
nahmlich auch dessen Ziel ( ... ) Wolffkan somit einen moralischen Imperativ austellen: ''Thue, was dich und 
deinen oder anderer Zustand vollkommener machet; unterlaf3, was ihn unvollkommener machet" (DE§ 12)" 
( 1983, 151 ). The tenninology used by Bissinger holds strong Kantian con notations. This way of reading Kant 
into Wolff does not do justice to either one of them. 
147 Cf. 6.2. 1 
148 DE § 222. Cf. furthennore Joes ten 1931, 87ff. fora concise account of fundamental differences 
between Wolff and Kant in the understanding ofthe source ofnonnativity and the relation between nature and 
reason in this respect. 
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affinity to his concept of nature. This raises the question, how can Wolff rnaintain this idea of 
nature and yet adrnit of the freedom of the moral agent? In what sense does he speak of freedorn? 
Is freedom conceived of within the bounds of nature? 
Wolff distinguishes between doings which are free and those that are not ruled by the will. 
Among the latter are e.g. whether one sees the person approaching, hears people making noise or 
whether the eaten food is digested. In many other respects, however, human beings are free. 
Whenever it is an aet determined by the will, such as whether one wants to reflect on the goodness 
of God and other acts which satisfy one's desires, the acts are regarded as free acts.1-t9 However, 
this is not a freedorn which morally qualifies these acts. The goodness of these free acts is 
determined by nature . The free acts either promote or prevent the perfection of the condition of 
humans.150 It is in this respect that free acts can be good (when they promote perfection) or bad 
(when they prevent this perfection). 151 
In the question of the freedom of acts, Wolff demonstrates another marked teleologicaI 
feature. It is the consequence ofthe acts for the condition of the perfection ofhuman nature which 
is the determinative basis ofthe moral qualification. 152 Consequently, to speak offreedom in Wolff 
does not mean the free determination of the moral law. Rather, freedom means the ability to 
choose between different acts, deciding which is good or bad, i.e. promotes or prevents one 
condition. Consequently, freedom is conceived of within the limits of natura] law. 
This also applies to Wolffs understanding ofthe role of reason. Again, reason does not 
detem1ine natura! law. Reason is not the source of natura! law, i.e. the moral law. Rather, natura! 
law is a constituent part of nature, which is perceived by reason. Reason discems natura! law. It 
does not construct it. 153 
i4g DE § I. 
150 DE§ 2. 
i51 DE§ 3. 
152 Cf. also Bissinger 1983, 150: "Gegenstand der Ethik sind die freien, nicht dagegen die 
nothwendigen Handlungen des Menschen. Diese freien Handlungen haben aus sich selbst eine Veranderung 
des Menschen zur Folge ( ... ) Dursch sein Handeln bzw. Nichthandeln setzt der Mensch bestimmte Wirkungen. 
Das Handeln selbst ist Ausflul3 des freien Willens; die Wirkungen einer bestimmten Handlung sind durch 
diese schon mitgesetzt. Eine bestimmte Handlung wi:ihlen, heil3t also, einen bestimmten Zweck verfolgen." 
153 This also leads to a certain reluctance in the approval ofSchroer's reflections on "Die rationale 
Herleitung des Verpflichtungscharakters" (1988, 155ff.). Schroer argues that reason becomes an important 
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Weil unsere freye Handlungen durch dasjenige, was aus ihnen entweder 
schlechterdinges, oder unter gewissen Umstanden nothwendig erfolget, gut oder 
bose werden; so wird zu Beurtheilung derselben eine Einsicht in den Zusam-
menhang der Dinge erfordert. Da nun die Einsicht in den Zusammenhang der 
Dinge die Vemunfft ist; so wird das Gute und Bose durch die Vemunfft 
erkandt. Und demnach lehret uns die Vemunfft, was wir thun und lassen sollen, 
das ist, die Vernunfft ist die Lehrmeisterin des Gesetzes der Natur. 154 
Viewed in this way, a person who subjects his or her doings to reason, i.e. to the obligation of 
natura! law, can be conceived of as a law to themselves and need no other law. 155 Understood in 
this way there is a fundamentally reciprocal relation between nature and reason as the source of 
norrnativity in Wolff. The moral good cannot be separated from nature. In this sense, nature serves 
as the source of nom1ativity. However, natura! law does not become amoral law, until it becomes 
a law of obligation, having its basis in reason. The role of reason is to teach natura! law. The role 
of reason is to explain the nonnativity implied in the concept of nature. 156 This is further related 
to Wolff s understanding ofthe motivation which follows the insight of reason into natura! law. 
The recognition of the good or bad implies the motivational basis of the will either to will or not 
will the particular aet. 157 
This understanding of reason as the teacher of natura! law leads Wolff to his understan-
ding of conscience. Conscience judges on the acts, whether they are good or bad. In arder to do 
so, however, it is in need of reason. Conscience, therefore, has its basis in reason. As natura! law 
role in the determination of natura] law. As the knowledge ofthe good can be somewhat unclear, reason is to 
gi"e a clear verdict on its moral demand. Even if this is an explanation ofthe obligation of nature, reason is 
conceived of as the source of nonnativity. "Bei Wolff is somit die Verwendung des Ausdrucks "Natur" zur 
Bezeichnung einer Quelle der Verbindlichkeit gleichbedeutend mit der Aussage, die Vemunft sei die einzige 
und vollstandige Quelle der Verbindlichkeit" (156). Even ifthis interpretation is tempting, it does not seem 
to be consistent with the strong emphasis on nature as the source ofnonnativity in Wolff. Characteristically, 
Schroer says that in Wolff nature as the source of obligation is synonymous with reason as such a source. 
Logi ca Ily, this implies that one could just as well take the standpoint of the present thesis, that nature is the 
source of obligation and reason is conceived of as a retlection of this basis of normativity. 
"
4 DE § 23. 
155 DE§ 24. 
156 Therefore, Joesten is also correct when she speaks of the doublesided character of obligation, 
i.e. obligatio passiva and obligatio activa. Nature is the source of the passive obligation, disposing the human 
to do the good. Reason is the source ofthe aet i ve obligation, making the obligation of nature amoral law 
(1931 , 22ff.). 
157 DE§§ 6f. 
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could be called law of reason, so it may be called the law of conscience. 
Da nun das Gesetze der Natur gleichfalls erfordert dasjenige zu thun, was uns 
und unseren Zustand vollkommener machet; so verbindet uns unser Gewissen, 
unsere Handlungen nach dem Gesetze der Natur einzurichten. Und daher 
konnen wir auch das Gesetze der Natur ein Gesetze des Gewissens nennen. 
Weil nun aber das Gewissen aus der Vernunfft entspringet; so ist dieses Gesetze 
des Gewissens, folgends auch das Gesetze der Natur, dasjenige, was uns unsere 
Vemunfft lehret. Und dahero wird auch das Gesetze der Natur die Aussage der 
Vernunfft genennet. 158 
And as the insight ofreason implied the motivation of the will, so does the conscience. This is due 
to the conscience giving either pleasure, when one does good, or displeasure, when one acts 
badly. 159 
4.3 Conclusion 
Along with Melanchthon, Wolff represents an understanding of a unity of nature and reason. In 
Wolffthe notion ofthe normativity of nature is quite apparent. Wolff argues that nature serves as 
the basis of obligation for the human being. Nature obliges the human being to further completion 
of his or her condition. The fundamental rule of action in Wolff obliges the human being to aet 
accordingly. In this sense nature is the basis of nom1ativity in Wolff, why he is also to be seen as 
a proponent of a naturalistic justification of normativity. This understanding of nature as the 
source of norn1ativity holds significant resemblances to the naturalism in e.g. Rolston and Callicott. 
However, Wolffs understanding of nature raises sorne problems with regard to the freedorn of 
the human being. According to Wolff, he does not reject the freedom of the individual. Therefore, 
he also argues for the importance of reason in the perception of natura! law. Consequently, Wolff 
may be said to endorse a concept of passive obligation on the basis ofhis notion of nature and an 
active understadning of obligation in the light of reason. Even if Wolff apparently does save 
himself from a deterministic understanding of moral life, he does maintain an understanding which 
would be critically evaluated in the light of both Hurne's and Moore's theories. 
158 DE§ 137. 
159 DE § 136. 
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Reason as the Source of Normativity 
Whereas Part II.I demonstrated the similarity in two theories of natural law in the naturalist 
grounding of normativity, the present part focuses on two theories where the concept of reason 
is in focus. It appears that both Martin Luther (Chapter 5) and Immanuel Kant (Chapter 6) argues 
in favor ofnatural law theories where nature is not considered as tbe basis of normativity. Rather, 
reason holds an essential role. 

Chapter 5 
Reason and Divine Will 
The Reformation is often understood as a decisive factor in the formation of the early 
modernity. 160 The socalled indi vidualism and rej ection of an ecclesiastical authority paved the way 
for the understanding of the individual which is characteristic of modernity, it is claimed. Even if 
this may hold sometruth, several notions in Luther demonstrate the necessity of understanding him 
on the background of mediaeval thought rather than in the light of modernity. One such concept 
is his understanding of natura! law. In this notion it is apparent that individualistic traits in Luther 
are identifiable, but that the proper understanding necessitates an awareness of the possibility of 
a temporal rending ofhis thought. The foliowing exposition of Luther's thought will attempt to 
delienate the course between the Schylla of a modernistic reading and the Charybdis of a 
mediaeval confinement of his understanding of natura! law. This reading is intended to 
demonstrate how Luther in his understanding of natura! law can be conceived of as prerunner of 
the separation between the realm of nature and the realm of morals, that is characteristic of the 
Enlightenment. 161 It is, however, also intended to demonstrate the relevance ofLuther's insights 
in a rectification of a rigid modem understanding of nature, where morality is conceived of as a 
distinctly different realm. 162 
160 By early modernity I refer to the understanding of natura! law that we find in thinkers of the 
seventeenth century, such as Hugo Grotius, Johannes Althusius, Thomas Hobbes, John Selden, Jean 
Barbeyrac, Samuel von Pufendorf and Christian Thomasius. Cf. Haakonssen 1999 for an excellent collection 
of articles dealing with some ofthese thinkers. Albeit essential differences among these thinkers, there are 
simi lar traits which justify an understanding of their thought as marking the transition to the natura! law 
thought of the late eighteenth century. The leading example of the latter being Immanuel Kant, of course. 
161 As we shall see in the foliowing chapter, Kant may be read as an advocate ofsuch a separation. 
However, as will also be demonstrated, such an interpretation of Kant does not stand alone. 
162 When dealing with Luther's natura! law thought, one has to face the challenge ofhis widespread 
remarks on this notion. Luther has not written a treatise dealing with natura! law as a specific issue. Most of 
Luther's references to natura! law are in his ethical writings. These writings, however, are aften occasioned 
by particular circumstances. As Luther's primary aim is to deal with these conditions, natura! law is only 
referred to as part of the discussion. Therefore, Luther's discussion on natura! law often has the character of 
an ad hoc reflection. However, this does not mean that natura! law was not important to him. Rather, as his 
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The venturing of this course will highlight the understanding of a relation between nature 
where God is present in nature and yet nature is marked by the Fall. Even if the arder creation is 
permeated by the presence of God, the nature of the human being ( which is part of the arder of 
creation) is still conceived of as depraved. Therefore, as human nature is marked by the Fall, 
reason is the seat of natura! law. Consequently, the leading notions to be analyzed in this chapter 
are the order of creation, the relation between nature and morality and reason as the basis of 
morality. 
5.1 The Order of Creation as the Basis of the Moral Order 
Even if the dominant trait in Luther points to a rejection of an objective arder as the basis of 
natura! law, this does not imply the disposal of the order of creation as highly important to 
Luther' s concept of normativity. Therefore, the necessity of an analysis of this notion is inevitable. 
In the foliowing, an account will be given of the doctrine of creation, how nature is conceived of 
as the basis of the moral ord er, and how nature is still thought of as devoid of morality. 
primary aim in these writings was nota theoretical discussion, but a guidance on concrete issues, natura) law 
seems to have been understood as a notion, which he could take for granted. In the foliowing, the focus, 
therefore, is on his ethical writings, even ifthere will be references to other writings as well. Among the works 
dealing with Luther's understanding of natura! law the debate between Troeltsch (1912) and Hol! ( I 932) 
marks a classical reference. Whereas Troeltsch argued that Luther distinguished between a relative and an 
absolute natura! law, finding the fonner in the Decalogue and the latter in the Sermon on the mount (532ff.), 
Hol! argued that Luther' s natura! law was to be seen as a prescriptive rule of conscience understood in the 
light of Christian love (243). In Althaus ( 1965) it was argued that natura) law was to be understood as a law 
ofreason. As such there was no distinction between the demands ofthe natura! and Christian law. However, 
the Christian is moved by the love of Christ and does more than the natura! law demands. Therefore, Luther 
says that the Christian is willing to suffer for the sake of his neighbour (39ff.). In Olsson ' s comprehensive 
study on creation, reason and law in Luther's theology ( 1971 ), it is argued that Luther's understanding of 
natura! law is imbedded in his doctrine of creation. This serves as the basis for the universal i ty of natura! law 
as a law of reason. For the Christian, however, faith implies a new relation to the demands of natura) law. It 
is only as a Christian that one can have a relation to natura! law as the loving care and will of God (512). 
Recently, Raunio (1998) has criticized some ofthe attempt for undertaking a dualistic reading ofLuther. 
According to Raunio, Luther' s natura I law is to be seen in the light ofthe order ofnature as an arder ofDivine 
love. Natura! law is to be seen as the law of divine nature, or the law of di vine love (103). In the foliowing 
interpretation of Luther, it will be attempted to argue that Luther understands natura! law as a law of reason. 
Natura! law is based in man 's abilities ofpractical reasoning. As such it holds validity, even ifhuman nature 
is considered depraved. Fora relatively recent, more comprehensive review than given here, cf. Raunio 1993, 
21-56. 
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5.1.1 The Presence of God in Nature 
An actual account of Luther' s understanding of creation leads far beyond the present thesis. 
However, as Luther' s understanding of natura! law is fundamentally related to his concept of the 
order of creation, a short introduction of same main themes of this idea must be given. 163 
For Luther the crealio ex nihilo is fundamentally related to his understanding of God's 
relation to creation. It is not merely an expression of a creative aet which is temporarily confined. 
God has not created the world and left, as a carpenter makes a ship and leaves it. 164 Rather, God' s 
creation of the world constitutes his ongoing concern for creation. Creation is continuously 
maintained. Tue belief in God as creator, implies for Luther a recognition that God has given and 
maintains all that is necessary fora good life. Dus includes God's provision ofbodily needs as well 
as the service of nonhuman nature and political order. 
Das meine und gleube ich, das ich Gottes geschepffe bin, das ist, das er mir 
geben hat und on unterlas erhelt leib, seele und leben, geliedmasse klein und 
gros, alle synne, vernunfft und verstand und so fort an, essen und trincken, 
kleider, narung, weib und kind, gesind, haus und hoff etc. Dazu alle creatur zu 
nutz und notdurfft des lebens dienen !esset, Sanne, Mond und stemen am 
hymel, tag und nacht, lufft, fewer, wasser, erden und was sie tregt und vermag, 
vogel, visch, thier, getreyde und allerley gewechs, Item was mehr leibliche und 
zeitliche gu( e )ter sind, gut regiment, fri de, sicherheit. 165 
Luther is quite comprehensive in his very concrete understanding of God's care for man. Because 
of his goodness and love for human.kind, God protects and gives all that is necessary for man. 166 
In this sense, creation is a continuous aet of God, i.e. a creatio continua. 
This understanding ofthe manifold way in which God sustains creation, is also reflected 
in Luther's ideas of the three orders, i.e. the church (ecclesia), family (oeconomia), and the State 
163 Cf. e.g. Lofgren 1960; Olsson 1971 , and Link 1991 , 27ff. fora more thorough account of 
Luther's nation of creation than is given here. 
164 WA 46, 558, 20 (Cf. Link 1991 , 35). The same metapher is also used by Melanchthon fora 
similar argument, cf. 3.1. 
165 WA 30 I, 183f. 
166 WA 30 I, 184, 24ff. 
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(politia), whereby Gud sustains and regulates the world. 167 In relation to the last mentioned, Luther 
can even speak of the political rulers as gods. 168 The political authority is considered as God's 
instruments, God 's cooperatores. 169 In this sense, God is considered as present in creation. The 
ubiquity of God is an essential concem for Luther. Consequently, Luther can also speak of 
creation as larvae Dei or Gottes Mummerey. 110 By this notion of instruments and masks whereby 
God marks his presence in creation, Luther also prevents an identification of God with creation. 
As creator God is different from creation. But he is present in the sense that he seeks his will to 
be sustained. 171 
The notion of God as creator, the continuous creation, and God as present in creation 
also entails that creation is not separate from the will of God. From the beginning, creation means 
being in a relation to God, a relation which is determined by law. All of creation stands in this 
relation of law to God. 172 This applies to nonhuman nature and humans alike. For humans this is 
apparent in Luther's concept ofnatural law. Since creation man has had an apprehension of natura! 
law. This is a constitutive part of human nature. 173 Thus, natura! law is part of God's continuous 
concem for creation, it is part of creatio continua. On account of natura! law God wants to make 
his will known to man and regulate moral life. For the Christian, life in accordance with the will 
167 Cf. e.g. Althaus 1965, 43ff.; Brady 1985, 202ff.; Idem 1986, 34ff. and Mi.ihlen 1994, 557ff. for 
a further discussion on these three orders. 
168 This is done repeatedly in the exegesis of psalm 82 (W A 31 I, 189ff. ( e.g. 31 I, 191 , 22; 192, 
4; 192, 12; 201 , 19; 202, l; 204, 4)). 
169 WA 40 III, 210, 35ff.; 40 III, 214, 20ff.; 40 III, 236, 29ff. 
170 WA 15, 373, 7; 15, 373, IS: " ... der wellt laufft und sonderlich seyner heyligen wesen sey Gottes 
mummerey, darunter er sich verbirgt und ynn der wellt so wunderlich regirt und rhumort"; 40 I, 174ff. 
171 Cf. also Link 1991 , 44f.: "Die ''Schopfung aus dem Nichts" findet ihre umfassendste Auslegung 
in dem Satz, dal3 Gott selbst ist, der sich uns in der gesamten Schopfung darbietet ( ... ). Damit ist offenkundig 
mehr gesagt, ais dal3 das Dasei n der geschaffenen Welt auf Gon "zurUckgeht". Das Bild notigt den Gedanken 
einer Kondeszendenz Gottes ante Christum natur f6nnlich auf. Als Schopfung ist die Welt keine "neutrale" 
Wirklichkeit; sie ist von der Gegenwart Gottes bis in das "geringste Baumblatt" hinein buchstablich 
durchdrungen ( ... ) und verdankt ihren Bestand, ihre Ordnung und ihre verlaBliche Dauer allein dieser ihr 
geradezu immanenten Prasenz." 
172 Cf. Olsson 1971 , 19. 
173 WA 16,447, 35ff.; 18, 80, 3Sff. 
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of God is considered a proper response to God's infinite care and provision. 174 Therefore, the 
notion of creation is closely related to Luther' s understanding of moral normativity. This relation 
is the concern of the foliowing paragraph. 
5.1.2 Nature as the Basis of the Moral Order 
The notion of God's presence in nature is also apparent in amoral sense. Nature is not conceived 
of as a sphere which is separate from the moral realm. This is apparent in both Luther's 
understanding of nonhuman nature and his conception ofthe basis of natural law in the nature of 
man. 
With regard to nonhuman nature, Luther apparently understands the golden rule as 
manifest in nature. This is is clear from a passage, where Luther speaks of animals living in 
accordance with the golden rule: 
Another resemblance: wild and irrational animals acknowledge this law. When 
a pig is being slaughtered or captured, other pigs, having seen this, will run 
around and grunt, as ifthey had compassion. Likewise chicken, geese and other 
wild animals, when they see that one of them suffers, they naturally are hurt and 
sad, and if possible they will help. 175 
In this quotation it is demonstrated how Luther sees the golden rule as expressed in the behavior 
among wild animals. In the relation to fellow creatures, animals are capable of setting themselves 
in the place of one another and feel compassion. It appears that Luther understands nature as an 
order of love, which nonhuman nature also takes part in. In the words of Raunio: "Die 
gottgewollte Ordnung der Wirklichkeit besteht nach Luther darin, da.f3 alle Kreature einander 
dienen und gute Werke tun. Die Ordnung der Natur folgt fur ihn nicht dem augustinischen ordo-
Gedanken, sondem sie ist von der agape gepragt. Sie beruht nahmlich nicht darauf, da.f3 sie das 
17~ WA 30 I, 184, 34ff.: "Hieraus wil sich nu selbs schliessen und folgen: weil uns das alles, so wir 
vermu(e)gen, dazu was ym hymel und erden ist, teglich von Gott gegeben, erhalten und bewaret wird, so sind 
wir ia schu(e)ldig yhn daru(e)mb on unterlas zulieben, loben und dancken und ku(e)rtzlich yhm gantz und gar 
damit zudienen, wie er durch die zehen gepot foddert und befohlen hat." 
175 WA 4, 593, 4-8: "Secunda similitudo, quia bestiae et irrationabilia animalia istam !egern tuentur. 
Videmus quando porcus mactatur aut capitur, alii videntes circumstrepunt et grunniunt quasi miserentes, sic 
gallinae, anseres et in omnibus bestiis quando vident, quod aliud de suo genere necessitatem patitur, 
naturaliter condolet, tristatur et si potesr, adiuvat." 
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Gute, das sie bekommen haben, mit den anderen teilen." 176 
In addition to the understanding of the golden rule as a normative rule within creation, 
Luther also comes cl ose to a normative notion of nature in his account of the basis of natura! law. 
As will be apparent, however, Luther's argument for the basis of natura! law does not take his 
deliberations on nature as a whole into consideration. When the question on the basis of natura} 
law is raised, it is important to distinguish between (i) deliberations on the observation of natura! 
law and (ii) an actual argument for the existence of natural law. 
In the course of the first type of reflections, we find two characteristic considerations. 
Firstly, Luther refers to the biblical reference to natura! law. The most central reference for him 
is the common place in Romans 2, 14 f.. 177 The reference to Romans does not, as mentioned, 
appear as an argument. Rather, Luther speaks straight forward about natura! law and then refers 
to it as the law which Paul speaks of. St. Pauls mentioning of natura! law does not serve as an 
argument for the existence of it, but rather as an informative elaboration of Luther' s acknowled-
gment of it. A similar use of references seems to be the case, when Luther point to Christ's 
summary of the law in the natural law, i.e. the golden rule, as it is expressed in Matthew 7, 12. 
"Auch Clu·istus Manh. 7. selbst fasst alle propheten und gesetze ynn dis naturliche gesetze: 'Was 
yhr wollet, das euch die leutte thun sollen, das thut yhr auch yhnen', Denn das ist das gesetz und 
die prophete." 178 Even ifthis might not be called an argument in the proper sense of the word, as 
Luther does not refer to the biblical references as a reason for the existence of natura! law, the 
biblical reference must be maintained as important in Luther's understanding of this notion. 
As a somewhat intermediate position between the deliberation ona natura} law and a 
proper argument, Luther can also refer to natura! law as a phaenomena which can be discemed 
in relation to preaching and which man may discover on his own. If natura! law was not engraved 
in the heart of man, one could teach and preach the law without man being moved by it. 
176 Raunio 1993, 130. Cf. idem, l 29ff. fora more comprehensive account ofLuther's understanding 
ofthe golden rule as a law of nature. 
177 W A 16, 43 I, 28: Was nu Moses geschrieben hat ynn den Zehen gepoten, das fiilen wir natilrlich 
ynn unserm gewissen Rom 2; 18, 80, 28: Also ist das auch nicht alleyne Mose gesetz, Du sollt nicht rnorden, 
ehebrechen, stelen sondem auch das naturlich gesetze ynn ydermans hertze geschrieben, wie Paulus Ro. 2. 
leret; 24, 9, 24; 391, 539, 7; 42, 374, 11 ff. 
178 W A 18, 80, 30ff. 
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F urthermore, man may also discover natura! law on account of his awareness of a conscience. Man 
feels what is right and wrong, even if the Devil has darkened his apprehension of the law. 179 Even 
if Luther here does not give an argument for the existence of natura! law, he does argue that it is 
there. Even if it still lacks the premisses of an argument, this reflection leads him closer. Luther 
still has not answered the question, why is there a natura! law? 
A genuine argument for natura! law, however, is to be found in Luther' s understanding 
of creation. Luther speaks of natura! law as implanted in man or written in the mind of man. 180 
Important in this argument is the emphasis on the will of God. For Luther it is important to stress 
the freedom of God. God is not confined within limits of an arder of nature. Nor is natura! law a 
mere expression of a structure ofbeing. 181 Rather, natura! law is to be understood as amoral norm 
that has a continuous source in the will of God. Natura! law is dependent upon and determined by 
the will of God. 182 
However, even if Luther stresses this voluntaristic understanding of the basis of natura! 
179 WA 16,447, 27ff.: ·'Wenn aber das natu(e)rlich gesetz nicht von Gott ynn das hertz geschrieben 
und gegen were, so mu(e)ste man lang predigen, ehe die gewissen getroffen wurden ( ... ) Weil es nu zuvorym 
he11zen ist, wiewohl tunckel und gantz verplichen, so wird es mit dem wort widder erwecket, das ja das hertz 
bekennen muss, es sey also wie die gepot lauten ... "; 18, 80, 35ff.: "Sonst, wo es nicht naturlich ym hertzen 
geschrieben stu(e)nde, mu(e)st man lange gesetz leren und predigen, ehe sich das gewissen an neme. Es muss 
es auch bey sich selbs also finden fulen, Es wu(o)rde sonst niemand keyn gewissen machen, Wie wol der 
reuffel die hertzen soverblend und besitzt, das sie solch gesetz nicht allzeyt fulen ... " 
180 WA 16,447, 27; 17 II, 102, 8; 17 ll, 102, 39; 18, 80, 28ff; 24, 6, 14ff; 24, 9, 20ff; 24, JO, 4ff.: 
Also halt ich nu die gepot, die Moses geben hat, nicht darumb, das sie Moses geboten hat, sondem das sie mir 
von natur eingeptlanztet sind und Moses alhie gleich mit der natur uberein stymmet; 30 r, 192, 19; 39 I, 426, 
9ff; 39 I, 454. 4f: Neque tamen Moses autor fuit decalogi. Sed a condito mundo decalogus fuit inscriptus 
omnium hominum mentibus; 391, 478, 16ff.: Decalogus non est Mosi lex, neque primus ipse eam dedit, sed 
decalogus est totius mundi, inscriptus et insculptus mentibus omnium hominum a condito mundo; 39 I, 539. 
7ff. 
181 Recently, Ralinio has argued that the intention ofnatural law is that fallen humankind regains 
pa11icipation in the order of Di vine love in creation ( 1998, I 03f.). Other researchers, e.g. Bayer, Duchrow, 
Haikola, and Wingren have also recognized Luther's concept ofnature as an order ofself-giving love (cf. 
Raunio 1998, I 04 ). However, this does not mean that Luther thereby sets his voluntaristic understanding 
aside. Luther does think in categories oforder and he does regard these orders as expressions of God's love. 
But these orders are always thought of as having their basis in the will of God. This doublesidedness also 
holds for natura! law. 
182 Cf. also Olsson I 971, I 64f.: "Erstens ist also zu beachten, dass es Gott ist, der durch das 
natUrliche Gesetz seine Forderung an den Menschen richtet ( ... ) Dass es sich so verhålt, ist ein Ausdruck des 
Verhåltnisses zwischen Gott und dem Menschen, welches durch die Schopfung gegeben ist, dass nåmlich der 
Mensch ais der Erschaffene dem Schopfer unmoglich entfliehen kann." 
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law, this does not imply that natura! law is not closely related to the nature of man. For Luther 
there seems to be an inextricable relation between being human and having a knowledge of natura! 
law. Luther goes so far in his account of this cl ose relation, that it almost brings him in conflict 
with his voluntaristic understanding. Due to the voluntaristic understanding, the relation between 
being human and having a knowledge of natura! law is not a necessary relation. Rather, it has its 
basis in the will of God. Having been created, however, Luther almost sees this relation between 
human nature and natural law as a necessary relation. This is apparent, when he can say that 
natura) law cannot be separated from human nature. 183 Furthermore, not only human nature 
apprehends natura) law, Luther can even speak of nature as such which teaches natura! law, i.e. 
the golden rule. 184 
This point appertains to the concept of the arder of creation. As already mentioned, 
Luther understands God as present in Creation. Creation is conceived of as regulated in 
accordance with the will of God. Understood in that sense, Creation reflects the Di vine will and 
cannot be conceived of as isolated from natura) law. 185 However, this is not as straight forward 
as it may seem. Luther is somewhat unclear on this question. The question, whether the order of 
creation is identical to natura) law consequently has been answered affirmatively as well as 
negatively. It appears that the right interpretation implies neither the one nor the other. Natura! 
law is neither identical to the order of creation, nor is it different from it. 186 
183 WA 16,447, 35ff.; 18, 80, 35ff. 
184 W A 11, 279, 19f: Denn die natur leret, wie die liebe thut, das ich thun soli, was ich myr wollt 
gethan haben; 24, 9, 20. 
185 This point is also made by Elert, when he can say that '' ... Das "naturliche Gesetz" bei Luther 
is nicht andres ais die "Schopfungsordnung"" ( I 953, 338). 
186 The ambiguity of Luther on this question has raised an extensive discussion on the relation 
between the "is" and the "ought" in Luther. Are the actual given orders (i.e. natura! and political) considered 
as normative? Or, is natura! law considered as a critical, moral norm present in the rational, retlective human 
being? Without in any way attempting to give a ful! account of this discussion, a briefsurnrnary seerns to be 
necessary. Several position have argued that natura I law for Luther is to be understood in close relation to his 
notion of the orders of creation. This is the viewpoint in Lau, when he argues that one cannot distinguish 
sharply between •'is" and "ought". Rather, these two aspects are to be seen as included in each other. "Die lex 
naturae ist narnlich bei Luther weder ein Seinsgesetz noch Inbegriff der seinsollenden Natur des Menschen, 
sondern ist ein Seinsollen konkreter Lebensordnungen" ( 1933, 95). Troeltsch (] 912, 532ff.), Elert ( 1953, 
336f.) and Heckel ( 1953, 66) corne cl ose to a similar understand ing. Ina critique of Troeltsch, Holl ( 1932) 
argued Troeltsch didn ' t distinguisch sufficiently between the "is" and "ought" of Luther's natura! law thought 
(243). For Holl it was to be perceived as a rule of conscience (246). " .. . dieses unurnstol3lich Gegebene rneint 
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Concluding the question on Luther' s understanding ofthe basis of natural law, it has been 
demonstrated, how Luther does not reject the nation of an arder of nature. However, this arder 
does not serve as the basis of natural law. There are no traits of an idea of a natura! order which 
is an ex pression of a lawfullness serving as the basis of normativity. When Luth er speaks of natural 
law in relation to man, he refers to an awareness of a moral law which is a constituent part of 
human nature, even if it is not necessary. There is no necessary relation between human nature and 
natura] law. 
5.1.3 Nature as Devoid of Moral i ty 
Although Luther can speak ofthe presence of God in nature and ane can find notions in Luther's 
understanding of nature which can support the understanding that nature is the bearer of an 
inherent moral normativity, it is equally important to point to an apparently totally opposite 
conception. Due to this other comprehension, nature is fundamentally marked by the Fall. Nature 
in the post lapsarian state appears to be devoid of morality. Even if this may also be demonstrated 
with respect to nonhuman nature, the present account focuses on human nature, as this is the 
concern of Luther. when he speaks of natura! law. 
Luther's understanding of the depraved human nature is also essential to his political 
thought. Especially two nations in Luther demonstrate this faet, i.e. his understanding of the two 
uses of the law and his concept of the necessary power of the political authority. Luther 
distinguished between the political and theological use of the law.187 Closely related to this 
distinction was his understanding of the double concept of justice, the outer, political justice 
Luther ais solches nicht, wo er von dem nati.irlichen Gesetz spricht. Vielmehr denkt er an die Regel, nach der 
es sittlich verwe1tet und in ein Ganzes des Zusammenlebens eingeordnet werden soli. Er nennt diese das 
natOrliche Gesetz, um dam it auszudri.icken, daf3 sie im unmittalbaren Gewissen des Menschen ihren Sitz hat" 
(246). Mi.iller ( 1928, 166), Wolf ( 1962, l 96f.) and Welzel ( 1962, I 02) endorsed viewpoints simi lar to Holl. 
As an intennediate standpoint it may be argued that Luther understands natura! law neither is 
identical to the orders of creation nor as an individualized rule of conscience. For Luther it is important that 
human life takes place within a given setting, whether in relation to nature or in political life. Within this 
setting, however, it is equally important for him to argue that natura! law appears as a law of reason. The 
human being has a rational recognition ofthe demands of natura! law. 
187 W A 39 I, 441 , 2ff.; 39 I, 485, I 6ff.; 40 I, 429f.; 40 I, 4 79f.; 40 1, 485, 23ff.; 40 I, 528, 6ff. The 
question about the twofold use of the law is extensively discussed in In epistolam S. Pauli ad Galatas 
Commentarius (WA 40 I, 33-688; 40 II, 1-184). 
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(coram hominibus), and the inner, spiritual justice (coram Deo ). 188 In the political use, the law is 
conceived as coercing hurnans to outwardly lawabiding deeds. The law in this sense secured the 
political justice and is the precondition of social life among humans. 189 In the theological use of 
the law, it is understood as leading humans to justification by faith. By recognition of their 
sinfullness and insufficiency with regard to the will of God, humans are led to receive justification 
as a gift. 190 
It should be recognized that there is a double use of the law ( .. . ) The first 
meaning and use of the law is to control the impious. For the Devil rules in all 
the world and impels men to all kinds of scandalous deeds. Therefore God has 
instituted magistrates, parents, teachers, laws, prisons and all sorts of civil 
orders, in arder that they at least can bind the hands of the Devil so that he 
cannot ravage, as he would have done otherwise ( ... ) The other use of the law 
is theological or spiritual and leads to the increasement of transgressions. It is 
particularly to be found in the law of Moses, so that sin may appear and grow 
on account of this use of the law, in particular in conscience. St. Paul speaks 
magnificently about this in Romans 7. Therefore, the true duty of the law and 
the first and proper use of the law is to reveal to man his sin, blindness, misery, 
impiety, ignorance, hate to and contempt for God, death, Heil, judgment and 
deserved anger from God. I 91 
In both uses of the law, Luther's understanding of the depraved nature of humans are implied. 
Politically, Luther presupposes an understanding of man as a brute, making the coercive force of 
188 W A 16, 528, 5; 19, 624, 30ff; 39 I, 82, 4ff; 40 I, 40ff; 40 I, 208f; 40 I, 393, 21 ff; 40 I, 554, 
I 5ff. 
189 W A 40 I, 487, 30ff; 40 I, 49 I , I 6; 40 I, 49 I , 27f; 40 I, 528, 6ff; 40 I, 551 , I 9ff. 
190 W A 40 I, 480, 32ff; 40 I, 485, 27f; 40 I, 487, 32ff; 40 I, 492, I 7ff; 40 I, 528, 14ff; 40 I, 551, 
22ff 
191 WA 40 I, 479f.: ·'Hic sciendum est duplicem esse legis usum ( ... )Primusergo intellectus et usus 
legum est cohercere impios. Diabolus namque regnat in toto orbe terrarum et impellit homines ad omnia 
flagitia. ldeo Deus ordinavit Magistratus, Parentes, praeceptores, leges, vincula et omnes ordinationes civiles, 
ut, si non possint amplius, revinciant saltem diabolo manus, ne pro libidine sua saeviat etc. ( ... ) Alter legis 
usus est Theologicus seu Spiritualis, qui valet ad augendas transgressiones. Et is maxime quaeritur in lege 
Mosi, ut per eam crescat et multiplicetur peccatum, praesertim in conscientia. De hoc Paulus magnifice 
disputat ad Roma. 7. ltaque verum officium et principal is ae proprius usus legis est, quod revelat homini suum 
peccatum, caecitarem, miseriam, impietatem, ignorantiam, odium, conternptum Dei, mortem, infernum, 
iudicium et commeritam iram apud Deum." 
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law necessary. 192 Theologically, the depraved nature of man makes it impossible for him to live 
according to the will of God, even if one acknowledges the law, i.e. natura! law. 
In this underst,mding of human nature, Luther comes quite close to the later conception 
of Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes' description of the state of nature as a war of every man against every 
man has remarkable resemblances to Luther's anthropological presuppositions. Furthermore, just 
as it is the case in Hobbes, that natura! law is not deri ved from human nature, so it is also the case 
in Luther. In neither Hobbes nor Luther does man haveasocial nature which accords with natura! 
law. Natura! law has a source outside human nature. In I-lobbes it is agreed upon as articles of 
peace in the state of nature. In Luther it has its source in the will of God. 193 
As an example ofLuther' s understanding of the depraved nature of the human being, let 
us consider his nation of the basis of political authority. The political authority is not conceived 
as being in accordance with human nature. 19-1 On the contrary, the political authority is necessary 
in arder to keep men from killing each other. Because God wants man to live and dwell on earth, 
he must institute and maintain the political authority, which is to inforce and preserve political 
arder. 
Denn wer wil sich widder die setzen odder ungehorsam sein odder sie 
verachten, die Gott selbs mit seinem namen nennet und sie Gatter heisst und 
seine eh.re an sie henget, das, wer sie veracht, ungehorsam ist odder sich widder 
sie setzt, der veracht damit und ist ungehorsam und setzt sich zu gleich widder 
den rechten obersten Gott, der ynn yhn ist und durch sie redet und richtet, Und 
heisst uhr urteil sein urteil. 195 
This forms an important reason for Luther' s emphasis on the Di vine institution of the political 
authority. The nation ofthe Di vine institution of the magistrate constitutes an absolutely essential 
19
" WA 6, 213, 36; 10 III, 381, 27; 11 , 251 , 8ff.; 16,507, 22ff.; 16,522, 24ff.; 30 II, 554, 35ff.: 
·· ... wo es [i.e. the politi ca] magistrate] nicht were, kundte kein mensch fur dem andem bleiben, Es muste einer 
den andern fressen, wie die unvernunfftigen thier unternander thun ( ... ) ais ist des welltlichen regiments werck 
und ehre, das es aus wilden thieren menschen macht und menschen erhellt, das sie nicht wilde thiere werden"; 
51,214, 30f. 
193 Cf. Nissen 1996, 63ff. fora more detailed comparison ofLuther and Hobbes with regard to their 
anthropological concetion and understanding ofthe basis of natura! law. 
19
~ WA 11,251, 12ff.; 30 Il, 555, 19ff. 
195 W A 31 I, 192, 25ff. 
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basis of Luther's political thought. As this is not our concem in the present thesis, we will confine 
ourselves to some short remarks. As Luther emphasizes God's will in his understanding of natural 
law, so he stresses the will of God as the basis of political authority. 196 This is conceived of as part 
of God's creatio conrinua, where God sustains the life among humans by keeping social and 
political order. Therefore, Luther can also argue that any active rebellion against the political 
authority is the Devil's work. 197 Consequently, Luther understands both natura! law and the 
political authority as based on the will of God and important parts of Gods sustaining of creation. 
For both it is also apparent that their source is the Divine will, rather than the nature of human 
beings. 
The political authority is absolutely necessary, but cannot be derived from human nature. 
Natura! man (i.e. the non-Christian) is so marked by sin and evil that social coexistence is 
impossible. 198 Even if it was attempted, nobody would be without fear. Therefore, man must be 
tied like a brute, if the world is not to be left desolate. Consequently, for natura! man God has " ... 
den selben ausser dem Christlichen stand unnd Gottis reych eyn ander regiment verschafft unnd 
sie unter das schwerd geworffen, das, ob sie gleych gerne wollten, doch nicht thun kunden yhr 
bossheyt und ob sie es thun, das sie es doch nit on furcht noch mit friede unnd glilck thun miigen: 
gleych wie man eyn wild bosse thier mit keten und banden fasset, das es nit beyssen noch reyssen 
kan noach seyner artt, wie wol es gerne wollt ( ... ) Denn wo das nicht were, Syntemal alle wellt 
bose und unter tausent kaum eyn recht Christ ist, wiirde eyns das ander fressen, das niemant kund 
weyb und kind zihen, wich neeren und Gotte dienen, damit die welt wiiste wiirde."199 
The function of political authority, therefore, is to protect against chaotic conditions.200 
In a concise passage from Eine Predigt, dass man Kinder zu Schulen ha/ten solle20 1, we find 
196 WA 11, 247, 21: Auffs erst mi.issen wyr das welltlich recht und schwerd wol grunden, das nicht 
yemand dran zweyffel, es sey von Gottis willen und ordnung ynn der wellt; 19, 625, 20ff.; 19, 629, 22ff.; 30 
11, 554, 36; 3 l I. 192. I ff.: Weil es nu nicht aus menschlichem willen odder fi.irnemen kompt, Sondern Gott 
selbs alle oberkeit setzet und erhelt 
197 WA 18, 307, 20ff.; 311, 192, 10 
198 WA 10 lll, 381, 19ff.; 11 ,25 1, 4ff.; 16, 507ff.; 16, 525, 6ff.; 16, 527, 33ff.; 40 rII, 268, 17ff. 
199 WA 11 ,251, 4ff. 
2uo WA 10 III, 381, 19ff.; 11,251, 12ff.; 16, 488, 19; 18,390, 36ff.; 24, 73, 28; 30 II, 554, 35ff.; 
40 III, 2 I 0, 38f. 
101 WA 3011, 517ff. 
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several of these ideas concentrated. Here, Luther speaks of the Divine institution of the political 
authority in ord er to prevent the possible consequences of man' s natura! behavior as a wild animal. 
Aber das welltlich regiment erhelt zeitlichen und vergenglichen frieden, recht 
und leben. Aber dennoch ists eine herrliche Gottliche ordnung und eine 
treffliche gabe Gottes, der es auch gestifft und eingesetzt hat und auch wil 
erhalten haben, als des man aller ding nicht emperen kan, Und wo es nicht 
were, kundte kein mensch fur dem andem bleiben, Es muste einer den andem 
fressen, wie die unvemunfftigen thier untemander thun, Darumb gleich wie des 
predig ampts werck und ehre ist, das es aus sundem eitel heiligen, aus todten 
lebendige, aus verdampten seligen, aus teuffels dienem Gottes kinder macht, 
Also ist des welltlichen regiments werck und ehre, das es aus wilden thieren 
menschen macht und menschen erhellt, das sie nicht wilde thiere werden. Es 
erhellt einem iglichen seinen leib, das den nicht jederman erwurgen musse, 
schenden mlisse, Es erhellt iglichem sein kind, tochter und son, das ihm das 
selbige nicht iederman entfuren noch entwenden mlisse, Es erhellt iglichem sein 
haus und hoff, das nicht ein iderman hinein brechen noch drinnen freveln mlisse, 
Es erhellt iglichem sein acker, vihe und allerley gliter, das die selbigen nicht ein 
iderrnan angreiffen, stelen, rauben, beschedigen mUsse, Welchs alles unter den 
thieren nicht ist, Und wurde auch unter den menschen nicht sein, wo weltlich 
regiment nicht were, sondem wurden gewislich aus menschen eitel thiere 
werden.201 
Surnmarizing the above, we have seen that Luther has a somewhat doublesided understanding of 
the relation between nature and natural law. On the one hand he comes very close to arguing for 
a realist understanding, when he speaks ofthe moral norrnativity as present in nature. On the other 
hand, he keeps maintaining the necessity of the will of God, demonstrating that the basis is rather 
to be conceived of in voluntaristic terms. This latter aspect also seems to be more in line with his 
anthropological ideas, where he endorses a view on human nature where it is seen as a brute. So 
even if there are traits pointing in the opposite direction, the main trend in Luther is his 
understanding of natural law as not being based in his concept of nature. This of course leads us 
to an enquiry, as to where Luther then finds the basis of natura! law, a question leading us to look 
into his understanding of the role of reason, to which we now turn. 
202 WA 30 II, 554, 33ff. 
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5.2 Reason as the Basis of Morality 
Having seen how Luther's understanding of natural law as not being based in nature, we now have 
to raise the question of the relation between natura! law and reason. How does Luther understand 
reason with respect to the basis of natural law? This question will be dealt with by giving an 
account of, firstly, his understanding of natura! law as a law ofreason and, secondly, the character 
of the depravity of human nature. 
5.2.1 Natural Law as a Law ofReason 
When Luther speaks of the place of the apprehension of natura! law, he refers to several places. 
In same passages he refers to the heart as its seat2°3, whereas in others he puts more emphasis on 
the conscience as the place where natural law is recognized.204 Even if Luther does acknowledge 
these other places, this does not mean that he discards of the traditional understanding of natura! 
law as based in reason. Cf. also Althaus: "Das natiirliche Recht ist dem Menschen "eingepflanzt", 
namlich der menschlichen Vemunft. Insofem ist es Vemunftrecht - die Vemunft weiss darum. 
Aber es stammt von Gott, der die Vemunft gegeben und das natiirliche Gesetz ihr eingeschrieben 
hat.::>.os 
203 WA 16, 431, 28ff.; 16, 447, 26ff.; 17 II, 102, 4ff.; 30 I, 192, 19; 391, 426, 9ff.; 391, 455, 15ff. 
204 W A 16, 431 , 29; 17 TI, I 03, 1 ff.: "Wie wird dyrs nu( o) fur Gott gehen, wenn du nicht liebest 
deynen nehisten? Da wird dich deyn eygen gewissen verdamnen, das solch gepott inn sich beschrieben sind, 
und das gantz leben ais eyn exempel wird wider dich zeugen, das du nicht auch also than hast dem andern, 
wie dich deyn eygen leben so krefftig gelert hatt ... " 
205 Althaus 1965, 32. Reason as the basis of natura} law has often been repeated, cf. e.g. Haikola 
1967, 67ff. and Olsson 1971 , 504ff.. One important discussion, however, is how this understanding of reason 
relates to Luther's understanding of love as the principle of Christian ethics. The classical discussion in this 
respect is the discussion between Troeltsch and Holl. Troeltsch 1912, 532 claimed that the basis in reason was 
Luther's only way of maintaining a concept of natura! law, why Luther had to separate it from the Biblical 
ethics oflove. In contrast to this interpretation, Holl 1932, 24 7 argued that Luther had understood natura} law 
in the light ofthe Christian concept of love. For Luther the commandment ofcharity was the basis ofhis 
understanding ofnatural law as a law ofreason. More recently, Raunio 1998 has given an interpretation which 
has some similarity to Holl's understanding. According to Raunio the previous interpretations of Luther's 
understanding of natura] law often read Luther in dualistic categories, separating the Di vine and the human. 
Furthermore, this understanding has implied a distinction between " is" and "ought" and the rejection of any 
objective structure of being upon which natura! law is grounded (97f.). Raunio wants to correct this 
understanding by demonstrating how natura} law is to be understood as participation in the divine order of 
love, constituted in creation. "To my knowledge, no one has recognized that natura! law, that is, the Golden 
Rule, is from the beginning for Luther the law of divine nature, or the law of divine love. The Reformer calls 
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Denn niemand ist, der nicht fulet und bekennen mtisse, das es recht und war sey, 
da das nattirlich gesetz spricht: Was du dyr gethan und gelassen willt haben, das 
thu und las auch eym andern, das liecht lebet, und leucht ynn aller menschen 
vernunfft. 206 
For Luther, the emphasis on reason as the basis of natural Iaw holds significant implications with 
respect to the moral sufficiency of natural law. It is the endorsement of reason as the primary basis 
of natura] law which enables Luther to argue that natura! law holds universal and political 
applicability. 
Luther by no means understands natural law as confined to a select people. Neither Jews 
nor Christians have an exclusive understanding of natura! law. That other peoples also have an 
understanding of natural law is often argued by Luther in his reflections on the legitimate political 
authorities of these peoples. Natura! law is taught to them by their own conscience and reason. 
What this natural law demands is nothing else than the Decalogue. An important reference for 
Luther in this respect is Romans 1 and 2.207 
Das aber wir Heyden ein gesetz haben, das leret uns unser eygen gewissen und 
vemunfft, wie auch Sant Paulus zun Romem am Ersten spricht ( ... ) Derhalben 
it the law ofpure and uncontaminated nature, which is identical to love( ... ) We have largely forgotten or failed 
to take into consideration adequately that for Luther the whole creation is an "order of love." In this order 
nothing exists for itselfbut all things exist for others. The sun shines, water flows, and trees produce fruit for 
others and not forthemselves. Nature follows this law, and the aim ofnatural law is that falle humankind, too, 
regains participation in this order of creation." (103f.). In spite of my high regards ofRaunio's work, I must 
admit some problems in foliowing him in this interpretation. Two problems appear to be the most decisive. 
Firstly, methodologically Raunio's references are limited to very early works ofLuther. This does not appear 
to be an understanding which is shared by amore mature Luther. Secondly, theologically this understanding 
would imply serious problems with regard to Luther's later understanding of natura! law. If natural law is 
considered common to all mankind, what are the soteriological implications of Raunio's interpretation? It 
appears tome, that Raunio's interpretation will have difficulties in incorporating fundamental themes ofthe 
two uses of the law and the two kingdoms doctrine. lf the commmon natura! law is considered participation 
in divine nature, as Raunio claims, what is the relevance of faith? Of course, Raunio gives an answer to some 
ofthese objections, claiming that man in faith receives the Di vine love and participates in the divine attributes. 
Only hereby is the loving application ofnatural law possible ( l 13ff.). However, this does not resolve a certain 
uneasiness conceming the underlying interpretation of natura! law. How is the relation between natura! law 
as such which is understood as Divine love (in which the whole creation takes part) and natura! law in the light 
offaith (which is understood as the participation in di vine attributes) to be understood?. lt appears tome that 
the distinctions are somewhat unclear and may imply serious theological problems. 
106 W A 1 7 II, I 02, 8ff. 
201 WA 16, 379, 9ff.; 16, 431, 14ff.; 18,307, 5; 39 l, 540, 2f. 
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wenn gleich Mose das gesetz nie geschrieben hette, so haben doch alle 
menschen das gesetz von natur ynn yhren hertzen geschrieben, Gott aber hat 
den Jtiden auch ein geschrieben gesetz, das ist die Zehen gepot geben zum 
Uberflus, welche auch nicht anders sind denn das gesetz der natur, das uns 
nati.irlich ynns hertz geschrieben ist. Was nu Moses geschrieben hat ynn den 
Zehen gepoten, das fiilen wir nattirlich ynn unserm gewissen Rom. 2.208 
This implies that natura! law has a universal validity. It is not confined to a narrow group to whom 
the law has been revealed. Therefore, neither the revelation of the Decalogue nor the preaching 
of the law justifies a restricted endorsement. Natura} law is considered universally valid. 
This is also apparent in Luther's understanding of the political implications ofhis natura! 
law thought. Accorcling to Luther, the rightful political authority rules according to natura! law, 
which finds its expression in an emphasis on the concept of reason. In Von der weltlichen 
obrigkeii1°9 this understanding is formulated quite clearly in Luther's reflections on how the 
political rul er is to aet. Afer having given an account of the necessity and limits of the political 
authority, in the last part of the writing, Luther tums to the question on the guiding principles of 
the political ruler. An important concem for Luther is to give guidance to the Christian political 
mier, this guidance also reveals important sides to Luther' s understanding of the role of reason 
for the non-Christian ruler. Luther emphasises the necessity of the ruler being wiser than his 
counsellors. If the ruler does not have a deeper understanding of the law than what can be 
acquired from books, unjustice will prevail. The ruler must be able to go beyond the actual law 
and by means ofreason make ajudgment how a law is to be applied.210 Reason must guide the use 
of law. Luther then reflects on several concrete questions and ends his writing by returning to the 
role of reason in the interpretation of law and justice. In the question of restitution, love and 
natura! law should be the guiding princip les. One should not just claim one' s right, but should take 
the particular case into consideration.21 1 Tue right judgment cannot be given on account of books, 
208 WA 16,431, 14ff. 
209 W A 11 , 229ff. 
210 W A 11, 272, l 3ff.: "Darumb muss eyn furst das recht ja so fast ynn seyner hand ha ben ais das 
schwerd unnd rnitt eygener vemunffi messen, wenn unnd wo das recht der strenge nach zu( o) brauchen odder 
zu(o) lindem sey, Also das allzeyt uber alles recht regiere unnd das uberst recht unnd rneyster alles rechten 
bleybe die vernunfft". 
211 WA 11,278, 27ff. 
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but must be deri ved from love and natura! law, of which reason is filled. Concludingly, Luther 
makes the point that one should never let the positive law make reason a prisoner. Rather, reason 
should govern and guide the understanding of law.212 
From these references to Luther's understanding of the relation between natura! law, 
reason, and the positive law, it is clear how Luther understands the positive law as an expression 
of natura! law, which is known to reason. Therefore, reason must judge according to its 
understanding of natura! law. Consequently, natura! law is understood as a law of reason, an 
evaluative critical norm. This understanding of natura! law is also apparent in Luther's 
understanding of the relation between the biblical law and natura! law. Just as the political law is 
to be in accordance with and evaluated in the light of natura! law213, so the normativity of biblical 
law is determined by its accordance with natura! law. The reason for teaching the Decalogue is 
because it corresponds to natura! law.214 As such natura! law is the critical norm for the 
Decalogue. It is natura! law which determines what should be obligatory.215 Therefore, Luther also 
says that one can construct new and more clear decalogues. "Certainly, we can make new 
decalogues, just as Paul does in all of the !etters, and Peter, but most of all Christin the Gospels. 
And these decalogues are clearer than the decalogue of Moses ... "216 Thus, Luther also here sees 
reason as the basis of natura! law. It is on account of a reasonable, critical reflection that one finds 
the most appropriate expression of natura! law. Therefore, former normative sumrnaries, such as 
the Decalogue, are under a constant critical evaluation. This critical evaluation is undertaken by 
reason. 
This understanding of natura! law as a law of moral reasoning and Luther' s emphasis on 
the continuous assessment of positive law and construction of new moral laws is a point where 
112 W A 11 , 280, l 6ff.: "Darumb sollt man geschriebene recht unter der vemunfft hallten, darauss 
sie doch gequollen sind ais auss dem rechts brunnen, und nit den brunn an seyne flosslin bynden und die 
vemunfft mitt buchstaben gefangen furen." 
rn WA 11 , 279, 24ff.; 11,280, 12ff.; 17 II, 102, 11; 30 II, 562, 10 
m WA 16, 394, 19ff.; 16,447, 22ff.; 18, 81 , 18ff.: ''Warumb hellt und leret man denn die zehen 
gepot? Antwort: Darumb, das die naturlichen gesetze nyrgent so feyn, und ordenlich sind verfasset ais ynn 
Mose, Drumb nympt man billich das exempel von Mose." 
215 WA 16,394, 19ff.; 16, 424, I !ff. 
216 WA 39 I, 47, 27ff.: "Imo novos Decalogus faciemus, sicut Paulus facit per omnes Epistolas, et 
Petrus, maxime Christus in Euangelio. Et hi Decalogi clariores sunt, quam Mosi Decalogus ... " 
79 
Reason and Divine Will 
it may be argued that Luther represents what one could call theological constructivism. In contrast 
to philosophical constructivism, a theological constructivism presupposes a given basis of 
normativity. Theological constructivism continuously constructs moral principles on the basis of 
this given source of moral normativity.217 
However, even ifLuther seems to emphasize the basis of natura! law in reason, he also 
endorses the darkened understanding of reason. Because of the sinfullness of man, his 
understanding of natura! law can be so blinded that he does not apprehend it properly. This 
somewhat enigmatic understanding of natura! law as having its basis in reason and yet reason as 
depraved necessitates same further remarks on man's apprehension of natura! law and the 
character ofthe depravity of man' s nature. 
5.2.2 The Depravity of Man's Relation to Natura} Law 
When Luther seems to be able to unite his understanding of natura! law as recognizable by reason 
and yet man' s understanding thereof as darkened, the question arises, how Luth er understands this 
depravity. Is it of an epistemological character? Or, should it rather be conceived of in theological 
terms? 
Here, as elsewhere, Luther is not concemed with philosophical questions. Luther is first 
and foremost a theologian. Therefore, his primary concem is nota theory of knowledge, but rather 
an account of man's relation to God. Therefore, even when Luther speaks ofthe majestic dignity 
of reason218 and its abilities in ordering wordly affairs,219 this does not mean that he thereby sets 
aside his understanding of man's distorted reation to God and neighbour. Rather, he maintains the 
misuse and misunderstanding of natura! law as characteristic of all men. This is apparent when he 
speaks of man' s understanding of natura! law. 
Even if men have a natura! apprehension and feeling of natura! law, reason is so blinded 
217 Cf. 14.2 fora further account of a theological qualification of metaethical constructivism. 
218 W A 39 I, 175, 20: ·'Nec eam Maiestatem Deus post lapsum Adae ademit rationi, sed potius 
confirmavit." 
119 WA 40 1, 293, 28ff.: "Quare naturalia quidem integra sunt, sed quae naturalia? Quod homo in 
impietate mersus et servus diaboli habet voluntatem, rationem, liberum arbitrium et potestatem aedificandi 
domum, gerendi magistratum, gubernandi navem, et faciendi alia officia quae homini sunt subiecta, Gen 
primo. Ea enim non sunt adempta homini, Non est sublata generatio, politia, oeconomia, sed confirmata est 
his dictis." 
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and depraved by the Devil that they do not understand this knowledge. If tbey are reminded by the 
word of God they intentionally set it aside and ignore it.220 Therefore, Luther argues, people are 
totally wrong when they fool themselves by supposing that they understand the commandment of 
charity. Of course, it is part of their nature, but that does not imply that they really understand it. 
This is evident from the way they aet upon it. If they had understood it properly, they would have 
preferred the deeds of charity. So unbelievably and infinitely blinded is human reason that it is 
incapable of judging rightly on the doctrine of faith, life or deeds. 221 In other words, Lutber 
acknowledges man' s recognition of natura! law, but stresses the misuse of it. This misuse is so 
grave that Luther can even say that man does not have a real understanding of natura! law. Man 
only has understood part of natura! law, not the deeper sense of it. 
This lack of the deeper sense of natura! law relates to fundamental themes wi thin L uther' s 
ethics, of which only a brief account can be given here. For this purpose we focus on a sermon on 
Romans 13, 8ff. from 1525.122 The deeper sense ofnatural law is love. It is this sense of natura! 
law which is ignored, when natura! law is only understood in terms of demand. This is due to the 
depraved nature of man, where the recognition of the law is tumed into a carnal prudence, 
prudentia carnis.123 The law is not seen as God 's loving will for his creation. The goodnes of God 
is not apparent.224 Any positive law is an expression of natura! law and love. When this 
110 W A 40 II, 66, 34ff.: "Tametsi enim omnes homines 'notitiam quandam naturalem habeant, 
animis ipsorum insitam', qua naturaliter sentiunt alteri faciendum esse, quod quis velit sibi fieri (Quae 
sententia et similes, quas !egern naturae vocarnus, sunt fundamentum humani iuris et omnium bonorurn 
operum), tamen adeo corrupta et caeca est vitio diaboli humana ratio, ut illam cognitionem secum natam non 
intelligat aut, si etiam admonita verbo Dei intelligat, tamen scienter (tanta est potentia Satanae) eam negligat 
et contemnat." 
111 WA 40 II, 71 , 32ff.: "Adea incomprehensibilis et infinita est caecitas humanae rationis, ut non 
solum de doctrina fidei sed etiam de vita et operibus rite iudicare non possit." 
121 Am Vierden sontag nach Epiphanie. Epistel S. Pauli zu den Romern ca. xiii (WA 17 II, 88-104) 
223 WA 39 I, 82, ! 5ff.: Natura enim vitio original is Peccati corrupta et excaecata non potest ultra 
et supra opera ullam iustificationem imaginari aut concipere; 40 I, 504, 32ff.; 40 Il, 71, 22ff. 
214 This is a point which is also emphasized by Olsson 1971 , I 66: "Durch das natur! iche Gesetz hat 
er zwar Kenntnis davon, dass dies eine Forderung teils im Verhaltnis zu Gott, teils im Verhaltnis zum 
Nachsten an ihn richtet. Aber in seiner Verkehrtheit beherrscht ihn die Vorstellung, dasser durch Leistungen 
vor Gott dessen Wohlgefallen erringen soli, die Einstellung also, dasser sich selber vor Gott behaupten soli." 
The distinction between the demand ofthe law and God's will is a fundamental distinction in Olsson's work. 
Hereby Olsson refers to the unity ofthe law and gospel befare the Fall ofman as an expression ofLuther's 
understanding ofGod 's will, whereas man after the Fall only sees God as demanding. ( I 19ff.). 
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fundamental norm of law is forgotten, the true meaning oflaw is not applied.225 Therefore, Luther 
distinguishes between living according to law and living according to love. Whereas the former 
only looks at the outward deeds, the latter takes the need of one's neighbour into consideration.226 
This applies to Luther's understanding of the relation to the law and the distinction between (i) 
the apprehension of natura! law and (ii) the life in accordance with the will ofGod. God's will goes 
beyond a mere apprehension of the law.227 The life in accordance with God's will is only possible 
on the basis of faith. It is only on the basis of faith that one can live the life of pure love, which is 
the will of God. 218 Therefore, Luther distinguishes sharply between the deeds of law and the deeds 
of faith. This is a fundamentally important distinction for Luther, which repeatedly can be found 
repeatedly in his writings.219 For the person to aet in accordance with love, a change in the person 
has to occur. The person must have been justified by faith. Having been justified by faith, law, 
however, still remains. But now law can be fulfilled on the basis of love and not on the basis of a 
demand. Therefore, justification by faith and love to neighbour are intimately related to each 
other.230 Luther puts it very precisely: "Also bleybt der glaub der thetter und die liebe bleybt die 
that."231 
These reflections on the relation to the law are explicitly related to natura! law. As he 
argues elsewhere, Luther also here endorses the voluntaristic notion of natura! law as engraved 
m WA 17 Il, 9lff. 
226 W A 17 Il, 88f. 
227 W A I 7 Il, 90, 17ff.: "Wer rechte gutte werck du( e )r Gott thun wi li, der hu( o )te sich du( e )r den 
gu( e )tten wercken, die du( o )r der wel It gleyssen und da durch die leut meynen frum zu werden. Und wer frum 
und heylig seyn will, der hute sich fu(e)r der heylichkeit ynn wercken ausser dem glauben." 
228 WA 17 II, 97, 7ff.: "Wie wyr ofil gesagt haben, glaub und liebe mus man also scheyden, das der 
glaub auff die person und die liebe auff die werck gericht sey. Der glaube vertilget die sund und macht die 
person angeneme und gerecht. Wenn aber die person angenem und gerecht worden ist, so wird yhr der heylige 




9 Cf. e.g. W A 6, 207, 26ff.: "Alszo einn Christen mensch, der in dieser zuvorsicht gegen got lebt, 
weisz alle ding, vormag alle dingk, vormisset sich aller ding, was zu thun ist, und thuts alles frolich und frey, 
nit umb vil guter vordinst unnd werck zusamlen, zsondern das yhm eine lust ist got alzso wolgefallen, und 
leuterlich umb sunst got dienet, daran benuget, das es got gesellet"; 11, 249, 24ff.; 30 I, 180, 23ff. 
230 W A 17 Il, 98, l 3ff.: "Ob nu wol der glaube das gesetze nicht fu( o )llet, so hat er doch das, dam it 
es erfu(o)llet wird, denn er erwirbet den geyst und die liebe, damit es erfullet wird. Widderumb, ob die liebe 
nicht rechtfertiget, so beweyset sie doch das, damit die person rechtfertig ist, nemlich den glauben." 
231 WA 17 II, 98, 25. 
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on tbe mind of man and natura! law as apparent to every man.232 However, the depravity of man's 
nature prevents the true meaning of natural law, i.e. love. Even if every man feels and recognizes 
natura! law and the golden rule, the distorted lust and love prevents its true meaning. 
Deru1 eyn iglicher fulet, das er will geliebt und nicht gehasset seyn, so fulet und 
sihet er auch, das er eym andem eben dasselb schuldig ist, das heysst aber lieben 
den andem als sich selbs. Aber die bo(e)se lust und liebe verfinstem solchs liecht 
und blenden den menschen, das er solch buch ynn seynem hertzen nicht ansihet 
und solchem hellem gepott der vemunfft nicht folget, darumb mu(e)s man yhm 
mit eusserlichen gepotten, bu( o )chem, schwerd und gewalt weren und zu ruck 
treyben, und yhn solchs seynes natu( o )rlichen liechts erynnem und seyn eygen 
hertz ihm fur die augen stellen. Noch sehen sie solchs liecht nicht, sondem 
bo(e)se lust und liebe weret, das sie des nicht achten and mu(e)s doch von 
aussen durch schwerd und gesetz gezwungen, von der that sich enthalten.233 
This discussion on the relation of man to natura! law also relates to the question ofthe unity ofthe 
law in Luther. Is the law to be considered as essentially the same, befare and after the Fall? Does 
Luther make use oftwo concepts of law? Even ifthis has aften been endorsed, it is important to 
maintain the unified concept oflaw in Luther.23➔ When Luther distinguished between the situation 
befare and after the Fall, the distinction does not concem the content of the law. The law is 
essentially the same. However, man's relation to the law differs. Therefore, the difference is to be 
found in man's relation to the law rather than in the content of the law. 
Concluding on the question conceming the character of the depravity of man, it may be 
argued that the depravity is of a theological character. Man recognizes natural law just as well 
after the Fall, as he did befare. The depravity concems neither the content of the law nor the 
232 WA 17 II, 102, 4ff. 
233 WA 17 Il, 102, I 6ff. 
134 The classical reference is the mentioned idea of Troeltsch that Luth er distinguishes between an 
absolute and a relative natura( law (1912, 486ff.). This interpretation has been rejected by e.g. Holl 1932, 481 
and Athaus 1965, 3 7. Olsson refers to this discussion, pointing to problems in the interpretations ofTroeltsch 
as well as Holl. ·' lm Hinblick auf diese von Troeltsch und Holl berilhrten Fragen muss vor allen Dingen betont 
werden, dass es sich nach Luthers Anschauung realiter so verhalt, dass das natilrliche Gesetz, der Dekalog 
und die Gebote der Bergpredig (bzw. des Neuen Testamentes) an und fur sich identisch sind, und mit ein und 
demselben Begreff erfasst werden, namlich dem Begriff des Gesetzes" ( 1971, 168f). For further discussion 
on this issue, cf. Lau 1933, 62ff. and Heckel 1953, 88. Furthermore, Raunio's survey (I 993, 21 ff.) of the 
interpretations ofthe relation between natura! law and Divine love rnay also be read as a summary ofthis 
discussion. 
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apprehensive faculties of man. When Luther does admit the blinded apprehension ofnatural law, 
he does not so much refer to the lessened recognition of natural law as to man's distorted relation 
to the same law. This relation can only be rectified on account of justification by faith. Therefore, 
the depravity is of a theological character rather than epistemological. 
5 .3 Conclusion 
The analysis of Luther' s understanding of natura! law has demonstrated several points of relevance 
to the thesis. First of all, it is important to note that he argues in fa vor of a natura! law theory 
where the focus is on reason, rather than nature. Even ifhe relates his nation of natura! law to his 
doctrine of creation, this does not imply that he bases natural law in an understanding of an 
analogy between the natura! order and natural law, as we saw it in Melancthon. This seems to be 
the case, even if there may be points where he appears to endorse nature as the basis of amoral 
order. In Luther's doctrine of creation, the notion of God' s continuous care for creation is an 
important idea. This implies that his understanding of natural law is also seen in this light. This is 
part ofthe reason why he can separate nature and reason as basis of natura! law. As human nature 
is depraved, natura! law is based upon the will of God, rather than human nature. The human 
being' s knowledge of natura! law is an expression ofGod's endowment ofhuman beings with the 
abilities of moral reasoning and the ability to take of the po1itical regime. This endowment is also 
expressed in terms of God as engraving natural law in the reason of the human being. In this sense, 
natura! law is primarily a law of reason. As a law of reason, this ability also gives the human being 
the responsibility of continuously evaluating positive laws (whether political og Biblical) and as 
an ongoing process construct new moral laws. Here Luther appears to advocate a theological 
constructivism. Tue determination of the content of natural law is an successive, open endeavour. 
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Reason as the Source of Normativity 
In the present chapter the primary attention will be given to the moral philosophy of Immanuel 
Kant.235 The philosophical works of Kant have had a continuous profound impact. This influence 
is also apparent in the present thesis, as some of the theories of envirorunental ethics are inspired 
by basically Kantian tenets. 236 This impact of Kant is part of the reason for the necessity of a 
thorough analysis of his thought. Another reason is his actual central significance for the topic of 
the thesis. 
It may be argued that the relation between nature and reason is an absolutely fundamental 
issue in Kant's moral philosophy. His discussion on this question is closely related to his stance 
on traditional natura! law thought. For the traditional natura! law thought a close link between the 
two was argued, as has been described in the present thesis. For Kant, it seems, the whole concept 
of morality is determined by the independence of autonomous moral reason from nature. However, 
Kant also argues for the important relation between the two, a!beit on the basis of his critical 
theory as a whole. As these issues are so closely related to the discourse on natura! law thought, 
the present analysis of Kant's understanding of the relation between nature and reason is also 
dependent upon recent interpretations of Kant's moral philosophy in the light of natura! law 
235 Consequently, focus will be on the moral philosophical treatises. Among these special attention 
will be given to Grundlegung zur Meraphysik der Sitten and Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. The 
complexity of Kant's thought and the extent of secondary literature necessitates such a narrowing of one's 
field of enquiry. This does not mean that other writings of Kant (particularly other moral philosophical 
writings) are not taken into consideration, but they are given a !esser priority and figure mainly as 
perspecti ves. 
236 Taylor and Sagoff represent the most clear Kantian inspiration. Taylor's theory of respect for 
nature (cf. Chapter 9) is inspired by Kant's idea ofthe moral agent 's respect for other moral agents as ends 
in themselves. Sagoff's theory (cf. Chapter 11) emphasizes a nation ofmoral reasoning which may be seen 
as basically Kantian. Cf. also Nissen (Forthcoming) for an account of the Kantian influence in Taylor and 
Sagoff and fora critical discussion on Kant's moral philosophy as the basis of environmental ethics. 
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thought. 237 This will be demonstrated on the basis of an analysis of two fundamental structures in 
Kant's moral theory. Firstly, it will be demonstrated how the basis of morality as a faet of reason 
is an inevitable notion ofKant. The emphasis on this point leads Kant into problems with regard 
to nature. However, secondly, it can also be demonstrated how Kant incorporates the link between 
nature and reason in his critical theory. This leads to the concluding aim of the present 
interpretation of Kant, namely to argue that Kant's understanding of moral reason as natura! 
reason implies a strong affinity to traditional natura! law thought leading to the tentative assertion 
that Kant' s moral theory fundamentally is to be understood as a natura! law theory. 
6.1 Causality and/or Freedom 
The question concerning Kant's understanding of the relation between nature and reason is 
237 ln the works on Kant's natura! law thought, one can broadly distinguish between works of 
historical and systematic character. Among the works with an historical approach three studies are of 
particular interest. Dulckeit 1932 discusses the relation between natura! law and positive law in Kant. Krieger 
1965 gives an account ofthe crises ofnatural law. In modem times this is partly due to the notorious dualism 
in Kant between nature and morality. However, this duality is not absolute in Kant, why Krieger demonstrates 
how Kant in various ways attempts to overcome this dichotomy by providing the possibility of a unity of 
nature and morality. Furthermore, it is demonstrated how Kant in his notions ofhistory and politics argue for 
an actual unity of nature and morality. Schneewind 1993 gives an account of Kant's resemblance to the 
Grotian modem natura! law tradition. At several points do we find a similar interest. So, even if Kant also 
differs in various ways, it is argued that this tradition provided him with " ... the determining problem for 
practical philosophy'' (55). 
Among more systematically orientated studies I wish to mention the foliowing: Cohen I 910 
demonstrates how the natura! law was a faet in Kants "Rechtslehre". This understanding of natura I law is 
discussed in relation to contemporary representatives ofnatural law and it is argued that Kant holds a double 
line of thought. Natura! law is at the same time a part of ethics and yet independent thereof (391 ). Paton 1946, 
I 57ff. explains how Kant' s natura! law fonnula ofthe categorical imperative in several respects brings him 
cl ose to a traditional understanding of natura! law. This is main ly argued by reference to Kant's understanding 
of nature as a type and symbol of moral law. Hereby, it is claimed that the notion of the natura! arder is 
essential to Kant as a symbol ofthe moral arder. Rossvær 1989 refers to Paton's classical work, but criticizes 
Paton for his thesis of a double requirement for the moral i ty of an action. According to Rossvær, this neglects 
Kant's emphasis on the unity ofthe different formulations ofthe categorical imperative. Rather, one must 
adopt a double perspective, implying a theoretical and practical aspect on the moral lawgiving. In his inclusion 
ofthe theoretical aspect in the practical reason, Kant provides the basis ofseeingthe moral subject from a new 
universal perspective, based on the concept of the maxim, constituting the new sense ofmoral agency. The 
task of integrating different maxi ms leads to the assertion of the necessity of finding one's place in nature as 
a rational being, leading to the natura I law formula of the categorical imperative. 
Other works of a more ind i reet concern with natura! law ( e.g. Schink 19 I 3; Wil I iams 1968; li ting 
1972 and Forschner 1974) could also be mentioned, but if one confines oneself to the works with an explicit 
interest in this notion, the relevant works are rather few. 
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connected to fundamental traits of his moral philosophy. The understanding of this relation is 
maybe the basis of the whole of Kant' s critical theory of the possibility of moral norms. The 
fundamental problem to Kant is the relation between the sensuously perceived nature and the 
lawfullness of ethics. This problem had become acute for Kant partly because of the influence of 
the theories of the new science about the mechanical laws of nature,238 partly because of the 
influence of the moral philosopical theories of Christian Wolff. 239 
In Kant's moral philosophy Wolff is a leading figure of opposition. Wolffs notion of 
perfection as a basic principle of morality240 forms a position fundamentally at variance with 
Kant.241 For Kant this idea did not leave space for the freedom ofthe moral agent, which is so 
essential to Kant's moral philosophy. However, at the same time this raises an essential problem 
for him. As the human being in one sense is a natura! being and yet in another sense amoral being, 
how do these aspects of the human being relate to each ether? How does one maintain both the 
notion of the action of humans as taking part in a causally determined world and yet claim that the 
freedom of the moral agent is based upon the independence from natura! causality? In other words, 
Kant came cl ose to a selfcontradiction, which he also acknowledged in his discussion on the third 
antinomy. 
In Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft it is i.a. argued that reason has an urge for a 
comprehensive understanding ofthe totality ofthe world. Undertaking this endeavour reason ends 
up in selfcontradictions, i.e. antinomies. The third af these concerns the contrast between freedom 
and complete determination.2·12 From one perspective it may be endorsed that the causality af the 
238 Cf. Sullivan 1989, 11 
239 Cf. Ibid., 9 
24° Cf. 5.1.2 
w According to Beck, some commentators argue fora paradox in Kant's moral philosophy in 
relation to his stance on the relation between the individual and the law. According to this interpretation, Kant 
initially argues for the complete subjection of the individual to the law, but later endorses the subordination 
ofthe law to the will. It appears, however, that this is not to be seen as a paradox, but rather as an expression 
ofthe development in Kant's ethics with relation to rationalism and the later romanticism (1974, l 22ff.) 
242 KrV, B 472ff. 
References are given to volumes and pages of: Kant ·s gesammelte Schriften. Herausgegeben von 
der Koniglich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Band lff. Erste Abtheilung: Werke, Berlin: 
Druck und Verlag von Georg Reimer 191 Off. However, as I have also wanted to indicate explicitly, which 
writing is referred to, this reference is included as the preceding abbreviation. In the case of Kritik der reinen 
Ve111unft references are given to the first (A) and second (B) edition. 
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laws of nature is not the only causality on account of which the phaenomena of the world can be 
explained.243 From another perspective everything in the world occurs according to the laws of 
nature, why there is no freedom.244 The Thesis argues for the necessity of an absolute spontaneity 
of causality. This is the only way to explain the beginning of all causa! relations.245 This view 
provides the basis for an argument for transcendental freedom. Even if this freedom cannot be 
demonstrated, it still allows for the assumption of new causa! relations.246 As moral freedom 
necessitates freedom from causa! determination but also takes place in the world of causa! 
phaenomena, the acts of the moral agent also establish the beginning of a causa! relation.247 
According to the Antithesis freeedom and the laws of nature are irreconcilable. They express two 
differing concepts of causality. The spontaneity of causality endorsed in the nation of freedom 
leads to a negation of the unity of experience as there is no causa! relation between objects 
experienced. Nature is the only basis of consistency and arder in the occurences of the world. 
Freedom from the laws of nature is not only freedom from coercion, but also from the main thread 
of a11 laws. Consequently, nature and freedom differ from one another as lawfullness to 
lawlessness.248 However, if one takes the course of advocating a transcendental physiocracy (i.e. 
the omnipotence (Allvermogenheit) of nature) one has to endorse the viewpoint that there has 
been no absolute beginning of causality. Of course, this idea is incomprehensible, why some degree 
of transcendental freedom must be endorsed. If so, one ends up with the problem of reconciling 
this transdendental freedom to the sphere of the phaenomenal nature which seems impossible. 
Consequently, the notion of nature is dissolved.249 
These two different understandings of the relation between nature and freedom constitute 
an issue which Kant repeatedly discusses in his moral philosophy. If nature is causally determined, 
how do we maintain the freedom of the moral agent? lf the freedom of the moral agent is 
143 KrY, B 472. 
244 KrY, B 473. 
245 KrY, B 474f. 
246 KrV, B 476f. 
147 KrY, B 478. 
248 KrY, B 474f. 
249 KrV. B, 477ff. 
Cf. e.g. Allison 1990, 11 ff. and Naticchia 1994 fora more detailed discussion on the third antinorny. 
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demonstrated, how does this relate to the causally determined nature? Kant gives various answers 
to these problems. These reflections form the basic theme of the present discussion on Kant. One 
important key to understand this arnbiguity in Kant is the endorsement of a two view doctrine in 
Kant. When he discusses the relation between the sensuous (physical, phaenomenal) and the 
supersensuous (intelligible, noumenal) world, he is not arguing for two separate worlds but rather 
describing two different perspectives. The difference is methodical rather than ontological.250 
This theme of the third antinomy is an essential part ofthe present discussion on Kant's 
moral philosophy. The leading questions are: In what sense is morality based upon reason? What 
does this entail in relation to physical nature? Is it possible to bdng nature and reason close to each 
other in the basis of morality? 
6.2 Reason as the Basis of the Moral Law 
In this paragraph it will be attempted to concentrate the attention on reason as the basis of 
mora1ity. How does Kant argue for this viewpoint? How is morality understood as a law of 
reason? What is the nature of morality? 
6.2.1 Freedom and Autonomy 
Already in the preface to Grundlegung does Kant distinguish between the laws of nature and the 
laws of freedom. They are both seen as material knowledge of reason, as they have to do with 
specific objects and laws, to which they are subject. Thus they are in contrast to the formal 
knowledge of reason, which concerns itself only with the forms of rationality and reason and the 
general rul es of thought. 251 Even if they are alike one another in this respect, the laws of nature 
25° Cf. Beck 1960, 192f. Cf. also Paton 1946, 266ff. and Sullivan 1989, 279ff. for similar 
distinctions. One ofthe more recent discussions on this much discussed concept of two standpoints is in 
Korsgaard 1996, 200ff.. She seems to be in line with Beck, arguing that there is no real incongruency between 
the two views. "The two worlds, or the two views of the world we get from the two standpoints, may seem 
strangely incongruent, but it is important to see that there is no contradiction. The incongruity simply follows 
from the faet that we stand in two very different relations to our actions: we must try to understand them, but 
we must also decide which ones to do" (205). 
251 GMS, IV 387: "Alle Yernunfterkenntnis ist entweder material und betrachtet irgend ein Objekt; 
oder formal und beschaftigt sich blof3 mit der Form des Verstandes und der Yernunft selbst und den 
allgemeinen Regeln des Denkens i.iberhaupt, ohne Unterschied der Objekte. Die formale Philosophie hei/3t 
Logik, die materiale aber, welche es mit bestimmten Gegenstanden und den Gesetzen zu tun hat, denen sie 
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and freedom are fundamentally different. This is i.a. apparent in Kant's explanation of the basis 
of freedom. Freedom implies both a negative and positive sense.252 The negative sense of freedom 
is understood as the freedom from nature, the sensuous, and inclination253, whereas the positive 
is conceived of as the freedom of determining one's action in accordance with moral reason.254 
These two aspects ofthe nation of freedom are implied in each other and merely explicate a logical 
relation. To assert the possibility of the freedom of the will, one has to endorse both. 
The negative sense of freedom presumes the causality of the physical, phaenomenal 
nature. As man is a natura! as well as an intelligibel being, the negative sense of freedom argues 
for the possibility of the latter not to be determined by the physical causality. Freedom in this 
strong, transcendental sense presupposes complete independence from the causa! laws of nature. 255 
In this sense freedom is defined in contrast to nature. The notion of freedom is a pure concept of 
reason. which therefore is transcendent to the theoretical philosophy, why no examples of 
experience can be given. Where this nation merely is a regulative principle for the theoretical 
reason, it demonstrates its real i ty by practical use of the fundamental practical sentences. This is 
precisely on account of its being a causality of pure reason, whereby it determines arbitrium256 and 
unterworfen sind, ist wiederum zwiefach. Denn diese Gesetze sind entweder Gesetze der Natur oder der 
Freiheil. Die Wissenschaft von der ersten hei/3t Physik, die der andern ist Ethik; jene wird auch Naturlehre, 
diese Sittenlehre genannt." 
252 GMS. IV 446f., 452f; KpV, V 33, 47f.; MS, VI 213f., 226f. 
In the references to Metaphysik der Sitten I do not use the abbreviations referring to Kant's 
"Rechtslehre" or ''Tugendlehre" (as is often done), but the more inclusive reference to the whole work. This 
is due to rny conviction that these two parts are not to be read independently of one another, even if they 
should be distinguished. 
m GMS, IV 452f.; KpV, V 33; 96f. 
2;.i GMS, IV 447f.; 454f; KpV, V 33; 67; 105; 132. 
255 Kp V, V 29: ''Wenn aber auch kein anderer Bestimmungsgrund des Willens fur diesen zum 
Gesetz di enen kann ais blo/3 jene allgemeine gesetzgebende Form: so mu/3 ein solcher Wille ais ganzlich 
unabhangig von dem Naturgesetz der Erscheinungen, namlich dem Gesetze der Kausalitat, beziehungsweise 
aufeinander gedacht werden. Eine solche Unabhangigkeit aber hei/3t Freiheit im strengsten, d.i. transzendenta-
len Verstande. Also ist ein Wille, dem die blo/3e gesetzgebende Form der Maxime allein zum Gesetze dienen 
kann, ein freier Wille." 
256 The translation ofthe German Willkiir with arbitrium refers to Paton's terminology, cf. Paton 
1946, 213f. 
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demonstrates pure will, which is the source of all moral terms and laws. 257 
Precisely because man is both a natura! and an intelligible being, freedom takes both 
aspects into account. When Kant speaks of the positive sense of freedom, he not only takes into 
consideration the freedom ofthe will from the subjection to nature, but also the extent to which 
man subjects his own nature to the intelligible moral law.258 However, this does not imply a 
lessening of the doublesided character ofthe relation between nature and the will. Consequently, 
Kant can also say that the will is subjected to nature and nature to the will. Whereas the former 
is due to the causality of nature, which sets limits for the free will, the latter is due to the 
determination ofthe maxims of the 11011-empirical, extrasensuous (iibersinnlichen) nature of the 
rational being.259 As the causality of the physical nature belongs to the sensuous world, he can also 
say that freedom is an idea of reason (Idee der Vernunft) and nature is a concept of rationality 
(Verstandesbegriff). Whereas the first cannot be proven, the reality of the second can be 
demonstrated by the examples of experience. But even if this raises a dialectic ofreason, as the 
necessity of nature seems to be in contrast to the freedom of the will, the reality of freeom is 
undeniable in practical respect as freedom is the possibility reason makes use of in its determina-
tion in one' s doings. Therefore, it must be presumed that there is no true contradiction between 
257 MS, VI 221: "Der Begriff der Freiheit ist ein reiner Vernunftbegriff, der eben darum fLir die 
theoretische Philosophie transzendent, d.i. ein solcher ist, dem kein angemessenes Beispiel in irgend einer 
moglichen Erfahrung gegeben werden kann, welcher also keinen Gegenstand einer uns moglichen 
theoretischen Erkenntnis ausmacht, und schlechterdings nicht fLir ein konstitutives, sondern lediglich ais 
regulatives und zwar nur blof3 negatives Prinzip der spekulativen Yernunft gelten kann, im praktischen 
Gebrauche derselben aber sine Realitat durch praktische Grundsatze beweist, die, ais Gesetze, eine Kausalitat 
der reinen Vernunft, unabhangig von allen empirischen Bedingungen (dem Sinnlichen Uberhaupt), die WillkUr 
bestimrnen und einen reinen Willen in uns beweisen, in welchem die sittlichen Begriffe und Gesetze ihren 
Ursprung haben." 
258 KpV, V 132 . 
..... a rational being has two standpoints from which to consider himself. From both standpoints he 
can know the laws ( ... ) ofthe use ofhis powers and consequently the laws of all his actions ( ... ) We need only 
add that it is as belonging to both the sensible and the intelligible worlds that the principles on which as 
rational beings we should necessarily aet appear to us as imperatives on which we ought to aet.'' (Paton 1946, 
240) 
259 Kp V, V 44: ·'Der Unterschied also zwischen den Gesetzen einer Natur, welcher der Wille 
unterworfen ist, und einer Natur, die einem Willen (in Ansehung dessen, was Beziehung desselben auf seine 
freien Handlungen hat) unterworfen ist, beruht darauf, daf3 bei jener die Objekte Ursachen der Yorstellungen 
sein rnUssen, die den Willen bestimmen, bei dieser aber der Wille Ursache von den Objekten sein soli, sodaf3 
die Kausalitat derselben ihre Bestimmungsgrund lediglich in reinem Vernunftverrnogen liegen hat, welches 
deshalb auch eine reine praktische Vernunft genannt werden kann." 
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freedom and the necessity of nature, as neither the concept of nature nor the concept of freedom 
can be abandoned.260 
Just as it must be presumed that there is no real contradiction between freedom and 
nature, freedom as a characteristic must be presumed for all rational beings. The freedom of the 
will is a characteristic of practical reason as such. Only a rational being has the ability to aet 
according to the conception of law, i.e. princip les, or a will. As reason is demanded in order to 
deduce action from law, will is nothing but practical reason.261 When reason incessantly determines 
the wilL it follows that the objectively necessary acts of such a being are also subjectively 
necessary. Consequently, the will is the ability only to choose that which reason independently of 
inclinations recognizes as practically necessary, i.e. good.262 As morality serves as a law to rational 
beings, it must count for all rational beings, and as it cannot be separated from freedom, freedom 
of the will must be a characteristic of all rational beings. " ... ein jedes Wesen, das nicht anders ais 
unter der ldee der Freiheit handeln kann, ist ebendarum in praktischer Rlicksicht wirklich frei, d. 
i. es gelten fur dasselbe alle Gesetze, die mit der Freiheit unzertrennlich verbunden sind, ebenso 
ais ob sein Wille, auch an sich selbst und in der theoretischen Philosophie giiltig, fiir frei erklart 
wiirde".263 As is apparent. a denial ofthe freedom ofthe will would also imply a denial of practical 
reason. However, practical reason cannot be denied, as the moral law is immediately apparent to 
man and leads to the notion of freedom, as it commands independently of empirical conditions. 
Also ist es das moralische Gesetz, dessen wir uns unmittelbar bewu.f3t werden 
(sobald wir uns Maximen des Willens entwerfen), welches sich uns zuerst 
darbietet und, indem die Vemunft jenes als einen durch keine sinnliche 
Bedingung zu iiberwiegenden, ja davon ganzlich unabhangigen Bestimmungs-
grund darstellt, gerade auf den Begriff der Freiheit flihrt. Wie ist aber auch das 
Bewu.f3tsein jenes moralischen Gesetzes moglich? Wir konnen uns reiner 
praktischer Gesetze bewuBt werden, ebenso wie wir uns reiner theoretischer 
Grundsatze bewuBt sind, indem wir auf die Notwendigkeit, somit sie uns die 
Vemunft vorschreibt, und auf Absonderung aller empirischen Bedingungen, 
160 GMS, IV 455f. 
261 Cf. also Beck 1974, 121: ·'Kant kommt zu dem Ergebnis, daf3 ein freier Wille, ein moralischer 
Wille und reine praktische Vernunft dasselbe sind" 
261 GMS, IV 412. 
263 GMS, fV 448. 
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dazu uns jene hinweist, achthaben. Der Begriff eines reinen Willen entspringt 
aus den ersteren, wie das BewuBtsein eines reinen Verstandes aus dem 
letzteren. 16-1 
This concept of freedom is the key to the explanation ofthe autonomy ofthe will. The will is a 
kind of causality of living, rational beings and freedom is the characteristic of this causality as it 
is efficacious independently of any extemal causes. "Der Wille ist eine Art von Kausalitat lebender 
Wesen, sofem sie vemlinftig sind, und Freiheit wlirde diejenigen Eigenschaft dieser Kausalitat sein, 
da sie unabhangig von fremden sie bestimmenden Ursachen wirkend sein kann; so wie 
Natumotwendigkeit die Eigenschaft der Kausalitat aller vemunftlosen Wesen, durch den EinfluB 
fremder Ursachen zur Tatigkeit bestimmt zu werden".165 The moral law is a law of causality 
through freedom. 166 
This causality offreedom is the basis of Kant's understanding of autonomy. Basically, 
autonomy is the notion of practical reason as being a moral law to itself. It is the notion of the 
moral law as the governing principle of practical reason and will of the rational being, the 
lawgiving forn1 as the determining cause of the will.167 Therefore, the autonomy ofthe will is also 
the only principle of the moral law, a principle which consists in its independence from any 
264 Kp V, V 29f. 
265 GMS, IV 446. 
266 Kp V, VI 47: ·'Das moralische Gesetz ist in der Tat ein Gesetz der Kausal i rat durch Freiheit und 
also der Moglichkeit einer ubersinnlichen Natur, sowie das metaphysische Gesetz der Begebenheiten in der 
Sinnenwelt ein Gesetz der Kausalitat der sinnlichen Natur war, und jenes bestimmt also das, was spekulative 
Philosophie unbestimmt lassen rnul3te, namlich das Gesetz fur eine Kausalitat, deren Begriff in der letzteren 
nur negativ war, und verschafft diesem also zuerst objektive Realitat." 
267 KpV, V 29; 31. 
Paton identifies the positive concept of the freedom ofthe will in Kant with his notion of autonomy. 
•· ... ifwe are to distinguish the laws offreedom from the laws of nature, we can do so only by supposing that 
the laws of freedom are self-imposed. The spontaneous causa] action of a free will must therefore take place 
in accordance with self-imposed law. But this is just what we mean by "autonorny"; and a free will must be 
conceived as acting under the principle of autonomy - that is, as capable of acting on maxims which can at 
the same time be willed as universal laws. Since we have discovered this to be the principle ofrnoral action, 
we can say that a free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same thing" (1946, 212). Even if 
plausible at first. this understanding of Kant's concept of autonorny appears deeply problernatic. As Allison 
points out, this interpretation holds absurd implications, not being able to provide an explanation of the 
freedom to do evil. Analysing dift'erent attempts to avoid this consequence, Allison argues for the necessity 
of distinguishing between practical freedorn and autonorny. By focusing on the concept of rational agency, 
it is argued that autonomy is understood as a prope1ty of the will as a capacity of selfdetermination 
independently of sensuous needs ( 1990, 94ff.) 
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matter.268 On account of this empirical independency, the universality is also endorsed. The 
autonomy of the will is the nature of the will whereby it is a law to itself, and thereby merge with 
the universal moral law. ··Autonomie des Willens ist die Beschaffenheit des Willens, dadurch 
derselbe ihm selbst (unabhangig von aller Beschaffenheit der Gegenstande des Wollens) ein Gesetz 
ist. Das Prinzip der Autonomie ist also: nicht anders zu wahlen ais so, daf3 die Maximen seiner 
Wahl in demselben Wollen zugleich ais allgemeines Gesetz mit begriffen seien".269 As being a Iaw 
to itself, the will is defined in formal terms, as the ability of the will to determine itself. It is as such 
that it is formal as well as universal. This determinative ability of the will is found in all rational 
being, albeit only there.270 Accordingly, what is good is not determined by its accordance with the 
moral Iaw, but rather on account ofthe determination ofthe will.271 The autonomy of the will is 
the only principle of all moral Iaws and their proper duties. In the independence of all material of 
the Iaws and the determination of the arbitrium, the pure comrnon lawgiving form is the only 
princip le of morality. 272 
Consequently, Kant praises the good will. There is nothing, which without reservation 
can be called good, except the good will.273 However, the goodwill is not good because of its 
effect, but only on account of the will in itself. Even under conditions where the will did not have 
its ability, it would still shine as ajewel that has its whole worth in itself.274 But hereby the will is 
not determined independently of the moral law. There is a cl ose relation between the moral law 
and the will. A completely good will stands under objective laws, but is on that account not 
understood as coerced to lawfull acts. Due to its subjective character the will can only be 
268 KpV, V 33; 42. 
269 GMS, IV 440. 
270 GMS, IV 427. 
271 GMS, IV 390. 
271 Kp V, V 33: --oie Autonomie des Willens ist das alleinige Prinzip aller moralischen Gesetze und 
der ihnen gemaBen Pflichten; alle Heteronornie der WillkUr grundet dagegen nicht allein gar keine 
Verbindl ichkeit, sondem ist vielmehr dem Prinzip derselben und der Sittlichkeit des Willens entgegen. In der 
Unabhiingigkeit namlich von aller Materie des Gesetzes (niimlich einem begehrten Objekte) und zugleich doch 
Bestimmung der WillkUr durch die bloBe allgemeine gesetzgebende Form, deren eine Maxime fåhig sein muB, 
besteht das alleinige Prinzip der Sittlichkeit." 
273 GMS, IV 393: "Es ist i.iberall nichts in der Welt,ja Uberhaupt auch auBer derselben zu denken 
moglich, was ohne Einschrankung fur gut konnte gehalten werden, ais allein ein guter Wille." 
w GMS, IV 394. 
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determined through the conception of the good. Consequently, there is no imperative for the 
Divine or holy will. The demand is here in the wrong place, as the will already necessarily is in 
accordance with the moral law.175 
6.2.2 Morality as a Faet of Reason 
As the causality offreedom necessitates the ability of practical reason to be a law to itself, we now 
tum to the question of Kant's nation of practical reason. Central to our query will be the reflection 
on the relation between the moral law and practical reason. What does the a priori character ofthe 
moral law imply for its relation to practical reason? Is the moral law part of practical reason? Does 
it constitute practical reason? 
Kant's Grundlegung takes as basis the cornmon moral knowledge ofmankind. Kant's aim 
in his moral theory is mere ly to expound the generally accepted princip les of morals. 276 This 
generally accepted moral law has an a priori basis, i.e. it is not dependent upon any experiential 
or otherwise empirical conditions. Any attempt to include empirical considerations reduces the 
moral ]aw to a practical rule, lessening the cause of its obligation (Verbindlichkeit)277, opening the 
possibility of the worst mistakes.278 
Jedermann mu/3 eingestehen, da/3 ein Gesetz, wenn es moralisch d.i. ais Grund 
einer Verbindlickeit gelten soll, absolute Notwendigkeit bei sich fuhren ml.isse 
( ... ); da/3 mithin der Grund der Verbindlichkeit hier nicht in der Natur des 
Menschen oder den Umstanden in der Welt, darin er gesetzt ist, gesucht werden 
milsse, sondem a priori lediglich in Begriffen der reinen Vemunft, und da/3 jede 
andere Vorschrift, die sich auf Prinzipien der blo/3en Erfahrung grundet, und 
sogar eine in gewissem Betracht allgemeine Vorschrift, sofem sie sich dem 
mindesten Teile, vielleicht nur einem Bewegungsgrunde nach, auf empirische 
Grunde stiltzt, zwar eine praktische Regel, niemals aber ein moralisches Gesetz 
hei/3en kann.179 
275 GMS, IV 414; KpV, V 32; 82. 
176 GMS. IV 403f. 
177 GMS, IV 389; KpV, V 34; 41; 91. 
178 MS, VI 215. 
179 GMS, IV 389. 
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Whereas in natura! sciences the a priori principles are necessary in arder to systematize the 
physical observations, it is wholly different with the moral law. It is only in so far as it is a priori 
based and seen as necessary that it counts as law. The concepts and judgments conceming the 
doings of man has nothing to do with morality, if it includes anything from experience.280 
This is closely related to his concept of practical reason, which he understands as the 
ability to determine the will independently of a.nything empirical. This is on account of the faet of 
autonomy in the fundamental principles of morality, whereby it determines the will to action. 
Hereby pure reason demonstrates itself as practical reason. 28 1 " .•. reine, an sich praktische Vemunft 
ist hier [i.e. in relation to the universal formulation of the categorial imperative as the fundamental 
law of the pure practical reason] unmittelbar gesetzgebend. Der Wille wird ais unabhangig von 
empirischen Bedingungen, mithin, ais reiner Wille, durch die bloBe Form des Gesetzes als 
bestimmt gedacht und dieser Bestimmungsgrund ais die oberste Bedingung aller Maximen 
angesehen".282 Thus freedom and unconditional practical law are mutually related. This raises, 
however, the question: What is the epistemological basis of the w1conditional practical (unbedingt-
Praktischen)? Is it freedom or the practical law? It cannot be freedom as this concept is determined 
by its relation (albeit negative) to the empirical. Followingly, it is the moral law which is 
immediately intelligible and leads to the concept of freedom, as it bids us independently of the 
empiri ca!. The consciousness of the moral law is possible through the awareness of the necessity 
whereby it prescribes practical reason.283 It is a requirement of the moral law of reason that it is 
only related to itself, if it is to be objective and universally valid (allgemein gilltig). It is the pure 
will which is to be determined by the a priori moral law, disregarding its causa! effects.284 The 
moral worth of an action, therefore, is not determined by the empirical outcome, but merely by the 
conception of the law in itself, which is only found in a reasonable being.285 
This is further substantiated in Kant' s understanding of the imperative character of the 
280 MS, VI 215. 
281 KpV, V 31; 42. 
282 KpY, V 31. 
283 KpV, V 29f. 
m KpY, V 20f. 
285 GMS, IV 401. 
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moral law. A concise passage in the introduction to Metaphysik der Sitten highlights several key 
terms with relation to the notion of the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative is 
closely related to Kant' s understanding of obligation (Verbindlichkeit), as obligation is understood 
as the necessity of a free action according to the categorical imperative of reason. An imperative 
in general is understood as a practical rule whereby coincidential acts are made necessary. Thereby 
an imperative differs from a practical law which can also be of inner necessity to the acting subject 
(as is the case for holy beings). The categorical imperative, however, is only concentrated on the 
form of the action. ·'Der kategorische (unbedingte) Imperativ ist derjenige, welcher nicht etwa 
mittelbar, durch die Vorstellung eines Zwecks, der durch die Handlung erreicht werden konne, 
sondem der sie durch die blo/3e Vorstellung dieser Handlung selbst (ihrer Form), ais unmittelbar 
ais objektiv-notwendig denkt und notwendig macht". All other imperatives are technical and 
thereby conditional. The basis of the categorical imperative li es in its sole relation to freedom as 
the determination of the arbitrariness (Willki.ir), whereby an intention can be subjected to it.286 
Consequently, the imperative is a rule, which is described on the basis of a demand (ein Sollen) 
that is an expression ofthe objective coercion of the aet and which entails that when reason wholly 
detem1ined will, action inevitably would occur according to this rule.287 The categorical character 
of the imperative is due to its unconditionality.288 As categorical it is also the real imperative of 
morality.189 
The categorical imperative differs from other produets of practical reason. Among 
imperatives the primary differentiation is with regard to hypothetical imperatives. Where the 
categorical imperative is unconditional, this is not the case for hypothetical imperatives. These are 
conditionally determined.19° Furthermore, the categorical imperative is to be distinguished from 
the maxims. Whereas the categorical imperative is an objective principle, the maxim is a subjective 
286 MS, VI 222. 
287 KpY, V 20. 
288 KpV, V 32. 
289 GMS, IV 416. 
190 GMS, IV 414ff.; 420f; Kp V, V 20. 
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principle for the will.291 The basis, however, for the maxim of the actions is the moral law.292 As 
such, the maxim must also be universal, as is the moral law. One must aet in such a way that ane 
can will the maxim of ane' s acts to be a universal law. 293 
The unconditionality of the moral law is due to its character as a faet ofreason. Asa faet 
of reason the moral law can be found in practical consciousness without sensory experience.294 
Kant provides different arguments for the certainty ofthe moral law. Its faet can be identified on 
account of the consciousness of this moral law95, the moral law itself296 and as autonomy in the 
principle of morality.297 As a faet ofreason, it bids without taking the inclinations of humans into 
consideration. It is concemed only with the human as free and having a practical reason.298 
However, this is not to be understood in a limited sense, as any finite (even infmite) being is 
included. "Es (i .e. the moral law) schriinkt sich also nicht bloB auf Menschen ein, son dem geht auf 
alle endliche Wesen, die Vemunft und Willen haben, ja schlieBt sogar das unendliche Wesen, als 
oberste Intelligenz, mit ein".299 Furthermore, moral law demonstrates its reality in its positive 
291 GMS, IV 400; MS, VI 225. 
192 MS, VI 388ff. 
m GMS, IV 402. 
294 Kp V, V 31 f. ; 42f. 
It appears that this understanding implies two diff'erent views on the ''justification" ofthe moral law. 
Whereas the moral law in GMS is deduced from the concept of freedom, Kant in Kp V seems to base the 
notion offreedom in the consciousness ofthe moral law. This is due to the moral law being "a faet ofpure 
reason" (Paton 1946, 203). 
295 KpV, V 31; 42. 
296 Kp V, V 31; 4 7. 
297 KpV, V 42. 
Cf. Beck 1974, 160. However, according to Beck, Kant is not sufficiently clear in his argument. 
There is no clear distinction between the consciousness of amoral law (where the moral law exists as a faet) 
and the law itself, ofwhich one can be conscious. In his preference for the latter understanding, Kant seems 
to be endorsing a circular argument, maintaining this as a faet of pure practical reason (Ibid.). One way of 
dealing with thi s tension in Kant is to follow Beck in his argument that the faet ofpure practical reason is to 
be understood as the lawgiving of reason itself. ''Da aber das rnoralische Gesetz - das Faktum fur die reine 
Vernunft - nichts anderes ais die Gesetzgebung der Vernunft selbst ausdrlickt, spiegelt sich im Faktum/ur 
die reine Vernunft nur das Faktum der reinen Vernunft wider. Wenn ein Wesen glaubt, es gebe eine 
Verpflichtung, so gibt es fLir dieses Wesen ein gliltiges Gesetz. Die metaphysische Deduktion hat gezeigt, 
welche Gestalt dieses Gesetz haben mu/3; es ist das Faktum/ur die reine Vernunft." (ldem, 162f.). 
298 MS, VI 216. 
299 KpV, V 32. 
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determination of the negatively thought causality, whereby it gives objective (even if only 
practical) reality to reason, transforming its transcendental use to an immanent.300 
The faet ofthe moral law also raises the reverence for the moral law. The reverence is 
only effected through reason. It does not concern the assessment of actions, but only the 
motivation. The reverence is the incentive of the action.30 1 This is the positive effect of the 
reverence, whereas the negative is the demarcation of the inclination.302 The only motive for the 
will is the reverence for the law. Any aet of duty must exclude the influence of inclination. Thus 
objectively is only the law left and subjectively the pure reverence for the practical law. However, 
the reverence is to be understood as a feeling caused by the concept of reason, not as a received 
feeling. Thereby the reverence differs from the inclination. The reverence is the immediate 
determination of the will through the law and the awareness thereof. Consequently the object of 
the reverence is the law which we necessarily enjoin ourselves.303 As such, Kant can also speak of 
the moral law as the incentive of the will.30-1 
The reverence for the moral law is closely related to his emphasis on duty. One is 
motivated by reverence, but must aet according to duty. "Pflicht ist Notwendigkeit einer Handlung 
aus Achtung furs Gesetz ( ... ) Nun soli eine Handlung aus Pflicht den Einflu/3 der Neigung und mit 
ihr jeden Gegenstand des Willens ganz absondem, also bleibt nichts fur den Willen tibrig, was ihn 
bestimmen konne, ais objektiv das Gesetz und subjektiv reine Achtung fur dieses praktische 
Gesetz, mithin die Maxime, einem solchen Gesetze, selbst mit Abbruch aller meiner Neigungen, 
Folge zu leisten".305 The free subjection of the will under the moral law is the reverence for the 
30° Kp V. V 48: ·'Denn das moralische Gesetz beweist seine Realitat dadurch auch fur die Kritik der 
spekulativen Yernunft genugtuend, dal3 es einer blof3 negativ gedachten Kausalitat, deren Moglichkeitjener 
unbegreitlich und dennoch sie anzunehmen notig war, positive Bestimmung, namlich den begriff einer den 
Willen unmittelbar (durch die Bedingung einer allgemeinen gesetzlichen Form seiner Maximen) 
bestimmenden Vemunft hinzufugt und so der Vernunft, die mit ihren Ideen, wenn sie spekulativ verfahren 
wollte, immer uberschwenglich wurde, zum ersten Male objektive, obgleich nur praktische Realitiit zu geben 
vermag und ihre transzendentalen Gebrauch in einen immanenten (im Felde der Erfahrung durch Ideen selbst 
wirkende Ursache zu sein) verwandelt." 
301 KpY, V 76. 
302 KpV, V 78f. 
303 GMS, IV 400. 
30
~ KpV, V 71f.; 75; 87f. 
305 GMS, IV 400. 
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law. The aet whieh according to this Iaw is objectively practical is the duty.306 Consequently, Kant 
also emphasises that the aet of reverenee for the moral law is an aet out of duty (aus Pflieht), 
which is to be distinguished from the aet whieh is merely in aeeordance with the moral law 
(Pfliehtmal3ig). In the latter case inelinations ean be the determining grow1ds of the will, whereas 
in the former the aet of duty is determined by the law alone.307 This implies a rejeetion of 
benevolence and love as the motive of the moral aet. No end ean serve as the basis of morality, 
only the good will.308 
In Kant' s understanding ofthe relation between the moral law as a faet of reason and how 
this raises the reverence for this law and the neeessity of the duty to follow the moral law, 
fundamental notions in his moral philosophy become apparent. On the one hand, he maintains the 
classical notion of the fundamental connection between reason and the moral law. As we have 
seen, this is an understanding apparent also in the ether representatives of natura! law thought. 
However, in Kant it is stressed that there is no neeessary relation between man ' s recognition of 
this moral law as a rational being and his action. For a finite being there is no immediate 
disposition or inclination to aet in aceordanee with the moral law. On the contrary, the praetical 
reason of man is eoncei ved of as coercing the will of man. Practical reason bids the right du ties 
on account of the moral law. When man acts morally right, this is not due to his moral nature , but 
rather his rational nature . 
Now the question arises, of what kind of metaethieal position ean Kant be seen as 
representative? Certainly, he cannot be seen as naturalist. This would entail an understanding of 
the moral nature of man whieh is not the issue in Kant. In Kant it is not the nature of man whieh 
is the basis of morality. Some kind of realism could be endorsed, as the moral law is given. It is 
not something that is constructed, neither soeially nor individually. However, Kant cannot be said 
to be cognitivist. The aim of his moral theory is not to argue for a moral law that one can 
recognize. The moral law is not understood as moral norms or entities that one appropriates. 
Rather, the moral law is understood as formal reasoning. As such Kant comes closer to the 
306 KpV, V 80. 
307 GMS, IV 397f.; KpV, V 81. 
308 GMS, IV 398ff. 
The notion f the will marksone ofthe central issues in Kan t's moral philosophy. However, fora 
more detailed account than is appropriate here, cf. e.g. Paton 1946, 34ff. 
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constructivist grounding of morality. The universality of the moral law is not determined by its 
actual norms, but rather on the basis of a common moral reasoning for all rational beings. As such 
moral i ty is also confined within the limits of practical reason. 
6.3 The Teleology of Kant's Moral Philosophy 
The preceding section demonstrated how Kant's justification of morality leads to an emphasis on 
the concept of practical reason. Morality is justified as a law of reason. However, this holds some 
problematic implications for Kant's moral philosophy, as the relation to the phaenomenal world 
seems to be strongly reduced. This raises the question of the role of nature as a basis of morality. 
To what extent does Kant include nature in the basis of morality? Does nature hold moral 
implications or is it excluded from any relation to the moral realm? These are the leading questions 
in this section, where we will attempt to look into Kant's understanding of teleology in relation 
to his moral philosophy.309 
6.3.1 Nature as the Type ofMoral Law 
In Kritik der praktischen Vernunft Kant treats his understanding ofthe type of the pure practical 
power of judgment.310 As this section stands out as particularly relevant for the present thesis, we 
will analyse this argument in more detail. Therefore, the following will focus on this part, including 
references to other writings of Kant. 
309 Even if fundamentally different in their approaches and intentions, some of the leading 
interpretations ofKant's moral philosophy, arguing for an emphasis on its teleological aspects (although this, 
of course, is understood indifferent ways), are: Paton 1946; Williams 1968; Keith Ward I 972 and Auxter 
1982. An overview ofthese interpretations ofKant will not be given here, as references to these works appear 
in the foliowing. 
3 1° KpV, V 67-72. 
According to Paton 1946, 160 Kant uses the word ·'type" in the same meaning as "symbol". When 
nature is seen as a type of moral law, it is understood as a symbol of the moral law. "The law of nature, as a 
concept of the understanding, has always a schema or schemata in virtue of which it applies to sensible 
objects, the schema of causal law in pa11icular being necessary succession in accordance with a rule. The law 
of freedom, as an ldea of reason, can have no schema whereby we can exhibit objects for it directly in 
intuition. Kant's suggestion is that we can exhibit objects for it indirectly or sybolically: in virtue of the 
analogy between the moral law and the law of nature, which share the common form of universality, we can 
treat events governed by the law of nature as symbols for objects conceived to fall under the law of freedom. 
lfwe can this, we use the law of nature as a type of the moral law." ( I 946, 160). Cf. Paton 1946, l 60f. and 
Beck 1974, 153 for further terminological clarification on the concept of"type". 
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The nations of good and bad determine an object of the will. However, they are 
themselves subject to practical reason, which, if it is a pure practical reason, must determine the 
will a priori with regard to its subject. The practical power of judgment determines the actuality 
of a possible action in the phaenomenal world.311 However, as a practical rule of pure reason 
implies the independency of empirical conditions, it seems contradictory to seek a case in the 
physical world where the idea of the suprasensual nation of the moral good can be applied. This 
leads the judgment of the pure practical reason into the considerable problem of applying the law 
of freedom on actions as occurences in the sensual world. 
But with regard to the practical power of judgment it is not the possibility of the action 
in the physical world which is the issue. This is the concem of the theoretical reason. For the 
practical power ofjudgment the question is the scheme ofthe law.312 The determination ofthe will 
is related to the law alone, with no other cause of determination. 
This is the point where Kant explicitly refers to physical nature as a type of the moral 
law.313 The natura! laws as laws must correspond to a scheme. But the laws of freedom cannot be 
subjected to any scheme as the basis of its use. Consequently the moral law has no other imparting 
capability of understanding in relation to the objects of nature than reason. Reason can appropriate 
the idea of the form of the Jaw of nature as a law which underlies the powers of judgment. This 
can be called the type of the moral law. As such tb.is form ofthe law of nature serves as a rule for 
the powers of judgment. 
Die Regel der Urteilskraft unter Gesetzen der reinen praktischen Vemunft ist 
diese: Frage dich selbst, ob die Handlung, die du vorhast, wenn sie nach einem 
Gesetze der Natur, von der du selbst ein Teil warest, geschehen sollte, sie du 
3 11 KpV, V 67. 
312 KpV, V 68. 
313 As Auxter (1982, 66) points out, both Paton and Beck have discussed the two concepts of nature 
included in Kant's moral philosophy. According to one understanding, nature is conceived of as determined 
by causa! laws, whereas the other nation of nature would argue for nature as an organic unity of laws and 
phaenomena ( cf. Paton 1946, I 61 ff. and Beck I 974, 154 ). Paton seems to argue that it is only the second 
understanding of nature that can serve as a type ofthe moral law (Paton 1946, 149), whereas Beck also 
maintains the minor role ofthe first understanding in this regard (Beck 1974, 154). Auxter, however, argues 
that " ... this order is not necessary to the conception ofthe morally ideal ( ectypal) world and that the mere idea 
of a teleological order of rational beings is sufficient for the determination of an ectypal world and the 
functionfog of moral judgmem ( 1982, 66). 
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wohl als durch deinen Willen moglich ansehen konntest? Nach dieser Regel 
beurteil in der Tatjedennann Handlungen, ob sie sittlich gut oder base sind.314 
When Kant in Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten speaks ofthe analogy between the laws of 
nature and the practical formulation of the categorical imperative, he seems to be endorsing a 
similar argument. He is not claiming any essential identity of the laws of nature and the moral law, 
but he is drawing out the formal similarity in the concept oflawfullness. Followingly, Kant can say 
that in one's maxim ane is supposed only to adopt such a maxim as could have been a universal 
natura! law. 
Weil die Allgemeinheit des Gesetzes, wonach Wirkungen geschehen, dasjenige 
ausmacht, was eigentlich Natur im allgemeinsten Verstande (der Form nach), 
d.i. das Dasein der Dinge heiBt, sofem es nach allgemeinen Gesetzen bestirnmt 
ist, so konnte der allgemeine Imperativ der Pflicht auch so lauten: handle so, ais 
ab die Maxime deiner Handlung durch deinen Willen zum al!gemeinen 
Naturgesetze werden sollte.315 
The natura! laws are not the determinative cause of the will, but they serve as a type of the moral 
law. The fom1 of the natura! laws can serve as the test on discerning the moral i ty of a given aet. 
When they are contrary to the form of the natura! laws that constitute the natura! order, they are 
morally impossible. This is even apparent to the most common mind, even if he must remember 
to use the natura! laws only as a type of the laws of freedom. Consequently, Kant can summarize 
his discussion on the nature of the physical world as a type of the intelligible nature of the moral 
law in the following way: 
Es ist also erlaubt, die Natur ais Sinnenwelt als Typus einer intelligibelen Natur 
zu brauchen, solange ich nur nicht die Anschauungen, und was davon abhangig 
ist. auf diese tibertrage, sondern bloB die Form der Gesetzmiilligkeit Uberhaupt 
( ... ) darauf beziehe. Denn Gesetze ais solche sind einerlei, sie magen ihre 
Bestimrnungsgrlinde hernehmen, woher sie wollen.316 
314 KpV, V 69. 
315 GMS, IV 421. 
316 KpV, V 70. 
103 
Reason as the Source of Normativ i ty 
Moreover, also the will is tested according to this criteria of universality, as the unconditionally 
goodwill is simply good, when it can be made a universal law, when it can not contradict itself. 
As universal law there is an analogy to the laws of the natura! world, why the maxi ms according 
to this will must be so that it can have itself as well as the universal natura! laws as its object. 
Weil die Gilltigkeit des Willens, ais eines allgemeinen Gesetzes fur mogliche 
Handlungen, mit der allgemeinen Verk.nilpfung des Daseins der Dinge nach 
allgemeinen Gesetzen, die das Formale der Natur tiberhaupt ist, Analogie hat, 
so kann der kategorische Imperativ auch ausgedrilckt werden: Handle nach 
Maximen, die sich selbst zugleich ais allgemeine Naturgesetze zum Gegensrand 
haben konnen.311 
These arguments ofthe analogy of the laws of nature and the moral law all have in common that 
they are ideas of reason. The realms of reason and nature are kept apart, even if these analogical 
similarities can be demonstrated.318 This also applies to a further argument of Kant's, where he 
argues that the laws of duty among humans constitute amoral, intelligible world by analogy with 
the physical world3 1'1 or the lawgiving ofthe individual reasonable being creates a common realm 
of similarity to the realm of nature. 
3 17 GMS, IV 437. 
3 18 However, even if Paton also argues for the necessity ofthis separation, he does emne very close 
to an interpretation of Kant in light of a perfectionist understanding of nature. This leads him to the 
endorsement of Kant 's appeal to teleological law. "Kant's appeal to a teleological, rather than to a causa!, law 
of nature may at first sight seem arbitrary, but this is far from being the case. When we are asked to conceive 
a proposed maxim as a law of nature, we must conceive it as a teleological law of nature; for it is a maxim 
of action, and action as such (quite apart from moral considerations) is essentially purposive. Furthermore, 
we are asked to conceive it primarily as a law of human nature, even if we are setting it against the 
background of natue as a whole; and human nature must be regarded as essentially purposive. All this was 
apparently so much taken for granted by Kant that he fails to state it explicitly, and so tends to mislead his 
readers" ( 1946. 150f.). Even if tempting, this interpretation appears to be reading a notion into Kant, which 
is not there. Paton even admits this in the quotation. To argue that something is so obvious that it need not 
be mentioned is a dubious argument. It seems to be more defensible to take the position ofBeck, when he 
argues that it is precisely in this distinction between nature as a type or symbol and yet different from the 
realm ofmoral ends that the important difference is seen to the perfectionist confusion ofthese realms (cf. 
Beck 1974, 157). Although Kant often makes use of a teleological terminology, it is important to emphasize 
that this has a hypothetical character. 
31 9 MS, VI 449: ·'Wenn von Pflichtgesetzen (nicht von Naturgesetzen) die Rede ist, und zwar im 
auf3eren Verhaltnis der Menschen gegeneinander, so berracthen wir uns in einer moralischen (intelligibelen) 
Welt, in welcher, nach der Analogie mit der physischen, die Verbindung vemi.inftiger Wesen (auf Erden) durch 
Anziehung und Abstof3ung bewirkt wird.'' 
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This is clear in relation to Kant's fommlation of the practical imperative that one should 
aet in such a way that one always not only uses the humanity in one's own person as well as in 
another person as means but also as an end in itself.320 He explains how this principle cannot be 
deduced from experience.321 This is due, firstly, to its general character as it concerns all rational 
beings, and, secondly, because this principle ofhumanity concems the objective end ofhurnanity 
rather than the individual ends. This doublesidedness is apparent in the practical lawgiving. The 
practical lawgiving has an objectiv character and a common form, which qualifies it as law. 
Subjectively it expresses the ends of the individual. This individual, however, is a rational being. 
Consequently, as one of the conditions of the concurrence ofthe will with the common practical 
reason, Kant endorses " ... die Idee des Willens jedes vernilnftigen Wesens ais eines allgemein 
gesetzgebenden Willens".322 This unity of the individual and the comrnon, objective will is based 
on the will of the individual as the foundation ofthe common will. Thereby an essential analogy 
is formed to the kingdom of ends within ethics, which is also constituted on account of the 
individual human as an aim in himself. On this basis he must respect another person as being an 
aim in herself as well. This mutuality constitutes the kingdom of ends within ethics, which has a 
cl ose analogy to the kingdom of nature. 323 
However, even if these arguments seem to lead to a somewhat harmonious picture of the 
relation between nature and reason in Kant, it is important to bear in mind that nature and reason 
are two distinctly different entities. As such Kant admits that they can even be at variance with one 
another. This is also the background for Kant's emphasis on reason and duty as the basis of 
morality. One cannot base morality on nature, as nature not only has no direct relation to morality, 
but even more so, because nature might even contradict morality. Consequently, Kant can also say 
that duty is selfcoercion for the human being as a rational, free being. But precisely this coercion 
also implies that the human bids itself in defiance of its natura! inclinations. Thus nature presents 
hindrances for moral i ty, which the human being must overcome in order to comply with the moral 
law. As the sensuous inclinations of the human being can lead it to ends in contrast to duty, it is 
320 GMS, IV 429. 
,
21 GMS, IV 430f. 
312 GMS, IV 431. 
323 GMS, IV 432ff. 
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necessary for the lawgiving reason to determine amoral end in the opposite direction.324 
Exactly this possible conflict between nature and reason is the basis of Kant' s postulate 
on God' s existence, as God must be postulated in ord er to ensure the happiness that all men strive 
for. In the ethics a necessary relation between nature and morality is postulated in order to be able 
to speak of the unity of the wish and the will as the condition of happiness for the the reasonable 
being. This happiness, which in unity with morality is also understood as the highest good, cannot 
be presumed without postulating the existence of a being which is different from nature and also 
can be the cause of the hannony between the law for the will of the reasonable being and nature. 
Such a being is God, why God must be postulated as necessary for morality.325 
Appendix: Nature as a Symbol ofMorality 
Even if Kant's Kritik der Urteilskraft326 is not included as a central text in the present discussion 
on Kant, we cannot ignore Kant' s reflections on nature as a symbol of morality. However, the 
foliowing is nota thorough analysis of this notion in Kant, but only included as a perspective on 
this idea. So even if perspectives to other parts ofKU are included, the focus will be on § 59: Von 
der Schonheit als Symbol der Sittlichk.eit.317 
In the last parts of his discussion on the aesthetic powers of judgment Kant reflects on 
a conception somewhat similar to his understanding of nature as a type of the moral law, i.e. 
nature as a symbol of morality. This is due to the demand on proof of the reality of concepts. 
Empirical concepts are demanded examples. lf they are pure rational concepts (reine Verstandes-
begriffe) they are exacted schemes. Pure concepts of reason (Vemunftbegriffe), however, cannot 
be demonstrated by means of examples. These are, rather, to be illustrated by symbols that are 
considered as analogical and concerned with the lawfullness and fom1 of this reflexion, not the 
exhibition (Anschauung) in itself. Beauty (particularly the beauty of nature) is regarded as such 
a symbol in relation to moral law. The beautiful can be a symbol of the moral good. Only in this 
respect ' ' ... gefållt es mit einem Anspruche aufjedes andem Beistimmun_g, wobei sich das Gemiith 
m MS, VI 380f. 
325 KpY, V 124f. 
326 KU, V l 65ff. 
327 KU, V 351ff. 
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zugleich einer gewissen Veredlung und Erhebung tiber die bloBe Empfånglichkeit einer Lust durch 
Sinneindrticke bewu.Bt ist und anderer Wert auch nach einer ahnlichen Maxime ihrer Urtheilskraft 
schiitzt" .328 This is the intelligible towards which the taste reaches, to which the highest conceptive 
abilities of human beings conform. In this ability the powers of judgment are not subjected to a 
heteronomy of the laws of experience. Rather, they correspond with something in the subject 
which refers to neither nature nor freedom and yet is related to freedom in terms of its 
supersensuous character, whereby the theoretical and practical are united. 
Sie [i.e. the powers of judgment] giebt in Ansehung der Gegenstande eines so 
reinen Wohlgefallens ihr selbst das Gesetz, so wie die Vemunft es in Ansehung 
des Begehrungsvermogens tut; und sieht sich sowohl wegen dieser inneren 
Moglichkeit im Subjekte, ais wegen der iiuJ3eren Moglichkeit einer damit 
tibereinstimmenden Natur, auf etwas im Subjekte selbst und auBer ihm, was 
nicht Natur, auch nicht Freiheit, doch aber mit dem Grunde der letzteren, 
niimlich dem Ubersinnlichen, verknupft ist, bezogen, in welchem das theoreti-
sche Vennogen mit dem praktischen auf gemeinschaftliche und unbekannte Art 
zur Einheit verbunden wird.329 
This unity of the theoretical and practical is the central issue in KU. From the outset of this work, 
his aim is to argue that the powers of judgment constitute a link between the rationality 
(Verstand)/abilities of knowledge (Erkenntnisvermogen) and reason (Vemunft)/abilities of desire 
(Begehrungsvermogen).330 Even if these two distinct realms seem separate from eacb other, one 
link between the two might be the notion of causality implied in the concept of freedom. 331 This 
idea necessitates the presumption of the powers of judgment as a conceptual link between tbese 
spheres. 332 ln § 59 Kant mentions some examples of the mentioned analogy of beauty and morality. 
Among his examples, two will be mentioned. 1. The freedom of the power of imagination ( die 
Einbildungskraft) is conceived of as uniform with the lawfullness of rationality in the judgment on 
the beautiful , which can be seen as an analogy to the moral judgment, where the freedom of the 
328 KU, V 353. 
329 KU, V 353. 
33° KU, V 167ff.; l 76ff.; I 95ff. 
331 KU, V I 95ff. 
332 KU, V 196. 
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will is seen as the consistency of this free will with itself according to laws of reason. 2. The 
subjective princip le of the judgment on the beautiful is seen as universal, i.e. valid for everyone, 
even if it cannot be presented with commonly known terms. This also holds for morality, where 
the objective princip le of morality is conceived of as universally valid and holds for all subjects and 
acts of these subjects. 333 Lastly, Kant mentions some examples of amore common character that 
also demonstrate this analogy.33 -1 
This notion of the beautiful as a symbol of morality is part of Kant' s discussion on the 
aesthetic powers of judgment.335 As an aesthetic judgment, Kant argues that the subjectivity is 
more prevalent336, than is the case for the teleological judgment. This does not entail, however, 
that the principle of subjectivity is without objectivity. It is a subjective principle with common 
validity. This is implied in Kant's understanding of the "Gemeinsinn".337 In order to be able to 
communicate the judgment of taste on objects, one has to endorse this "Gemeinsinn". lf the 
perception of objects is to be communicable, the impact ofthese objects must also be communi-
cable. Without this subjective condition of knowledge, knowledge as an effect can not be 
communicated. As the feeling that the knowledge of these objects raises, must be one that can be 
communicated, this necessitates the presumption ofthe mentioned "Gemeinsinn".338 However, this 
··Gemeinsinn" is a preswned principle, why the judgment on taste has a subjective-common 
character. 339 
This doublesidedness also applies to his understanding of the beautiful as a symbol of 
moratity. The power of judgment is not a produet of culture, it is not something which has been 
decided upon conventionally. It has its basis in human nature, in the dispositions for feelings for 
practical (i.e. moral) ideas.340 In relation to the feeling of desire, an object is either pleasant, 
333 KU, V 354. 
334 KU, V 354. 
335 Cf. KU, V ! 92ff for an account of the difference between the aesthetic and teleological powers 
of j udgment. 
336 KU, Y203f. 
m KU, V 237f. 
338 KU, V 238f. 
339 KU, V 239f. 
34° KU, V 265. 
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beautifuL sublime, or good. The beautiful in particular concerns the quality.341 The beautiful is that 
which pleases in the pure judgment, whereby it follows that it must please independently of all 
interests. As such it is an explanation of the common judgment on subjective grounds. It is 
subjective as it is due to its empirical character, yet it also supports the end of practical reason. 
Beauty is purposive with regard to moral feeling.341 Consequently, the direct interest in the beauty 
of nature is also a characteristic of a moraiiy good person343, even if this concems the form of 
nature. However, when one is pleased by a bird or flower, one is not only interested in the form, 
but also its being.3-1-1 Frnthennore, reason is interested in the objective reality ofthe ideas of nature. 
Nature must hold a cause ofthe lawfull consistency between its effects and ours. Consequently, 
reason cannot think on the beauty of nature without being interested. This interest, however, is 
basicaliy moral, why such an interest is a reason to presurne a morally good attitude in such a 
person. 3-15 ''Dieses Interesse aber ist der Verwandtschaft nach moralisch; und der, welcher es am 
Schonen der Natur nimmt, kann es nur sofern an demselben nehmen, ais er vorher schon sein 
Interesse am Sittlich-Guten wohlbegrlindet hat. Wen also die Schonheit der Natur unmittelbar 
interessiert, bei dem hat man Ursache, wenigstens eine Anlage zu guter moralischen Gesinnung 
zu vermuten".346 
6.3.2 The Kingdom of Ends 
In the discussions on nature as a type on moral law and nature as a symbol on the ethical it is an 
important issue to protect ethics from a subjectivity, where the moral agent is isolated from a 
whole. Even ifthe notion of autonomy Kant's moral philosophy cannot be abandoned, this does 
not mean that Kant ignores the importance of the whole, of which the human being is a part. A 
further area where the understanding of a necessaiy whole also is apparent is in his understanding 
34 1 KU, V 266. 
342 KU, V 267. 
343 KU, V 298. 
344 KU. V 299. 
m KU. V 300. 
346 KU, V 300. Fora further discussion on this relation between the aesthetic judgment on beauty 
and morality, see e.g. Cohen 1982 and Paton 1946, l 58ff. 
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of the kingdom of ends. As an ethical subject the individual takes part in a kingdom of ends, which 
applies for both the relation between humans and as an analogy on the realm of nature. 
In the determination of the relation between the end (Zweck) and duty, it is important 
that ethics cannot take its starting point in the end, which would entail an empjrical basis for ethics. 
Therefore, ethics must let the concept of duty lead to the end and the end of the maxim must be 
based on moral principles.347 So even if ethics cannot have its basis in the concept of ends, which 
would lead to a contradiction in Kant' s moral philosophy, Kant still holds the position that any aet 
has an end. This is an aet of freedom of the acting subject, it is nota cause of nature. As it is a 
practical principle, it is a categorical imperative for the pure practical reason.348 Consequently, it 
is crucial that freeedom and duty preceed and are the basis of the concept of ends. Ethics gives 
matter an end for pure reason. This end is an objective, necessary end, which is presented as duty 
to the human being. As the sensuous inclinations induce to ends which can be at variance with 
duty, lawgiving reason must determine its own ends in contrast to these ends. 349 Thus, ethics can 
be defined as a system of ends for pure practical reason. So even if ends and duty separate the two 
parts ofthe common doctrine of morals they are necessarily tied to each other.350 This definition 
of the necessary end in any aet seems to have a different accentuation from the determination of 
rn MS, VI 382ff. 
348 MS, VI 384f.: ·'Zweck ist ein Gegenstand der freien Willkur, dessen Vorstellung diese zu einer 
Handlung bestimmt (wodurchjener hervorgebracht wird). Eine jede Handlung hat also ihren Zweck, und da 
niemand einen Zweck haben kann. ohne sich den Gegenstand seiner Willkur selbst zum Zweck zu machen, 
so ist es ein Akt der Freiheit des handelnden Subjekts, nicht eine Wirkung der Natur, irgend einen Zweck der 
Handlungen zu haben. Weil aber dieser Akt, der einen Zweck bestimmt, ein praktisches Prinzip ist, welches 
nicht die Mitte! (mithin nicht bedingt), sondem den Zweck selbst (folglich unbedingt) gebietet, so ist es ein 
kategorischer Imperativ der reinen praktischen Vemunft, mit hin ein solcher, der einen Ptlichtbegriff mit dem 
eines Zweckes tiberhaupt verbindet." 
349 MS, VI 380f.: "Die Ethik dagegen gibt noch eine Materie (einen Gegenstand der freien Willkur), 
einen Zweck der reinen Vemunft, der zugleich ais objektiv-notwendiger Zweck, d.i. fur den Menschen ais 
Ptlicht vorgestellt wird, an die Hand. - Denn, da die sinnlichen Neigungen zu Zwecken (ais der Materie der 
Willkur) verleiten. die der Ptlicht zuwider sein konnen, so kann die gesetzgebende Vernunft ihrem Einflul3 
nicht anders wehren, ais wiederum durch einen entgegengesetzten moralischen Zweck, der also von der 
Neigung unabhangig a priori gegeben sein mul3." 
350 MS, VI 381: ·'Aus diesem Grunde karm die Ethik auch ais das System der Zwecke der reinen 
praktischen Vernunft definiert werden. - Zweck und Ptlicht unterscheiden die zwei Abteilungen der 
allgemeinen Sittenlehre. Dal3 die Ethik Pflichten enthalte, zu deren Beobachtung man von anderen nicht 
{physich) gezwungen werden kann, ist blol3 die Folge daraus, dal3 sie eine Lehre der Zwecke ist, weil dazu (sie 
zu haben) ein Zwang sich selbst wiederspricht." 
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the categorical imperative in Grundlegung. The nation of ends in Grundlegung has an apparently 
different function which is much more hypothetical. Thus, the end and the duty do not exclude 
each other. Even if duty is the fundamental principle, this does not imply the preclusion of the 
moral relevance of the concept of the ends of acts. 
The understanding of the important role of the end is also apparent in Kant' s actual 
mentioning of the kingdom of ends, which constitutes itself in the relation between rational 
beings.351 The nation of a rational being which in all the maxims of its will must perceive of itself 
as a common lawgiver in arder to assess itself and its actions in this perspective, leads to the 
concept of the kingdom of ends. Kingdom is here understood as the systematic connection 
between different rational beings on the basis of a common law. The laws determine the ends, why 
one can imagine a unity of ends. This is based on the nation that every rational being is subject to 
the moral law and must treat herself and all others not just as means, but also as ends. Hereby a 
systematic unity of rational beings through common, objective laws (i.e. a kingdom) emerges, 
which can be called the kingdom of ends. 352 
Therefore the reasonable being must always see himself as lawgiving in a kingdom of ends 
which is possible because of the freedom of the will. Thus, moral i ty is constituted in the relation 
of all acts to the lawgiving, whereby a kingdom of ends is possible. However, this lawgiving must 
emerge from the will of any reasonable being, when it acts on the princip le not to undertake any 
351 GMS, IV 433f. 
35
~ Ibid., 433. 
Paton argues that the realization ofthis kingdom ofends is only possible ifnature is governed by 
teleological law and thereby constituted in such a way as to promote the success of moral volition. The 
effective manifestation of good will requires the cooperation, not only of other rational beings, but the 
cooperation of nature itself. This is only possible on the basis of the presumption of nature as manifesting a 
di vine purpose ( 1946, 192). In her relatively recent work, Creating the Kingdom of Ends, Korsgaard argues 
somewhat differently. Focusing on the concepts of reciprocity and responsibility in personal relations, it is 
argued that the theory ofthe kingdom ofends can be understood as explaining how this qualified mutuality 
comes about in the personal and moral relations between rational agents (I 996, I 88ff.). "On the whole, Kant's 
view is that we must always hold ourselves responsible, and that we should as far as possible always hold 
other people respons i ble. But this is not because people's noumenal freedom is known to us as a theoretical 
faet. It is because of the respect which the moral law commands us to accord to the human i ty in every person. 
We hold one another responsible because this is essential to our interactions with each other as persons; 
because in this way we together populate amoral world ( ... ) When we enter into relations ofreciprocity, and 
hold one another respons i ble, we enter together into the standpoint of practical reason, and create a Kingdorn 
ofEnds on eanh" (212). Thus, Korsgaard's interpretation of Kant is in no need ofa teleological concept of 
nature in arder to argue for the possibility ofthe realization of the kingdorn ofends. 
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aet according to another maxim than that which can be combined with the common law, i.e. only 
so ··daf3 der Wille durch seine Maxime sich selbst zugleich ais allgemein gesetzgebend betrachten 
konne" . Where the maxim is not necessarily consistent with this objective principle for the 
reasonable being, the practical coercion, duty must be the necessity of the act.353 
If, consequently, there is to be a highest practical principle, it must be such a principle as 
is consistent with the end of any rational being and so can serve as common practical law. The 
basis of this principle is that any rational being exists as end in herself. "Der praktiske Imperativ 
wird also folgender sein: Handle so, da/3 du die lvlenschheit, sowohl in deiner Person ais in der 
Person eines }eden anderen, jederzeit zugleich ais Zweck, niemals blojJ ais Mitte! brauchst ". 
However, the notion ofbeing an end in oneself only concems rational being. These ends are not 
subjective, but objective ends, why they also give the persons an absolute worth.354 Only rational 
beings are an end in themselves, in contradistinction to anything else, which alone can be a 
means.355 
... der Mensch und ilberhauptjedes vemilnftige Wesen existiert als Zweck an 
sich selbst, nicht blo/3 ais Mitte! zum beliebigen Gebrauche fur diesen oder 
jenen Willen, sondem muB in allen seinen sowohl auf sich selbst als auch auf 
andere vemilnftige Wesen gerichteten Handlungen jederzeit zugleich ais Zweck 
betrachtet werden. 356 
As morality is the condition, according to which a rational being can be an end in itself and 
consequently only through this be a lawgiving member of the kingdom of ends357, all other beings 
of nature are mere ly objects and only have a relative worth. 
Die Wesen, deren Dasein zwar nicht auf unserem Willen, sondern der Natur 
beruht, haben dennoch, wenn sie vemunftlose Wesen sind, nur einen relativen 
Wert, ais Mitte!, und heiBen daher Sachen, dagegen vemilnftige Wesen 
Personen genannt werden, weil ihre Natur sie schon als Zwecke an sich selbst, 
353 GMS, IV434. 
354 GMS, IV 428f. 
355 KpV, V 87. 
356 GMS, IV 428. 
357 GMS, IV 435. 
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d.i . ais etwas, das nicht blo/3 ais Mitte) gebraucht werden darf, auszeichnet, 
mithin so fem alle Willkfu einschrank.t (und ein Gegenstand der Achtung ist).358 
Even ifthe idea ofthe kingdom of ends consequently expresses a qualification ofthe worth of 
natura) beings, this idea also implies an analogy to the kingdom of nature. Based in the conception 
of the kingdom of ends the notion of a world of reasonbale beings (mundus intelligibilis) is a 
possibility. Every rational being must aet so that he on the basis of his maxim at any time is a 
lawgiving member of the common kingdom of ends. Therefore, the formal principle for the maxirn 
is that one must aet so that one's maxim also can serve as a common law. This makes an analogy 
between the kingdom of ends and the kingdom of nature possible. 
Ein Reich der Zwecke ist also nur moglich nach der Analogie mit einem Reiche 
der Natur, jenes aber nur nach Maximen, d.i. sich selbst auferlegten Regeln, 
diese nur nach Gesetzen auJ3erlich genotigter wirkender Ursachen. Demu-
nerachtet gibt man doch auch dem Naturganzen, ob es schon ais Masehine 
angesehen wird, dennoch, sofem es auf vernilnftige Wesen als seine Zwecke 
Beziehung hat, aus diesem Grund den Namen eines Reiches der Natur. Ein 
solches Reich der Zwecke wfude nun durch Maximen, deren Regel der 
kategorische Imperativ allen verntinftigen Wesen vorschreibt, wirklich zu 
Stande kommen, wenn sie allgemein befolgt wurden.359 
However, this analogy has that in common with the understanding of nature as a type of moral law 
that it has a regulative character. 360 In the understanding of nature as a type of the moral law Kant 
stated i.a. how this conception could be a test on the moral validity of a maxim. Only if a maxim 
could be imagined with the same common valid i ty as the laws of nature, would it be an expression 
358 GMS, IV 428. 
359 GMS, IV 438. 
360 Therefore, Auxter also seems essentially correct, when he argues that: "In contending that nature 
is purposi ve Kant does not mean that nature possesses its own purposes on behalf of which it organizes 
natura! events. Rather nature is purposive in the sense that it must be treated by us as if an ideal completeness 
(as spelled out through the maxi ms of reason) were present in order to discover and organize empirical laws. 
Nature is continually interpreted in terms ofthis ideal that we hold out for ourselves; we project this ideal onto 
nature in order to comprehend it. This is the sense, then, in which nature is purposive according to these 
necessary heuristic principles" ( I 982, 52). Furthermore, Auxter argues that nature itself does not have to be 
teleological in order for the moral law to be applied. Nature is rather to be understood as a "medium"," ... 
through which the message ofthe moral idea is transmitted. But nature is not itself the message, even though 
it defines the limiting conditions for the expression ofthe message" (74f.). 
113 
Reason as the Source of Normativity 
ofthe necessary conformity with the criteria ofuniversality. Kant does not speak of the concept 
of ends as a test of the validity of a maxim. The conception of ends is not determinative for 
moral i ty. This notion hereby differs essentially from the argument on nature as a type. The decisive 
in this maner is for Kant to demonstrate the analogy that is present between the ethical kingdom 
of ends and the kingdom of nature. Whereas the argument of nature as a type also endorses the 
analogy, it is applied as a test on the moral validity. In the conception of ends Kant explains the 
analogy which is constituted, when the notion of ends implied in ethics is demonstrated. 
In the present context it is also interesting to include a few perspectives on Kant's 
understanding of happiness and the highest good, as Kant also here includes the question on the 
unity of nature and ethics. The moral Iaw is the determining cause of the will, even if happiness 
is included in the concept of the highest good. However, the highest good has duty as its basis, 
as duty bids that the highest good should be the final object of all acts. But this can only come 
about on the basis of harmony between one' s own and God's will. Thus, the moral law leads to 
Kant's philosophy of religion on account of the concept of the highest good. Here religion is 
understood as the acknowledgment of all duties as Di vine commands, not as sanctions (i.e. in 
themselves fortuitous orders of an arbitrary heteronomous will), but as the autonomous laws of 
any free wilL which, however, must be regarded as the commands of the highest being. Only on 
the basis of the presumption of and the harmony with this morally perfect and almighty being can 
we have hopes of attaining the highest good, which the moral law bids us as the object of our 
endeavours. 361 
This striving towards the highest good is also present in Kant' s reference to the human 
aspiration to happiness. Happiness is the condition for a reasonable being in the world, where 
everything occurs according to one's wishes and will, and consequently depends on the 
consistency of nature with its ends. The moral law, however, bids independently of nature, as a 
law of freedom. However, in the practical task of pure reason one must postulate such a 
connection, such a highest good. Therefore, one must also postulate the existence of a highest 
being, which is different from nature, as the basis of this connection.362 The end ofhappiness is 
something real for all rational beings. They have this end with inevitable necessity. The imperative 
361 KpV, V 129. 
361 Kp V, V I 24f. 
114 
Reason as rhe Source of Normativity 
for the promotion of this happiness is hypothetical-assertorical. The grounds for this is that one 
cannot presurne it as necessary in relation to an uncertain, possible end. It is an end that one with 
certainty and a priori can presurne in any human being as this is part of its essence.363 
The faet that this striving towards happiness necessarily is united to the essence of the 
human being, just as the obtaining of this happiness only can be expected on the basis of the 
postulation of a highest being as its guarantor, has its grounding in the poor natura! fitness of the 
human being for its acquirement. In the natura! aptitude for an organized, goal oriented being there 
is no means (Werkzeug) whereby it is well equipped to reach a certain end. Fora being endowed 
with reason and will, reason is not well suited for the attainment of happiness. 364 Thus, for many 
there will be a hatred to reason because of its poor ability to promote happiness for the human 
being.365 
Even if the nations of morality and happiness have to be separated, this does not mean 
that they have to be contrasted to each other. Pure practical reason does not want that one gives 
up on the claim on happiness. One only has not to take this claim into account, as soon as duty is 
the issue. It may even be regarded as duty to concem oneself about happiness, partly because it 
can be a means to accord with duty, partly because the lack of happiness can form hindrances to 
duty. However, on the face of it the striving towards happiness can never be duty, even less can 
it be the principle of all duty. This is due to the empirical character of all other determinative 
grounds than pure practical reason, which would exclude the worth of morality.366 Therefore, it 
must be maintained that even though the human being admittedly is a natura! being, why reason 
must take into consideration the sensuous needs of humans and thereby the basis of happiness, a 
mere reduction of reason to this purpose would imply that the human being did not differ 
363 GMS, IV 415f. 
It is worth noticing that Kant spoke ofthe human nature in the first edition of his Grundlegung. 
Even ifthis was corrected in the later edition, where he referred to the essence ofthe human being, it suggests 
that Kant apparently comes very cl ose to deriving fundamental principles in his moral philosophy from the 
concept of the human nature. This is, of course, problematic within Kan t's moral philosophy in general, why 
he may have tried to eliminate the possibility of a misunderstanding on account ofthis tenninology by using 
essence in stead of nature. 
364 GMS, IV 395. 
365 Gl\.1S, IV 395f. 
366 KpV, V 93. 
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essentially to the rest of nature. Reason also determines what is right and wrong in itself. Pure 
practical reasonjudges on this independently ofthe senses.367 
6.4 Reason as the Source ofNatural Morality 
As hopefully has become apparent, the actual basis ofKant' s moral philosophy is the emphasis on 
reason. It is the autonomous lawgiving of reason which is the source ofthe moral law. But at the 
same time he also includes an understanding of the moral subject as part of a larger whole. This 
implies that the autonomy of the individual is to be understood within the frame of this whole. In 
this understanding Kant comes very cl ose to a traditional conception of the natura! law, as it also 
here often is stated that ethics has its basis in reason, just as this reason is not to be understood 
individualistically, but rather as part of an order. In the present thesis we have seen examples of 
this line of thought in Melanchthon368 and Wolt169 • But the crucial difference to Kant is his 
persistent safeguard of the realm of morality against heteronomy. The whole within which the 
lawgiving of rational beings takes place is constituted exactly by autonomous moral individuals. 
The reference is not to a given, natura! order where humans recognize given moral facts. On the 
contrary, the rational beings themselves are the basis of this moral order.370 In contrast to the 
moral law, nature represents something given in Kant. So when he speaks of the similarity 
between the moral law and nature, he characteristically accentuates the analogi ca! character of this 
similarity. In contrast to earlier representatives of a natura] law thought (who wou]d argue for the 
ham1ony of the natura! and moral order), Kant claims that the similarity has a regulative character. 
It is not a real identity. 
But in spite of this necessary reservation against a too onesided interpretation of Kant 
in the light of the traditional natura! law thought, it is also essential to maintain the traits in Kant 
where he endorses the union between nature and ethics. This is i.a. the case in his discussion on 
367 Kp V, V 61 f. 
368 Cf. Chapter 3. 
'
69 Cf. Chapter 4. 
370 In this understanding of moral reasoning as the basis of norrnativity, it may be argued that Kant 
represents a constructivist position. There are no given moral facts which are to be recognized. In this sense 
Kant stands in contrast to a realist, naturalistic understanding of the sources of nonnativity. Cf. Chapter 14 
fora reconstructive summary ofthe constructivist positions within the thesis. 
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the relation between the human as an intelligible and a sensuous being. The human is a citizen in 
both the kingdom of ends and the kingdom of nature. As an intelligible being the human is 
differentiated from the sensusous world and takes part in an order which can only be apprehended 
by reason. As a natura! being the human being is bound by the sensusous world and its empirical 
existence.371 The primat)' characteristic of the human, however, is its intelligible character, 
whereby the crucial difference to the rest o f nature is brought out. As an intelligible being the will 
is a form of causality, dependent upon the rationality of the human being. Freedom is the 
characteristic of the causality, as it can work independently of extemal causes. Ina similar way the 
necessity of nature is the character of the causality for all in-ational beings, whereby they are 
determined to action on the basis of strange causes.371 
Im Begriffe eines Willens aber ist der Begriff der Kausalitat schon enthalten, 
mithin in dem eines reinen Willens der Begriff einer Kausalitat der Freiheit, d.i. 
nicht nach Naturgesetzen bestimmbar, folglich keiner empirischen Anschauung, 
ais Beweises seiner Realitåt, fåhig ist, dennoch aber, in dem reinen praktischen 
Gesetze a priori, seine objektive Realitåt, doch (wie leicht einzusehen) nicht 
zum Behuf e des theoretischen, sondem bloJ3 praktischen Gebrauchs der 
Vemunft vollkommen rechtfertigt.373 
But this accentuation of the intelligible character of humans does not imply a contrast between 
nature and ethics. Admittedly, Kant speaks a dialectic of reason ( eine Dialektik der Vemunft), 
according to which freedom is only an idea of reason ( eine ldee der Vernunft), the objective reality 
of which is doubtful, whereas nature is as rational term (Verstandesbegriff), the real i ty of which 
can be proven by examples of experience. As the latter appears to be more defensible due to its 
empirical character, this apparently entails the problematic nation of freedom. However, as it is 
only on behalf of freedom that one can maintain practical reason it is impossible to deny the reality 
of freedom. 374 "Diese [i.e. reason] muJ3 also wohl voraussetzen, daB kein wahrer Widerspruch 
zwischen Freiheit und Natumotwendigkeit ebenderselben menschlichen Handlungen angetroffen 
371 KpV, V 86f. 
m GMS, IV 446. 
m KpV, V 55. 
374 GMS, IV 455f. 
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werde; denn sie kann ebenso wenig den Begriff der Natur ais den der Freiheit aufgeben".375 
Consequently, Kant presumes that both nature and reason are necessary
1 
even if they are in an 
apparently tense relation to each other. 
Kant also reflects on this problem m relation to the conception of time. If the 
determination of the existence of the things in time is taken as determination of the things in 
themselves, the necessity of causa! relations in no ways can be united with freedom. This 
determination will imply that any event is always determined by something prior. As the past time 
always will be outside the power ofthe moral agent, the acts will always be unfree. So if freedom 
is to be saved for natural beings whose existence is bound in time, it must be presumed that this 
being and causality only applies to the appearance (Erscheinung). Freedom, however, concems 
the actual essence, the thing in itself. 376 The apparent contrast between the mechanics of nature 
and freedom can be dissolved in the notion ofthe rational being as a noumenal being. The rational 
being is more than only a temporally conditioned being of nature. The rational being is also 
determinable on account of laws that it gives itself through reason. Nothing precedes this 
detem1ination. Any aet is to be seen as an expression of the human being as a noumenal being. 377 
As member ofthe intelligible world the acts of the human being are consistent with the autonomy 
of the pure will. As part of the sensuous world its acts accord with the heteronomy of the 
phaenomenal world. But if the intelligible world contains the basis for the sensuous world and 
consequently its laws, the human being as intelligens (even if it is part ofthe sensuous world) can 
acknowledge itself as subject to the autonomy of the will and the laws of reason. Thus the laws 
of the intelligible world are imperatives and the aet in accordance with this princip le are duties.378 
A concise passage in Kritik der praktischen Vernunft will form the conclusion on the 
375 GMS, IV 456. 
Melchert attempts to naturalize Kant's understanding of freedom by developing a notion of 
--rreedom from rational ly undisciplined nature" ( 1990, 67ff.). According to Melchert freedom and causality 
can be reconciled in Kant, by positing rationality as the heart offreedom. Hereby the two major analyses of 
human freedom are united; ·· ... it shows that freedom can be more than merely hypothetical, involving 
distinctively human, rational spontaneity, while being a matter of degree and avoiding extravagant 
metaphysical assumptions" (73). 
376 KpV, V 94f. 
377 KpV, V 97f. 
378 GMS, IV 453f. 
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discussion on Kant. Here Kant argues that the moral law must obtain the form of the intelligible 
world for the sensuous world, which implies a supersensuous nature without interrupting the 
mechanism ofthe sensuous worJd. Nature in the understanding is the existence of things according 
to laws. The sensuous nature of reasonable beings consequently exists under empirically 
conditioned laws. In contrast the supersensuous nature is independent of the empiri ca! and is 
consistent with the autonomy of pure reason. The law for this autonomy, however, is the moral 
law, the picture of which exists in the sensuous world. Consequently, the moral law is the source 
of its reflection in the sensuous world.379 
Das Gesetz dieser Autonomie aber ist das moralische Gesetz; welches also das 
Grundgesetz einer i.ibersinnlichen Natur und einer reinen Verstandeswelt ist, 
deren Gegenbild in der Sinnenwelt, aber doch zugleich ohne Abbruch der 
Gesetze derselben, existieren soli. Man konnte jene die urbildliche (natura 
archetypa), die wir bloB in der Vernunft erkennen, diese aber, weil sie die 
mogliche Wirkung der Idee der ersteren, als Bestirnmungsgrundes des Willens, 
enthalt, die nachgebildete (natura ectypa) nennen.380 
This understanding is confirmed by comrnon experience. Where the maxim is tested by practical 
reason, it is always seen how it is supposed to be, if it is to count as a universal natural law.38 1 
In this way Kant rnaintains the characteristic (and absolutely crucial) distinction between 
the realm of physical nature and of practical reason. But just as characteristic is his constant effort 
to prevent a contrast between these two domains. Kant distinguishes and even separates these two 
worlds, but he also insists upon their interrelatedness. Both are pictures of the other world. 
Physical nature is a picture of the moral law, just as the moral law depicts the physical world. But 
precisely because of Kants continuous emphasis on the formal similarity ofthe natura! and moral 
world and the underlining of their essentially different character, he remains an advocate of not 
deducing ethics from the concept of nature, but, rather, to argue for reason as the source of 
normativity. 
379 Apart from the references to Auxter already included in the thesis (see i.a. 6.3. l and 6.3.2), cf. 
Auxter 1982. 64ff. fora more detailed discussion on this aspect ofKant. 
38° KpV, V 43. 
381 KpV, V 43f. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
The analysis of Kant's understanding of nature and reason as normative concepts can now be 
concluded. It has been demonstrated that Kant emphasizes reason as the source of normativity but 
that he does not discard nature. Even if nature does not serve as a source of normativity, it still 
has a role in the moral reasoning of the moral agent. As part of the analysis of Kant it has been 
attempted to argue that his moral philosophy can be seen as a genuine natura! law theory. Firstly, 
the analysis gave an account of the third antinomy, demonstrating this problem as essential to the 
inquiry of the thesis. Thereupon, his understanding of reason as the basis of the moral law is 
examined. His understanding of moral freedom and autonomy served as the first notion of interest. 
Having demonstrated the importance of this idea and its dependency upon the idea of moral 
reason, Kant's understanding ofthe moral law as a faet of reason forms the subsequent concem. 
The factiticity of the moral law gives rise to a discussion on the metaethical basis of Kant's 
thought. Here, it is argued that the constructivist understanding must be preferred. The next part 
concentrates on teleological traits in Kant's moral philosophy. This is argued on the basis of an 
exposition ofhis understanding ofthe phaenomenal world as a type of the moral law. Furthermore, 
his understanding of nature as a symbol of morality is also analyzed in an appendix. As the last part 
on the resemblances between the laws of nature and morality, the chapter provides an account of 
his understanding of the kingdom of ends. The concluding part of the chapter argues in favor of 
an w1derstanding of reason as the source of natura! morality. In the analysis of Kant's thought, is 
has been demonstrated how he represents a constructivist position. Moral nom1s are not given, 
but come into being on the basis of moral reasoning. 
120 
Part III 
Nature and Reason in Contemporary Environmental Ethics 
In the natura! law thought, which has been our concem until now, we have found two types of 
moral thought. As we have seen, it can be claimed that one mode of argumentation finds the basis 
of morality (as the natura! law tradition can be equated with moral theology or philosophy) in the 
concept of nature. The other understanding advocates reason as the source of normativity. It will 
now be attempted to show that these same types can be found in contemporary environmental 
thought, and that there is also here an equation to moral theology or philosophy. Even if there is 
no explicit use of natura] law thought, there might still be a similarity in the foundation of 
normativity, indeed, this seems aften to be the case. Firstly (Part III.I) this will be demonstrated 
with regard to the nation of nature as the basis of morality and secondly (Part III.II) it will be 
shown also to be the case in the concept of reason as the source of normativity. 

Part III.I 
Nature as the basis of morality 
In this part the focus is on the environmental thought ofHolmes Rolston, III (Chapter 7), J. Baird 
Callicott (Chapter 8), and Paul Taylor (Chapter 9). A number of other positions on environmental 
ethics will also be included in discussion with the mentioned thinkers. 

Chapter 7 
The Valuable Nature 
In the environmental thought of Holmes Rolston, III we find an example of a theory of 
environmental ethics where the understanding ofthe normativity of nature holds resemblance to 
a premodem natura! law mode of thought. We will here highlight these parts by focusing on two 
issues. Firstly we explain his understanding of the values in nature and how this relates to his 
understanding of the role of the human being as valuer. Secondly, we are concemed with the 
relation between ecology and morality - how does this relate to the classical discussion of the 
naturalistic fallacy? The chapter is concluded with an outlook to the other theories of the thesis.382 
7.1 Values in Nature and the Human Valuer 
In this paragraph we will look into Rolston' s concept of value and how this relates to his 
understanding of the hwnan valuer. Rolston seems to maintain at one and the same time that 
nature carries its value independent of humans and on the other hand, it is necessary to have 
humans as valuers and overseers. How do these apparent exclusive nations relate to each other? 
7 .1.1 V al ues in Nature 
Rolston distinguishes between a primary sense of environmental ethics, which is biocentric in its 
approach, and a secondary sense, which is anthropocentric.383 Whereas the anthropocentric sense 
3s2 Ralstan's wark an environmental ethics is impressive. The substantial literature by Ralstan is 
ane indication of the effort Rolston has put into this discussian. The extent of his writings, however, alsa 
necessitates a narrowing of one's fteld of enquiry. In the foliowing, the focus is on the major works, i.e. 1986; 
1988; 1994 and 1999. This does not mean that other works ofRolston are not referred to. But it does mean 
that these works constitute the primary frame of reference for the present analysis of Rolston. Furthermore, 
Rolston ' s theory of environmental ethics has been the subject of several studies. In the present analysis, 
however, the focus is on Rolston's writings, even if a few references to other discussions on Rolston will be 
included. 
383 Rolston 1986, 1 l ff; Ibid., 20ff; Ibid., 23f; I 988, 1. 
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of environmental ethics understands the environment as instrumental and auxiliary, the primary 
sense (also called the naturalistic) is reached, only when humans ask questions not merely of 
prudential use but of appropriate respect and duty. This distinction is important as environmental 
ethics cannot be seen as yet another area of applied ethics. Fora proper environmental ethics it 
is necessary with a wholly new approach to fundamental issues, such as the concept of nature. The 
crucial question is what kind of value nature has. 
Rolston argues that there are several kinds of value384• Nature has intrinsic, instrumental, 
and systemic value. Further, there are different kinds of value that are carried by nature or, as 
Rolston also says, are valued by human beings. Among the former, the most interesting are the 
intrinsic and systemic values. By intrinsic value Rolston refers to a value which is a good for an 
organism, independently ofhuman beings.385 Lower and higherorganisms can have agood oftheir 
kind, a good of their own. Closely related to this value is the discussion on is and ought. Theis 
of this being implies the ought to be. Rolston does not list several intrinsic values, as the intrinsic 
value is dependent upon the genetic set of the organism.386 This value is sharply contrasted to the 
instrumental value.387 Here the organism has its value for another kind. A plant or an animal can 
384 Rolston's valuetheory is much discussed. Among the explicitly theological comments, one can 
refer to e.g. LaBar and Benzoni. LaBar (1986, 78ff.) demonstrates the similarity between Rolston and the 
concepts of nature in the Bi ble. "The Bible is primarily about God's relationship to man. It is is not, except 
peripherally, about other organisms. Nevertheless, reviewing the statements in the Bi ble about nonhuman 
organism leads one to the conclusion that the writers of the Bible were aware of al most as many kinds of value 
as those enurnerated by sophisticated contemporary thinkers like Rolston." (90). Benzoni ( 1996) recognizes 
the key issues in Rolston's value theory, but argues that it is not the value theory which is the weak point in 
Rolston, but rather his anthropology. A richer, more ful ly developed theological anthropology would have 
furthered his argument. "In the end, Rolston's estimable environmental ethics suffers more, I think, from lack 
of completeness and clarity than it does from any necessary inconsistency or incoherence. While the lack of 
a fully developed theological anthropology weakens his entire enterprise, the core ofhis project, his objective 
value theory grounded in the di vine, remains essentially untouched by this critique. Still, with the development 
ofthis anthropology, his ethic could integrate the natura!, human, and di vine spheres while yet maintaining 
their distinctiveness." (35 1 f.). 
385 Cf. i.a. Rolston 1986, 110-115; 1988, 11 2-1 17; 186-188; 1994, 167ff.; 1999, 38ff. 
38° Callicott ( I 999, 221-237) argues that Rolston 's concept of intrinsic value implies a rejection of 
a socalled modem scientific worldview, which never really is discussed in Rolston. Instead, Callicott advocates 
a post-modem approach based upon insights of quantum physics. " ... ecology intellectually resonates with 
the New Physics. Therefore, I think, a value theory inspired by and conceptually analogous to, but by no 
rneans reduced to or derived from, quantum physics is particularly congenial to an ecologically informed 
environmental ethic." (235). 
387 Rolston 1986, 11 Off.; 1988, 186-188; 1994, 171 ff. 
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have an instrumental value at both nonsystemic and systemic levels. On the former there is use of 
a particular organism, even if it has no ecosystemic influence. On the latter level, the instrumental 
value can be a part of the foodchain of the ecosystem. In this case, the value comes close to 
Rolston's understanding of the systemic value.388 Here, Rolston refers to the value as part of the 
ecosystem. The value of the individual being is its place within the whole, the web of life. 
All such intrinsic value has its place ecosystemically; intrinsic value couples with 
instrumental value, and this will lead us on, presently, to systemic value. Things 
do not have their separate natures merely in and for themselves, but they face 
outward and co-fit into broader natures. Value-in-itself is smeared out to 
become value-in-togethemess. Value seeps out into the system, and we Jose our 
capacity to identify the individual as the sole locus of value.389 
Besides these values, Rolston also mentions values, that are carried by nature.390 Here, Rolston 
is describing something quite different from the intrinsic value. Whereas the intrinsic value is 
independent of human beings, the values carried by nature are also valued by humans. This does 
not imply an anthropocentric grounding ofthese values. But it does imply that humans appreciate 
these values. They may emne about independently of humans, but they are not independent of 
humans. They require a human valuer. Describing these values, Rolston lists several of them. 
Rolston describes at least fourteen different types of values that are carried by nature. We 
will shortly summarize the description of each of these values39 1• Life-Support Value. Life and 
culture is bound to the biosystem. It is the biosystem that provides the possibility of the 
sustainability of life. The human beings are dependent on this life supportive value of the 
biosystem. Economic Value. Nature can be rebuild to cultural needs. In this sense nature has an 
instrumental capacity. Coupling human labor with the rich utilitarian pliability of nature, natura! 
sources can be refined and properties relocated so that the economic value of nature is utilized. 
388 !dem 1988, 186-188; 216-218; 220-224; 1994, 171-177; 219-223. 
389 !dem 1994, l 73f. 
390 !dem 1986, 74ff.; I !Off.; 1988, 3ff.; 213f.; 205ff. ; 1994, 134ff. 
391 A more elaborate description of each of these values can be found in Rolston, "Yalues in 
Nature", in: 1986, 74-90; !dem, "Humans Yaluing the Natura! Environment", 1988, 1-44 ( on pp. 3-26); Idem, 
1994, 134-141. The last reference is the most concise, whereas 1988, 1-44 the most detailed. There are some 
mi nor terminological differences between the various texts, but in general there is a great deal of overlapping. 
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Recreational Value. There are two main types of value that often can be combined, the gymnasial 
and the theatrical. In regard to the former, nature is a place to show what one can do. It is a space 
for sports, hiking, etc. The latter is concemed by being let in on nature's show. The recreational 
focus is here contemplative. Scientific value. The value ofthe natura! sciences cannot be endorsed 
without the value of nature. The absorbing complexity of the natura! environment as the object of 
the natural science studies is the background ofthe worthfullness of the natura! sciences. Aesthetic 
value. Nature presents beauty and greatness in life and landscape in various forms, which can leave 
the human with a sense of awe. Genetic-diversity value. The biological diversity of species carry 
an intrinsic value. Extinguishing these species stops the story of natura! history. It brings death 
without survivors into Earth's prolific exuberance of life. Historical value. In the process of 
evolution the human being is a latecomer. Wildlands provides a profound historical museum, 
telling about what the world was Iike befare the humans came. Further, wildlands provide 
historical value for the cultures superimposed on natural history. Cultural-symbolization value. 
Animals as well as plants and nonorganic nature can be cultural and national symbols. Character-
building value. Organizations and individuals use wildland as a space of developing human 
character. This is the case for competitive games and exercises. It is also the case for wildlands 
as pro vi ding a sense of propo11ion, teaching the virtues of humility, simplicity, frugality, serenity, 
and independence. Diversity-unity value. The sciences reveal a growing complexity and diversity 
of nature. Yet they also detect unificatory relationships of common composition and kinship 
between diverse natura! kinds. Nature has an inclination to both to diversify and and to unify. 
Stability and spontaneity value. Constancy is coupled with a degree of contingency in nature. The 
laws of nature order nature, but at the same time there is also space for spontaneity. The 
ecological succession is never twice the same. Dialectical value. The human culture has developed 
in a dialectical relationship to nature. Culture is carved out against nature, but also out of nature. 
The hostility along with the irenic character of nature is characteristic of the dialectic context of 
life. Life value. Life as such can be regarded as a value. Whether in plants, animals or humans, life 
can have an almost sacred value, as it expresses the kinship between the different life forms. 
Religious value. Nature inspires poetry, and philosophical and religious reflection. Experiences 
of nature can have a profound poetic dimension. Nature can reveal parts of God's being and 
character. 
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This doublesidedness of Ro1ston' s understanding of the value of nature is contained in 
his understanding nature as valu-able. Nature is at the same time a value and able to produce 
value.392 This double character of the value of nature imp1ies a somewhat unclear picture of 
Rolston's concept ofvalue. Rolston does not seem to be sufficiently aware ofthe epistemological 
problems of this theory.393 Rolston does discuss the viewpoint that value is a relationaltermand 
that value requires a valuer. However, even ifhe does discuss these positions, he does not supply 
us with a convincing argument for the difference between the intrinsic value of nature and the 
values valued by hurnans.394 For humans, it seems that there are only values where the humans 
have a conscious understanding of value. Rolston does not speak ofthe intrinsic value ofhumans. 
Why can he not include such a value in his theory? Ifhumans are part of the ecological web oflife 
(as we shall see later), why are they different from the rest of nature in this respect? For nonhuman 
organisms, Rolston fai1s to prove why the good of these organisms can serve as the basis of 
391 Rolston 1994, 196f: "Ecology is not something subjective that goes on in the human mind. In 
an ecological perspective, that Earth is valuable means that the evolutionary ecosystem is able to produce 
value, and has long been doing so. A late, remarkable produet of the process is humans, who claim to be of 
value in a unique way. When humans come, they find Earth aften valuable, able to produce valued 
experiences. The subjective value events are a capstone subset superposed on the global, objective carrying 
of value. This does not commit the naturalistic fallacy, because moving from an is to an is af value, is 
valuable and even to a (nonmoral) ought-to-be is what nature has done befare us here. Humans are urged to 
move further to amoral ought-to-be. Otherwise we fall into the subjectivist, anthropocentrist fallacy." Idem 
1999, 286: ·'Morality is not intrinsic to natura! systems. In faet, there are no moral agents in wild nature. 
Nature is amoral, but that is not to disparage it. That is to set aside irrelevant categories for its interpretation. 
Amoral nature is fundamental ly and radically the ground, the root out ofwhich arise all the particular values 
manifest in organisms and ecosystems. This includes all human values, even though, when they come, human 
values rise higher than their precedents in spontaneous nature." 
393 The critique of the epistemological problem in Rolston has also been raised by others. Callicott 
and Norton represent two such examples As a critical comment on Norton's and Callicott's critique of 
Rolston ·s concept of intrinsic value, Preston (1998) concludes that "Under cl ose inspection, the critiques of 
intrinsic value that Norton and Callicott offer are not quite as devastating as they might at first appear ( ... ) 
Because, as I have shown, Norton and Callicott's critiques are inadequate, environmental ethicisists should 
continue to articulate and refine different account of objective intrinsic value." ( 428). Among other thinkers, 
one can point to Harlow ( 1992) for making the point that Rolston's distinction between "autonomous intrinsic 
value" and "anthropocentric intrinsic value" coincide in the light of a postwittgensteinian epistemology. "The 
whole point of the account I have suggested is that there is no neutral nature in either the epistemological or 
the ethical sense. In the attempt to speak of values in a world beyond language we reach a conceptual limit 
beyound which we simply do not know what to say." (42). 
394 Thomas ( 1997) also notices the problem ofRolston 's attempt of asserting the difference between 
humans and the nonhuman nature, and at the same time their interrelatedneess. Thomas concludes that 
Rolston gives up on his biocentrism. As an alternative to Rolston, Thomas suggests a biocentrism inspired 
by Emerson. 
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something we call value. Admittedly, nonhuman organisms thrive better at some conditions than 
at other. Admittedly. they have a good oftheir kind. But are these goods to be called values? I find 
that there is such a distinct difference between what Rolston calls intrinsic values for nonhuman 
organisms and values valued by humans, that they can hardly be classified with the same term. This 
is a terminological problem, but even more a question of categories. It seems that two distinctly 
different categories are mixed up. Some of this will be more clear, when we look into Rolston' s 
understanding of the human valuer. 
7.1.2 The Human Valuer 
Humans value the environment in many ways. Rolston certainly admits this faet. However, this 
does not imply an environmental ethics in the secondary sense. Even ifhumans are aware of their 
valuing of environment, even if they get excited about the experienced values of nature, value is 
still not dependent upon the human being as a conscious being. Rolston acknowledges the human 
as valuer, but rejects not just the traditional anthropocentrism, but also the anthropogenic 
(generated by humans) argument for values in nature.395 
Value is not received as the conclusion of an argument, or by the indifferent 
observation of a causa! series. A value or disvalue recognized has got some bite to 
it. That can confuse us into thinking that values Iie entirely in the human 
experiences that nature generates, no matter how greatly features in the wildemess 
contribute to it. But life support and genetic information operate regardless of 
whether humans are aware ofthese things. Perhaps the human valuing of nature 
generates new values, a kind that are experiential by logical necessity, but these are 
superimposed on spontaneous natura! values, some kinds of which do not require 
human experiences to generate them.396 
For Rolston it is important that the valuing is seen as part ofthe ecological process. Valuing is not 
understood as being undertaken by a subject that is isolated from nature. The valuing agent is part 
of the natura! field in which the natura! objects also partake. The whole process of valuing is 
395 Rolston 1994, I 58fL This position cornes close to the position of Attfield. He also argues for 
the intrinsic value of nature. The difference between Attfield and Rolston is in their argument for this 
understand ing. Whereas Rolston referes to ecology as the basis of his theory, Attfield refers to the Western 
Christian tradition. See Chapter 12 for a fuller account of Attfield's position. 
396 Ibid., 161. 
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among natura! events.397 This can be tied up with Rolston's understanding ofthe processuality of 
life, even though Rolston does not do this himself. In his essay on ·'The River of Life: Past, 
Present, and Future"398 he uses the image of life as a river. As the river, life is understood as a 
process, a ceaseless flow, transcending the individual. This nation implies critical perspectives on 
classic concepts. One of these concepts is the relation between the human and the natura!. Life is 
seen as an organic unity. Only when life is environmentally homeostatic, can it survive. Life is a 
project of nature, the human being a part ofthis life project. The human cannot be understood as 
different from nature, but as necessarily interwoven with the environment.399 
On the other band, the human also has a special status.400 Even though there is a unity 
with nature to a very large extent, the human is also more thanjust natura! processes and ecology. 
The human is the only being with a conscience. It is only humans who have a " ... subjective 
capacity ( capacity of subjects) to be objective (appreciate world objects)".401 For Rolston it is 
important to say that the humans at one and the same time are part of and yet different from 
nature.-1°1 
Humans evolved out of nature, and that can confuse people into saying that 
humans are just natural, since they are produets of various natura! laws and events 
operating through evolutionary history, and, since their origins were natura!, they 
397 !dem 1986, 99ff.; 1988, 203. 
398 !dem 1986, 61-71. 
399 A similar understanding on the basis ofChristian thought can be found in McDaniel (1986). He 
argues that the substantialist perspective 011 the relation between humans and nonhuman nature must be 
discarded in fa vor af an ecological (202ff.). This will have an intluence on the understanding of not only 
humans and nonhuman nature but also an the concept of humans as created in the image af God (206ff.). 
Whereas McDaniel counts this as ane af the positive reasons for this new perspective, one could use the very 
same reflections as an argument for the necessary precaution. Cf. the conclusion of the present thesis, where 
it is argued that the Christian doctrine on the human being as created in the image of God may inspire an 
understanding of an endorsement of the unity between man and nature and the difference at the same time. 
This unity and difference is an important aspect ofthe nation ofnatural law. 
400 Rolston 1994, I ff. 
401 ldem 1988, 341. 
401 This doublesided understanding of the human being in relation to nonhuman nature can also be 
found in same ofthe other theories of environmental ethics in the thesis, e.g. Taylor and Attfield, even if there 
are different accentuations. This of course raises the question whether the traditional dichotomy between bio-
and anthropocentrism is a useful te1minology to describe the issues at stake in environmental ethics. Cf. e.g. 
Krebs 1999 fora different approach in her critical taxonomy ofthe arguments in theories of nature. 
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continue to be natural. But that is to fall into a ''nothing but" fallacy (more 
accurately the genetic fallacy), which confuses what a thing now essentially is with 
what its historical origins once were. It cannot take emergence seriously.403 
In the previous chapters on Immanuel Kant, we have seen how Kant stresses the rationality and 
autonomy of the human. We also saw how Kant in Kritik der reinen Vernunft came close to 
arguing for a dichotomy between the human as a rational being and nature as regulated by 
heteronomous laws of nature_-1o-1 But we also saw how his understanding of nature as a type for 
the moral law and the aesthetic as a symbol ofthe moral good implied a lessening of this apparent 
dichotomy_.ios Having looked into Kant's thought it is therefore interesting to notice Rolston's 
discussion on Kant. This discussion is in close connection to his understanding of the human's 
similarity and difference to nature. 
The superiority of the humans, in the sense that they are the only beings with a conscience 
and capable of reflecting on the needs of others, is the point where Rolston refers to Kant.406 Kant 
also stressed this ability ofthe human and also emphasized this as the basis of the dignity ofthe 
human. But Rolston criticizes Kant for only focusing on humans as the other. For environmental 
ethics it is necessary also to see nonhumans, the biosphere, the Earth, ecosystem communities, 
fauna, flora and natura] kinds as beings in which there is formed integrity, objective value 
independent of subjective value. Further, Rolston claims that Kant was still "a residual egoist in 
the objects of his ethics" _-1o7 Limiting himself only to humans, Kant stayed a humanistic altruist, 
but neglected the altruism towards animals and plants. Rolston believes this to be a decisive 
difference between humans and nonhumans that humans can count ( defend) life and even nonlife 
with vision of greater scope, which is not possible for nonhumans. The humans ought to be "ideal 
observers", using mind and morals to fom1 an intelligible view ofthe whole and defend ideals of 
.io, Rolston 1994, 4. Rolston further criticises Callicott for having too wide a concept of nature. In 
Rolston·s opinion Callicott does not differentiate enough between humans and the rest of nature. This 
distinction needs to be maintained. Ibid., 5 . 
.io.i Cf. 6.1 
.ios Cf. 6.3.1 and Appendix: Nature as a Symbol of Morality. 
•
06 Rolston 1988, 339f. There are other passages, where Rolston refers to Kant, but unfortunately 
they are too limited to be taken into account here. 
407 !dem 1988, 340. 
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life in all forms . .ios 
Rolston's attempt to appropriate elements of Kant's thought is certainly interesting. 
However, his understanding of Kant seems somewhat limited. As we have seen, Kant does not 
neglect nature. Admittedly, he does distinguish sharply between the realms of (1) freedom and 
rationality and (2) the heteronomy of nature. But at the same time he acknowledges the lawfullness 
of nature as a symbol of morality. This is closely connected to his moral ideal ofthe kingdom of 
ends. As nature is a w1ified whole, so is the ideal of the moral realm that the individual, 
autonomous persons must bring together in their ethical duties.409 Even if this has a hypothetical 
character in Kant, he does stress this close similarity between nature and reason. In this respect, 
Kant can hardly be said to be a "residual egoist". Moreover, his concem for the beauty of nature 
as a symbol of the moral good hardly justifies this critique. 
Further, the previously metioned problems with regard to Rolston's concept of the 
valuable nature still seem to be true. After having analyzed his understanding ofhumans as valuers, 
he sti ll fails to justify the difference between the value of the nonhuman nature and humans. The 
categorial difference sti ll seems to be a problem. Rolston seems to operate with two sets of 
normativity. On the one hand he talks about the intrinsic value of nature. This implies for him the 
duty of respect. On the other hand he also talks about the values of nature that are carried by 
nature, yet valued by human beings. These values are also morally relevant. They raise moral 
duties in regard to the human as the only being with a conscience, the only being capable of 
reflecting on values of other beings and the implied moral duties. Here, Rolston apparently does 
not see that he is somewhat inconsistent. In the first case the moral agent is to respect a value that 
is only a value to the particular subject. It is a value irrespectively of my acknowledgment of this 
value. The moral agent is to respect the value of another being. It is not the value in itself which 
raises the moral demand. The moral demand is towards the individual which has intrinsic value, 
i.e. a value irrespective of the moral agent. It is the individual other which is to be respected, not 
the value as such. In the other case, it is the values. In this case the individual is the human being. 
However, the values are not anthropocentric. A value like the life-support value is there befare 
the arrival ofhumans. But they are still valued by humans. The problem with this value in regard 
408 Rolston 1988, 338. 
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to the former is that here, the value is what is morally relevant. It is not the human, but the value 
which is to be morally respected. 
Concluding the reflections on Rolston's concept of value, his naturalist valueconcept is 
very clear. Rolston' s valuetheory represents a lue id, naturalist argument. Value has its basis in 
nature. Even when man is considered as a valuer, he is still conceived of as a valuer within nature. 
In this sense, Rolston may even be said to represent an ontological basis of value. This is the case, 
when value in Rolston can be said to be validated on the basis of ecological and evolutionary 
principles of being, which permeate nature and human being. In that sense, the constituent 
principles of nature and morality have a common basis. In Rolston, nature and reason are 
interrelated on this account. Having demonstrated this naturalistic valueconcept in Rolston, we 
now tum to his understanding of the unity between nature and humans. Part of our concem in the 
foliowing paragraph will be a critical analysis of Rolston's thought in the light of Moore's 
understanding of the naturalistic fallacy. 
7.2 A Naturalized Ethics 
This focus on the moral duties of the human leads us into the question of the ethics of Rolston's 
theory. lf his theory is to be understood as an "Environmental ethics" that humans are to take into 
account, and the values of nature and thereby the basis of his theory is independent of humans -
what is the moral role of the human beings then? This is a leading question in this paragraph. 
7.2.1 The Ecological Morality 
Morality and ecology are considered to be in a harmonious relation. Rolston considers ecology 
as an ethical science. The homeostatic laws of ecology prescribe ethical duties. In this sense, 
Rolston believes it is necessary to go from a consideration of how nature is based on these 
ecological laws to the moral duty that one ought to comply with these laws. Earlier philosophical 
traditions have also argued fora unity between man and nature, but a contemporary argument 
could be the ecological consideration.41 0 Rolston follows Aldo Leopold in this argument~ 11 A 
4
10 Rolston 1986, 53ff. 
411 Attfield (1994, 128) argues that Rolston does not provide any argument for " ... how "oughts" 
of any kind could be grounded in factual descriptions of any kind, whether ecological or otherwise, or how 
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central idea of Leopold is the rightness of an action when it preserves the integrity, stability, and 
beauty of the biotic community.412 However, this does not entail an understanding of the 
lawfullness of nature. Rolston argues from an evolutionary viewpoint, when he explains that recent 
natural sciences have taught us that the evolutionary world is to be understood as history. It is a 
story still taking place, of life as still arriving.413 Nature is not regulated by laws extrinsic to itself. 
This doesn 't leave nature unregulated. The regulation of nature lies within the systemic character 
of the biosystem. This entails a systemic dependency of environmental ethics on nature.4 14 The 
ecosystems contain certain values that have ethical relevance. Rolston mentions values such as 
integrity, projective creativity, life support, and community. This is not considered an interhurnan 
ethic, but attempts to develop an extension of ethics into environmental attitudes.415 Even if 
Rolston here does not explicitly argue for an ecological basis of morality, this seems to be very 
much the case, when we tum to his understanding of the naturalistic fallacy. 
Rolston introduces his Environmental Ethics by arguing that what he seeks is a " ... 
naturalized ethics".416 Rolston repeatedly refers to the naturalistic fallacy, arguing that it is 
rational reflection can flow in either direction from the one to the other." 
41
~ Cf. 8.1.1 fora short introduction to basic tenets of Leopold's thought. The influence from 
Leopold is present in both Rolston and Callicott, which is the reason why both may be seen as representatives 
of different forms of land ethics. As is mentioned below (8.1.1 ), Callicott, however, is often seen as the 
leading representative of the land ethics. 
413 Rolston 1988, 343. 
414 fdem 1986, 17: "The claim that morality is a derivative ofthe holistic character ofthe ecosystem 
proves more radical, for the ecological perspective penetrates not only the secondary but also the primary 
qualities of the ethic. It is ecological in substance, not mere ly in accident; it is ecological per se, not just 
consequentially"; 1988, 334f.: ·'Though obligations in environmental ethics have universal intent, they are 
not categorical, not absol ute and independent of circumstances and bel iefs about the world. They are systemic, 
and the systemic components are both natura! and cultural. Do x, because you believe y about the world, that 
z is a faet and vis ofvalue there. We move from believed facts to believed evaluations and thence to believed 
duties. In this respect, environmental ethics is not different from interhuman ethical systems, though these 
other ethical systems, focusing on human relationships, sometimes allege taht they are independent of 
metaphysics or natura! facts." 
415 !dem 1988, 228: ''The land ethics rests upon the discovery of certain values - integrity, projective 
creativity, life support, community - already present in ecosystems, and it imposes an obligation to aet so as 
to maintain these. This is not, we have repeatedly wamed, an ethic conceming culture, not an interhuman ethic. 
We will continue to need the Ten Commandments, categorical imperatives, the Golden Rule, concepts of 
j ustice, and the uti I itarian calculus. But we are developing an extension of ethics into environmental attitudes, 
a new commandment about landscapes and ecosystems.'' 
416 !dem 1988, xi. 
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necessary to dispence of this classical problem and recognize the necessity of moving from an is 
to an ought. This distinction operates with a false dichotomy. "In environmental ethics one' s 
beliefs about nature, which are based upon but exceed biological and ecological science, have 
everything to do with beliefs about duty. The way the world is informs the it ought to be".417 For 
the environmental ethics the description of nature can not be separated from the ethical 
prescriptions. Rolston criticizes the natura! right tradition for being too abstract. In contrast to the 
natura! right tradition, the environmental ethics cannot be isolated from the concept of nature.418 
Two further arguments for the necessity of moving from is to ought, is the processuality of life. 
Life is like a river floating on. Life is protecting life. This facticity of nature implies moral 
normativity, raising the appeaJ of an intemalisation of the moral sense. "If seen as a symbol, this 
river of life is no longer merely a metaphor, it is a truth that bears moral insight, because it helps 
us see more deeply how the life process is and how it ought to be".41 9 Further, it is not possible 
to maintain the sharp distinction between the sciences and the ethics. In environmental ethics there 
is a paradoxical linkage between facts and values.410 
This point is further substantiated in Genes, Genesis and God. In this work Rolston 
repeats his emphasis on the doublesidedness of morality as within nature and yet as something 
which is characteristic ofhumanbeings as distinct from nonhuman nature. However, he does seem 
to move the point of emphasis slightly towards an understanding of nature as not having anything 
to do with ethics.-121 This raises the challenge of his attempt to naturalize ethics. As previously, 
Rolston maintains the natura! basis of morality, as the human being is thought of within an 
417 !dem, 1988, 230. Cf. 13.3 fora summary and critical assessment ofthe dift'erent parts ofthe 
thesis where the naturalistic fallacy is discussed. 
m ldem 1986, 67: "What is often wrong with the model of a "conctract," in te!Tils ofwhich ethics 
is argued out, is that it is anti-natural, tinding individualistic humans reluctantly banded together against 
threatening nature. There, rights-talk understandably appreciates individuals and depreciates nature ( ... ) 
Nature gives us objective life, ofwhich the subjective life ofthe individual is but a partial, inner face." Even 
if Rolston 's critique of the natura I right tradition may have a point, this does not count for the natura! law 
tradition. This is precisely a claim ofthe present thesis. Natura! law stresses the moral individual as part of 
nature, part of a larger whole. Natura! law does not lead to the same individualistic tendency as one may find 
in theories of natura! rights. 
419 Ibid., 70. 
410 Ibid. , 13. 
4
"
1 !dem 1999, 212; 284fl 
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evolutionary paradigm. ·'Morality is not intrinsic to natura! systems. In faet, there are no moral 
agents in wild nature. Nature is amoral, but that is not to desparage it. That is to set aside 
irrelevant categories for its interpretation. Amoral nature is fundamentally and radically the 
ground, the root out of which arise all the particular values manifest in organisms and ecosystems. 
This includes all human values, even though, when they come, human values rise higher than their 
precedents in spontaneous nature".422 So even if nature as such is independent from morality, 
humans emerge from nature as moral agents. This also means that hurnans and nonhuman nature 
share certain interests such as species specific values. The difference between humans and 
nonhuman nature is the ability of the fomer to reflect morally on these values. This normative 
deliberation is different from the rest of nature.423 "There are twin truths: nature is a womb that 
humans really never leave, and so ethics does have to be "naturalized," to fit human biology, 
including human reproductive needs. Yet there is an exodus out of nature into the freedom of 
spirit in cultural Iife, superimposed on biological life. We never become free from nature, but we 
do become free within nature":12-1 
By this clarification in his recent work, Rolston does seem to have rep lied to some of the 
criticism put forward in relation to the epistemological problem of his theory of value.425 Whether 
he saves his theory of committing the naturalistic fallacy, is a different question. It does seem, 
indeed, still to have some problems. One point of critique in this respect is that Rolston apparently 
is somewhat unclear about the distinction between humans and nature. Rolston often stresses that 
humans are natura!. They are not free from nature. This implies the humans' relatedness to nature 
and is thought of as a critique of the previous anthropocentric ethical tradition. The problem about 
this notion in Rolston is that we hardly find any mentioning of the respect towards humans. 
Rolston's aim is not to argue for the moral duties towards humans. His concem is nature. What 
he seems to forget is his own strong emphasis on humans as nature. Does this not imply that 
humans also haveamoral responsibility toward each other? This may imply a flaw within the basic 
structure of Rolston ' s thought. His theory as a whole is dependent upon this idea of the human 
412 Ibid., 286f. 
m lbid .. 280ff. 
424 Ibid .. 282f. 
425 Cf. e.g. Harlow ( I 992) and Preston ( 1998 ). 
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as nature. 
The fundamental categorical mistake seems to be that Rolston forgets what is the factor 
of motivation in his theory. The basis of his theory is a respect ofvalue. However, as far as I can 
see, he does not justify this respect. He does indeed argue for the values of nature and human 
beings. But he forgets to argue, why the intrinsic values of nature are to be respected. When the 
intrinsic value of nature is independent ofhuman beings, how does it raise a normative demand? 
How does Rolston prevent this from ending up in a secondary sense of environrnental ethics? As 
I see it, Rolston' s theory necessarily implies this anthropocentric perspective. Rolston seems to 
forget himself. He is building a theory of which he himself is a part and yet he forgets that doing 
this he is at the same time setting himself apart from his theory. A critical question to Rolston 
could be, how is this to be understood as anything else but clear anthropocentrism? 
This touches upon the naturalistic fallacy of Rolston's thought. Rolston keeps reminding 
us of this fallacy. Indeed, he maintains the necessity of it. But stressing the need of coming from 
is to ought does not prove the possibility. The question remains to Rolston, how do I come from 
is to ought? If the basis of human moral behavior is duty (which seems to be the argwnent of 
Rolston), how does one justify the transition from the acknowledgment from the faet of value to 
the moral demand? These critical questions may also be applied to the last aspect of Rolston's 
thought, to which we now turn, i.e. the idea of the hwnan beings as following nature. 
7.2.2 Following Nature 
As we have seen, Rolston argues that the ethics are to be in accordance with the principles of 
ecology. Closely coupled with this v iew, he speaks of the rightness of the actions of humans when 
they are foliowing nature.426 We need to explain this idea, as it is one of the parts of Rolston's 
thought_ where he indeed seems to c01ne close to the natural law tradition, as we found it in 
Melanchthon and Wolff. 
Rolston mentions seven different ways of foliowing nature. We will try to explain each 
ofthem in tum, observing Rolston's taxonomisation. Foliowing nature in an absolute sense. All 
actions of humans are regulated by laws of nature. If nature is understood as the aggregate of all 
426 Rolston 1986, 30-52; 1988, 32ff See these references fora more detailed account ofthe different 
ways of fo ll owing nature. 
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physical, chemical, and biological processes, there is no way for humans to exempt from nature. 
ln this sense, humans cannot help but follow nature. Foliowing nature in an artifactual sense. 
Human actions are characterized by deliberation. If nature is understood as above ( excluding those 
of human agency), human action can never be in accord with nature. The deliberate actions of 
humans will always be unnatural in the sense of being artifactual. Humans can nev er follow nature. 
Following nature in a relative sense. By the deliberative powers of the human agent, the forces 
of nature can be shifted. The human can often choose between different natura! courses. The 
human does not aet automatically in accord with nature, but can choose between actions that are 
all natura!. In this sense humans follow nature in a relative sense. Following nature in a 
homeostatic sense. The ecological crisis has necessitated a consideration for the homeostatic sense 
of following nature. Nature is under stress because of the impact of deliberate actions of humans. 
However, even if nature is strained in this way, humans cannot escape nature and are still highly 
dependent on it. It is necessary that nature is studied in order to get a clear understanding of which 
options will retain stability in the ecosystem and in the human' s relationship to it. "To follow 
nature means to choose a route of submission to nature that utilizes natura! laws for our well-
being".m However, Rolston argues that this is not moral behavior in regard to nature. Foliowing 
nature in an imitative ethical sense. Nature does not have a moral conduct. The behavior of 
naturen is amoral, in the sense that there is no issue of morality implied. Interestingly, Rolston 
remarks foliowing: "There is no way to deri ve any ofthe familiar moral maxims from nature: "one 
ought to keep promises." "Tell the truth." "Do to others as you would have them do to you." "Do 
not cause needless suffering." There is no natura! decalogue to endorse the Ten Comrnandments; 
nature tells us nothing about how we should be moral in this way, even if it should tum out that 
this is approximately the morality ingrained by natura! selection in humannature".428 However, this 
does not imply that there are not any goods of moral relevance in nature. But this does not tally 
very well with the immoral courses of nature. Apparently nature can not be followed in an 
imitative ethical sense. Rolston, however, keeps open the question, if nature is therefore bad? 
Following nature in an Axiological Sense. Humans are political animals. Therefore, humans are 
inclined to form urban environments. These are not unnatural, however, as they are dependent 
427 Rolston 1986, 36. 
m Ibid., 38f. 
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upon the nautal sources. The urban environment is not unnatural either, as it is often a symbiosis 
between humankind and nature. The wild environn1ent, nevertheless, is the environment where the 
humans do not go to aet on nature," ... but to contemplate it, drawing ourselves into its order of 
being, not drawing it into our order of being".429 Humans are here let in on the intrinsic value and 
integrity of nature. Here, Rolston finds it necessary to move from the is to the ought. Nature can 
not but be regarded as a good. But as soon as we move from a natural is to a natura! is good, the 
relations with that natura! good become moral. In this axiological sense we can and ought to 
follow nature,·· ... to make its value one among our goals; and, in so doing, our conduct is here 
guided by nature".m Following Nature in a Tutorial Sense. Humans can leam about morality by 
reflecting on nature. Phenomena of the natura! world can teach humans about traits of character 
and morality. This teaching comes about in an environmental reciprocity. It is relational, arising 
out of the encounter between humans and nature. It is not all cases of nature that are morally 
defensible. But these courses also imply morality, as it appeals to the moral conduct of humans. 
It is important to maintain the natura! resistance along with the natura! conductance.431 
7 .3 Conclusion 
The analysis of Rolston can now be concluded. We have seen that Rolston represents a naturalist 
metaethical position. In line with the naturalist grounding of nom1ativity, Rolston refers to given 
facts as the source of normativity. As such Rolston also shares basically realist traits. Furthermore, 
Rolston stresses the link between the nature and morality and the principles of ecology within both 
so strongly that he may even be said to share the ontological basis of normativity, which may also 
m Ibid., 43. 
430 Ibid., 46. 
431 Even if Krebs 1999, I I 9ff. comrnents succinctly and precisely on the argument of foliowing 
nature, as she finds it a number oftheories of environrnental ethics (arnong which she includes Rolston), I do 
not think her critical remarks apply to Rolston. She argues that we cannot follow nature, as nature is not a 
valuer. Furtherrnore, even if there were values-as-such, i.e. independly of a valuer - this would still not suffice. 
In the latter case, it is sti ll necessary that the value-as-such is valued by someone, which could only be the 
human being (on account ofher previously described epistemic moral anthropocentrism) (22f.). However, 
in Rolston 's understanding offollowing nature, it is not the value concept which is in focus. In some ofthe 
ways which Rolston finds that the human being can follow nature, he even cornes close to a Kantian 
understand ing. Cf. 13.2 for the concluding reflections of the thesis on this notion. Here it is argued that this 
idea plays a central role in various theories of natura! law and environmental ethics. 
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be found in same theories of natura! law. This suggests that one can find more than one point of 
reference in Rolston, where he can be read in the light of natura! law thought. Furthermore, it has 
been shown that Rolston does not have a convincing argument of how he avoids the naturalistic 
fallacy. Rolston even argues for the necessity of holding the is and the ought very close to each 
other. A total separation is not possible, according to Rolston. However, Rolston also argues that 
the human being is a special being endowed with special ab il i tes of moral reflecsion. This implies 
a special role for the human being. In same sense the human being emerges out of nature and still 
remains within nature. In this sense, the human being remains a fundarnentally natura! being, even 
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In 1949 several essays of Aldo Leopold were collected in A Sand County Almanac. 432 Among 
these essays, "The Land Ethic" has become the most influential, mak.ing out the background and 
inspiration of a group of environmental thinkers developing the land ethics into an academic 
environmental ethic.433 The leading representative is J. Baird Callicott, for whom it has been a 
central aim to develop the thought of Aldo Leopold into a more coherent philosophical system. 
Although Leopold revealed an important insight into the character of nature, following from the 
many years of his service as a forest ranger, he did not supply the sufficient philosophical 
underpinning. Callicott, according to whom the Jack of this philosophical argument is the reason 
for the dimissal of land ethics among philosophers,434 has attempted to work out precisely such 
a philosophical basis_-135 In the present chapter we turn to Callicott, focusing our critical analysis 
on the same two concepts of nature and reason, as has been the concem in the previous chapters. 
It is also here the intention to see ifthere is a metaethical basis of Callicott's thought which makes 
his theory appropriate in a reformulation of natura! law.436 
-m Leopold ( 1949): "A Sand County Almanac ,, and "Sketches Here and There ", New 
York/Oxford: OUP. Callicott has edited the leading commentary on this work, Campanion to a A Sand 
County Almanac: Jnterpretive and Critical Essays ( 1987). This commentary includes critical essays by e.g. 
Rolston and Callicott. 
m In addition to Callicott, several other thinkers fa li within this gro up. Some of them because of 
their expl icit alliance with this theory, others because of the similarity in the type of argument. Among the 
thinkers within these two groups can be mentioned e.g Manon Andreas-Grisebach, Andrew Brennan, Stephen 
R. L. Clark, William Godfrey-Smith, Klaus Michael Meyer-Abich, Val Plumwood, Holmes Rolston, Robert 
Spaemann, Richard Sylvan, and Edward 0. Wilson (cf. Callicott 1999, 146 and Krebs 1999, 69. Amittedly, 
Callicott and Krebs disagree on the categorization of same ofthe thinkers. However, it has not been attempted 
to converge their accounts). In the present chapter we focus on Callicott. 
434 Callicott 1989, 75f. 
435 Ibid., 5f. 
436 !n our analysis ofCallicott the focus will be on his two main works on environmental ethics, i.e. 
1989 and 1999. In both ofthese works Callicott has collected several previously published articles. These 
articles are referred to on the basis ofthese books. A few articles 011 various aspects of Callicott's thought are 
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8.1 Land Ethics as Ethical Holism 
It is not feasible to deal with Callicott's thought apart from the main tenets of the land ethic. 
Therefore, an outline of this position is given below. In this account, we focus on two points, 
namely the foundations ofthe land ethic (8. 1.1 ) and how this leads to an ethical holism (8.1.2). 
8.1.1 The Foundations ofLand Ethics 
One important query is the scientific basis of the land ethic. "The land ethic rests upon three 
scientific cornerstones: (1) evolutionary and (2) ecological biology set in a background of (3) 
Copernican astronomy."437 The evolutionary theory underlines the relationship and kinship 
between the human and nonhuman nature. Whereas the former establishes a diachronic link, the 
ecological biology provides a synchronic link between human beings and the rest of the biotic 
community. Ecological theory argues that there is one biological comrnunity of natural beings. 
Finally, the Copernican astronomy implies the relative smallness and fragility of the earth and 
thereby the necessary interdependence of human and nonhuman natural beings. Callicott sums up 
the conceptual and logical elements of the land ethic in the following way: 
Here in outline, then, are the conceptual and logical foundations of the land 
ethic: Its conceptual elements are a Copernical cosmology, a Darwinian 
protosociobiological natura! hi story of ethics, Darwinian ties of kinship among 
all forms oflife on earth, and an Eltonian438 model of the structure of biocenoses 
all overlaid on a Humean-Smithian moral psychology. lts logic is that natural 
selection has endowed human beings with an affective moral response to 
perceived bonds ofkinship and community membership and identity; that today 
the natura! environment, the land, is represented as a community, the biotic 
community; and that, therefore, an environmental or land ethic is both possible -
the biopsychological and cognitive conditions are in place - and necessary, since 
human beings collectively have acquired the power to destroy the integrity, 
diversity, and stabil i ty of the environing and supporting economy of nature. 439 
also included, even if the focus is on Callicott's own writings. 
437 Callicott 1989, 82. 
m l.e. Charles Elton, who in the l 920's worked out the concept of the biotic community as a 
working paradigm for ecology (cf. Callicott 1989, 82). 
m Callicott 1989, 83. 
143 
Nature as an Organic Whole 
Tims, the theoretical basis of the land ethic is the thought ofHume, Smith, and Darwin. Common 
to these thinkers is the emphasis on public affections. The concem is not primarily on the 
individuaL but on the community as the ultimate measure ofthe moral value.440 This focus on the 
community is also clear in the central princip le of the land ethic: ''A thing is right when it tends to 
preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends 
otherwise".-14 1 Closely re!ated to this emphasis on the biotic community is Leopold's understanding 
of the relevance of ecology. The Land Ethic is developed on account of an ecological point of 
view.4-12 "The philosophical context of the land ethic and its conceptual foundation is clearly the 
body of empirical experience and theory which is summed up in the term ecology. "443 This entails 
that the land ethic calls to attention the holistic vision of the world, the unified system of integrally 
related parts. 
But the land ethic does not only have the principle of evolution as a theoretical basis. 
Land ethics emerges from the recognition of ecology within ethics, leading to the assertion of the 
inclusion of the biotic community in ethics as a process in ecological evolution.444 Befare the 
advent of the science of ecology, the various parts of nature where to some degree understood af 
isolated beings. The central notion of ecology has implied the interrelatedness of all these different 
organisms. Having come to appreciate ecology, this concept has also influenced the nation of 
morality. Morality is no longer understood in terms of rights but rather on the basis of nations as 
interrelatedness and community.445 As Leopold writes: "All ethics so far evolved rest upon a single 
premise: that the individual is a member of a community of interdependent parts." Ecology, he 
then goes on to note, "simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, 
m Ibid. , 1989, 2 I. This communitarian basis of natura! law may also be argued to be present in 
Melanchthon and Wolff Consequently, this notion is appropriated in the concluding part ofthe thesis, where 
it is argued that this is one point, where natura! law and environmental ethics accord with each other ( cf. 13.1 ). 
-1-1
1 Leopold 1949, 224-225 
442 Callicott 1989, 22ff. 
-1-13 Ibid., 22. 
4
-1
4 Ibid., 77; !dem 1999, 120ff. 
4
-1
5 !dem 1989, 22ff. 
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plants, and animals, or collectively: the land."-1-16 
In addition to the evolution of ecology within ethics, Leopold also speaks of the 
evolutionary origin of ethics. The theory of Darwin is here taken as the comerstone. At first, a 
consequence of the Darwinian theory appears to imply the absurdity of a claim of the existence 
of morality. The survival of the fittest necessarily seems to imply the furthering of aggresive and 
selfish individuals. However, Darwin found that the survival for many animals and for the human 
was only possible within social structures. The cooperative societies supported the members. But, 
this support could not be maintained if the members did not observe certain limits in the 
interactions with others. Further, Darwin argues that the basis of social groups are parental and 
filial affections common to all mammals. This Darwinian account of the evolutionary origin of 
ethics is adopted by Leopold in his land ethic. A consequence of this account is the argument for 
kinship with the rest of :nature.447 
One of the problems in a strong emphasis on ecology is the vulnerability to changes in 
the concept of ecology. For Leopold 's land ethic this problem becomes acute with the emergence 
of nations as deconstructive ecology and sociobiology. Callicott ends up with the same problem 
as we saw in Rolston of having to reconcile sociobiology and altruism. Whereas Rolston claimed 
the difference between morality and sociobiology, endorsing the difference between humans as 
moral beings and nonhuman nature as devoid of morality, Callicott maintains the Darwinian 
account ofthe comrnunity-based development of moral sentiments.448 But this close link becomes 
+1
6 Cited after Callicott 1999, 122. The notion of interdependency is a further notion, where the idea 
ofnatural law and environrnental ethics hold cornrnon insights. The ideas of interdependency in the included 
natura! law theories of the thesis are refined in the concluding part of the present study in an attempt to 
appropriate this notion in the reformulation of natura! law (cf. 13.1). 
447 Cai I i cott I 999, 5 9ff.; I 20ff. 
448 Cf. 7.2. l. The difference between Callicott and Rolston on this issue is due to their dissimilar 
grounding of moral i ty in respectively feelings and retlection. It is Rolston 's advocacy ofthe latter which leads 
Callicott into classifying Rolston as neokantian (1999, 145f.). Callicott's understanding ofrnoral sentiments 
is also based upon Hurne's understanding ofmorality as determined by sentiments which are based upon the 
moral agent' s mernbership of a cornmunity. Partridge ( I 996) criticizes Callicott' s use of Hume's moral 
philosophy. Rather than being supportive of an environmental ethics, a Humean understanding of moral 
sentiments would lead to anthropocentrism and alienate humans from nature ( 150). Hume's account requires 
the reciprocity which can only be the case arnong humans ( I 53f.). "As Callicott correctly points out, Hume's 
moral sentiments have their origin in interpersonal relationships. These sentiments are evoked by our 
recognition of the personhood or sentience in others. Personhood is not only the source of these moral 
sentiments but also its limit. Accordingly, the Humean sentiment of benevolence is not directed toward 
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problematic, when the understanding of ecology changes. Callicott discusses the challenge raised 
by contemporary ecology which problematizes the whole concept of an ecological community.449 
However, there seems to be elements in Leopold' s land ethic making it possible for him to 
rnaintain his theory. This is the case when he abj ures the balance of nature idea and when he argues 
for nature's inherent dynamism450, which has provided some of the background for the attempt to 
dynarnize the land ethic.451 
The land ethic has been criticized for its lack of normative force. Callicott's theory of 
environrnental ethics, it is claimed, is merely descriptive. According to the critics, it rnerely 
describes the genesis of morality, but does not prescribe actions towards nature.452 This is very 
much due to Callicott's attempt to ground his non-anthropocentric environmental ethic in 
biological moral theory, rather than in philosophical moral theory.453 The prevailing modem moral 
paradigm, according to Callicott, has been the contractual theories. Stemming out from Hobbes, 
it became cornrnon to argue fora state of nature as the basis of morality. Moral i ty was grounded 
in mutual selfinterest. Although the notion of selfinterest is strongest in Hobbes, in general it can 
be claimed that the contractual theories strengthened the individualism of the modemity. This did 
not imply the neglect of the comrnon good, but the common good had its basis in the will of the 
individual persons. 1n various formulations this contractual theory can be traced from the early part 
of the seventeenth century to contemporary representatives as e.g. David Gauthier. Callicott's 
insentient nature. much less toward abstractions such as species or ecosystems. Nor can Humean sympathy 
connect with objects in or conditions of impersonal nature." ( 153 ). 
mcallicott 1999, 125. 
~
50 Ibid., 123. 
451 Ibid., 134ff.; l37f. 
452 This is especially argued by Warwick Fox 1985, 21: "Callicott grounds his subjectivist 
environmental ethics in the work of Hume, Darwin, and Leopold, and claims that the theory ... derived from 
this lineage 'provides for' the moral considerability ofthe non-human world. But what should we understand 
by this? While some readers might think that Callicott's Hume-Darwin-Leopold axiology has normative and 
not just explanatory force, Callicott does not actually claim this, nor can he." This is followed up by Kristin 
Schrader-Frechette 1990, 189: "Callicott's use of biology to undergird his environmental ethics ... destroys 
the nonnative dimension of his ethics. He avoids relativism by postulating that ethical uniformity/unanimity 
is achieved by means of natura! selection. He says, 'human feelings have been standardized by natura! 
selection.' [But] behavioral uniformities explained through natura! selection are descriptive nor normative." 
(Cited after Callicott 1999, 101. Cf. ibid. for his discussion on this critique). 
m Call icott 1999, 100. 
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theory is a critique of this modem paradigm. Callicott's intention is to argue for an environmental 
ethic that tak.es wholes in consideration to a larger extent than is the case in contractual theories.454 
This rejection of the contractual theories is characteristic of Callicott. These theories all 
fall within the nonrealist mode of natural law thought described in the present thesis. Metaethically 
Callicott places himself within the other mode ofthougt, where the basis of morality is grounded 
in the communal whole one is a part of. This mode ofthought has been clear in Melanchthon and 
Wolff.455 We see how Callicott argues fora viewpoint of metaethical similarity to the naturalist 
mode of natural law thought. The important difference between Callicott and the natura! law 
thought is that whereas the latter argues for the relation between ontology and reason, Callicott 
argues for the relation between community and feelings. Callicott explicitly rejects reason as the 
basis of morality. The ecological community, nota premodem concept of being; feelings, not 
reason is the basis of environmental ethics.456 
8.1.2 Ethical Holism 
Another side of Callicott, where his argument has close affinity to natural law thought is his 
understanding of ethical holism. Callicott defends the view that it is the whole of the biotic 
community which is of ethical interest.457 The holistic character of the land ethic is the fundamental 
characteristic, setting it " .. . apart from the predominant paradigm of modem moral philosophy."458 
Callicott , however, argues that even though the land ethic is holistic in the biotic sense, 
the human being can still be member of the human community, which is understood as a 
community within the larger bio tic community. The membership of the human community implies 
that the human is not relieved of correlative moral responsibilities of that membership, such as the 
respect for universal human rights. Therefore, though the fundamental concem is with regard to 
454 Ibid., 62ff. 
455 Cf. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. 
456 Ibid., 64. 
457 Call icott 1989, 25: ·' ... the good of the community as a whole, serves as a standard for the 
assessment of the relative value and relative ordering of its constitutive parts and therefore provides a means 
of adjudicating the often mutually contradictory demands of the pa1ts considered separately for equal 
consideration." 
458 Ibid., 84. 
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the biotic community, this does not imply the neglect of the individual. But certainly there can be 
a tension between the concern for the whole and the individual. "Not only are other sentient 
creatures members of the biotic community and subordinate to its integrity, beauty, and stability; 
so are we."459 However, in Callicott's opinion, the conceptual basis ofthe land ethic irnplies a 
safeguard against a tendency to neglect the individual.46° Callicott is well aware of the inherent 
<langer of the land ethic to focus on the whole and forget the individual, as he is also well aware 
that this is a point where the land ethic has been accused of ecofascism.461 Callicott tries to defend 
himself against this critique, arguing that the recognition of the membership of the biotic 
community does not dissolve the membership of the human community.462 
Another aspect of the ethical holism which carries close resernblance to natura! law 
thought is Callicott' s rejection of moral pluralism. The nation of pluralism arises particularly due 
to two circumstances: (1) the urge of environmental ethics to develop an ethical theory for 
humans' relation to nature, and (2) its effort to include human beings makes the pluralistic 
approach a likely option. Furthermore, the many various theories of environmental ethics also 
promote the notion of pluralism.463 Even if pluralism has many defenders 46;'Callicott maintains the 
necessity of monism. This is due to any theory' s dependende upon a certain metaphysic. In 
grounding his theory on the conceptual basis of the communitarian land ethics, Callicott endorses 
this ideological framework as the determinative core ofhis theory of environmental ethics.465 Even 
459 Callicott 1989, 92. 
@ Ibid., 86f. 
461 I dem I 989, 9 If.; 1999, 70ff. 
462 ldem 1989, 93f.; 1999, 71. 
-1
63 !dem 1999, l 43ff. 
-16-1 Ibid., l 48ff. 
-1
65 This point has been critcized by Norton ( 1995c). Norton distinguishes between environmental 
philosophers in the role of ·'applied philosophy" or "practical philosophy". Whereas the latter takes its 
startingpoing in the actual cases and pragmatically determines the best solution, the former develops a 
theoretical basis as the framework for its deliberations on issues of environmental ethics. Callicott is, rightly, 
seen as a representative of the last approach. According to Norton, however, such an approach tends to 
separate philosophers from real management issues (342ff.). "Monists are not simply wrong in that they have 
not yet proposed the correct universal principle or because they have not quite successfully specified the 
precise boundaries of moral considerabil ity in nature. I bel ieve, rather, that the entire project of shoehoming 
all of our obl igations regarding other humans and nature into a "monistic" system of analysis is the wrong 
strategy for achieving better environmental decision making.'' (345). Cf. Callicott (1996) for a reply to 
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if his ethic does include overlapping communities (which does imply different and competing 
duties and obligations), this does not lead to an essential pluralism.466 
Such a moral philosophy as I have here outlined is in one sense pluralistic; in 
another it is not. It does involve a multiplicity of overlapping and competing 
community-generated duties and obligations. To that extent, it is pluralistic. But 
it is not pluralistic sensu Stone (and Wenz and Brennan, for that matter), because 
it involves only one metaphysics of morals: one concept of the nature of moral i ty 
(as rooted in moral sentiments), one concept of human nature (that we are social 
animals voyaging with fellow creatures in the odyssey of evolution), one moral 
psychology (that we respond in subtly shaded ways to the fellow members of our 
multiple, diverse, tiered communities and to those communities per se). ( ... ) It 
posits a single coherent strand of moral thought: David Hwne and Adam Smith set 
out its elements in the eighteenth century, Charles Darwin grounded them in an 
evolutionary account of human nature in the nineteenth, and Aldo Leopold( ... ) 
provided its outermost "accretion" in the twentieth.467 
8.2 The Communitarian Basis of Environmental Ethics 
In the land ethics the biotic community ofhumans and nonhuman organisms organism defines the 
basis of morality"68• as the ecological community and the ethics coincide.469 This is a point, where 
Callicott comes very cl ose to premodem, early modem and postmodem understandings of natura! 
law, critizising modernity's emphasis on individualism.-17° Callicott seems to come close to the 
realistic grounding in these thinkers. For Callicott as well as these natura! law thinkers, the basis 
ofmorality is thought ofwithin a whole which carries within itself as well the grounds and content 
of as the telos of morality. In all three aspects the affinity is of such a close character that it seems 
justifiable to argue that the thought of Callicott is identical to the scheme of the natura! law 
thought, even ifhe does not refer to it explicitly.471 
Norton. 
"
66 Callicott 1999, l 65ff.. l 74f. 
~67 I bid., 169. 
"
68 !dem I 989,64ff. 
-1
69 Jdem 1989, 69f.; 7lf. ; 80; !dem 1999, 132f. 
m !dem 1999, 101 ff. Cf. also 8.1.1 
471 Cf. 13.1 for the thesis' appropriation of Callicott in a refonnulation of natura! law. 
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The striking similarity between the natural law thought and Callicott is furthered when 
we look at the relation between societies and ethics. Ethics and society or community are 
understood as correlative.472 
Ethics and society or community are correlative. This single, simple principle 
constitutes a powerful tool for the analysis of moral natura! history, for the 
anticipation of future moral development (including, ultimately, the land ethic), 
and for systematically deriving the specific precepts, the prescriptions and 
proscriptions, of an emergent and culturally unprecedented ethic like a land or 
environmental ethic:173 
This understanding of the correlation between ethics and society is dependent upon as well 
Darwin's theory ofthe evolution af morals as well as the Humean understanding of the relation 
between community and morality. Ethics and society have developed correlatively. As the need 
of society changed. the moral community developed correspondingly. "The moral community 
expanded to become coextensive with the newly drawn boundaries af societies and the 
representation of virtue and vice, right and wrong, good and evil, changed to accomodate, foster, 
and preserve the economic and institutional organization of emergent social orders".474 This close 
link between the basis of ethics and the basis af society is also a characteristic of natura! law 
thought.475 
The question af the comrnunitarian basis of environmental ethics can not be separated 
from the question of the normative status of other species. The kinship with nonhuman nature 
implies the filial relationship, but touches also upon the discussion on the intrinsic value of 
nonhuman nature, which is endorsed by Callicott. According to Callicott the nation of intrinsic 
value refers to something being valuable in andfor itself. lts value is not derived from utility, but 
472 Callicott 1989, 80; 1999, 64ff. 
473 Idem 1989, 80. 
m Ibid. 
m In the present thesis this has e.g. been demonstrated in Melanchthon (3.3 .2) and Luther (5.1.3). 
Conceming the natura! law thought ofHume and Smith, cf. also Haakonssen 1999, I ff.: " It has long been a 
commonplace that the thinkers ofthe Scottish Enlightenment understood the moral li fe and moral institutions 
ofhumanity in social and historical terms; in faet, they have been seen as pioneers ofholistic methods of 
explanation and ofhistorical sociology." 
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is determined by its being an ''end-in-itself', not just a "means" to other ends.476 The notion of 
intrinsic value is challenged due to the post Cartesian scientific development and its distinction 
between objects and subjective states of mind. On account ofthis distinction it has been claimed 
that nature is valuefree. Value has been confined to the subjective realm of consciousness.477 
However. there are tendencies within science to move beyond this paradigm, claiming that facts 
are valueladen. Furthermore, it seems appropriate to distinguish between the source and locus of 
intrinsic value. Even if the human consciousness is regarded as the source of value, nonhuman 
nature can still be regarded as the locus of value. 
I concede that, from the point of view of scientific naturalism, the source of all value 
is human consciousness, but it by no means follows that the locus of all value is 
consciousness itself or a mode of consciousness like reason, pleasure, or knowledge. 
In other words, something may be valuable only because someone values it, but it may 
also be valued for itself, not for the sake of any subjective experience (pleasure, 
knowledge, aesthetic satisfaction, and so forth) it may afford the valuer.478 
As the newbom infant child can be intrinsically valuable in a truncated sense, because it is valued 
for its own sake,for itself, i.e. strictly its value is dependent upon human consciousness even if 
its ascribed intrinsic value, so can nonhuman nature.479 
For the present thesis it is interesting to notice that Callicott tater has substantiated the 
nation of intrinsic value on account of a metaethical analysis.480 After having discussed various 
arguments for intrinsic value, such as the phenomenological and teleological proof, the pragmatic 
476 Callicott 1989, 13 I. Callicott's explicit Kantian terminology on this issue is remarkable 
considering his repeated rejection of Kantian philosophy and yet the importance ofthis notion ofthe intrinsic 
value in his theory. This raises the question ofthe compatibility ofthis not ion with the rest of his thought. Is 
Callicott's nation of intrinsic value consistent with his theory as a whole? What does this imply for the 
monistic character ofhis theory? Even if it may be argued that this critique is putting to much emphasis on 
the terminology, it still remains as a valid critique that Callicott is a bit sloppy in te1ms oftem1inology. This 
is also a critique that applies elsewhere in Callicott. Occasionally he makes use of notions irrespectively of 
the connotations which arise in relation to these concepts. 
m Callicott I 989, 132. 
478 Ibid., 133. 
m lbid. , 133f. 
m ldem I 999, 239ff. 
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and Kantian481 argument, he comes up with his own argument moving towards a postmodem 
theory of this notion. Although valuing within the modem paradigm has been dependent upon the 
distinction between subject and object, this dichotomy is rejected in postmodem thought. Value 
is no longer determined by a subjective, conscious experience of value. Rather, value is " ... a 
subject's intentional aet: No intending subject, no value."481 Due to developments within recent 
physics, intrinsic value in nature is to be regarded as a potentiality to be actualized by a situated 
observer/valuer.483 "If quantum theory and ecology both imply in structurally similar ways in both 
the physical and organic domains of nature the continuity of self and nature, and if the self is 
intrinsically valuable, then nature is intrinsically valuable. Ifit is rational forme to aet in my own 
interest, and I and nature are one, then it is rational forme to aet in the best interest of nature".484 
8.3 Nature and Normativity 
Having seen how the principles of the land ethic constitute the fundamental tenets of Callicott's 
theory of environmental ethics and how this leads to an ethical holism and is further substantiated 
by a conception of a communitarian basis of environmental ethics, we now turn to an explicit 
analysis of the grounds of normativity. If the basis of Callicott's ethical theory is the biotic 
community, how does one come from what is to what one ought to do? How does one move from 
a recognition of the faet of the biotic community to a consideration ofthe implied values? 
8.3 .1 The Is/Ought Dichotomy 
For the land ethic the classical metaethical question of the naturalistic fallacy is highly acute, which 
also is apparent from the critique of Aldo Leopold for committing this fallacy.485 In other theories 
of environmental ethics this issue is also debated, discussing the sharp line between the is and 
ought. According to Callicott, Rolston among others, explores conceptual posibilities of moving 
m Ibid., 239-251 . 
482 Ibid., 260. 
m !dem I 989, l 57ff.; I 999, 260. 
m !dem l 989, 173. 
485 Ibid., 117. 
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beyond this traditional notion.486 For Callicott it is more important to show how the problem can 
be resolved within the thought of Hume, the first to pose the problem.487 On Humean ground there 
is" ... a direct passage from the perceived facts that we are natura! beings and that we belong to 
to a biotic community to the principal values of the land ethic".488 Further, this conceptual move 
from facts to values is an important theoreticai part of the Darwinian ethical thought.489 
The critique of the naturaiistic fallacy is particularly represented by G. E. Moore.490 
Moore' s position, however, is not relevant as a critique of Leopold, as his position is too strongly 
tied to his own ethics. According to Callicott, it does not give reason for alarm to note Leopold's 
incompatibility with Moore.~91 According to Cailicott, Hume did not use the term "naturalistic 
fallacy". Rather, Hume's position is characterized by criticizing the move from is to ought. Hrune 
found this move in many contemporary theories of ethics. Hume' s understanding of the unjustified 
transition from is to ought appears in a section where he argues that distinctions between good 
and evii are not founded merely on relations of objects nor perceived by reason. Moral judgments 
are founded, rather_ upon sentiment. Judgments on good or bad are determined by feelings af 
approbation or disapprobation, warm approval or repugnance, which spontaneously arise in us 
upon the contemplation of some action or object.492 These sentiments are considered natura! and 
universal. They are only slightly variable psychological features common to all people. Therefore, 
one can speak of normal and correct moral judgments. Consequently, the role of recognition is 
aiso discussed.493 In this respect a parallel is drawn with regard to Kant.494 This is in relation to 
Callicott's repeated critique of the modem paradigm of ethical thought. Callicott acknowledges 
the focus on the question of normative force in Kant. However, Callicott argues, the question of 
486 Ibid., 118. 
487 !dem 1989, I I 8f; 1999, I 03. 
488 !dem 1989, I 18f. 
m Ibid., 1 I 8f.; !dem 1999, I 00. 
49° Cf. 2.2 for an account of Moore's as well as Hume's position. 
49 1 Callicott 1989, I 19f. 
m Ibid., 120. 
m Ibid., 121 ff. 
m Ibid. , l 22f.; 1999, I 02ff. 
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normative force is not detennined whether the basis of morality is thought of as reason. 
''Leopold' s land ethic has its root in Hume, and Hume, unlike Kant, grounded ethics precisely in 
inclination - in unselfish feelings such as sympathy, beneficence, and humanity, not in dispassionate 
reason".495 Community is the fundamental nation in the land ethic. In Leopold's view, the 
recognition of land as a community to which we belong, leads to a use of it with love and 
respect. 496 
Therefore, for Callicott there is a legitimate move from is to ought.497 Of course, Callicott 
does end up with a problem concerning the deconstructiv ecology and the sociobiology.498 How 
can one argue that there is a legitimate move from is to ought, when what is seems to be contrary 
to moral behavior? It is not just amoral (i.e. the absence of morals), it is actually immoral (i.e. 
contrary to morality). How can one argue that the immoral should serve as the basis of morality? 
Does this not lead Callicott into insoluble selfcontradictions? Callicott believes he can salve part 
of the problem by going beyond the Leopoldian landethic, arguing fora dynamization of the land 
ethic_-199 I must admit, I am not convinced by Callicott's attempt to save the tenets of the land 
ethic. CalJjcott is aware of some of the main arguments against the land ethic. However, I do not 
believe he answers them in such a way that he can justify a reformulation of the land ethic. 
Callicott' s attempt to move beyond the land ethic seems to lead him into something quite different 
from the land ethic. When the organic, communitarian whole can no longer be maintained, it does 
not seem proper to speak of a land ethic any more. 
8.3.2 Faet and Value 
A further aspect of the naturalistic fallacy or is to ought problem in Callicott is the discussion on 
495 !dem 1989, 103. 
496 Ibid. 
497 Ibid., 127: ·'IfHume's analysis is essentially correct, ecology and the environrnental sciences can 
thus directly change our values: what we value, not how we value ( ... ) ... ecology changes our values by 
changing our concepts ofthe world and of ourselves in relation to the world. It reveals new relations arnong 
objects which, once revealed, stir our ancient centers of moral feelings." 
498 idem 1999, 117-139; 120. 
499 Ibid., I 34ff. 
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the relation between facts and values.500 Having argued for the legitimate move from is to ought, 
he also points to the unfortunate moral implications of the dichotomy between facts and values.501 
Drawing on the insights of physics, Callicott argues that the theory of relativity and the quantum 
theory challenge the traditional understanding of objectivity of facts. 502 On the other hand, it also 
seems necessary to modify the relativization of facts. 503 It is argued that an important reason the 
environmenta1 crisis is to be found in the different understandings of facts.504 Callicott argues that 
facts are not independent from theory and value. They are theory-laden, as well as value-laden.505 
On the other hand, values are also dependent upon facts.506 The reciprocal relation between facts 
on the one hand and theory and value on the other hand is the important nation to bear in mind. 
As (1) facts and (2) theory and value cannot be seperated from each other, neither does it make 
much sense to have a sharp line between is and ought. The mutual dependency must not be 
ignored. 
This is an important reason of Leopold's expansion of the moral concem to the biotic 
community.507 Because man is a part of this biotic community, he ought to care for it, repect it and 
have sympathy for it. As already mentioned, the philosophical basis of this idea is Hume's 
understanding ofthe feelings as basis of morality.508 Leopold's argument can be schematized on 
the account of Hume' s ethics.509 The difference between Hume and Leopold is that Hume' s 
concem was not nature, but society. Hume argued for the possibility of founding moral behavior 
in regard to society. This discussion on society can be applied to Leopold's concem for the biotic 
500 Ibid., 79ff. 
501 Ibid., 84. 
502 Ibid., 80ff. 
503 Ibid., 88f. ; I 06ff. 
504 Ibid., 96f. 
505 Ibid. , 82: ·'Facts are value-laden to the extent thai in the overwhelming "blooming, buzzing, 
confusion," which is the world, we select for anention arnong an infinity of potential facts those that interest 
us for any of potential ly an infinity ofreasons. Our interests -what we value - in a sense create actual facts. " 
506 Ibid., 88ff 
507 [dem 1989, 124. 
508 Ibid. , l 24f. 
509 lbid., 125. 
155 
Nature as an Organic Whole 
community. 510 In both cases, it is a community that surrounds man, he is part of it, his identity and 
ethical nations are formed by it. The land ethic is, therefore, not an attempt to develop a new ethic. 
The concern is rather to widen the sense of kinship, including the biotic community. 
Is nature a ·'proper object" of human sympathy, loyalty, benevolence, or 
respect? If animals are, as Descartes believed, mere automata, then they are no 
more proper objects of sympathy than is a pencil sharpener. Whether we ought 
or ought not extend them moral considerability ( ... ) turns thus on a matter of 
faet. Just what sort of beings are animals, and what connections have they to 
us? This is a question capable of cognitive resolution. Are plants, like animals, 
conscious beings? ( .. . )PaulTaylor (1986) has made a good case, however, that 
plants are conative, if not conscious beings, that they are "teleological centers 
oflife." If plants are not conscious then we have no grounds for sympathiwing 
with them, but ifthey are conative we may appropriately feel benevolent toward 
them. Are we, along with plants and animals, coevolved, distantly kin members 
of a biotic community, as ecology alleges? If so, then indeed we ought to feel 
sympathy or benevolence toward our fellow members and loyalty and respect 
toward the community as such. 511 
These last remarks on the necessity of resolving the dichotomy of is and ought on Humean 
grounds and the idea that facts and values are to be related to each other, gives an evident basis 
of seeing Callicott' s theory as a naturalistic theory. This is the sense in Moorean sense, but even 
more in the sense applied in the present thesis (i.e. the narrower sense of defining the good with 
reference to nature). Furthem1ore, Callicott' s theory also proves to be realistic. This is clear from 
his emphasis on the nation offacts. There are facts which can be known and recognized and which 
carry normative implications. This also means that Callicott' s theory with these last remarks have 
a somewhat unclear picture ofthe relation between nature and reason as the basis of normativity. 
Certainly, Callicott does not base his nation of normativity on reason. This is an essential point of 
this theory on account of the Humean inspiration of his argument. However, his argument is not 
quite satisfactory, as one is lefl with an epistemic problem. If one accepts Callicott's argument that 
normativity is based in feelings, how does account for the special role of the human being? I claim 
that Callicott does not give a satisfactory account of the moral role ofthe human being with due 
510 Ibid., 126. 
511 ldem 1999, l 14f. 
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respect to his quite radical biotic communitarianism. 
8.4 Conclusion 
The discussion on Callicott has demonstrated a theory which is fundamentally naturalist and 
realist. The strong influence from Aldo Leopold has lead Callicott to argue that the human being 
is part of a biotic community. This community serves as the basis of the moral feelings, which 
Callicott endorse as the basis of ethics. Ethics is to be based in sentiments rather than in reason. 
Therefore, ethics is based in the membership of the biotic community. This leaves reason 
somewhat isolated. Reason does not play an important role in the grounding of normativity, why 
Callicott also criticizes the Kantian and modem tradition fora misleading emphasis on this idea. 
By this argument Callicott comes into conflict with the Humean distinction between is and ought. 
Callicott, however, attempts to overcome this problem within Humean thought itself. In several 
of these ideas, a parallel to natura! law thought was demonstrated. The parallels are particularly 
clear with respect to the naturalist theories of Melanchthon and Wolff. 
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Chapter 9 
Respect for Nature 
In this chapter we tum to Paul W. Taylor's theory of environmental ethics. Apart from being ane 
of the leading representatives of environmental ethics, the Kantian basis ofhis theory also makes 
him highly relevant for this thesis. Whereas Kant emphasized the respect for other people, Taylor 
speaks of a respect for nature. Whereas Kant based this in the character of man as an autonomous 
being, Taylor emphasizes the conatus ofnature. Other clear parallels is the emphasis on rationality, 
the deontological character of their thought as well as an inclusion of the nation of virtues. 
However, even ifthere are such clearly Kantian tenets in Taylor, the primary aim of the following 
analysis is not to read Taylor in the light of Kantian ideas. Rather, the purpose is the same as in 
the other chapters, to focus on the concepts of nature and reason in arder to demonstrate some 
implied metaethical suppositions. 
In this chapter we therefore ask ourselves two main questions: (1) What is the leading 
understanding of nature? How is this substantiated? (2) What are the moral implications of this 
concept of nature?512 
9.1 The Rationality of Biocentrism 
The central aim of Taylor's theory of environmental ethics is " ... an attempt to establish the 
rational grounds [ my italicization] for a system of moral princip les by which human treatment of 
natura! ecosystems and their wild communities of life ought to be guided".513 This focus on 
rationality could imply an argument for an anthropocentric environmental theory, as the nation of 
512 Taylor has had a remarkable impact on environmental ethics, especially when one considers the 
relative ly few works of his within this field. Apart from his mainwork Respect for Nature ( 1986) only three 
articles deal with his own theory ( 1981 b; 1983 and 1984 ). An additional article assesses Frankena critically 
(1981a). All these works are included in the present analysis ofTaylor, even ifthe emphasis is on Respect 
for Nature. A few references to other discussion on Taylor are included, although his own writings are the 
primary concern. 
5 13 Taylor 1986, 9. 
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rationality can be used as an argument for the superiority of humans. In Taylor, this is certainly 
not the case. Even ifhumans have a superiority as moral agents, they are not considered as beings 
of superior worth. This is due to the biocentric basis of Taylor' s theory. Therefore, in the 
foliowing section we tum to the concept of biocentrism. In the subsequent section we tum to his 
argument for the rationality of this notion. 
9.1.1 The Concept ofBiocentrism 
''What moral significance the natural world has for us depends on the way we look at the whole 
system of nature and our role in it. With regard to the attitude of respect for nature, the belief-
system that renders it intelligible and on which it depends for its justifiability is the biocentric 
outlook. "514 The biocentric viewpoint underlies and supports the attitude ofrespect for nature. 
This viewpoint can be summarized in four core descriptions: 
(a) The beliefthat humans are embers of the Earth's Community of 
Life in the same sense and on the same terms in which other living things are 
members ofthat community. 
(b) The belief that the human species, along with all other species, are 
integral elements in a system of interdependence such that the survival of each 
living thing, as well as its chances af faring well or poorly, is determined not 
only by the physical conditions of its environment but also by its relations to 
other living things. 
( c) The belief that all organisms are teleological centers of life in the 
sense that each is a unique individual pursuing its own good in its own way. 
( d) The belief that humans are not inherently superior to other living 
things.515 
Briefly we will try to give a fuller description of each of these nations. 
Humans considered as members of the Earth 's community of Life.516 Human life is 
understood as an integral part ofthe natural arder ofthe Earth' s biosphere. Nonhuman species and 
the human species are conceived of as at the same place in the system of nature. This implies a 
si.i Ibid. , 99 
515 Ibid., 99f. 
516 Ibid., IO I ff. 
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common relationship to Earth for humans, wild animals and plants. Full awareness of this common 
relationship gives humans a sense of true community with nonhuman species. These nations are 
all expressions of the faet of the human as a biological being. This fundamental characteristic of 
the human is recognised in five realities of humans and non-human species: 1. Certain biological 
and physical requirements are necessary for survival and well-being for the humans and non-human 
species. 2. Humans and non-human species have a good of their own. The Realization ofthis good 
depends on contingencies that are not always under either human or non-human control. 3. 
Although the concepts of free will, autonomy, and social freedom apply only to humans, there is 
a fourth sense of freedom that holds equally of non-human species and humans. This kind of 
freedom is of great importance in any living thing's struggle to realize its good; whether human 
or non-human. 4. The human species is a late newcomer on Earth. 5. The non-human species can 
do without the humans, whereas the opposite is not the case.517 
The natura! world as a system of interdependence.518 The biocentric outlook implies the 
interdependence throughout the natura! world. The individual organisms, the species populations, 
the communities of biotic life, the ecological system and the whole biotic system is upheld by 
fundamental structures of interdependence. For this reason, the entire biosphere ofthe planet is 
a single unified whole, termed "the natura! world" in Taylor's theory. The natura! world is 
understood as ·· ... the entire set of natura! ecosystems on our planet, along with the populations 
of animals and plants that make up the biotic communities of those ecosystems"519. These natura! 
ecosystems that makeup the entire natura! world exist independent of the human beings. Human 
interference, however, is inevitable. Therefore, there is a gradual transition from the natura! to the 
artifical ecosystem. 520 
m The idea of humans as part of the biological community of li fe was also an irnportant notion in 
Rolston ( cf 7.2.1) and Callicott ( cf. 8.2). Although there are different accentuations ofthe implications ofthis 
idea, the fundamental consequence is the same in Rolston, Callicott, and Taylor - narnely to argue that there 
is no essential difference between humans and the rest ofnature. As is demonstrated in the concluding part 
of the thesis (cf 13.1 ), this argument is quite irnportant for the appropriation of environmental ethics in a 
reformulation of natura! law thought. 
518 Taylor 1986, 116; 3ff. 
519 Ibid., 3 
510 Jbid., 3ff This aspect of interdependence also characterizes the land ethic. However, unlike e.g. 
Callicott this whole does serve as the basis of normativity. Whereas the harmony of the whole was the 
criterion on the right acts in Callicott, Taylor does not qualify the right aet with reference to biotic system. 
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The individual organisms are seen as teleological centers of life.52 1 The biocentric 
outlook in Taylor does not only take biotic systems, ecosystems and species into regard. It is also 
highly important to respect the individual being. 522 This respect is grounded in the weH-being of 
this individual. In arder to have a well-being, there must also be a good for the individual. Taylor 
argues for this being the case for certain natural entities.523 The concept of the good of one's own 
only makes sense for living organisms. Inanimate objects and machines do not have a good of their 
own.524 As living organisms such as plants and animals have a good of their own, they can be 
understood as teleologi ca! centers of life. 525 
To say it is a teleological center of life is to say that its internal functioning as 
well as its extemal activities are all goal-oriented, having the constant tendency 
to maintain the organism's existence through time and to enable it successfully 
to perform those biological operations whereby it reproduces its kind and 
continually adapts to changing environmental events and conditions. It is the 
coherence and unity of these functions of an organism, all directed toward the 
realization of its good, that make it one teleological center of activity.526 
Seeing the individual organisms as teleological centers of activity and life implies the respect for 
and recognition of the inl1erent worth of the individual. 527 
Moreover, cf. 13. I for an appropriation of this idea of interdependence within nature in the tentative 
reformulation of natura! law. 
521 Taylor 1986, 1 l 9ff. 
m Ibid., 119; 122. 
523 lbid., 60ff. 
su Ibid., 123f. 
525 Cf. Paske (1989) for a critique of Taylor's understanding of nonsentient organisms as 
teleological centers oflife as being unclear and not rationally compelling. "A basic problem with Taylor's 
argument is that the concept ofteleology is itself so obscure that it is inapropriate to use it as a fundamental 
concept in what is supposes to be a rational, universal argument fora particular moral stance. If "teleological" 
merely refers to the faet that living things tend to maintain their existence and to reproduce and adapt to 
environmental changes, there is no need to anthropomorphise this by calling it "goal-oriented". Rather than 
depending upon a vague and obscure concept, it is more useful to utilize descriptive rather than metaphorical 
terms." (224) 
526 Taylor 1986, 121 f. 
527 Ibid., 46f.; 67f. "Now, fora moral agent to be disposed to give equal consideration to all wi ld 
living things and to judge the good of each to be worthy of being preserved and protected as an end in itself 
and for the sake ofthe bieng whose good it is means that every wild living thing is seen to be the appropriate 
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The problem about this point in Taylor's theory is the necessary identification with this 
good for the individual plant or animal. Taylor also makes a parallel to ethics among humans and 
argues that there is a resemblance to his biocentric ethics. Just as humans can recognize a human 
good, likewise there is a good for animals, plants, biotic communities etc.528 The recognition of 
this good of a being raises the demand of respect, it is argued. Even if Taylor argues for the 
rationality of this idea, I do not find it convincing. The nation of respect requires a mutuality, as 
it implies an aspect of looking back, taking into consideration. Looking back, a recognition is 
presumed.529 The faet ofrecognition also implies some degree of identification, as the recognition 
of the moral demand of respect requires its identification as a circumstance raising a moral 
demand. This point of identification is a problem in Taylor' s theory. Even if he says that the 
respect for nature is based on information on the well-being of the individual animals, plants etc., 
it still presumes the fundamental identification of this well-being with the well-being of human 
beings. However, in the case of human beings, I (as a human being) can respect the good of 
another human being as I can recognize that good. In the case of other beings, a similar 
identification seems to be problematic, without ending in some degree of anthropomorphism. 
Human superiority denied.530 Tue superiority ofhumans is generally based in fundamental 
object ofthe attitude ofrespect ( ... ) One who take the attitude ofrespect toward the individual orgnanisms, 
species-populations, and biotic communities of the Earht's natura! ecosystems regards those entities and 
groups of entities as possessing inherent worth, in the sense that their value or worth does not depend on 
their being valued for their usefulness in furthering human ends ( or the ends of any ether species). When 
such an attitude is adopted as one's ultimate moral attitude, I shall speak ofthat person as havingrespectfor 
nature." (46). 
528 l 986, 60ff. 
329 This notion of recognition respect is further developed in Darwall (1977), where it is critically 
compared to appraisal respect. Taylor also refers to this article, claiming his own use of respect resembles 
Darwall's recognition respect. Darwall defines recognition respect in this way: "Persons can be the object of 
recognition respect. lndeed, it is just this sort ofrespect which is said to be owed to all persons. To say that 
persons as such are entitled to respect is to say that they are entitled to have other persons take seriously and 
weigh appropriately the faet that they are persons in deliberating about what to do. Such respect is recognition 
respect ( ... ) The crucial point is that to conceive of all persons as entitled to respect is to have same conception 
of what sort of consideration the faet of being a person requires. '' (38) 
530 I dem, I 29ff. Furthermore, cf. "Are Humans Superior to Animals and Plants?" ( 1984 ), where 
Taylor criticizes the views of Louis G. Lombard i in support ofthe superior status ofhuman beings. "Although 
Lombard i's reasoning is not tlawed by the usual weaknesses that beset these efforts [ ... of arguing in fa vor 
ofthe superiority ofhumans], I do not think that he succeeds in justifying the claim that humans do have 
greater inherent worth than ether living things." (150) Cf. Wetlesen ( 1998) fora biocentric argument which 
is inspired by Taylor, but rejects the idea ofthe equal inherent value for all living organisms. "Taylor assumes 
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ly anthropocentric arguments. This is shown to be the case for three main historical sources (i.e. 
the essentialist view of human nature found in classical Greek humanism, the idea of the Great 
Chain ofBeing found in the metaphysics of traditional Christian monotheism, and the dualistic 
theory of the philosophy of Rene Descartes) and a contemporary argument (i.e. Louis G. 
Lombardi) for the relation between man and nature.531 We will not go into Taylors detailed 
discussion on each of these arguments, but only mention his repeated conclusion for each one of 
them, namely the impossibility of maintaining these arguments for the superiority of humans 
without referring to an umeasonable anthropocentric bias. In Taylor's own view the notion of the 
human superiority can not be maintained on rational and logical grounds. Taylor describes two 
main arguments that must be considered as flawed. The first argument is based on the notion of 
merits. The question on the status of the various species is determined by an account of the 
abilities of the members of the species. It is further argued that the human being is superior to 
other beings as it is the only being capable of a rational, autonomous and moral life. Taylor, 
however, demonstrates that this argument is logically flawed as the comparison of various species 
does not take their different needs into account. The argument for the superiority of humans is 
only possible in the light of an anthropocentric viewpoint. The other argument is the inherent 
worth. Due to the mentioned classical historical sources of our understanding of the relation 
between man and nature, it is argued that humans are the only beings of inherent worth. However, 
this is only possible on account of an anthropocentric basis. In Taylor, on account of the biocentric 
theory, it is argued that all species have inherent worth. 
Even if the idea of human superiority may be denied on the premisses of Taylor's 
argument, this does not imply that the human being does not have a special role as a moral being. 
Taylor indirectly admits that the human being has such a special role. This does not mean that the 
not only that all indi vidual living organisms haveamoral status, but also that they have an equal moral status 
value, or inherent worth, as he calls it. This assumption creates problems for the resolution of conflicts or 
interest between humans and nonhumans. Taylor seeks to sol ve these conflicts by means of the distinction 
between central and peripheral interests, and the numbers affected. It is open to doubt, however whether these 
premises suffice for his attempt to justify cases where human peripheral interes are given priority over the 
central and vital interests of other animals and plants." (32). Instead it argues for equal moral status value for 
moral persons and moral agents, and gradual moral status value for nonpersons, depending on their degree 
of similarity with moral persons. 
53 1 ldem, 135-152 
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human being is superior in general - but it does mean that the human beings has a special 
responsibility. 532 
Having outlined the maincontours ofTaylor's understanding ofthe biocentric viewpoint, 
we now turn to his argument for the rationality of this notion. 
9 .1.2 The Rationality of Biocentrism 
As mentioned, the main aim of Taylor' s theory is to argue for the rational grounds for the 
endorsement of his theory of environmental ethics. The question we will be concemed with in this 
paragraph is, what Taylor understands by rational. 
As described above, Taylor argues for a biocentric outlook as the basis of his 
environmental ethic. However, Taylor also argues for the rationality of this biocentrism as the 
basis of justification for his theory. Although he does not explicitly say that it is only in so far as 
his biocentric theory is understood to be rational that it can be accepted, he repeatedly refers to 
the rationality of this biocentric outlook. The notion of rationality may be said to serve as the 
criteria ofjusticification ofhis theory. When this is the case, his discussion on the relation between 
the anthropo- and biocentric environmental ethic is seen in a new light. The main argument of 
Respect for Nature is that ·· ... quite independently of the duties we owe to our fellow humans, we 
are morally required to do or refrain from doing certain acts insofar as those acts bring benefit or 
harm to wild living things in the natura! world. [Furthermore, ... ] these moral requirements have 
to be weighed against certain things valued by humans. To fulfill the duties of environmental ethics 
does involve at times a sacrifice of at least some human interests."533 This leads Taylor to the 
biocentric conception already explained. Therefore, in terms of moral obligations, Taylor states 
his general thesis accordingly: 
532 Krebs I 999 also argues as a conclusion on her comprehensive analytical philosophical studies 
on environrnental ethics that an episternic anthropocentrism cannot be avoided. "Should the ethics of nature 
be anthropocentric or physiocentric? The ethics of nature should not be anthropocentric in the 
instrumentally-truncated sense but neither should it be anthropocentric in the extensional sense. Rather, it 
should be moderate ly physiocentric, more precisely pathocentric. The ethics of nature must, however, rernain 
anthropocentric in the epistemic sense." ( 13 7) 
533 Taylor 1986, 10. 
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In addition to and independently of whatever moral obligations we might have 
toward our fellow humans, we also have duties that are owed to wild living 
things in their own right( ... ) Our duties toward the Earth's nonhuman forms of 
life are grounded on their status as entities possessing inherent worth. They 
have a kind ofvalue that makes it wrong to treat them as ifthey existed as mere 
means to human ends. It is for their sake that their good should be promoted 
or protected. Just as humans shold be treated with respect, so should they.534 
However, the problem in Taylor is the apparently unclear explanation of the relation between 
rationality and biocentrism, i.e. reason and nature. It seems that reason and nature are intertwined 
in Taylor. 
In his definition of environmental ethics he can describe it as both ( 1) a concem with 
moral relations between humans and the natural world535 and (2) a theory established on rational 
grounds for guiding human treatment of natura! ecosystems and their wild communities of life.536 
Whereas the first definition does not necessarily include the nation of rationality, the second is 
fundamentally based upon this concept. Whereas a concem could also be based upon animal 
sentiments, the last definition presupposes the moral superiority of human beings. Despite his 
repeated reference to the necessary rational justification of his theory,537 it is not clear what he 
means by "rationality". It appears that Taylor is mainly speaking ofthe theoretical rationality. 
Rationality is seen as a matter of being well-informed, of understanding the principles of the 
biocentric world-view and seeing the implications of the status of the human being in this light.538 
If this is the case, an important question to Taylor is how he understands moral reason. What is 
534 Ibid., 13. 
535 Ibid., 3. 
536 Ibid., 9. 
537 E.g. Ibid., 9; 14: "The ful I defense of this general thesis [i.e. the biocentric thesis and its 
consequent moral i mpl ications] depends on a systematic and detail ed construction of a whole biocentric theory 
of environmental ethics. It is only when such a theory is seen in its entirety and all its elements are carefully 
examined that its rational acceptability [my italicization] will be made evident. We shall find that the grounds 
on which its rational acceptability is established are at the same time grounds for rejecting all human-centered 
theories"; 21; 154; I 55f. The rational ( or rather reasonable!) justification is also the focus in his defense of 
the biocentric viewpoint in answer to objections raised to his theory ( 1983). His intention in this reply is to 
argue that ·· ... the biocentric out look on nature, which underlies and supports the moral attitude of respect for 
wild living things, can be accepted as not only a possible, but also a reasonable world view.'' (237) 
538 !dem 1986, I 54ff. 
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the relation between this informed understanding of biological life and the imperative of moral 
reason. I do not find a convincing account of the relation between this theoretical and practical 
rationality in Taylor. Furthermore, he seems to be using the nation of rationality and reasonable-
ness somewhat indiscriminately. Ibis is clear in a passage, where he both argues for the 
reasonableness of his theory and yet claims that this theory would be found acceptable by a 
rational person.539 This suggests that Taylor' s nation of rationality is so closely related to his 
biocentric world-view that they cannot be understood isolated from each other. He maintains 
natw-e and reason as the simultaneous basis of his theory. On the one band, the biocentric outlook 
(i.e. nature) is the basis of his theory in so far as it is rational. On the other hand, rationality is 
considered the basis of his theory to the extent that it corresponds with the biocentric outlook. 
Only that is termed rational which lies within the insights of the biocentric outlook. Consequently, 
nature and reason are intertwined with one another. If this is the case, Taylor represents an 
understanding which comes quite close to the positions ofRolston and Callicott. It seems that the 
nation ofrationality also in Taylor is imbedded in his concept of nature. Concluding the discussion 
on Taylor's understanding of rational i ty with this suggestive interpretation, we now turn to his 
understanding of the ethical idea of a harmony between man and nature. 
9.1.3 The Ethical Idea of a Harmony Between Man and Nature 
Taylor is clear in his rejection of an organic concept of nature.540 However, he does endorse an 
understanding of the harmony between ma.n and nature that comes very cl ose to the very nation 
he rejects. I will argue that Taylor has a hypothetical nation of an organic nature. Taylor describes 
it as an idea. It seems that Taylor in this respect is dependent upon the Kantian nation of a 
regulative idea. Even if nature is not actually organic, one can still have a regulative idea of a 
harmony of nature, which serves as a hypothetical guideline. 
539 Ibid., 154: ·'l propose the reasonableness [ my italicization] of denying human superiority on the 
ground that the whole notion ofhuman superiority over other species does not fit coherently into the view of 
nature and life contained in the first three elements ofthe biocentric outlook [cf. 99f.]. These elements taken 
together, I hold, would be found acceptable as a total world-perspective by any rational [my italicization], 
informed person who has a developed capacity of reality-awareness regarding the lives of individual 
organisms." 
5~° Cf. 9.2.1 
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This notion of the ethical idea ofharrnony between man and nature is in the last part of 
Respect for Nature. In this part Taylor discusses what one should do about the cases, where the 
principles of his environmental ethic do not apply. Taylor is well aware that his principles can not 
encompass all cases. As a guideline for the remaining cases, he describes this ethical idea. The 
leading idea here is a notion which comes very close to the traditional natural law concept of 
equity. Just as it is claimed that the political laws cannot cover all situations, why circumstances 
will occur where a fair verdict is based upon deliberations on justice, so Taylor argues that there 
are situations, where his principles do not suffice. In these situations one must deliberate by 
reference to one's total vision of the world order which accords with the biocentric theory.541 On 
the basis of such a worldview one would meet all other beings with respect. This comprehensive 
understanding of the biocentric outlook also implies that human civilization would be brought into 
harmony with the natura} world. 542 
Taylor understands this harmony in such a comprehensive way that it parallels the natura! 
law thought of an all encompassing order of nature. Here we have one of the clearest examples 
of the resemblance between Taylor and the natura! law thought represented by Melanchthon and 
Wolff. This is clear from the foliowingpoints: (1) The allusion to the organic concept ofnature, 
which is a common feature within this mode of natura! law thought, (2) The recognition of the faet 
that moral (and legal) principles cannot encompass all cases and the consequently necessary 
emphasis on the underlying justificatory basis, (3) The reference to an order and the cl ose link 
between this order and the harmony between man and nature, (4) The total vision of one's 
understanding of the world and (5) The normative function ofthis ethical idea all suggest a strong 
affinity between Taylor and natura! law thought. 
As we have seen, the question on the naturalistic fallacy is crucial to natura! law thought 
and environmental ethics.543 This question also comes up in relation to Taylor. We now adress this 
question. 
541 Taylor I 986, 307. 
542 Idem, 309. 
543 The question on the naturalistic fallacy is discussed in most ofthe thinkers included in the present 
theises. Cf. 13.3 for the concluding discussion on this notion. 
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9.2 Nature and Morality 
Taylor maintains a clear distinction between is and ought. On the one hand he can describe his 
understanding of nature, i.e. the biocentric outlook, while, on the other hand, he can explain 
reason as the basis of morality. While the former is a consequence of factual information, the latter 
is based on evaluative judgments. 544 Further, he distinguishes between conceptual and normative 
claims. Whereas the conceptual claim explains that plants and animals are to be considered as 
moral subjects that one can treat either rightly or wrongly, the normative claim argues that we 
ought to treat them rightly. 545 
In order to understand more fully Taylor's approval of the distinction between is and 
ought, we tum to a particular side of his understanding of nature, namely the rejection of the 
organic concept of nature (9 .2.1), his explicit argument for the respect for nature (9 .2.2), and the 
notion ofthe rights of nature (9.2.3). 
9.2.1 The Rejection of an Organic Concept ofNature 
According to Taylor, the understanding of the order of nature which characterized earlier 
understandings can no longer be maintained. This understanding was also shared by Darwin, who 
upheld a notion of an overall design of nature. For Taylor it is important that we can no longer 
speak of "the balance of nature" as a kind of basic norm. It is no longer necessary to maintain this 
notion in order to establish scientific explanations of nature. There has been a substitution of the 
former understanding ofthe (designed) order of nature with the contemporary understanding of 
ecosystems and their component biota. A consequence of Taylor's rejection of this former 
understanding of nature is also a rejection of an understanding of morality conceived as a matter 
of foliowing nature or acting in accordance with the design built into the very nature of things. 546 
Nature has not provided human beings with a guide to follow. Human beings are considered as 
moral agents who are to reflect upon the moral demands of the natura! world. " ... We humans as 
544 Taylor 1986, 4 7ff. 
545 Ibid., 19f. 
546 This is, of course, an important point where Taylor differs from natura! law thought. In natura) 
law thought the idea of living in accordance with nature is a leading principle. In the discussion on Rolston 
it was argued that his endorsement ofthis very idea constituted a resemblance to natura! law thought. The idea 
of living in accordance with nature is further sustantiated in 13.2. 
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moral agents must search for our own principles to guide us when we try to detem1ine how to live 
in right relation to the natura! world. This requires us to engage in ethical inquiry and not simply 
"read off' moral norms from a certain way of conceiving of the order ofliving things."547 
Taylor's rejection of the organic concept of nature is essential to the metaethical 
discussion on the basis ofhis environmental theory. It marks a point where he differs strongly from 
a naturalist standpoint. In the earlier article from 1981 , where Taylor outlined the contours of his 
later book, he seems to be arguing somewhat differently. In 1981 he still speaks of a natura! arder 
which the human being is a part of. It is argued that the biocentric outlook implies an understan-
ding of the human being as part of this web of interconnected organisms. This ecological 
interrelationship constitutes an organic whole. "To accept the biocentric outlook and regard 
ourselves and our place in the world from its perspective is to see the whole natura! arder [my 
italics] of the Earth' s biosphere as a complex but unified web of intercollilected organisms, objects, 
and events. The ecological relationships between any comrnunity of living things and their 
environment form an organic whole [my italics] of functionally interdependent parts. "548 Even if 
Taylor also here is careful to underline that this does not constitute amoral norm,549 his emphasis 
on the cl ose link between the factual and normative understanding of biological life does not make 
this distinction very convincing. Rather, the close link suggests a naturalist basis of Taylor's 
theory, even if he does not adhere to this position. 
Having established Taylor's rejection of the organic concept of nature and the normative 
implications of this rejection, we now tum to his understanding ofrespect for nature. In this idea 
some of the Kan ti an tenets become quite clear. 
9.2.2 Respect for Nature 
The distinction between moral agents and moral subjects is fundamental to Taylor's theory of 
547 Taylor 1986, 9. 
548 Taylor 1981, 209. 
549 Ibid.: '·However, I do wish to point out that this "holistic'' view ofthe Earth's ecological systems 
does not itself constitute amoral norm. It is a factual aspect of biological real i ty, to be understood as aset of 
causa! connections in ordinary empirical terms( ... ) Its ethical implications for our treatment ofthe natura! 
environment lie entirely in the faet that our knowledge ofthese causa! connections is an essential means to 
ful ti Iling the aims we set for ourselves in adopting the attitude of respect for nature." 
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environmental ethics. 550 The class of moral agents encompass beings that can reflect on moral 
issues, are capable of moral reasoning. This class comprises most humans, but cannot be identified 
with human beings. There are human beings who are not capable of this sort of reasoning, e.g. 
infants and some mentally disabled humans. There rnight also be other species also capable ofthis 
ability. This last question is regarded an open one. The criteria of belonging to this class are not 
based on speciesist arguments, but on a strict focus on the character of a moral agent. The class 
of moral subjects is larger than the class of moral agents. Moral subjects are all those beings in 
relation to whom one has duties and responsibility. Obviously a human being can be both amoral 
agent and amoral subject. Important, however, is the inclusion of animals and plants as moral 
subjects. The precondition for a being to be a moral subject is that it can be harmed or benefited. 
It is possible to take the standpoint of amoral subject and determine the right or wrong action in 
regard to this being. "Perhaps the most ethically significant faet about moral subjects is that it is 
always possible fora moral agent to take amoral subject 's standpoint and make judgments from 
its standpoint about how it ought to be treated. The stand implicit in such judgment is the 
furtherance or preservation of the well-being of the subject, not of the one who does the 
judging."551 
In this argument, one can include TayJor' s understanding of the structural symmetry 
between human ethics and environmental ethics.552 Human ethics are characterized by three main 
components, (I) A beliefsystem, (2) respect for other persons, and (3) the system of rules and 
standards. The beliefsystem is understood as the conceptual framework on account of which one 
understands other persons. This beliefsystem is the reason for the understanding of other persons 
as somebody you shold treat with respect. The system of rules and standards structure this respect. 
Environmental ethics, Taylor argues, are based on a similar structure. The biocentric outlook on 
nature is considered as the communitaristic basis of the beliefsystem.553 Human beings are 
550 Taylor 1986, 14ff. 
55 1 Ibid., 17. 
552 Ibid., 41 ff. 
553 Ibid., 42: ·'When amoral agent accepts the belief-system [i.e. the biocentric beliefsystem] and 
conceives of others as persons, she or he takes up a certain outlook on the social world. Others are seen as 
belonging to a community of which one is also a member on equal terms with them. The community it self 
is so ordered as to make it possible for all individuals to live self-directed lives according to value-systems 
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considered as members of Earth' s community of life. Thus, human beings are fundamentally 
connected with the nonhuman nature. Every living thing will be seen as a being of inherent worth, 
pursuing its own good in its own way. This implies the second component, the respect of nature, 
which must be considered as the only appropriate attitude. The third component is the standard 
and rules of behavior in accordance with this respect for nature. 
It is worth noting that Taylor actually refers to a communitarian basis of his environmen-
tal theory. This is done at a fundamental point of his whole theory. This suggests that this 
communitarian nation is a crucial element of Taylor's theory as a whole. If this is the case, there 
is a strong link to the metaethical basis of the ontological natura! law theories. 
This understanding ofthe structural symmetry between human ethics and environmental 
ethics is the reason for Taylor's concept of "respect for nature". He is widening the Kantian 
concept of respect for other persons. The Kantian inspiration ofTaylor's theory is also clear when 
he explains the difference between having and expressing the attitude of respect for nature.554 
Having the respect for nature is a question of a set of dispositions for the moral agent, namely the 
valuational, the conative, the practical, and the affeetive dimensions. These dispositions refer to 
the disposition to make certain value judgments, the disposition to have eertain ends, the 
disposition to aet for certain reasons, and, finally, the disposition to have certain feelings. 555 To 
express the respect for nature is a question of aeting out of consideration for nature. " ... people 
show genuine respeet for nature only when they aet or decline to aet out of consideration and 
concernfor the good of wild living things".556 The motivation is crucial.557 Respect for nature is 
nota maner of caring for or loving nature.558 What is important is the aet on account of duty and 
rules.559 These rules are considered as having universal justification.560 
of their own choosing, subject only to those constraints needed to give each an equal chance." 
55
-1 Cf. Taylor 1986, 80ff 
555 Cf. ibid. fora more detailed description of each ofthese dispositions. 
556 Ibid., 84 
557 Ibid. 
558 Ibid., 85f.; 90. 
559 Ibid. , 85. 
560 Ibid., 91. 
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In these last remarks the Kantian tenets are quite clear. One is to aet on the basis of duty 
and not inclination. Furthermore, the moral agent acts on behalf of respect of the other. An 
important difference, however, is the following idea, where Taylor argues in favor of nature as 
holding rights. 
9.2.3 Rights of Nature 
In this last part of the discussion on Taylor, we tum to his understanding of the rights of nature. 
Although Taylor explicitly does not base his theory of environmental ethics on the nation of 
rights,561 he still discusses this nation. As this nation is central to the theme of this thesis, we wi]l 
now try to discuss Taylor's understanding of the rights of nature. 
Taylor defines a right as '· ... a legitimate claim or entitlement to something, the 
recognition of the legitimacy of that claim or entitlement being (morally or legally) required of 
others."562 Whereas the moral rights are recognised on account of valid moral principles, the legal 
rights are imposed by a system of law. Taylor's primary interest is on the moral rights, but first we 
turn to his understanding of the legal rights of nature. 
The question of legal rights is basically a question on the passing of a law ascribing these 
rights. Having a legal rights is not the same as having amoral right563. In order to have a legal right 
it is necessary that a given law acknowledges the right of a given entity. Therefore, in order for 
nature to have legal rights, it is "onJy" aquired that this is formulated in a law. On the basis of the 
theory of Taylor, where animals and plants are considered as entities with a good of their own, it 
is logically conceivable for them to have the legal status of bearer-of-rights in a given society.564 
Once this legal right has been passed as a law, their individual good makes a legally valid claim 
upon humans, who are required by law to recognize the legitimacy of that claim.565 
With regard to moral rights, Taylor argues that it is not conceptually impossible to ascribe 
such rights to nonhuman beings, even if ane ought to refrain from doing so. " ... although it is not 
561 Ibid., 219. 
562 Ibid. 
563 Ibid., 224. 
5
6-1 Ibid., 222. 
565 Ibid. 
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conceptually confused or logically absurd to ascribe moral rights in an extended sense to animals 
or plants, there are good reasons for not doing so."566 If rights are understood in the traclitional 
sense of fundamental human rights, or rights of persons, it is truly absurd to argue for these rights 
in regard to nature. But there is another understanding of moral rights, ascribing rights to insane 
and severely retarded. In this sense it seems justifiable to speak of rights of nature. However, he 
does maintain the sufficiency ofhis own theory. The notion of moral rights ofnature does not add 
anything to what is already accomplished by the theory of respect for nature.567 
By the notion of moral rights Taylor understands a parallel to legal rights568. A person has 
a claim to something based on a valid moral principle. Others are required to respect this right. 
Two elements are fundamental in this argument: (1) the moral legitimacy andjustification, and (2) 
the moral duty or requirement. Both of these presuppose a valid, normative ethical system. This 
normative justification of the rights also distinguish them from the notions of needs, interests and 
values. Whereas these are expressed in a factual language, the language ofrights is normative. 
Thus, rights are justified, when they are based on the valid, moral system. On the assumption of 
these principles, one can speak of a true right. 
On account of this understanding of moral rights, it is highly problematic to assert the 
possibility of plants' and animals' moral rights.569 This is due to conceptual, rather than normative 
considerations. According to Taylor, there are four reasons why plants and animals cannot be 
bearers of moral rights. "(a) A bearer of moral rights is assumed to be a member of the community 
of moral agents. (b) There is a connection between being a bearer of moral rights and having self-
respect such that, if it is inconceivable for something to have self-respect it is inconceivable for it 
to be a bearer of moral rights. (c) It must make sense to say that a being is able to choose to 
exercise or to en joy a right if it makes sense to say it has that right. (d) A bearer of moral rights 
has certain second-order entitlements in virtue of its moral rights". For each ofthese conditions, 
Taylor claims that it is logically impossible forplantsand anirnals to fulfill them. Cf. (a): Neither 
plants nor animals are considered agents within a moral system that respects the rights of others 
;
66 Ibid., 225. 
567 Ibid., 225f. 
568 Cf. ibid., 226ff. for further details. 
569 Cf. ibid., 245ff. for further details. 
173 
Respect for Nature 
and can claim one's own rights. Cf. (b): Selfrespect is not something one finds in plants or animals. 
Cf. ( c ): Neither plants nor animals are capable of choosing between alternatives. This ability is one 
of the preconditions of having rights. Cf. (d): Firstorder rights can be demanded restituted on 
occasion of offence. Logically, plants and animals can not claim these demands, for which reason 
they cannot have rights. 
Even if Taylor dismisses the possibility of the rights of plants and animals on logical 
grounds. he does admit a modified concept of moral rights. On the basis of the rationality of the 
biocentric outlook on nature, which must be accepted by any person analyzing it without 
prejudice, nature is understood as an aim in itself and thereby worthy of respect570. The ethical acts 
that cmrespond with this attitude are actions, one is obliged to in regard to nature. "When animals 
and plants are regarded as entities possessing mherent worth their good accordingly is understood 
to make a claim-to-be-respected upon all moral agents, and duties are seen to be imposed upon 
agents as ways of meeting that claim".571 According to Taylor, there is not far from this 
understanding to a notion of rights of nature. Thus, there is a conceptual structure which justifies 
at least the respect for nature as a right of nature. This right can, however, serve as basis for other 
rights, namely ·· ... the right not to be harmed, the right not to be interfered with, the right not to 
have one's trust broken. and the right to restitution when one has been wronged. To carry out the 
du ties correlative with each of these rights is to treat animals and plant in the way they are entitled 
to be treated. They are deserving of such treatment in their own right. "571 Consequently, it seems 
justified to speak of a modified concept of rights for animals and plants. These rights, however, 
are something quite different from the rights ofhumans. As there can easily be a confusion of these 
concepts, it is better altogether to dismiss of the notion of moral rights forplantsand animals and 
confine oneself to a respect for nature. 
9.3 Conclusion 
The analysis of Taylor's environmental ethics can now be concluded. The leading concerns were 
a critical assessment ofhis understanding of nature and reason. It was demonstrated that Taylor 
57° Cf. ibid., 251 ff. for further details 
571 Ibid., 252. 
572 Ibid., 253. 
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develops a biocentric outlook, which serves as a worldview justifying his theory of respect for 
nature. According to his biocentric view on life all living organisms are seen as teleological 
lifecenters. They all have a conatus, which raises the demand of respect. In this sense there is a 
parallel to the Kantian emphasis on respect of the human person on account of the rationality of 
this person. Wheres Kant pointed to rationality as the criterion on moral standing, Taylor defends 
conatus as the determinative principle. This could suggest that Taylor shares the moral 
constructivism found in Kant. However, the critical reading of Taylor suggests that he is rather 
to be seen in the light of a naturalist justification of normativity. Even if Taylor is careful to 
distinguish conceptual and normative claims, he stresses the link between this theory of natura! life 
and the con-esponding ethical claims so strongly that it appears appropriate to suggest a naturalist 
understanding ofhis thought. This appears to be the case for naturalism in the wider sense as well 
as in the narrower sense. Therefore, the analysis of Taylor has demonstrated that he shares 
resemblances with a naturalistic natura! law thought both in the fundamental structure and in 




Reason as Basis for Environmental Ethics 
In this part we tum to three select positions, arguing for an environmental ethic which is based in 
a concept ofreason. The primary thinkers of our concern will be Bryan G. No1ton (Chapter 10), 
Mark Sagoff (Chapter 11) and Robin Attfield (Chapter 12). 

Chapter 10 
The Rationality of Environmental Policy 
Having seen three theories of environrnental ethics indifferent ways argue fora normative concept 
of nature, we now tum to a focus on reason as the source of normativity. Bryan Norton defends 
the idea of a rational basis of environrnental policy as the best way to ensure a protection of the 
environment. It is the central thesis of Why Preserve Natura/ Variety? to argue that the dilemma 
between arguing for protection of nature on account of nonanthropocentric reasons or reducing 
nature to a demand value can be overcome by an endorsement of nature as a transformative value, 
whereby Norton thinks of nature as a value which contributes to the formation of a rational world 
view. For Norton rationality is in focus, when he discusses concem for nature. 
As in the previous chapters, the primary concem will be the concept of nature and reason 
and the role they play in the grounding of morality. In the first part, the primary questions of our 
concem will be: How does Norton understand the concept of nature? What role does nature play 
in the grounding of morality? In the second part, we formulate the same questions but in regard 
to his concept ofrationality. The chapter ends with a conclusion.573 
10.1 Nature as the Basis of a Constructivist Epistemology 
In dealing with the mentioned questions, the primary focus in the subsequent paragraph will be on 
N orton' s understanding of nature by focusing on his defence of weak anthropocentrism and his 
rejection of holism. In the course of doing this, it is the aim to demonstrate how these notions are 
573 Bryan Norton's work on environmental ethics and environmental policy covers many subjects. 
In the foliowing the focus is on the concepts which are central to the enquiry ofthe thesis, why the focus is 
on the ethical issues in Norton. Furthermore, among his two main works, Why Preserve Natura! Variety? and 
Toward Unity Among Environmentalists. the primary frame of reference is the former. Besides this work 
several articles ofhis are referred to along the course ofthe argument. References to discussions on Norton 
have been minimized, as the focus is on his own writings. 
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integrally related to the following nations. The primary questions are therefore: How does Norton 
argue fora weak anthropocentrism? What are his grounds for rejecting holism? Finally, what are 
the underlying metaethical assumptions of these arguments? 
10 .1.1 The Defence of Weak Anthro·pocentrism 
The traditional distinction between nonanthropocentrism and anthropocentrism is the starting point 
for Norton when he argues for his own position.574 We will describe Norton's reflections on these 
two main types of environmental thought in brief. 
"Only humans are the locus of intrinsic value, and the value of all other objects derives 
from their contributions to human values".575 Such is the central thesis of anthropocentrism, 
according to Norton. This understanding of environmental ethics is substantiated in several ways, 
an1ong which the most important are the emphasis on consciousness as the precondition for moral 
status, the biblical argument for the superiority of the human being, and the argument based on 
the theory of evolution, each of which is criticized by Norton.576 
The dubious argumentative force also applies to the main views of nonanthropocentrism. 
Norton discusses the central notions of nonanthropocentrism. In regard to the discussion on 
intrinsic value and individual interests, he tak.es a critical stance.577 Further, rights of nonhumans 
cannot provide a satisfactory rationale against environmental deterioration. 578 This also holds for 
the concept of the rights of future generations. The individuality implied in these notions prevents 
the adequacy of these deliberations as basis for an environmental ethic. They do not supply a 
sufficient argument against e.g. a policy of depletion, as this barms no existing individuals, present 
or future. 579 Consequently, the arguments for species protection dependent upon notions of 
574 Norton 1984, l33ff.; 1987, 135ff. 
575 ldem 1987, 135. 
576 Cf. ibid., 13 7ff. fora further discussion on each of these ideas, where Norton demonstrates the 
questionable traits of each one of them. 
577 Ibid., I 56ff. 
578 ldem, 1982a. 
579 Idem, I 982b. 
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individualism are rejected as insufficient.580 
Even if individualism is discarded, nonanthropocentrism still holds serious problems. In 
the case of attempting to ascribe interests to species, the notion shows its limits. Conceptually, the 
notion of interests and rights breaks down, when applied to a species. There are no reasonable 
means of determining interests and rights in this case. 58 1 Other attempts of more holistic notions 
of nonanthropocentrism have focused on human the notion of sentiments. As we have seen, this 
is the case in Callicott.582 Norton criticizes this nation for not overcoming the damaging 
individualistic bias and for its inherent relativism.583 Finally, Norton criticizes the notion of 
holism. 584 We turn to this last point in the subsequent paragraph. 
Consequently, both anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism appear inconclusive. In 
arder to overcome the conceptual problems of these notions, Norton argues for a further 
distinction, namely between a strong and a weak anthropocentrism.585 The strong anthropocen-
trism is the more extreme versions of tbe above given characteristic of anthropocentrism. Weak 
anthropocentrism on the other hand, is characterised by making two ethical resources available. 
First, by demonstrating the close relationship between the human species and other living species, 
environmental ethics also support ideals of human behavior extolling harmony with nature. These 
ideals serve as a critique of preferences leading to an exploitation of nature. Second, nature serves 
as a source of inspiration in value formation. This is the case, when human experiences with nature 
serve as a process of value formation, leading to a substitution of merely felt preferences with 
more rational anes. Norton's argument fora weak anthropocentrism is its ability to supply " ... a 
framework for developing powerful reasons for protecting nature( ... ) [without these reasons 
resernbling] the extractive and exploitative reason normally associated with strong anthropocen-
580 !dem 1987, I 66ff. 
581 Ibid., 171: ·'To apply the concepts of rights and interests to nonhuman species as collectives is 
not only to expand the application of the concepts; it radically alters their very logic as no reasonable 
analogies exist for reconstructing them. We are left without any clear guidelines for deciding what rights a 
species has because one cannot generate such rights from interests in any meaningful sense of that term." 
582 Cf. 8.1.1 
583 Norton 1987, 174f. 
584 Ibid., 176ff. 
585 ldem, 1984, 134f.; 1987, 12f.; 135. 
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trism."586 Further, weak anthropocentrism also affects behavior. The ideal ofharmony with nature 
implies different actions in relation to nature. Furthermore, this view can be endorsed on religous 
as well as rational grounds. 587 
The weak anthropocentrism has two levels, a distributional and an allocational. Due to 
the former, one ought not to harm other human individuals unjustifiably. Whereas the former is 
based on individual considerations, this is not the case for the latter. Due to tbe latter one is 
obliged to maintain a flow of resources into the indefinite future, as these are necessary for 
ongoing human life. 588 
In line with his weak anthropocentrism, Norton takes a sharp, critical stance to what he 
calls a reductionist monism. The critique of monism is basically because of its dependence upon 
the axiological approach to environmental ethics. Due to this method, it is attempted to include 
all issues of environmental ethics under one single principle or theory.589 The goal is to offer a 
unified and monistic account of moral obligation in relation to nature. This central goal of moral 
monism leads to reductionism, according to Norton. Moreover, the practical implications of this 
theory is a paralyzing dilemma between assertions of either the entirely instrumental value of 
nature to human objectives or nature's value as independent on hun1an valuation. Both claims are 
monistic and yet the polarization of their assertions imply the conceptual and practical irnpossibility 
ofthese notions.590 
Monists are not simply wrong in that they have not yet proposed the correct 
universal principle or because they have not quite successfully specified the 
586 !dem 1984, 135. 
587 ldem 1984, I 35f. 
588 Ibid., 143ff. 
Eugene C. Hargrove and Laura Westra both develop own positions in opposition to Norton. 
Hargrove also calls his own position weakly anthropocentric. But whereas Norton argues for an anti-intrinsic, 
pragmatic position, Hargrove defends the intrinsic value of nature (1992). Westra endorses an "ethics of 
integrity" based on an ecocentric, holistic position as necessary in order to deal with the actual environmental 
problems. This position is cornplemented by the ecosystem approach and complex systems theory ( 1997). 
589 Norton 1995a, 331: "What locks the anthropocentrists and nonanthropocentrists in a death-grip 
is the assumption ofmoral monism - the beliefthat we only have moral obligations to those things which have 
some shared feature common to all moral patients." 
590 ldem 1995b, 341 ff. 
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precise boundaries of moral considerability in nature. I believe, rather, that the 
entire project of shoehoming all of our obligations regarding other humans and 
nature into a "monistic" system of analysis is the wrong strategy for achieving 
better environrnental decision making. 591 
Monism, of course, can be anthropocentric as well an nonanthropocentric. However, Norton 
particularly criticizes the nonanthropocentric, holistic monism. According to Norton, this kind of 
monism is found in Callicott, marking a point of critique for Norton. The criticism can be directed 
at the antihumanistic implications,592 the theoretical flaws,593 and the implied reductionism.594 A 
similar discussion is on the notion of organicism. Norton rejects various versions of strong 
organicism. This is especially because they often have been interpreted too literally and have been 
takcn to have moral force. Against the notions of strong organicism, however, Norton argues for 
a minimal organicism, based on the notion of selforganizing ecosystems.595 
A general critique of monism is its stagnant position within a modernist paradigm. This 
is particularly the case for nonanthropocentrism. When various attempts of nonanthropocentrism 
claim to overcome the split in reality between matter and spirit, which has pervaded philosophy 
since Descartes, they confine themselves within a discussion incapable of giving satisfactory 
answers to contemporary environrnental problems. Environrnental ethics must move beyond this 
modernist scbeme of thought. One way of doing this is to assert the pragmatic approach of 
Norton' s environrnental philosophy.596 In relation to holism, Norton consequently advocates a 
pluralistic version. According to such a view, both individuals and systems could be thought to 
have intrinsic value. Moreover, the value of ecosystems and individuals could not be compared 
591 Ibid., 345. 
592 !dem 1987, 178. 
593 !dem 1995b, 345ff. 
594 !dem 1996, I 09ff. 
595 ldem 1993, 29: "We began by posing the question whether environmentalists and environmental 
managers need a "new" organizing metaphor, and whether environmentalists should be organicists. By 
seeking a minimal holism - one that supports the important changes in perception, value, and worldview that 
environmentalists advocate, but one that also minimizes its mystical implications and metaphysical 
commitments - we have outlined in broad terms such a metaphor. 1t is non-reductionistic, but it is not 
metaphysically or ethically holistic, and it is not organicist in the strong sense"; 1992b, I 05ff. 
596 !dem 1995b, 354f. 
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to each other, as they are distinct to one another.597 However, even if Norton endorses this 
pluralist approach, this does not entail a relativistic account of ethics. Moral relativism must be 
avoided, and there are a number of strategies available for this purpose, e.g. the development of 
" ... a two-tiered system of analysis in which the "action" tier includes multiple rules for choosing 
acceptable behaviors and a second, "meta" tier contains rational principles for deciding which of 
the action rules is appropriate in various situations".598 
Concluding this paragraph, it seems appropriate to point to the similarities between 
monism and metaethical realism and naturalism. A fundamental claim of monism, as Norton sees 
it, is the assertion of an overarching principle which can serve as a guiding axiom for moral 
deliberation in all issues with regard to nonhuman as well as human entities. This fundamental 
claim has a remarkable resemblance to the basic tenets of moral realism and naturalism.599 
Consequently, Norton' s rejection of moral monism also implies the dismissal of realism. This is 
fully in accordance with the present interpretation of Norton as moral constructivist. The moral 
values are not given, they are constructed. This is further substantiated when we tum to his 
understanding of the transformative value of nature. Here it is argued that nature serves as a 
source for the formation ofvalues. The role of nature is not to hold given, normative values, but 
rather to serve as a basis of motivation for the construction of of values of nature. This 
constructivist value formation becomes more apparent, when we trun to a more explicit account 
of this nation. 
10.1.2 The Transformative Value of Nature 
The central value of nature in Norton is the transformative value. However, before we corne to 
this value, we focus our enquiry on other aspects ofthe value of nature. 
Norton clearly dismisses the utilitarian and intrinsic value of nature. Among other 
reasons, utilitarianism is rejected because of its theoretically problematic character600, and its 
597 !dem 1987, l 78f. 
598 !dem 1997a, 27. 
599 Cf. 2. I 
600 !dem 1987, 7ff. 
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inability to serve as a universal value.601 The intrinsic value of nature is dismissed because of the 
arguments given above against nonanthropocentrism 
Rather than these traditional concepts of value, Norton approaches the nation of value 
by deploying a distinction between felt and considered preferences. Felt preferences are normally 
tak.en as givens. Often they are not critically evaluated. Considered preferences are hypothetical 
desires or needs. They express the supposed desires of an individual under specifi.c 
circumstances602, they are subject to analysis and self-criticism.603 Whereas felt preferences are 
understood in relation to demand values, considered preferences are lin.ked with transformative 
values. Demand values are values satisfying felt preferences. Therefore, these values are often the 
subject of utilitarian considerations. Furthermore, these values are often taken into regard in 
economic analysis and the attempt to measure the value of nature in economic terms.604 
Transformative values focus on nature as a source of inspiration for the formation of the 
understanding of nature. Experiences with nature can lead to the appreciation of nature as 
something of a higher and better value. Implicit in the nation of transformative values there are 
two beliefs: ·'(1) that same preferences and related value systems are objectively better than others 
and (2) that the values and preferences held by individuals are altered by experiences they have".605 
A concise passage sums up the basic tenets of this nation: 
Insofar as environmentalists believe that experience of nature is a necessary 
conditio for developing a consistent and rational world view, one that fully 
recognizes man's place as a highly evolved animal whose existence depends 
upon other species and funtioning ecosystems, they also believe that such 
experiences have transformative value. Experience of nature can promote 
questioning and rejection of overly materialistic and consumptive felt preferen-
ces. Appeals to the transformative value of wild species and undisturbed 
ecosystems thereby provide the means to criticize and limit demand values that 
threaten to destroy those species and ecosystems while at the same time 
60 1 [dem 1997a, 28ff. 
602 [dem I 987, 9. 
603 Ibid., 208. 
604 Ibid., 10; 119ff.; 123f.; 127ff. 
605 Ibid., 11. 
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introducing an important value that humans should place upon them.606 
Transformative values are anthropocentric. They do not have their basis in an assertion of the 
intrinsic value of nature.607 However, this by no means implies a lesser concern for nature. Norton 
demonstrates how antecedents ofthis notion oftransfonnative value emphasize the responsibility 
for nature. This is particularly the case in the transcendentalist tradition608, and in the argument for 
the preservation of nature as embodiments of culture.609 Norton is critical of both these 
arguments.610 Important to him is the ecological view of nature. The basic principles ofthis world 
view sets down as well ontological as epistemological premises for the relation to nature. 
Ontologically this concept emphasi"zes the unity of man and nature. In line with a Darwinian 
understanding ofthe relation between man and nature, the dichotomy is denied.611 Epistemologi-
cally, the principle of cautiousness is emphasized. As the natural world is extraordinarily complex, 
a degree of scepticism as to the degree of knowledge about nature is necessary. The epistemology 
as well as the ontology of this world view both lead to a priori ty on the harmony with nature. 
"Thus, the ontology and epistemology of the ecological world view give rise to a positive value -
that of harmony with nature and nature's way. It is good, in this view, to do things in a way that 
mimics nature's patterns ( ... ) And it is bad to thwart those natura! processes, to interrupt well-
established patterns, to introduce irreversible changes. "612 
Norton' s focus on the transformative value of nature demonstrates the dynamic character, 
not only ofhis concept of nature (as described above), but also ofhis concept ofvalue. The value 
formation is a constant process, where the value of the particular valued object is under continuous 
606 Ibid., 189. 
607 Ibid., 207. 
608 Ibid., 191 ff. 
609 Ibid., I 96ff. 
610 Ibid., 195f.; 200ff. 
611 This denial of the dichotomy between the human being and nonhuman nature has also been 
demonstrated in Rolston (cf. 7.2), Callicott (cf. 8.2), and Taylor (cf. 9.1 .1 ). However, whereas this idea serves 
as an important part of their advocacy of a biocentric theory, Norton does not draw this conclusion. The den i al 
ofthis dichotomy is by Norton only endorsed in order to demonstrate a viable basis for the ideal ofthe human 
being's life in harmony with nature. 
rn Norton 1987, 207. 
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assessment. This aspect ofthe value of nature is also apparent in Norton's understanding of the 
creative value of nature, and the pragmatic, constructivist grounding of value. According to 
Norton, there cannot be argued fora universal value, as long as the discussion is confined to the 
traditional distinction between intrinsic and utilitarian value of nature. Rather, one ought to speak 
of the creative value of nature. Hereby, Norton refers to nature as supplying options for human 
opportunity. Throughout different times and cultures, this aspect of aspect of nature has always 
been valued.61 3 In his account ofthe pragmatic, constructivist grounding of value, Norton argues 
for the necessity of moving beyond the modernist paradigm of representational epistemology. 
Rather, one should adopt a postmodem concept of objecitivity, based on a relational conception .. 
There is not an objective value beyond perception, faet and value are related to each other. This 
forms the basis for Norton's advocacy of the pragmatic, constructivist tradition in epistemology 
and ethics. 
lf ( ... ) we reject the myth a Cartesian objectivity that exists beyond perception 
bo1h as it applies to knowledge and as it applies to value, we can defend 
objectivity of a post-modem kind; if we can defend a conception of objectivity 
that is relational rather than representational, and one which recognises that 
facts and values do not always present themselves independently of each other, 
then we may be ready to develop a new approach to the 'objectivity' of 
environrnental values. The approach I have in mind is based in the pragmatic 
tradition and rests on 'unavoidability' within a constructivist system of 
knowledge and value.614 
Value is constructed in relation to the given natura! and political circumstances. It is not given 
independently of the actual circumstances. 
Norton' s concept of value places him witin a metaethical constructivist grounding of 
morality. As demonstrated, this is apparent from a terminological observation, where Norton 
applies this very terminology in a characterization of his own thought. However, even if Norton 
had not supplied this obvious link to a constructivist interpretation of his thought, the whole 
notion of the transformative value substantiates the same interpretation. The value of nature is 
understood in terms of a process. It is fundamentally not concluded, but is understood as a 
613 Idern 1997a, 22f.; 28ff. 
61
~ ldern 1995a, 329f. 
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continuous evaluation, criteriologically determined by experience.615 
This constructivist approach to the concept of value is highly important to Norton in the 
discussion on the political application of the value of nature. As will be apparent, the possible 
political application serves as the criterion on rationality. Only to the extent that a particular value 
of nature can be implemented in policy making does it count as rational. In this sense, the value 
of nature is determined pragmatically. We now tum to Norton's understanding of the concept of 
rational i ty. 
10.2 The Concept of Rationality 
The notion of rationality is essential to Norton. Throughout his writings on environmental ethics, 
he argues for rationality as a criterion on the plausibility of the asserted notions. Moreover, an 
essential aim in Norton is to provide a coherent rationale for protection of nature and species 
diversity. But even if rationality plays this central role in Norton, the concept of rationality still 
seems somwhat blurred. It is not altogether clear, what Norton means by rationality. Therefore, 
the central questions ofthis paragraph are: How does Norton understand the notion of rationality? 
What aspects of rationality particularly in focus? What role does rationality play in the grounding 
of morality? 
Three concepts of rationality appear particularly conclusive in Norton, namely the 
scientific, political, and pragmatic. In the foliowing we look at each of these main notions. 
10.2.1 Scientific Rationality 
Norton describes several approaches to a rationale of the protection of nature. Rationale in this 
sense refers to patterns of argument, why these rationales can refer to strong and weak 
anthropocentrism, nonanthropocentrism and bio- or ontocentrism.616 As mentioned above, 
Norton's own position is that of weak anthropocentrism. In accordance with this position 
rationality is determined by its utility to human needs and interests. 
One aspect of this rational i ty is the argument for the scientific rationale of protection of 
615 This constructivist basis of normativity was also found (partly) in Luther (5.2.1) and in Kant 
(6.2). Cf. 14.1 fora tentative reconstruction of this nation in the light of the findings ofthe thesis. 
6 16 Norton 1987, I 3. 
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nature.6 17 Although the traditional distinction between descriptive and normative statements 
implies the impossibility of the link between science and morality, the ecological insight provides 
two arguments for the protection of nature. One argument focuses on the complexity of nature, 
and the respect this motivates. Another argument underlines nature serving as a source of 
knowledge. 6 18 
A further rational argument for protection of species diversity is the selfaugmenting 
character of species diversity. Once the argument for the relative anthropocentric utility of a given 
species is accepted, it would be irrational not to protect the species diversity. Any interference in 
the complex, interrelated web of subsystems within nonhuman nature carries a potential threat to 
damage the living conditions of any species. Furthermore, the extinction of one species is certain 
to have a multiple effect throughout the ecosystem. In the light of these observations, Norton 
advocates the rationality of the protection of species diversity.619 
Both of these essential arguments for the protection of the species diversity are 
fundamentally scientific. Rationality in this sense implies the selfevidence of the scientific 
discourse. However, this sense of rational i ty does not imply the argumentative and deliberative 
character of moral reason. Rationality in this scientific sense is understood in a methodical and 
morally neutral sense. This does not mean that the insights of this kind of reason cannot have 
moral implications, but this is only after the establishment and accept of a certain value, which 
would be the task of moral reason. 
10 .2.2 Political Rationality 
A further important concept ofrationality in Norton is political rationality. However, also in this 
sense, rationality is not seen primarily in moral terms. Rationality is rather seen as a methodical 
rationality. Admittedly, Norton does take a critical stance to attempts of setting a price on the 
value of nature.Hedismisses the cost benefit analysis. According to Norton, one cannot assess 
the value of a species in economic terms. Firstly, the methods of determining the values of spedes 
617 Ibid., 14ff. 
61 8 Ibid., 15; 18ff. 
6 19 Ibid., 50ff.; 1986b, l 14ff. 
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in economic terms are uncertain.620 Norton gives an account of three sources of this uncertainty. 
"First, the framing of the value question itself affects the outcome ( ... ) Second, many values of 
species cannot be assessed with any precision ( ... ) Finally, by attempting to quantify all benefits, 
economic analyses must treat all values as demand values."621 Therefore, Norton follows the 
critique ofthe insufficiency of the "benefit-cost analysis", arguing that there are better ways of 
assessing the value of species. Norton recommends an approach to decisions conceming 
endangered species, designated as "safe minimum standard". According to this approach one 
should avoid species extinction unless the social costs of doing so are unacctable large.622 A further 
critic of the "benefit-cost analysis" is that it does not intemalize the value of nature to the proper 
extent. The values of nature stay extemal, which is to be avoided. 623 
However, although Norton argues against the extemalization ofthe values of nature, it 
seems as if Norton 's concept of rationality does lead to an externalization. This is due to the 
apparently functionalistic criterion on rationality in the political discourse. A particular viewpoint 
is understood as rational in so far as it can be applied to policy making. Norton emphasizes the 
rationality of the protection of nature.624 However, in arder to determine what can be called 
rational, Norton refers to the implicit world view. The rational i ty of this world view is determined 
by its acceptance within the political discourse. This also implies the assertion of a constructivist 
grounding of the rationality of the protection of nature. The rational i ty of the protection of nature 
is an ongoing political formative process. 
This also marks the alternative to moral realism.625 Rationality in Norton is not thought 
of in cognitive terms. There is not a given, rationally recognizable entity of moral attributes. 
Rather, the rationality of a given view point is determined by the pragmatic, constructivist, political 
formation of this nation. Hence, rationality is criteriologically detennined by its functionalistic 
ability to enter into the political discourse. Hereby, Norton makes explicit his constructivist 
620 Ibid., 25. 
62 1 Ibid., 26. 
622 Ibid., 35. 
623 Idem 1997a, l 8ff. 
624 ldem 1987, 9. 
625 [dem 1995a, 328. 
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account ofrationality. 
10.2.3 Rationality as Pragmatism 
In Toward Unity Among Environmentalists a central thesis is the thesis of convergence. Norton 
argues that positions of varying theoretical basis convergence in issues of more practical matter. 
Even ifthese positions differ on questions ofthe value and moral status of nonhuman nature, the 
relation between man and nonhuman nature etc., they convergence on the proposed practical steps 
to be taken in order to protect nature.626 Consequently, Norton suggests that the debate moves 
beyond the theoretical discourse, where no agreement has been reached during the last three 
decades. Apparently, this debate must be judged futile. Rather than using all these resources on 
a pointJess discussion, the energy should be used on tinding the best practical solutions to the 
environmental problems.627 
Asa consequence of this viewpoint, Norton argues for environmental philosophy as a 
practical philosophy rather than applied philosophy. As applied philosophy, the first step would 
be to develop the theoretical basis of a given concept of environmental ethics and then work out 
the tools to apply this theory on concrete environmental issues. Practical philosophy would take 
its startingpoint in tangible marters and then seek the most "rational" way of solving these issues. 
This would shift the debate from the theoretical paralysis to more fruitful practical topics. 
This approach is the more pragmatic method of solving environmental problems. 
According to Norton it is also the more rational, as it proves more useful. The notion of rationality 
in this sense is determined by a similar functionalist criterion as seen above. The discourse on 
626 Norton 1991 , 12: " ... two environmentalists might work together to achieve the objective of 
prohibiting strip mining in a wildemess area, whi le justifying their activities by appeal to quite different values 
( ... ) Providing environmentalists can usually agree on what to do, a diversity of value concems need not 
debilitate the movement. "; 187. 
This convergence hypothesis is criticized by e.g. Steverson (1995). Steverson argues that Norton's 
hypothesis fails because of its methodological assumptions. It fails to provide for the degree of species 
protection most suitable to the nonanthropocentrist position. "The intractability ofthe debate at the normative 
level is not releived at the level ofpolicy formation. The opitimism expressed for the convergence hypothesis 
seems to wane when the issue of devising a single comprehensive decision criterion by which to develop 
practical policy is adressed, at least as regards species preservation." ( 147). Cf. Norton ( 1997b) fora response 
to Steverson's critique. 
627 Norton 1991, 12. 
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environmental problems is rational if it provides politically acceptable solutions to these issues. It 
is important to Norton that this approach is rational. The nation of rationality is repeatedly 
emphasised. 
10.3 Conclusion 
The analysis ofNorton has demonstrated a theory of environmental ethics which places focus on 
a constructivist basis of value. Values are not given. They are constructed within the political 
discourse. Therefore, nature has a transformative value due to its transformative impact on value 
formation. Nature does not serve as the source of normativity. Rather, the political reasoning and 
value making is considered the basis ofthe value of nature. In line with this understanding, Norton 
argues in favor of a practical approach to environmental issues. Rather than taking the 
startingpoint in theorymaking and discuss issues in the light of this theory, one should focus on 
the actual environmental problems and find the most practical, i.e. pragmatic solution to these 
problems. Therefore, Norton also endorses a philosophical pragmatism. The constructivist 
pragmatism leads to a critical assessment of the resemblances between his position and the 
constructivism which was found in Luther and Kant. Some parts ofNorton may be appropriated 
in their natura! law thought, just as parts of their theories could be integrated in his theory. 
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Nature as a Reasonable Value 
In the present chapter we turn our attention to Mark Sagoff. In Sagoff we find an argument for 
nature as a value, which it is considered reasonable to maintain within the political regime. I will 
argue that Sagoff does not base his theory of environmental protection on the concept of nature. 
Admitted1 y, Sagoff refers to a notion of intrinsic value of nature, but I hope to demonstrate the 
theoretical inadequacy of this notion in Sagoff. The real basis of Sagoffs theory is the notion of 
the reasonableness of nature as a political, moral, aesthetical and cultural value. 
For our present purpose of analyzing Sagoff s understanding of the relation between 
nature and reason as the basis of morality, we first focus on his understanding of the intrinsic value 
of nature (11.1). Secondly, we turn to his notion of nature as a reasonable value (11.2). In the last 
part ( 11.3 ), the critical analysis of Sagoff is concluded. 
11.1 The "Intrinsic" Value ofNature 
Fundamental for Sagoffs thought is a distinction between two sets of terminological pairs. This 
distinction is crucial for Sagoff in order to maintain his emphasis on the ethical, aesthetical, and 
cultural values imbedded in economy and legislation.628 Although Sagoff mentions several 
examples ofthis approach, the important differentations are those between economic and social 
regulation629, and the two types of rationality, namely the methodical and reasonable.630 The two 
basic distinctions are closely connected to the other differentiations between the citizen and the 
628 ln his mainwork on environmental issues, The economy of the earth, his primary intention is to 
argue " .. . for an ethical, aesthetic, and cultural interpretation of the goals and purposes that underlie social 
legislation, and it explains how such an interpretation can help us adjust those goals to the economic, 
technical, and other constraints that might otherwise prevents us from achieving them." ( 1988b, 1 ). In the 
foliowing the focus is on this work, even ifvarious articles by Sagoffalso are included. The reference to 
articles etc. on Sagoff is limited, as the concern is his own writings. 
629 fbid. , 2. 
630 fbid. , 12ff. 
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consumer, values and preferences, public and private interests, and virtues and methodologies.631 
As will be apparent, these distinctions are necessary for Sagoff in order to argue for his main thesis 
- that " ... social regulation expresses what \\e believe, what we are, what we stand for as a nation, 
not simply what we wish to buy as individuals".632 
One area in which this thesis is confirmed is the understanding of the value of nature. In 
order to clarify the argument, we distinguish between the basic premises of Sagoff' s concept of 
value (1 1.1 .1) and the different types of value in his theory (11 .1.2). Included in the explanation 
of the latter is his understanding of the intrinsic value of nature. 
11.1 .1 The Concept of Value 
The notion of value is continually compared to the understanding of preference. Whereas 
preferences often reduce persons to consumers, values are viewed in the light of persons as 
citizens.633 The distinctive difference between values and preferences is the understanding of value 
as a preference, reflecting a considered judgment about the right, good or appropriate in the 
circumstances.634 The reflection on the rightness or goodness of the particular value apparently 
combines value with a certain degree of subjectivity. However, value is prirnarily understood in 
politi ca! terms. As a political term, the notion of value reflects the individual ' s membership of a 
particular commmunity and the values of this community. This implies the intersubjectivity of 
value. "Public values are goals or intentions the individual ascribes to the group or community of 
which he is a member; they are his because he believes and argues that should be ours; he pursues 
them not as an individual but as one of us. The individual then shares with other members of 
631 Ibid., 7ff. 
632 Ibid., I 6f. 
6» The ernphasis on values rather than preferences is a characteristic therne in Sagoffs articles on 
environmental ethics. For an argument for the necessity of values in ecological science, see Sagoff 1985; for 
a fundamental discussion on values and preferences, see Sagoff 1986; for a critique of preferences in 
environmental economics, see Sagoff 1988a and 1994a. 
rn !dem I 988b, 9: "Some ofthese preferences [i.e. preferences which motivate people to action] -
we shall call them "values" - reflect a considered judgment the individual makes about what is right or good 
or appropriate in the circumstances. We can measure the intensity ofthese values, but we may also inquire 
about their justification; that is, we can ask the individual why he or she holds these values or views." 
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comrnunity intersubjective intentions".635 
The intersubjectivity implies a neutrality of the values. Sagoff distinguishes between two 
conceptions of neutrality. One is claimed in relation to the economic cost-benefit analysis. This 
approach claims to be neutral in regard of the wants of individuals. The right policy is the one 
maxirnizing the preference satisfaction. There is no assessment of theses preferences. The other 
conception ofvalue is Kantian.636 Here, the individual is ajudge of values, but this is as a member 
of a comrnunity. Some values are considered more reasonable than others, having a better claim 
upon assent. Even if values are subjective states of mind, they have an objective content as well. 
Values are therefore neutral in the sense that they are either correct or mistaken. The right policy 
protects and promotes these values.637 These two approaches to the concept of value are of 
essential significance to Sagoff. They are closely related to his distinction between as well the 
individual as conswner and citizen, as his notions ofreason and rationality. As the preferences of 
consurners can differ and most likely will do so, it is problematic to try to base public policymaking 
on a methodologically rational analysis of theses preferences. Rather, the deliberative rationality 
635 !dem 1986, 302. 
636 A problem with Sagoff's account of the Kan ti an value concept is the Jack of references to Kan t's 
own writings. Apart from a general reference to GMS, Sagoff's understanding is based on W. Sellars (1968): 
Science and Metaphysics, New York: Humanities Press and !dem (1979: "On Reasoning About Values", 
American Philosophical Quarterly 17, 81-10 I. This may also be the reason of the slightly problematic 
understanding of Kant, even if it appears to be in general agreement with Kant'moral philosophy. Kant's 
discussion on value is more precise than it is in Sagoff. Sagoff seems to be reading Kant's moral philosophy 
in general as a theory on value, which is a rnisleading interpretation of Kant. Taken that value can be equated 
with Wert, the most obvious place to relate Sagoff's reading to Kant, would be Kant's distinction between 
Preis. Wiirde and Wert (GMS, IV 434f.). In relation to his understanding of the moral agent as regarding 
every other moral agent as an end in him- or herself, whereby the kingdom of ends is constituted, Kant speaks 
of everything as having either a Preis or Wurde . Anything which has a Preis can be substituted with its 
equivalent, whereas anything which cannot be sustituted with anything else has a Wurde. Anything which 
relates to ordinary demands, has a Marktpreis, whereas anything which is wanted merely on the basis of 
emotions (Gemtitskrafte) has an Affektionspreis. Only that which is an end in itself does not have a relative 
worth (i.e. Preis), but has an inner worth, i.e. Wurde. Morality has such a Wiirde. The value of nature, Kant 
says, is its influence on the way ofthinking, whereby it has a Wurde, similar to moral i ty. "Die natur sowohl 
ais Kunst enthalten nichts, was sie in Ermangelung derselben an ihre Stelle setzen konnten; denn ihr Wert 
besteht nicht in Wirkungen, die daraus entspringen, im Vorteil und Nutzen, den sie schaffen, sondem in den 
Gesinnungen d.i. den Maximen des Willens, die sich auf diese Art in Handlungen zu offenbaren bereit sind, 
obgleich auch der Erfolg sie nicht begtinstigte." (435). 
637 Sagoff 1988b, 43ff. 
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should establish the consensus and agreement on values that society is to be characterized by.638 
Consequently, the neutrality and objectivity of moral values ties in their qualification as 
common, political values. Sagoff persistently criticizes attempts to make moral values objective 
in quantifiable ways. The attempt of setting a prize on moral values is repeatedly rejected.639 Some 
values cannot be quantified in economic tem1s.640 These last comments bring us to Sagoffs 
understanding ofthe different types of value. We now tum to an explanation of these types. 
11.1.2 The Different Types of Value 
Sagoff lists several types of value. Some can be prized, others not. In contrast to the values that 
cannot be measured in economic value, he plainly speaks of the instrumental value. This is the 
kind of value in focus, when one attempts to make a cost-benefit analysis of the worth ofvalue 
compared to the value of an economic enterprise. This kind of value is strongly rejected in Sagoff, 
not the least because ofits utilitarian basis.641 " ... I question attempts by today' s environmentalists, 
particularly those who identify themselves as ecological economists, to vindicate environmental 
protection on instrumental grounds".642 
Among the other types of nonutilitarian value ascribed to nature, Sagoff is more detailed. 
He often mentions these values in immediate connection to each other. Even if they are related to 
each other, they are also distinguished from one another. One of the essential intangible values is 
the aesthetical value.643 The aesthetical value " ... depends on qualities that make an object 
adrnirable of its kind; when these qualities change, the aesthetic value ofthe object may change 
638 lbid., 122f: "[Public laws are to express] ... a common perception of ourselves and the values 
we stand for as amoral community; they are not intended to satisfy personal preferences. When we make 
public law and public policy, ( ... ) we are to consider shared values and common intentions, not simply 
personal interests. Public issues must be discussed in public terms. What counts in public policy is a 
conception of right and wrong - a conception of the good society - not just what works for you." 
639 Cf. e.g. idem 1988b, 93ff.; 1991, 37ff.; 1994b, 285ff. 
640 !dem 1988a, 63ff.; 1988b, 68ff., 74ff. 
641 ldem I 995, 618; 1992, 58; 70; 1988a; I 985, I 04ff.; 11 0f. 
642 ldem 1995, 610. 
643 !dem 1998, 286; 1992, 58; 67; 70. 
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with them''.644 When viewed as an aesthetic value, nature is often seen as an object ofknowledge 
and perception. 
When nature is regarded with love or affection, it is regarded as having amoral value.645 
In this sense, nature can " ... exemplify ideals, aspirations, and commitments that "lift up" one's life 
( ... ) by presenting goals that go beyond the pursuit of one' s own welfare".646 In this sense nature 
can haveamoral good, if they are living, a good of their own.647 Consequently, nature ought to 
be protected out moral deliberations and arguments.648 
Closely related to the aesthethic, but especially the moral good of nature is the intrinsic 
value of nature. When nature is valued as in the case of the moral value, the object itself is valued, 
rather than the benefit it confers on the valuer. Nature has its own good.649 
Sagoffs concept ofthe intrinsic value of nature is somewhat problematic. His argument 
for the intrinsic value in contrast to the instrumental is that "we care about these objects because 
ofwhat they mean to usand express about us, not because of what they do for us".650 This is an 
insufficient description of an intrinsic value. Firstly, there is a strong emphasis on the valuing of 
human beings. The value is dependent upon a valuing agent. Theoretically this might be an 
insightful understanding of this concept. But that touches more on the conceptual possibility of 
this notion at all. To claim the necessity of a valuer seems to lead the notion of an intrinsic value 
into absurdity.651 Secondly, the distinction between what nature "means to us" and what "they do 
for us" does not get this concept beyond the instrumentality Sagoff criticizes. Nature is still valued 
instrumentally when its value is dependent upon what it means ''to us". Nature is still viewed as 
644 [dem 1992, 58. 
645 [dem I 998, 286; 1992, 58; 67; 70. 
646 ldem 1992, 58. 
647 Ibid. 
648 I dem 1995, 61 O; 1985, 111 f. 
649 Idem 1998, 286f.; 1995, 618; 1992, 58f; 67; 69f. 
650 [dem 1992, 59. 
651 Sagoff appears not to give a sufficient account of the problematic relation between value and 
valuer. He does not distinguish sufficiently between these notions. In this sense he has the same problem as 
Rolston, only the opposite. In Rolston nature has an objective value, but the distinctiveness ofthe human 
being is not explained sufficently. In Sagoff nature is seen as having an intrinsic value, even if he does not 
argue sufficiently how this is to be conceived, when it is dependent upon a valuer. 
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means to the expression of the values that are important to the valuer. It is only as long as it 
expresses these values that it is valued "intrinsically". The instrumentality of Sagoff's concept of 
the intrinsic value is put to the point, when he can say that humans' lives may be lifted up by seeing 
nature as asetting for collective moral and aesthetic judgment.652 The focus on the intrinsic value 
has the instrumental purpose oflifting up the Eves ofhumans. This makes it sound pretty shallow, 
when he in the immediately preceeding section can speak of nature as having a good of its own, 
that it should be protected for moral and aesthetic reasons, even if it does not do anything for 
us.653 
A further value often mentioned by Sagoff is the cultural value. There is a close 
relationship between the value ofnature and the shaping of one's identity.654 Nature expresses who 
we are and what we stand for. This is an essential notion in Sagoff. Nature is closely connected 
to the national idea. 655 The value of nature as an ex pression of a cultural heritage is essential to its 
intrinsic value. It is because nature expresses the values of a particular nation that it can be valued 
for its own good and not for what it does.656 In this sense nature and culture become close 
intertwined.657 Consequently, nature ought to be protected out of cultural arguments.658 
Finally, nature has a spiritual value. This type of value plays a !esser role in Sagoff, but 
does, however, seem to have some bearing upon the basic assumptions of Sagoff s theory. 
652 Sagoff 1992, 70: "We treasure the Chesapeake - and we cherish other environments - because 
we ourselves are native to them. The value we attach to them goes to our identity more than to our interests -
to who we are, not just what we want ( ... ) To treasure an ecological community is to see that it has a good of 
its own ( ... ) - that we should protect even when to do so does not profit us ( ... ) Even when nature does not do 
anything for us ( ... ) we owe it protection for moral and aesthetic reasons ( ... ) ... we may lift up our lives a little 
by seeing nature( ... ) not just as an assortment ofresources to be managed and consumed, but also as asetting 
for collective moral and aesthetic judgment." 
653 Ibid. 
654 ldem 1998, 286: "Species may be profoundly important for cultural and spiritual reasons ( ... ) 
By viewing local flora and fauna as a sacred heritage - by recognizing their intrinsic value - we discover who 
we are rather than what we want ( ... ) Even those plants and animals that do not define places possess 
enormous intrinsic value and are worth preserving for their own sake. What gives these creatures value lies 
in their histories, wonderful in themselves, rather than in any use to which they can be put"; 1992, 70; 1988b, 
28f. 
655 [dem 1988b, I 24ff. 
656 !dem 1992, 58f.; 70; 1998, 286. 
657 !dem 1992, 68f. 
658 !dem 1985, 1 11 f. 
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Referring to H. D. Thoreau659, it is claimed that he represented an understanding of the spiritual 
value of nature. In the writings of Thoreau ( and others) one finds lessons on the spiritual value of 
nature that nature teaches, if one listens closely enough. Man must have a personal relationship 
to nature, strive after a fellowship with nature.660 
Summarizing Sagoffs understanding of the "intrinsic" value of nature, it is apparent that 
his notion of intrincity is quite problematic. In Sagoff nature does not hold an intrinsic value. 
Rather, nature is conceived of as a value in various ways which all deri ve their value from the basis 
ofthe human being as a citizen valuing nature. In Sagoffthe human being is not primarily thought 
of as a natural being. Rather, the human being is thought of as amoral and political being capable 
of reflecting on the values of nonhuman nature without ending up in a problematic relation 
between nonhuman nature and human beings. Sagoff distinguishes clearly between nonhuman 
nature and human beings. Therefore, he does not base his environmental ethics on the concept of 
the intrinsic value nature but on the abilities of deliberation of the political human being. For 
Sagoff the concem is about reason rather than nature. We now tum to a critical analysis of his 
concept of reason. 
11.2 Political Reason 
As the distinction between preferences and value is essential to Sagoff s concept of value, similar 
distinctions makeup the necessary basis for his understanding of rationality. Sagoff distinguishes 
between two types of rationality. One refers to a stronger conception of "rational" inquiry: "a 
sense which is associated with objective truth, correspondence to reality, method and criteria".66 1 
The other focuses on rationality as "sane" or "reasonable", rather than "methodical" . Rationality 
in this sense names a set of moral virtues, such as tolerance, respect for the opinions of others, 
willingness to listen, reliance on persuasion rather than force.662 Whereas the latter is connected 
to an understanding of the individual as a citizen, rather than consumer, the opposite is true of the 
former. The first type of rationality is closely connected to the attempt of setting a prize on moral, 
6
;
9 Idem 1998, 285; 1995, 610; 618. 
660 Idem 1998, 285; 287. 
661 !dem 1988b, 13. 
662 fbid. 
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cultural, and aesthetical values. The second type is essential to Sagoff's own theory. We now turn 
to a more detail ed account of these two types of rationality. 663 
11.2.1 The Methodical Rationality 
The methodical rationality is determined by mathematical criteria and methodologies. "This 
approach conforms to a philosophy of science that stresses notions like "value neutrality", 
··replicable experiments", and "correspondence to an independent reality". In accordance with this 
approach, economists study data that have to do with prices and consumer preferences. It is in 
relation to this kind of rational i ty that the attempt can be made to make the intangible values 
tangible. In doing so, they can try to balance the benefits of environrnental protection, measured 
in this way, against the opportunity costs of economic development.664 
The cost-benefit analysis has two fundamental elements: (I) Tue conception of externality 
and (2) the determination of value. For the economic analysis the external values must be 
intemalized to be included in this cost-benefit analysis.665 Further there is the problem of evaluating 
nature. The conception of extemality can have a narrow and an expanded sense. In the narrow 
sense only phycical damages are considered. The expanded sense tries to estimate the "worth" of 
moral, aesthetic, political or cultural concems and convictions . Sagoff admits a restricted use of 
the narrow understanding of extemality666, even if he is critical of the consequences of these cost-
benefit analysis. They tend to reduce the citizen to a client and consumer.667 They neglect moral 
reason. The emphasis of the human being on values that express who we are as part of a particular 
community and society, and not just what we want, are not taken into consideration to the proper 
extent. 
This leads Sagoff into a critique of the expanded sense of extemality, i.e. any attempt to 
set a prize on ethical values in order to establish an assessment of the benefits of economic 
663 Sagoffs understanding ofthe two approaches to rationality is particularly found in 1988a, 68 
and 1988b, I 2ff. ; 77ff.; 220ff. 
664 !dem 1988a, 68; 1988b, 13; 77; 86; 159; 222. 
665 !dem I 988b, 29ff. 
666 Ibid., 33ff. 
667 Ibid. , 46ff. 
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progress in relation to the cost of environmental goods. Sagoff calls certain values intangible, 
namely ethical, aesthetic and cultural values. In connection with the methodological rationality, 
it has been attempted to make these values tangible, so as to take them into consideration in the 
cost-benefit analysis.668 There are, however, so many problems related to this attempt that it is not 
successful, the problem of infom1ation not the least. Studies have demonstrated how information 
can have a profound impact on priorities and deliberation of moral agents. This raises the 
methodological question, if decicions on environmental issues should be tak.en on the basis of the 
immediate attitude of citizens or if they should be allowed to educate themselves. Taking a course 
between these two extremes, the problem still remains, whether the respondents should just be 
given information to decide on account of a hypothetical market situation or if they should be 
given sufficient information for thorough deliberation.669 
One economic, theoretical precondition for the success of the cost benefit analysis is the 
alliance to the efficiency criterion as a sufficient principle of allocation of ressources. According 
to Sagoff this criterion does not suffice. If the efficiency criterion is seen in relation to preference 
satisfaction, Sagoff points out that preferences can be of various character. Preferences are not 
good in themselves, as they e.g. can be of an unjust character. The efficient satisfaction of 
preferences cannot be the only aim of a just political society.670 The efficiency criterion needs a 
substantial or normative concept of welfare as a qualification. It has been argued in various 
theories of a hypothetical consent of the citizens to the efficiency norm that such a substantial 
qualification was included. As it was argued that society as a whole hypothetically assents to the 
effeciency criterion it has been argued that a common political notion of the good was included 
in this assent. However, Sagoff takes a critical stance on these theories, arguing that various 
theories all endorse the reasonableness of their theory. 671 
Having demonstrated Sagoffs fundamental critique ofthe methodical rationality and the 
implied economic presumptions, we now tum to his other notion of rationality, the deliberative 
6os !dem 1988a, 55ff.; 1988b, 81 ff. 
669 Cf. 1988b, 84ff. fora ful ler explanation of this problem. 
670 Ibid., IO I ff. 
671 Ibid., 107ff. Only Rawls appears more plausible to Sagoff, as Rawls confines his theory of assent 
under a veil of ignorance to the political realm. ln A Theory of Justice Rawls emphasizes that his theory is 
strictly politi ca! and not rnetaphysical (Ibid., 11 0f.). 
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rationality. 
11.2.2 The Deliberative Rationality 
The other type of rationality emphasises good reasons - reasons that are open and yet stand up to 
criticism. Rationality in this sense refers to the reasonableness imbedded in the sound process of 
the political decisionmaking. Essential to this kind of rationality is the reasoning on account of 
moral, aesthetic, cultural and political values. As it is dependent upon these values, this rationality 
also implies a rejection of the utility of economic cost-benefit analysis in regard to nature. Rather 
than economic consideration, this type of rationality uses juridical or deliberative approaches to 
decisionmaking upon issues of environmental protection. This approach to rationality " ... uses a 
juridical or deliberative model to weigh various normative constraints, established by statute, 
against these opportunity costs ( ... ) Because there is no methodology for making this sort of 
judgment public officials have only statutory language,judicial interpretation ofthat language, 
their general knowledge and experience, and the virtues of inquiry to rely upon. "671 
Fundamental to Sagoffs critique of the economic considerations is the awareness of the 
demise of capitalism as a sufficient basis of social regulation.673 The recognition of the inadequacy 
of economy as criterion in this field indicates the necessary substitution of economy with other 
criteria in questions of protection of nature. Therefore, Sagoff also criticizes fundamental 
assumptions of leading environmental economists.674 However, even if Sagoff focuses on 
deliberative rationality, this does not mean that issues as "justice" and "equality" are taken into 
consideration in environmental protection. Although political thinkers generally ascribe the 
protection of these values as one ofthe most important tasks, this is not at stake in discussion on 
environmental issue. The notions of "justice" and "equality" are important for the conception of 
672 Sagoff 1988a, 68. 
673 ldem 1988b, 17ff. 
674 In neoclassical economics, four dogmas have had an important impact on theorymaking: (I) That 
markets may fail to allocate ressources efficiently, (2) that choices reveal preferences, (3) that people always 
make the choices they believe will benefit them and (4) that perfectly competitive markets will allocate 
resources to their most beneficial use. Sagoff argues, however, that all theses dogmas have been abandoned 
in mainstream economics, even ifthey are still quite intluential in environmental economics ( 1994b ). Cf. also 
1994a fora similar critique. 
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the good society.675 But in regard to environmental values the focus is on impersonal preferences. 
It is intergenerational, intersubjective, communitarian values that are in focus as political values 
in regard to nature.676 The reasonable environmental values reflect values of a particular political 
community. It is as citizens within this community that the deliberations of the individuals have an 
objective, intersubjective character.677 However, this communitarian basis of the political reason 
necessitates the political participation of the individuals. It is only as a result of a political, 
democratic process that one can actually determine the values of essential importance.678 
This dependency on the political process seems to imply an understanding which comes 
quite close to the idea ofKantian constructivism as depicted by Rawls.679 In Sagoff moral values 
are not given. They are not values which are to be recognized as it could be claimed by a 
cognitivist approach. Rather moral values are the result of a political, communitarian formation 
and construction. In Rawls' A Theory of Justice it is also argued that the basis of moral concepts 
is a construction. Rawls argues that " ... the principles of justice for the basic structure are the 
object of the original agreement. They are the principles that free and rational persons concemed 
to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the 
fundamental terms of their association. These princip les are to regulate all further agreements; they 
specify the kinds of social cooperation that can be entered into and the forms of government that 
can be established."680 In Political Liberalism Rawls furthers his theory of justice, as he gives a 
reply to critics who argued that his nation of the individual rational agent was too abstract. In the 
course of this work, Rawls also elaborates upon his understanding of political constructivism. 
Hereby, he understands " ... a view about the structure and content of a political conception. It says 
that once, if ever, reflective equilibrium is attained, the principles of political justice ( content) may 
675 Idem 1988b, I 14ff. 
676 Ibid. , I I 5f. 
677 Ibid., 119. 
678 In this argument it seems correct to point to communitarian tenets in Sagoff. Values are 
determined on the basis ofthe moral agent being part of a particular political community. This communitarian 
aspect has asocial and political meaning in Sagoff. In Rolston (cf. 7.2) and Callicott (cf. 8.2) we also found 
this commmunitarian notion, even if it was understood in relation to nonhuman nature. In the last part of the 
thesis (cf. 13.2), it is argued that this idea is also present in natura! law thought. 
679 Cf. 2.2 
680 Rawls 1971 , 11. 
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be represented as the outcome of a certain procedure of construction (structure ).',681 Furthermore, 
political constructivism requires four essential characteristica, among which the most important 
for our purpose are (apart from the emphasis on the principles of justice as an outcome of a 
procedure of construction) the idea that it makes use of " ... a rather complex conception of person 
and society to give fom1 to and structure to its construction"681, and that " ... political constructiv-
ism specifies an idea of the reasonable and applies this idea to various subjects: conceptions and 
principles, judgments and grounds, persons and institutions."683 
This idea of political constructivism seems to be quite comparable to Sagoff s 
understanding of the deliberative rationality. In Sagoff and in Rawls the focus is not on truth, just 
as it is not on a cognitivist approach. Both endorse the notion of virtues in their understanding of 
respectively the delberative rationality and the notion of reasonableness. For both there is a focus 
on the moral agents as part of a political community, where the political ideas and values are to 
reflect common and shared political notions. This ideas, however, are an expression of a 
continuous process ofreflection within society. The similarities to Rawls' political reason and the 
virtues ofreasonableness makes it obvious why, at the end of The economy af the earth, Sagoff 
emphasises the deliberative rationality, constrasting it to the methodical. "I believe that social 
regulation must involve choosing between these two conceptions of rationality, that is, between 
method and morality. I have argued that we can base regulatory policies on moral, aesthetic, and 
other substantive concerns and judgments - that we do not have to quantify our political values 
and cultural identity as if these were exogenous variables that must be brought into contingent 
markets". 684 
These comparisons with Rawls have made it more clear what kind of metaethical basis 
we find in Sagoff. It seems plausible to argue that he represents a constructivist position. The 
Kantian influence appears to be quite important in Sagoff. This is probably also the reason why 
we find this quite clear argument of the basis of environmental ethics in a concept of reason, rather 
than in a concept of nature. 
681 !dem 1993, 89f. 
682 Ibid., 93. 
683 Ibid., 94. 
684 Sagoff 1988b, 223. 
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11 .3 Conclusion 
The critical analysis of Sagoffhas demonstrated that Sagoff apparently has a somewhat incoherent 
nation of the intrinsic value of nature. Even if Sagoff makes use of this terminology, his 
understanding appears to depart so markedly from a cornmon use of this term that it would be 
better to give up this terminology. This problem also relates to Sagoff's unclear understanding of 
the relation between value and valuer. As was shown, Sagoff does not give a satisfying argument 
ofthe relation between the value of nature which is independent ofthe valuer and the necessity 
of the subjective valuer. The ambiguity in Sagoff on these two points may be due to a lacking 
perception of the implied naturalism in his thought. As the good is defined per se, but with 
reference to politi ca! values, one may argue that this is a case of naturalism in the expanded sense. 
Along with this naturalist position we have found an emphasis on the nation of reason. In this 
emphasis, Sagoffplaces himself partly within metaethical theories of practical reasoning. What is 
at focus in Sagoff is not the concept of nature, but rather the notion of reason as the basis of 
environmental protection. This understanding of reason does not derive its content from a view 
on nature. but rather from an understanding of the political society. Reason, not nature, is the 
pivotal tumingpoint in Sagoff's theory. Sagoff's understanding of the deliberative rational i ty has 
its basis in an idea of political reason. The reasonableness of the citizen is determined by the social 
and political cornmunity that the individual is a part of. Thereby Sagoff incorporates an important 
cornmunitarian notion in his theory of the basis of environmental protection. In a certain sense, 
Sagoff, therefore, comes close to a Rawlsian constructivist position. 
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Reasoning About the lntrinsic Value of Nature 
In the present chapter we tum to an argument for the combination of nature and reason as the 
source of normativity. Robin Attfield admits an intrinsic value in nature and yet the emphasis on 
rationality is not neglected. However, this combination of nature and reason as the basis of 
environmental ethics raises the question of the relation between the two. In what sense is reason 
included in Attfield' s understanding ofthe moral standing of nature? Are nature and reason two 
distinct modes? If so, in what sense can they be combined? Does Attfield commit the naturalistic 
fallacy? Are nature and reason placed next to each other, due to their irreconcilability?685 
12.1 The Intrinsic Value of Nature 
A fundamental discussion within environmental ethics is the relevance of tradition to the formation 
of an adequate theory ofman's relation to nature. One position argues that the Western tradition 
is fundamentally embedded in a dichotomistic conception ofthis relation. This notion has its roots 
in a Judaeo-Christian heritage, due to its emphasis on the Lordship of man over nature. 
Philosophers such as Descartes and Kant affirmed this tradition. According to this position a 
critical stance must be taken towards the theological and philosophical heritage of the Western 
tradition. Contemporary environmental ethics must be developed in some degree of opposition 
towards this tradition686. Another position would maintain the possible constructive basis of this 
685 Attfield has written extensively on issues of environmental ethics. Within the last years, his 
concern has been with questions of justice, sustainable development and global ethics. In the present thesis, 
however, the focus will be on his understanding of the basis of environmental ethics. Therefore, we 
concentrate on The Ethics af Environmental Concern ( 1983) and Environmental Philosophy: Princip/es and 
Prospects ( l 994a)as his primary works on this theme. Other works of Attfield are included as perspectives. 
686 The classical example ofthis argument is the famous article by Lynn White Jr. (I 967). In this 
article it was argued that Western Christianity was the root ofthe ecological crisis. "Especially in its Western 
form, Christianity is the most anthropocentric religion the world has seen ( ... ) Christianity, in absolute contrast 
to ancient paganism and Asia's religions (except, perhaps, Zoroastrianism), not only established a dualism 
of man and nature but also insisted that it is God's will that man exploit nature for his proper ends." (1205). 
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very same tradition. Within the Judaeo-Christian tradition we find sufficient notions of man's care 
for nature, to ensure the use of this tradition as the basis of the construction of a contemporary 
environmental ethics. Man is not thought of as lord over nature but rather as steward. Further, 
throughout Western tradition there are many evidences of a care for nature. Attfields holds this 
last position, arguing for the relevance of the Judaeo-Christian, Western tradition in contemporary 
environmental ethics. 687 Attfield' s advocacy of this tradition is due to the awareness of its necessity 
in order to achieve an enduring and plausible character of environmental ethics. If tradition is 
neglected, environmental ethics will be developed in a vacuum, which prevents its adequate 
theoretical grounding. 688 
However, even if these historical considerations are fundamentally irnportant to Attfield, 
the critical, constructive part of his theory is not Jess important. But this part is thought of as 
reconcilable with tradition. In the foliowing we look into Attfield's argument for the intrinsic value 
of nature. We do this by focusing on three questions: How does Attfield regard the holistic 
conception of environmental ethics? What are the criteria on moral standing? What does this 
notion on moral standing imply for his understanding ofthe intrinsic value of nature? 
12.1.1 The Rejection of Holism 
Two main strands of holism are described by Attfield. One argues for the biosphere as a 
community and the other conceives of it as an organic whole. Both can be traced to Aldo Leopold. 
Referring til Passmore' s ackowledgment of the elements listed by Leopold as constituent parts of 
the ecological " life-cycle", Attfields maintains along with Passmore that this does not generate 
In order to rectify the deficiencies of classical Christianity, White suggested that insights from St. Francis of 
Assis i were appropriated. The argument of this article raised a comprehensive discussion on the role of 
Western Christendorn in the ecological crisis. One of the fruits of this discussion was the anrology edited by 
Eugene Hargrove, Religion and Environmental Crisis (1986). In this antology several articles refute the 
understanding of White. It is amitted that there is a potential within Judaeo-Christian heritage which can be 
interpreted along the lines of White. However, there are also important traits pointing in other directions. One 
mightjust as well find the potential for an understanding of man's unity with the created world, the notion of 
man's responsibility in caring for nonhuman nature etc. 
687 Attfield 1983c, 20-67; 1994a, 13-87. 
688 As mentioned in the introduction, a similar argument may be said to be part ofthe present thesis. 
In arguing that one can base environmental ethics on notions ofnatural law, the thesis is arguing in favor of 
an appropriation of a classical ethical concept within Western theology and philosophy. 
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ethical obligation. Further, the mere faet of mutual dependency does not carry with it amoral 
relationship. Clearly, there are several examples of mutual dependency without this constituting 
a realm of morality.689 Most important, however, Attfield argues that although " ... everything 
which is of value (and located anywhere near our planet) is located in the biosphere, and the 
systems of the biosphere are necessary for the preservation of all these creatures. But that does 
not give the biosphere or its systems intrinsic value. Rather it shows them to have instrumental 
value, since what is of value in its own right is casually dependent on them. "69° Consequently, 
Attfield can neither accept the notion of intrinsic value in inanimate beings, ecosystems, the biotic 
community or the biosphere nor its implied metaphysic. Due to this metaphysic, the distinction 
between individual organisms and the unity of the whole is blurred. 691 This distinction is also 
important to keep in mind, when talking about the value ofthe ecosystem. This value is dependent 
upon the flourishing of the individual organisms that constitute this ecological realm. Although the 
individual organism are part of an ecological whole, they are still the constituent parts of it. The 
ecological whole has no value in itself.692 
A metaphysics, then, which is suited to our ecological problems need to treat 
humans alongside the rest of the natura! order in a naturalistic way, without 
being reductionist about their irreducible characteristics. It must not deny the 
reality of the natura) systems on which we depend, yet must allow the reality of 
their individual members, and uphold the responsibilities which as individuals 
and groups people have for the care of the natura! environment. For man is 
neither "apart from nature" nor simply "a part of nature", whether nature is 
regarded as a col!ection of atoms or organisms or as a single organic system. 693 
Having shortly commented on Attfield's critical stance on holism, we now tum to his understan-
ding of the criteria on moral standing and the extensionalism implied in this viewpoint. However, 
it is worth noting that this rejection of holism also implies a rejection of one of the points, where 
there could be a link to a natura! law thought. 
689 Attfield 1983, l 57f; see also 1994a, 98 . 
690 Idem 1983, 159. 
691 Ibid. 
69
~ Ibid., 62. 
693 lbid., 63 . Cf. also 1994a, 96ff. for Attfield 's critique ofe.g. Callicott's holism. 
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12.1.2 The Criteria on Moral Standing 
In the present paragraph we tum to Attfield's concept of moral standing. Firstly, an account is 
given of his understanding of the inference from humans to nonhumans. Secondly, the question 
is asked, if Attfield thereby cornmits the naturalistic fallacy. 
12 .1.2 .1 The Inference from Humans to N onhumans 
When Attfield tums to the question of the moral standing of nonhwnans, his primary concern is 
their value in their own right. This question implies applied ethics, normative ethics and 
metaethics.694 In the present discussion on Attfield, we focus on the metaethical issues of his 
treatment of this question. 
In the attempt of determining the criteria on moral consideration, Attfield draws the 
attention to the distinction between moral consideration and moral significance. Even if nonhuman 
organisms deserve moral consideration, this is not the same as an argument for their moral 
significance. In discussing moral consideration, Attfield refers to various arguments.695 Taking his 
startingpoint in a discussion on the criteria of sentience,696 he maves on to a critical analysis of 
reason,697 consciousness and awareness of interests,698 species diversity.699 Even if Attfield does 
admits partial agreement on most of the positions, he specifically focuses on the relation between 
sentience, desires, needs, and interests as the basis of moral concern. These are all criteria with 
relevance to living organisms, excluding inanimate objects of moral consideration on the basis of 
intrinsic value. Attfield does admit, however, that inanimate objects can have inherent value.700 But 
694 Idem 1983, 140f 
695 Fora more detailed account than given here, cf. idem 1995, 7ff In this passage, Attfield in detail 
discusses moral consideration with regard also to people, future people, possible people and former people. 
696 !dem 1983, 141 ff. 
697 Ibid., 142. 
698 Ibid., 144ff.; !Siff. 
699 Ibid., l 49ff. 
700 lnherent value is here defined as" ... the value which an object has through its ability to contribute 
to human li fe by its presence, and contends that this is the kind of value which attaches to things whether alive 
or not which are interesting to watch or study, or beautiful to contemplate, or which heal us when we are with 
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living organisms are possible holders of intrinsic value, due to the faet of their interests and desires. 
As long as an organism can be either benefited or harmed, i.e. it raises the demand on moral agents 
that it can be shown beneficence or not, it has moral status.701 Consequently, any living organism 
with needs, interests, and desires is due moral consideration. 
It is worth noting that Attfield makes no distinction between the moral status of plants, 
animals, and humans on account of their species. The relevant criteria of moral standing are 
applied irrespectively. This line of argument is due to the analogical method described by Attfield 
in "Methods of ecological ethics".702 Here1 Attfield distinguishes between different methods of 
argument fora concem for nature. For Attfield, it is important to maintain the analogical inference 
from human moral criteria to nonhuman living organisms. This method of environmental ethics 
survives the charge of undue anthropocentrism and individualism. The only criteria are the extent 
to which nonhuman organisms can be regarded as having amoral standing. For any nonhuman 
organism having a moral standing, similar moral responsibilities arise as are due in relation 
between human beings. 703 
In addition to the criteria of moral consideration, Attfield also uses the concept of moral 
significance in order to attain a plausible and practically feasible theory of environmental ethics. 
The criteria of moral significance are also determined on account ofthe analogical method. With 
regards to plants, Attfield argues that they cannot be "pained or gladdened, satisfied or frustrated; 
and, except for the most primitive, they have no prospect of ever evolving into anything which 
could bear characteristics of this kind ( ... ) they are not in any morally interesting sen se agents, 
even though causally their activity is vital for those beings which are so."704 Consequently, 
nonconscious organisms like plants has a !esser moral significance than conscious organisms, even 
if the the moral standing is the same. 
In the present context the question of the sources of normativity is of course highly 
relevant to Attfield's discussion on the moral standing of nonhumans. Interestingly, Attfield is not 
them." ( 15 1 f). 
701 Ibid., 145. 
702 Idem 1994a. 91 ff. 
703 Ibid. , 102. 
70
• ldem 1983, l 54f. 
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particularly explicit on this particular issue. The point, where he comes closest to an explanation 
of the metaethical basis, is in his dicussion on the last man example. In the example, Attfield 
describes a situation where it is asked whether the last last sw-viving man does anything wrong in 
hewing down the last remaining elm. 705 In his comments on this situation, he appears to hold an 
intuitionist standpoint, even if he still maintains the necessity of a theory, explaining the moral 
status of the tree. 706 Even if Attfield partly recognizes intuitionism he has not laid his argument in 
fa vor of reasoning aside. 
However, when we tum to his understanding of the naturalistic fallacy we shall see that 
his understanding ofthe intrinsic value of nature implies that reason is not considered as the actual 
source of normativity. Reason may hold a role as a means to theorizing. However, it is not clear 
that reason holds a role as a source of nonnativity. 
12.1.2.2 The Naturalistic Fallacy 
Due to Attfield's concept ofintrinsic value of nonconscious entities (see above), he clearly rejects 
the necessity of a valuer in arder to determine what is of value.707 Whatever has interests of its 
own has moral standing and the realization of these interests has intrinsic value.708 This position 
distinguishes Attfield from positions arguing for the moral status of abstract entities as species and 
ecosystems and positions stressing the necessity of the reflective powers in order to speak of 
value. This raises the question if Attfield actually is committing the naturalistic fallacy. Is the link 
between nature and normativity so close, that it is not meaningful to distinguish between 
descriptive and prescriptive statements? 
Attfield is quite concemed about the naturalistic fallacy. He believes it important to 
maintain this classical distinction. In order to substantiate his point, he tums to a discussion on 
7o; Fora ful[ account of the example, cf. i dem 1994a, I 68. 
706 Jdem 1983, 155: "Most people who consider this question [i.e. the last man example]conclude 
that his aet would be wrong ( ... ) ... though I grant that stray intuitions may need to be reined in by a consistent 
moral theory, in this case intuitions confirm a theory which already has some independent support." 
707 I dem 1983, 160: " ... by accepting the intrinsic value of some nonconscious entities I am clearly 
rejecting most forms of the plausible view that what is of value is necessarily valued by some conscious 
subject." 
708 Ibid., 161. 
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Holmes Rolston III, Don Marietta and J. Baird Callicott. According to Attfield, Rolston was the 
first within environmental ethics to discuss the possibility of overcoming the apparent gulfbetween 
''is" and and "ought". Rolston argued that technical oughts were derivable from personal ends 
together with a statement of natura! law conceming the constraints on the occurence of those 
ends.709 This makes possible the derivation of the moral ought from the same statement oflaw, 
provided the language can be translated into a moral ought. However, as this only takes human 
interests into consideration, Rolston further argues that the value of the ecological, integral system 
provides a moral ought. Moreover, in ecology factual descriptions and judgments of value appear 
together. The is/ought dichotomy disappears. 71 0 The interrelation of statements of facts and 
judgments, is also apparent in Rolston's argument for the indissoluble relation between the 
reflection on value and the underlying worldview. But this does not imply that value is not 
discovered in the ecosystem. Is and ought are discovered simulta-neously. 
Attfield criticizes Rolston for the insufficient explanation of the derivation of "ought" 
from the factual descriptions and the Jack of expounding how rational deliberation can flow in 
either direction from the one to the other. Furthermore, even if Rolston's account argues for the 
value of the ecosystem, he fails to give an account of the independent status of the stability, beauty 
or integrity of the ecosystem. 711 
In Marietta the focus is also on the necessarily implied worldview of the valuer. Facts and 
judgements of value are connected, both are typically constituted by a person's worldview. Albeit 
rationally scrutinable, the emphasis on worldviews does prevent the rational deliberation on the 
values and thereby the possibility of conflicting viewpoints from coming to terms on the basis of 
rationality. Attfield does not find the theory of Marietta convincing, as it does not convicingly 
demostrate the preclusion of judgments in relation to value. 712 
Finally, Attfield discusses the position of Callicott. Callicott refers to as well G. E. Moore 
as David Hume in his discussion on the naturalistic fallacy of environmental ethics. According to 
709 Idem 1994a, 128. 
7 10 Ibid., I 27f. 
711 Ibid., 128f. Anfield makes some good points in his critique of Rolston. Cf. 7 .2.1 and 13.3 for 
the present thesis ' discussion on Rolston's stance on the naturalistic fallacy. 
712 Attfield 1994a, I 28f. 
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Attfield, Callicott misunderstands Moore, neglecting that Moore focuses on definitions of good 
in his account of their fallacy. Therefore, Callicott's dismissal ofMoore's discussion is on a false 
basis. Moore's discussion still holds its relevance, according to Attfield. Further, Callicott 
demonstrates (following Rolston) the possibility of a prudential ought, based on the awareness of 
ends and a law serving to relate means to ends. Finally, Callicott argues fora noninstrumenta1 
ought. Reason can lead to the objects of any natural moral sentiment. Disclosure of the evolutinary 
determined kinship with other species may imply an awareness of the rightness of similar moral 
sentiments in dus community as that in a political community with fellow human beings. In both 
cases the moral oughts have a noninstrumental character. In his argument for the prudential as well 
as the argument for the noninstrumenta1 ought, Callicott apparently has a close link between is and 
ought.113 
However, Attfield argues that Callicott seems to forget the implicit reasoning in his own 
theory. Callicott encourages the reasoning about the kinship of humans with non.human species, 
but seems to forget that this implies a lessening of the close link between is and ought, which he 
also endorses. Furthermore, the prioritizing of same values over others is not dealt with. 
Callicott's theory does not ask the central question, why I should show benevolence towards the 
object of my symphathy. Consequently, grounds for regarding the good of nonhuman beings as 
valuable requires reasonable argument. However, there seems to be no room for such arguments 
in Callicott. 714 
Even if Attfield seems to insist on the relevance of not committing the naturalistic fallacy, 
the question must be raised, if Attfield himself does not commit it as well. Essential to Attfield's 
understanding ofthe relation between facts and values is the concept of the well-founded value-
beliefs. If there are such, the well-founded oughts can also be derived accordingly. However, not 
all values are well-founded. Same empirical states are of evident intrinsic positive and negative 
value, such as enjoyment and harm. In the case of such an evidence of the intrinsic value, the 
reason for the moral ought is also apparent.715 "Clearly where an empirical state falls under a 
713 Ibid., l 30f. 
rn Ibid., 131. Cf. 8.3 and 13.3 for the present thesis' discussion on the naturalistic fallacy in 
Cai! icott 's theory. 
715 Ibid., l 31 f. 
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description such that it is necessarily of intrinsic value, then here there is a clearcut reason for the 
action of any suitably placed agent ( e.g. by way of fastering or protecting this state ); and where 
there are no other considerations, or the balance of reasons comes out in favour of a certain 
action, there are then overriding reasons for acting accordingly".716 Untill this evident determina-
tion of the intrinsic value is clear, Hume' s and Moore's critical metaethical remarks are still 
important. 717 
Attfield ca!ls himself a naturalist. Asa consequence of this position he does not have 
anything in principle against an inference from faet to value. His only reluctance is due to the 
lacking account of the intrinsic value. "Granted my naturalist metaethical beliefs (in Moore's 
sense) I do not hold that there is an intractable gulf prohibiting inferences from faet to value. But 
I cannot accept either that any and every world-view or intuition of fittingness or reconstructed 
Humean sentiment makes for defensible fact/value transitions. Thus until they are properly tackled, 
the metaethic problems raised by the historical Hume and the historical Moore have not lost their 
importance, whether for ethics in general or for environmental ethics in particular".718 
Does Attfield commit the naturalistic fallacy? Clearly he criticizes some of the leading 
representatives of a contemporary inference from faet to value, and clearly he stresses the 
importance of the historical distinction between is and ought. But he still admits the legitimacy of 
this inference and does endorse a metaethical position supportive of this notion. Of course, he 
himself would not say that it is a naturalistic fallacy, but nevertheless, he does bring faet and value 
into such a close relationship that they become tied to each other. Furthermore, in his advocacy 
of the naturalist standpoint, there does seem to be a resemblance to the naturalist natura! law 
thought of Melanchthon and Wolff, even if his former rejection ofholism pointed in an opposite 
direction. 
12.1.3 The Intrinsic Value ofNature 
In his argument for the intrinsic value of nature this position is further substantiated. The central 
question to Attfield is the possibility of interests of trees. Do trees have interests? Are these 
716 Ibid., 132. 
717 Ibid., l 32f. 
718 Ibid., I 32f. 
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interests a viable basis of moral consideration? 
As means of introduction to his own position, Attfield dicusses different positions 
asserting (i) the rejection of the interests of trees (particularly Hare and Feinberg) and (ii) various 
grounds for preserving trees (including anthropocentric as well as biocentic positions). These 
discussions lead him to the paradox of claiming the needs and goods of trees, but also the rejection 
oftheir intrinsic value. 719 The rational uncomfortableness ofthis paradox entails the necessity of 
Attfield' s own position. 720 
For Attfield the important notion is the interest of the organisms of moral consideration. 
If one can speak of interests of a particular being, it has moral standing. As basis of his argument, 
Attfield refers to Jan Narveson721 • According to Narveson, "every moral agent acknowledges that 
the satisfaction his interests is intrinsically good. But if so, every agent must also acknowledge that 
the satisfaction of every other agent' s individual interests is intrinsically good too, unless they can 
justify regarding others differently. Hence the satisfaction of everyone's interests must be of 
concem to every consistent moral agent".722 Consequently, any refusal to take interests into 
account must be justified. With regard to plants, Attfield argues that they have vegetative interests, 
equally important to those of purposive organisms. This does not imply a Jack of differentiation 
of the species. The capacities of humans and other purposive organisms make these count for 
more than non-purposive organisms. But this does not entail a neglect of the interests of e.g. 
trees. 723 " ... Even if not all lives are worthwhile lives, it still might be that many or even most 
vegetable lives are worthwhile and of value in themselves".724 Having argued for these interests 
719 Ibid., 165. 
720 In addition to the account given here, cf. i dem 1995, 29ff. fora more detail ed description of this 
notion. 
721 Narveson, Jan ( 1967): Morality and Utility, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press (Cf. Attfield 1994, 
167). 
722 Attfield 1994a, 167. Cf. also 1995, 29: ·'Jn current philosophical usage, what is ofintrinsic value 
is what is good or of value in itself, rather than of value extrinsically, or through its relations to other things 
( ... ) Some things must be of value in themselves and for no reason beyond themselves; amd thus their value 
is nonderivative and independent, and may be called "intrinsic." And whenever this is so the state of affairs 
in question will supply a reason for action which is independent of other desirable end-states or values, and 
which derives from nothing but itself." 
m Ibid. 
12
~ Ibid., 168. 
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oftrees, Attfield explains the practical implications of this standpoint: 
... some degree ofrespect is due to al most all li fe, even though the main gro und 
for the preservation of natura! kinds remains human interests; and it implies that, 
where natura! trees could be replaced without aesthetic loss or ether disadvanta-
ge to humans there are still reasons for not doing so ( .. . ) nothing which has 
interests is to be viewed wholly instrumentally, and ( ... ) things which have 
interests characteristically have some value in their own right. If trees have a 
good which is not our good, then they also constitute a good; if they have their 
own form of flourishing, they are thereby of value in themselves. 725 
Even if this account does not imply the assertion of the rights of trees, it does supply the argument 
for the moral obligation in relation to trees.726 
Having given an account of the main tenets of Attfield's understanding ofthe intrinsic 
value of nonpurposive organisms such as trees, one important question remains. What is the 
metaethical background of this argument? It seems that Attfield holds an intuitionistic 
presupposition. This is particularly clear in his recognition of the differences in potential between 
different species. According to Attfield, even if these differences must be admitted, and the 
possible goods and harms open to most people vastly exceed those open to ether beings, this does 
not entail the legitimate neglect of the moral standing of trees. Because, "After all, we have still 
to account for the distress which at least some of us feel at the destruction of a living tree". 727 This 
argument shows the intuitionistic argumentation. Attfield refers to the distress which is felt. It is 
not the rational deliberation on the moral standing of the tree, nor established moral properties of 
the tree which serves as the basis of its moral standing. In a further argument, reflecting upon his 
own account of the last man example of Routley, Attfield once more appears to make use of an 
intuitionistic argument. In arguing that most people would regard it as wrong to destroy the last 
living example of a bealthy elm, capable of propagating its kind, Atffield refers to the reaction of 
hurnans on this deed. Once again, it is not an established moral criterion which serves as the basis 
ofthe argument against the destruction of this tree, but merely the reaction of the moral agent. 
715 Ibid., 169. 
716 Ibid., 169f. 
717 Ibid., I 68. 
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This reaction serves as the basis of Attfields conclusion, " ... if. without being swayed by the 
interests of sentient creatures, we share in these conclusions and reactions, we must also conclude 
that the interests of trees are of moral significance".728 However, as already noted above, this 
recognition of intuitionism does not imply that Attfield rejects the importance of reasoning. This 
becomes more clear, when we turn to an explicit consideration ofthis aspect of this theory. 
12.2 Reasoning on Nature 
The last remarks on the intutionistic basis of Attfield' s account of the moral standing of trees, 
leads us to the question of the role of rationality and deliberation in his account. What role does 
his account of reasoning have for his environmental ethic? To what extent is reasoning a necessary 
basis for his theory? 
12.2.1 The Anthropological Basis of Environmental Ethics 
The concept of reasoning and thinking on environmental ethics is fundamental to Attfield's 
account of environmental ethics. This is implied in the idea of his account as a theory of 
environrnental ethics. But it is also implied in the anthropological assumption of Attfield. 
Arguing for his own position, Attfield refers to the theistic anthropology. The theistic 
anthropology differs from the scientific in its assertion of the superority of man. The scientific 
w1derstanding of man implies his being part of nature. Man is not essentially different from the rest 
of nature, but is rather understood as an evolutionary produet of nature. In somewhat contrast to 
this viewpoint, the theistic anthropology claims the difference between man and the rest of nature. 
Although man and nature are closely related in many ways, there is a fundamental difference. Man 
as the only being is created in the image of God and is endowed with a special responsibility. Man 
is understood as steward in relation to nature. In this sense man is different and distinct from the 
rest of nature. 729 
This anthropology has important consequences for environmental ethics. The distinction 
between man and nature implies the necessary emphasis on the responsibility of man. As the 
728 Ibid. 
729 Attfield 1983, 52ff. 
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capacity for reasoning is characteristic for man, this implies the necessary assertion of the role of 
reasoning within environmental ethics. On account of the faculty of reason man is differentiated 
from the rest of nature and is also given a particular responsibility. 
This serves as an important background for Attfield's claim of the role ofreasoning in 
environmental ethics. One way this reasoning works is in the inference from criteria on human 
moral standing to the moral standing of nonhuman nature. In his discussion on defences of 
biocentrism, Attfield refers the analogical argument for the moral standing of nonhumans, as 
described above. 730 It is not on account of a rational recognition of its moral status, but merely due 
to the analytical and logical inference. In Kantian tenns, ane could say that there is no a priori 
recognition of the moral standing of nonhuman nature. The argument is based on a hypothetical 
deduction. This holds implications for Attfield' s concept of reason. Reason in Attfield is primarily 
conceived of in a theoretical sense. Reason is not thought of as a source of nonnativity, as the 
source of the moral standing of nature lies within nature itself. Reason does not constitute the 
moral value of nature, but without it one could not have an ordered reflection on this issue. 
Therefore, even if reason does not constitute the order of morality, it does provide the ordering 
of moral reflection. In this ordering, the function of reason is theoretical. It is due to the theoretical 
ability it serves the instrumental purpose of structuring the moral deliberations. This understanding 
of reason is also apparent in Attfield's argument for the reflective equilibrium of theory and 
application. 
12.2.2 The Reflective Equilibrium of Theory and Application 
The previous paragraph raises the important question, what about moral reason? Does Attfield 
reduce reason to an instrumental faculty of man? In developing his theory of environmental ethics, 
Attfield wants to achieve a reflective equilibrium between judgements and theory, between 
nonnative principles and their application.731 To understand this correctly, it is important to keep 
Attfield's idea in mind, that " ... there are recognizable limits and a recognizable scope to moral 
reasoning, discemible from a priori considerations such as the meaning of the very concept of 
73° Cf. 12.1.2.1 
73 1 Attfield 1983c, 88. 
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moral i ty, as well as from the a posteriori study of particular judgements". 732 Attfield holds this 
viewpoint, even if he argues in fa vor of moral realism. 733 However, even if he explicitly calls 
himself naturalist, this does not mean that he on the basis of amoral objectivist standpoint refrains 
from carrying out his reflections in search of " ... the best available consistent and defensible 
position. "734 
This position of Attfield supports his attempt to achieve the mentioned reflective 
equilibrium. In arder to discem the underlying principles of attitudes to environmental issues, the 
right method must be deployed. According to Attfield the right method in ecological ethics is 
cornmon to most branches of normative ethics, consisting in the formulation of principles which 
are adequate to a good range of reflective judgements and then the testing, followed up by the 
potential revision of the principles. Even if this method has been criticized for circularity and Jack 
of specificity, Attfield maintains its credibility due to a similar method within the sciences, where 
the rnethod is not questioned.735 
Attfield' s reference to the sciences is a sign of his metaethical naturalist position. 
Unfortunately, he does not discuss the relevance of this method within the sciences. He seems to 
take the mere faet ofthe use ofthis method within the sciences as a token of its legitimacy. Having 
forgotten to justify this method within the sciences, the reference to it does not provide the 
necessary justificatory basis of it within ecological ethics. 
A similar argument is introduced in Attfield' s discussion on Values, Conflict and the 
Environment.736 Even if he was one ofthe authors to this report, he finds it necessary to cornment 
on its concept of value and notion of interest. Setting his discussion on the notion of interest apart, 
his discussion on the concept of value sheds light on the previous idea of reflective equilibrium. 
In the report the method of Comprehensive Weighing of values is attempted. nus weighing is 
differentiated from the traditional cost/benefit analysis in refraining from measuring value in 
732 Ibid. 
733 Ibid., 89: ·· ... moral discourse is not concerned merely with prescriptions or expressions of 
attitude or commitment; it asp i res to truth and actually admits of knowledge." 
m Ibid. 
735 ]dem 1994a, 92. 
736 Attfield and Dell (1989). 
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monetary terms. Rather the rational defensibility is of concem. Thus it is argued that some values 
demonstrably outweigh others. As an example Atffield mentions e.g. the preferableness of 
protecting an orchid species from extinction in comparison to draining a marsh for agriculture.737 
Even if rationality is essential to this method, the concept of rationality appears to differ in a 
significant way. Rationality seems to be taking on a different role than the mentioned instrumental 
aspect. fn the method of comprehensive weighing, rationality is rather understood in termsofa 
source of normativity. It is in terms of rational i ty that the different degrees of value are recognized. 
These different degrees can not be made tangible. Their difference is on account of the rational 
evaluation. Attfield does not explain the criteria of this evaluation. It appears to be selfevident to 
reason, which values are to be preferred to others. 
Apparently Attfield makes use oftwo senses ofrationality, an instrumental and amoral 
sense. This two concepts of rationality are not necessarily compatible with each other. In the 
environmental ethical theory of Mark Sagoff, it is precisely these two concepts that are in contrast 
to each other. This raises the question of the consistency of Attfield's account. The notion of 
rationality is important to him and yet lacks sufficient theoretical cogency. 
12.3 Nature and Reason as a Combined Basis ofEnvironrnental Ethic 
One of the reasons of the theoretically problematic basis of Attfield' s notion of rational i ty might 
be the interrelatedness of nature and reason, which is also found in his theory. Nature and reason 
are not contrasted to each other, but rest in a mutual relation, completing each other as the 
justificatory basis of Attfield's theory of environmental ethics. On the one hand, nonhuman nature 
has certain interests that imply a moral standing. This applies to sentent and nonsentient creatures 
alike. Only inanimate objects of nature do not have a moral standing. Apart from the inanimate 
nature, nonhuman nature has an intrinsic value on account of its interests. On the other hand, 
humans of course also have a moral standing. Their interests are also to be taken into considera-
tion. Consequently, the interests of nonhuman and human nature can c01ne into conflict with each 
other. Often this is the case. In this situation man's character as a rational being serves as the other 
basis of Attfield' s theory. The human being is assigned a particular role as steward of nature. Even 
737 !dem, 144. 
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if the human being is part of nature, he/she is also differentiated from nature. 
This simultaneous assertion of (i) the kinship of man.kind and the rest of nature and (ii) 
the chararacteristic capacities of humans is a basic concept in Attfield. In order to maintain this 
doubleness and facilitate an environmental ethic supportive of this notion, it is necessary to 
develop a metaphysics which neither reduces man to simply a part of nature, nor conceives of man 
as radically different from nature.738 
12.4 Conclusion 
In the analysis of Attfield's theory of envirorunental ethics we have found an argument i favor of 
the intrinsic value of nature and the reasoning of the human being as a combined basis of 
envirorunental concem. In arguing for the intrinsic value of nature, Attfield rejects holistic theories 
as found in e.g. Callicott. Rather, one should apply a method of analogy extending the principles 
of moral standing from human beings to nonhuman nature. As this establishes the criteria of moral 
consideration, one should also apply principles of determining moral significance, if one is to have 
a practicable theory of envirorunental ethics. In this analogical method of extensionalism reasoning 
is required. Throughout his theory, Attfield emphasizes the reasoning of the human being as an 
indispensable notion. This is due to his anthropological standpoint but also due to the necessity 
of establishing a reflective equilibriurn oftheory and application. In the exposition of Attfield we 
have seen how he clairns a naturalistic standpoint. Therefore, Attfield also admits a limited 
inference from is to ought. In his theory, however, his notion of reason is somewhat unclear. It 
is not clear whether reason is considered in terms of theoretical rationality or moral reason. 
Attfield seerns to be applying both notions, althought not completely consistently. In contrast to 
Norton and Sagoff, Attfield has not endorsed a constructivist standpoint. Reason is essential to 
moral theorizing, but reason does not construct moral values. Therefore, Attfield's theory does 
not appear to be suitable for the appropriation of the nonnaturalist understanding of natura! law. 
However, his naturalist metaethical standpoint does suggest that parts of his theory might relate 
to a naturalist natura! law thought. 
738 !dem 1983c, 63. 
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IV. Reshaping Nature and Reason 
In this last part of the thesis, the tindings of the thesis are summarized. Furthermore, it is 
attempted to reflect critically on these tindings in arder to reformulate the idea of the normativity 
of nature and reason. Hereby, it is the intention tentatively to develop a basis fora reformulation 
of natural law and to argue fora renewed use ofthis ethical theory. In Chapter 13, the focus is the 
concept of nature, whereas the nation of reason forms the basis of Chapter 14. In Chapter 15 the 
idea of the interrelatedness of nature and reason is brie fly assessed and the thesis is concluded by 
reflections on the main assumptions of the study. 

Chapter 13 
Nature as the Basis of Normativity 
The normativity of nature is one ofthe issues of theological and philosophical ethics that continues 
to beat the centre of ethical enquiry. Throughout the present thesis, the understanding of this idea 
has been demonstrated within select representatives of natura! law thought and environmental 
ethics. It is now the intention to focus on some ofthe main findings of these thinkers and attempt 
a tentative construction of a normative concept of nature that may prove appropriate for as well 
natura! law thought as environmental ethics. 
The primary concerns in the present chapter will bethree leading questions. Firstly, the 
question will be raised, how one should understand man as nature. This question leads on to the 
following, whether man's living in accordance with nature implies a normative stance. The third 
question follows from the second, as the question is raised, how the notion ofliving in accordance 
with nature relates to the critique of naturalistic ethics of committing a fallacy. 
13.l Man as a Natura! Being 
The nation of man as a natural being plays an important role in natural law thought and 
environmental ethics. Even if quite different in setting and terminology, both discourses argue for 
the naturalness of man. 
In the premodem natural law thought this was argued by reference to the doctrine of 
creation. Both Luther and Melanchthon took this doctrine as a faet. For both of them this idea 
implied that the human being shared conditions of life with nonhuman nature. Not only was the 
human being and nonhuman nature conceived of as created by God, the nation of God's 
continuous care and sustainment of creation was a central idea. In this sense, the human being and 
nonhuman nature was conceived of as God's creation as such. As creation being dependent upon 
God's care, there was no difference between the human being and nonhuman nature. The human 
being and nonhuman nature share this absolutely fundamental aspect of life - that it is always 
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considered as given. Life is never something which creation can make a claim of. Creation is 
always conceived of as receiving the gift of life. This feature points to a fundamental theo-
dependency. Creation is dependent upon God. 739 
However, dependency is not only related to God, but is also constituted between the 
human being and nonhuman nature. The human being and nonhuman nature are situated in an 
interdependent relationship. Certainly, the notion of man as created in the image of God for Luther 
and Melanchthon implies that man has a certain role in relation to nonhuman creation. Man has 
been given a mandate to rule over the world.74° Clearly, this places nonhuman creation in a 
dependency upon man. But the relationship is not onesided. This is argued on the basis of natura! 
law. As we saw it in Luther, natural law is also thought of as the basis of life among animals. 
Luther acknowledges the golden rule among animals, arguing that to some extent animals are 
capable of setting themselves in the place of others. 741 Luther also argues that natura! law applies 
to nonhuman nature by means of another example. Just as it is part of natura] law that human 
beings should have rest now and then in arder to gain strength742, so animals should have a similar 
739 In speaking of theo-dependency the dependency upon God is emphasized. A similar 
understanding may be said to be endorsed by Gustafson (1994). Gustafson speaks of God as" ... the power 
that brings all things into being, that bears down on them and threatens and limits them, that sustains them 
and is the condition of possibility for their change." (14) In the experiences with nature, we meet God as such 
a power. Gustafson argues that this sense ofthe Divine may form an important part of our relation to nature. 
"Humans are to seek to discem what God is enabling and requiring them to be and to do as participants in the 
pattems and processes ofinterdependence of life in the world. The divine ordering is perceived, insofar as it 
is humanly possible, in and through the ordering of nature, culture, history, and personal living. It has no 
equilibrium which guarantees the realization of all justifiable ends, and our ends as developers oftechnology 
and culture infinitely complicate the achievement of even a dynamic one. We are to relate all things to each 
other in ways that concur with their relations to God, again, insofar as this can be discemed. But God will be 
God. As intentional participants we have responsibility, and the destiny ofthe natura! environment and our 
parts in it is heavily in our hands, but the ultimate destiny of all that exists is beyond our human control." 
(148f.). 
740 This idea which has often been endorsed in a Christian setting has been criticized as the root of 
the ecological crisis (White 1967). However, within the Biblical writings there is not onesided endorsement 
of anthropocentrisrn. This is pointed out by e.g. Hoffe 1993, l 98ff. Hoffe argues that if one should point to 
a nation within the Judaeo-Christian tradition which has had a negative impact on the treatrnent of nature, it 
would be the strict monotheism, which has irnplied a desacralization of nature. " Wer in der Bibel trotzdern 
nach Yoraussetzungen fur die ·'Ausbeutung der Natur" sucht, tindet sie paradoxerweise in der genuin 
religiosen Komponente. Durch einen Gott, der keinerlei Gotter neben sich duldet, durch einen monotheisti-
schen Gott wird die Natur entsakralisiert." (203) 
741 Cf. 5.1.2 
74
~ W A 30 I, 144, 6ff. 
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rest from work in order to do well.743 Not to give animals the proper rest implies not acting in 
accordance with natura! law. In this example it is clear how not only animals are dependent upon 
human beings, but that human beings are also dependent upon nonhuman creation. It appears to 
be a consequence of Luther' s natura] law thought that the life of man does not succeed when 
nonhuman nature is not treated in accordance with natura! law. In this sense natura! law is 
conceived of as a common rule of life for as well human beings as nonhuman nature. Natural law 
is an expression of human beings and nonhuman nature as having similar needs in terms of basic 
life conditions, for being fundamentally interdependent. 
This idea of the similarity in the need of fundamental conditions of life between human 
beings and nonhuman nature is also shared by e.g. Callicott. Even if Callicott neither refers to God 
nor to the doctrine of creation, his line of arguments have a similarity to the premodem 
understanding of Luther and Melanchthon. Callicott refers to the scientific comerstones of 
evolution, ecological biology, and Copemican astronomy as the basis ofhis land ethics. 744 Needless 
to say, all these comerstones are absent in Luther and Melanchthon. But when Callicott explains 
his concept of the bio tic community one finds several similar tenets. One of the basic features of 
the idea of the bio tic community are ties of kinship among all forms of life on earth. This has its 
basis in the Darwinian theory of evolution. Due to this theory moral sentiments have developed 
within social groups, forming the basis of an evolutionary origin of ethics.745 Even if completely 
different in the underlying argument, phaenornenologically Callicott agrees with basic nations of 
natura! law thought in quite important aspects. 
One of the points of agreement is precisely the notion of community. In Callicott the 
cornmunity if conceived of as a biotic community. This bio tic community which includes all forms 
oflife is conceived of as an ethical entity. The principles constituting and giving shape to this biotic 
community are also understood as the source ofnormativity. In this sense the basis of Callicott's 
land ethic is fundamentally naturalistic. In Rolston the notion of the community is seen in his 
743 W A 18, 81, 26ff. : "Das man aber den Sabbath odder son tag auch feyret, ist nicht von no( e )tten 
noch umb Moses gepot willen, sondem das die natur auch gibt und leret, man mu(e)sse ia zu weylen eynen 
tag rugen, das mensch und vieh sich erquicke ... " 
744 Cf. 8.1.1 
745 Ibid. 
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understanding of the systemic value. 746 The value of the individual being is understood with 
reference to its being part ofthe ecosystemic whole. Value is not located individually, but rather 
within the ecosystem. In line of his understanding of evolution, Rolston argues that evolution is 
to be seen as a story, still arriving. The human being is part of this story. Asa a natura! being, the 
human being never leaves this story. As moral agents, the human beings are still considered part 
of this story, even if their abilities of deliberation partly differentiate them from the rest of 
nature.747 The human beings are still considered part of the natura! community, even if 
differentiated from the rest of nature. 7-1s 
The nation of the human being as part of a natura! community also plays an important 
part in natura! law thought. Befare turning to the nation of a natura! community in natura! law 
thought, it is necessary to define the nation of community. What characterizes a community? What 
is the difference between the nation of community and the concept of arder? How does this relate 
to the concept of association? The nation of arder implies a structure. An arder is conceived of 
wben separate parts are related in a structured whole. Therefore the separate parts of the arder 
are understood within this systemic structure, transcending the individual part. Community also 
implies the nation of a structured whole. A community may also be understood in a wider sense, 
i.e. as a relationship which has identity shaping impact. A religious, philosophical, or political 
community is understood in this sense. An important difference between arder and community, 
therefore, seems to be the difference in impact on identity. Whereas arder may be understood in 
a more neutral, decriptive sense, community implies a nation of formative impact. Association is 
related to community, but is understood as relations of a looser sense. An association does not 
746 Cf. 7. 1 . 1 
747 Cf. 7.2.1 
m Fora relatively recent, insightful theory of the ea11h community as the basis of an eal1h ethics, 
cf. Rasmussen ( 1996). Rasmussen argues that the idea of the ea11h community has not yet had a sufficient 
impact on ethics. "That nature is a community is the scientific discovery of the twentieth century. That earth, 
human society included, is also a community has not yet registered with us. At least how to sustain it as a 
community has not." ( 15) This understanding of community is necessary in arder to argue for the appropriate 
responsibility for this community ( l 5ff.). "The basic premise for futureactions and outlooks is the simple 
sentence above: all that exists, coexists. Community rests at the heart of things. The dance ofreality is "a 
permanent dance of energy and elements" in a "vast communitarian chain" that embraces tbe entire cosmos. 
We are consigned to the wonder of a universe whose tapestry is whole." (324) 
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have an impact on identity, but is understood as being based on mutual interests.749 
Turning to the natura! law thought, Luther understands natura! law as a law of order 
expressing the will of God as constitutive for Creation. Human being is part of this natura! order. 
Natura) law as a moral law is an expression of this order of being. However, this is not to be 
understood in static categories, as being is upheld by God. Being is conceived of as a dynamic 
process. In the same sense, natura! law as a moral law is not to be seen as a static moral code. 
Rather, natura! law as moral law is to be regarded as being under the same constant dynamic 
development as may be seen in nonhuman nature. Even if the notion of order is the most common, 
when giving an account of Luther, the same notion may also be explained by reference to the 
notion of community. If the concept of community is understood as the relationship between 
independent parts which is constituted by cornmon principles of being and normativity, there is no 
essential difference between "order" and "community".750 
Even if Melanchthon endorses a more explicit ontological basis of natura! law, the 
similarity in his argument is quite apparent. In Melanchthon we find a quite close relation between 
his notion of nature and concept of nonnativity. The moral reflection of the human being is an 
expression ofthe order which is constitutive ofthe physical realm as well as the moral realm. The 
physical and moral realm are essentially alike, expressing different aspects of the same order. 
Therefore, when Melanchthon speaks of the natura) light of reason, he speaks of an awareness of 
reason of a natura!, arithmethic, and moral order.751 On this basis it may be argued that 
Melanchthon holds an understanding of man as part of a natura! community in comparable lines 
with Callicott and Rolston. 
749 Cf. Rawls 1996, 40ff. for this distinction between community and association. Furthennore, cf. 
Sagoff's distinction between society and community (1988b, l 18ff.). Sagoff's understanding ofsociety seems 
to hold some resemblance to Rawls' concept of assocation, whereas their understanding of community appears 
to be essentially the same. 
750 The notion ofrelationality as a point where natura! law thought and environmental ethics have 
a common concem is also endorsed by Northcott 1996. "The natura! law ethic ofthe Middle Ages reflected 
a theology of cosmic and social order and relationality in which persons were set in a di vine hierarchy of 
being, and a di vine purposiveness for all life from angels to animals ( ... ) We can then see that there is a 
theological ground within the Christian doctrines of God, creation and redemption, and particularly in the 
Christ events, for the recognition of the moral value of the non-human world, and ofthe deep relationality of 
human life and self-consciousness to the created order." (220f.) 
1s1 Cf. 3.1 
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In Wolff the nation of the arder of nature is constitutive for his natura! law thought. 
Furthermore, this arder is sees as the test on the moral aet. Acts are considered right when they 
further the perfection of the condition of the agent. In his endorsement of this idea as the general 
rule of action, Wolff clearly demonstrates the resemblance with the central principle ofland ethics. 
As Leopold argued that a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty 
of the biotic community752, so Wolff argued that a thing is right when it tends to perfect the 
condition ofthe agent.753 In land ethics as well as in Wolff we find the principle ofharmony as the 
end ofmoral action. This also applies to Wolffs nation of nature. In Wolffnature is conceived of 
as the source of obligation. Due to man' s natural being, he is under the same obligation of nature. 
Asa natura! being the human being is obliged to follow the law of nature, which finds it expression 
in the nature of man as well as other things. The obligation of natura! law is an ex pression of man 
as a natura! being. 754 
In both natura! law thought with the ontological basis and environmental ethics as land 
ethics the idea ofthe naturalness of the human being appears to be a central nation. The concept 
of the human being and nonhuman nature as fundamentally interwoven is inescapable. The human 
being cannot relate to nature as something essentially different, rather the human being is nature. 
This may be argued on the basis of a theological argument with reference to the doctrine of 
creation, where man is conceived of as created from dust. In this sense, the human being is 
understood as a fragile being sharing the same life conditions as the rest of Creation. 755 It may also 
be argued by a philosophical argument, referring to the idea that there are no objective differences 
between the human being and nonhuman nature apart from the epistemic.756 Finally, it may be 
argued by a scientific argument which empasizes the theory of evolution as constituting a cornmon 
source of li fe for human beings and nonhuman nature. 757 That the human being is nature, therefore, 
seems to be selfevident. ln this sense, it seems arguable that this idea holds an objective status. The 
752 Cf. 8.1. I 
753 Cf. 4.1.2 
754 Cf. 4.2.1 
755 Cf. Gen. 2, 7 
756 Cf. Krebs 1999, l 37f. 
757 Cf. e.g. Callicott 1989, 83. 
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human being as nature appears to be an objective reality.758 As an objective reality it may serve as 
a universal basis of a natura! law ethics, just as it may serve as a startingpoint for an environmental 
ethics. However, the mere account of this objective reality does not serve as a justification of the 
normative significance of this nation. 
When the question is raised, if normativity has its basis in the concept of nature, or in 
what sense normativity may be deduced from the nation of nature, the typical question in reply will 
be, if ane speaks of nonhuman nature og the human nature. Immediately considered, this question 
may appear justified. But at a closer look it may not be so obvious that this is merely a question 
of clarification. Maybe this question is in itself an ex pression of an implicit set of values, which 
already include an assessment of the basis of normativity. The question seems to hold the implicit 
presumption that ane hereby speaks of two quite different entities. But this is not necessarily the 
case. As we have seen, several arguments may be given for an understanding of the human being 
as nature which demonstrate the communal being with nonhuman nature. Viewed in this way the 
distinction can only be theoretical, serving as a clarification of concepts. In its schematism, 
however, it renders what should properly be kept together. The question may be raised the 
proponents of this distinction, how they can justify such a differentiation without as a startingpoint 
having included a set of values. Where this is the case, of course, at a fundamental point it will 
confuse the assessment ofthe source of normativity. It would befar more upright to say that the 
human being as nature is essentially the same as the rest of the animal nature. 
13 .2 Secundum naturam vivere 
Even if it is granted that the human being is to be considered a natura! being, this does not per se 
imply a normative stance. In the account of the human being as a natura! being it was merely an 
intention to give a factual argument, why this may be endorsed as an acceptable standpoint. 
758 In a theological setting, this understanding of the naturalness of the human being is an 
indispensable part of a Christian ethics. O'Donovan (1994) refers to this as the objective principle of 
Christian ethics. "The order of things that God has made is there. It is objective, and mankind has a place 
within it. Christian ethics, therefore, has an objective reference because it is concemed with man 's life in 
accordance with this order. The summons to live in it is adressed to all mankind. Thus Christian moral 
judgments in principle adress every man. They are not something which the Christian has opted into and 
which he might as well, quite sensibly, have opted out of. They are founded on reality as God has given it." 
(17) 
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Having established the plausibility of this argument the following questions turn on the implication 
ofthis idea. How does the human being live in accordance with nature? What does it mean to live 
in accordance with nature? Does it imply a moral stance to live in accordance with nature? These 
questions have proved to be central to natura! law thought and environrnental ethics.759 
In Melanchthon we find the idea of the natura! law as being an expression of the natura! 
order. Natural law is not conceived as merely a law of reason. Even if natural law is apparent to 
man as a law of reason, i.e. as a light of nature, natura! law as amoral law is still essentially similar 
to natura! law as a physical law. Therefore, when the human being acts in accordance with natura! 
law as amoral law, this action reflects the laws of physical nature. Natura! law as amoral law is 
given by nature. Nature is considered as the source of moral law. But even if Melanchton does 
regard nature as such, he still acknowledges God as an auctor of natural law. 760 Therefore, when 
Melanchthon acknowledges the nature of the human being as being in accordance with the moral 
law, this is grounded in the will of God. Nature as being in accordance with natural law is also 
apparent in his understanding ofthe sociability of the human being. Natura! law demands social 
and political life. This accords with human nature. Natural law and human nature accord in the 
demand of social life.761 
In Wolff nature is seen as being an independent source of normativity. Whereas 
Melanchthon argued in favor ofthe necessity ofthe will of God, Wolff claims the validity ofthe 
normativity of nature, irrespectively ofthe will and existence of God.762 Nature obliges man to live 
according to natura] law, which determines the attainment of happiness. In Wolff the end of the 
moral life is to attain happiness, whereby his ethics become decidedly teleological. A similar 
teleological notion is apparent in land ethics, when the basis of ethics is the question of the impact 
of one's actions on the stability ofthe biotic community. A difference between Wolff and the land 
ethics in Callicott' s version is their stance on individualism. Whereas Wolff recognizes the role of 
the individual, Callicott is very critical towards an emphasis on this notion. Therefore, even if both 
759 Cf. Fraling 1990 and Mohrmann 1999 for two collections of articles dealing with the question 
ofthe normativity ofnature. Several ofthese articles carry the issue beyond environmental ethics, applying 
it to questions of biomedical ethics, social ethics etc. 
76° Cf. 3.2. l 
761 Cf. 3.3.2 
762 Cf. 4.1.2 and 4.2. l 
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Wolff and Callicott acknowledge the importance ofthe whole ofnature as a source ofnormativity, 
this idea becomes too abstract in Callicott. Callicott does not pay sufficient attention to the moral 
agent (i.e. an individual agent) as responsible ofbeing aware ofthe normative implications of the 
concept of nature. 
Even if Wolff acknowledges the role of the moral agent, his understanding of the 
obligation of nature implies problems with regard to the freedom of the human being. Nature 
determines the good and obliges man to live accordingly. Apparently, the moral agent cannot 
escape the determination of nature. 763 In this sense, Wolff comes very close to a deterministic 
understanding of human moral life, even if he argues for the possibi lity of maintaining human 
freedom. Even if Wolff acknowledges the freedom of certain acts, this freedom does not qualify 
these acts morally. The moral qualification of these acts still depends on their accordance with 
nature, whether they further the perfection of the human nature. Even when he acknowledges 
freedom this freedom is conceived of as set within limits of nature. However, Wolff does admit 
that nature hereby only serves as a passive obligation. Active obligation, i.e. the normativity of 
nature as a moral demand, still requires reason. 764 
In the environmental ethical theories of Callicott and Rolston, we also find an argument 
in favor of following nature. In Callicott this is an essential principle for his whole theory. This is 
a consequence of the inspiration from Leopold. Due to this source of inspiration he argues that 
the human being acts as part of a biotic community and thereby follows nature in moral life. 765 
In Rolston we also find an argument in favor of foliowing nature. Ethics has its genesis 
in nature. Themoral life of the human being, therefore, is to be conceived of as a life in accordance 
with nature. Ethics has to follow the laws of ecology. Consequently, actions are right when they 
happen in accordance with the laws of nature. Rolston describes in various ways how the human 
being is to follow nature. Among these, some of the most interesting are his arguments for human 
beings to follow nature in a homeostatic, axiological, and tutorial sense. The homeostatic sense 
stresses the interdependence between human beings and the rest of nature. The idea of the 
axiological sense of following nature implies that human beings are let in on the values of nature, 
763 Cf. 4.2.1 
764 Cf. 4.2.2 
76; Cf. 8. 1.1 
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seeing that the values of nature are good whereby these values aquire a normative status. Lastly 
the human being can leam from examples of nature, whereby nature can become a tutor for human 
beingsi reflection on normative issues.766 
This last idea of nature becoming a tutor to human beings as moral agents is also found 
in Kant. even if Kant would not argue that morality has its basis in the unity between the human 
being and nonhuman nature. Consequently, when Kant argues that nature can serve as a tutor., he 
conceives ofthis role of nature in an indirect way. Nature is not to teach the human being how to 
aet with regard to nonhuman nature. Rather, the role of nonhuman nature is to teach the human 
being how (not) to aet in relation to other human beings. Nonhuman nature in Kant, therefore, 
only has an indirect value. 767 
The notion of acting in accordance with nature, of foliowing nature plays an important 
role in the natura} law thought of Melanchthon and Wolff and in the environmental ethics of 
Rolston and Callicott. This suggests a complementarity in this idea for both discourses. In the 
premodern and early modem natura] law thought of Melanchthon and Wolff, the notion of 
foliowing nature is dependent upon arguments which can be difficult to defend in a contemporary 
setting. However, some of the insights of Rolston and Callicott may be incorporated in a 
reformulation of some of the traditional natura! law ideas. Rolston's general notion of the 
naturalized ethics implies a unity between nonhuman nature and morality which was also 
characteristic of the ontological basis of natura] law in Melanchthon and Wolff. In Melanchthon 
the basis of natural law was still dependent upon the existence of God. In this respect Melanchthon 
holds a traditional premodern viewpoint. In Wolff natura! law had its normative validity 
independently ofthe being ofGod. Natura! law was strictly based on the notion of nature. In this 
766 Cf. 7.2.2 
767 MS, VI 443: ''In Ansehung des Schonen, obgleich Leblosen in der Naturist ein Hang zum bloBen 
Zersti:iren (spiritus destructionis) der Pflicht des Menschen gegen sich selbst zuwider: weil es dasjenige 
Geflihl im Menschen schwacht oder verti lgt, was zwar nicht filr sich allein schon moralisch ist, aber doch 
diejenige Stimmung der Sinnlichkeit, welche die Moralitiit sehr befdrdert, wenigstens dazu vorbereitet, 
niimlich etwas auch ohne Absicht auf Nutzen zu lieben (z.B. die schi:inen Kristallisationen, das unbe-
schreiblich Schi:ine des Gewiichsreichs). In Ansehung des lebenden, obgleich vernunftlosen Teils der 
Geschopfe ist die gewaltsame und zugleich grausame Behandl ung der Tiere der Pflicht des Menschen gegen 
sich selbst weit inniglicher entgegensetzt, weil dadurch das Mitgefilhl an ihrem Leiden im Menschen 
abgestumpft und dadurch eine der Moralitiit im Verhiiltnisse zu anderen Menschen sehr diensame naturliche 
Anlage geschwiicht und nach und nach ausgetilgt wird ... " 
234 
Nature as the Basis of Normativity 
idea one may see a characteristic modem feature in Wolff. Even ifMelancthon and Wolff disagree 
on this issue, they both argue that there is a unity between the laws of nature and the moral law. 
A similar unity is endorsed in Rolston. In Callicott we also found this unity in his critique of the 
modem paradigm of ethical thought. Callicott argued that the modem contractual theories and 
their emphasis on the notion of reason implied an inexpedient dichotomy between nonhuman 
nature and the morality ofhuman beings. Therefore, Callicott refers to a Humean understanding 
ofthe relation between sentiments and community as the basis of morality, making it possible for 
Callicott to argue that the human being as part of the biotic community has an impact on the 
inclinations and feelings ofhuman beings. Even ifCallicott departs from Melanchthon, Wolff, and 
Rolston in his emphasis on sentiments, this move still does not break up the unity between 
nonhuman nature and human morality. 
Viewed the other way, the natura! law thought of Melanchthon and Wolff may be 
incorporated as a classical, theoretical basis of their environmental ethics. The similarity in the 
pattems of argument suggests the plausibility of a natura! law mode of thought as a possible basis 
of land ethics. As an example one could mention the notion of inclination. In Melanchthon this is 
apparent due to the influence from Aristotle. The human being is inclined to social coexistence 
with other human beings. In other words, the human being is inclined to a life within a cornmunity. 
In Wolff the human nature is inclined to pursue the good. The good causes pleasure, which is 
desired by human nature. Wolff places an emphasis on inclination at a very fundamental point in 
his moral theory. As the good causes pleasure, it holds in itself the reason for the human being to 
will the good. The good holds an intrinsic moral motivation. This forms the basis of natural law, 
as the purpose of natura! is to perfect the condition of the human nature. Inclination, therefore, 
serves as an explanation ofthe motivational force of the good.768 In the Melanchthonian as well 
as in the Wolffian nation of inclination we find ideas which appear fruitful as as a theoretical 
underpinning of environmental ethics taking a course similar to Rolston's and Callicott's. 
In the natura! law thought of Melanchthon and Wolff as in the environmental ethics of 
Rolston and Callicott the emphasis on the normativity of nature and understanding of the 
normative implications ofliving in accordance with nature has raised the critique of this idea as 
an example of the naturalistic fallacy. Therefore, we now tum to this nation and assess these 
768 Cf. 4.1.2 
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various arguments of the normativity of nature in the light of this classical critique. 
13.3 The Naturalistic Fallacy 
The question to be adressed here is, whether we find a naturalistic fallacy in the included thinkers 
of the thesis and if so, what this implies for the claims of normativity within their theories. 
In Melanchthon we found an argument for the close link between the laws of nature in 
physical nature and in amoral sense. This was e.g. expressed in Melanchthon' s understanding of 
the Di vine light of nature in reason of man. The light of reason witnesses to the order of nature 
and the presence of God in nature. This is closely related to his understanding ofthe doctrine of 
creation, as this idea is supported by the faet of the awareness of the moral law in the human mind. 
The moral reasoning of man is, therefore, an expression of God' s continuous care for his 
creation. 769 As this awareness of the moral law is also seen as an ex pression of the order of nature, 
moral reasoning also becomes a demonstration of the lawfullness of creation. Consequently, even 
ifMelanchthon acknowledges moral reasoning as essential to the formation of moral norms, this 
does not mean that he escapes the naturalistic fallacy, as was evidenced in the ontological 
grounding of natura! law which formed the basis of Melanchthon' s grounding of normativity.770 
The Humean critique is of lesser relevance to a analysis of Melanchthon' thought. Moore's 
critique. however, seems to apply in the wider as well as in the narrower sense. In the wider sense, 
it seems clear that Melanchthon bases his notion of normativty by reference to nonmoral entities 
such as the order of nature and the presence of God in creation. 
In Wolff the argument is quite different, even if he also represents an example of 
cornmitting the naturalistic fallacy. Wolff argues more clearly for the idea of nature as the basis 
of morality. Physical nature is conceived of as constituted by laws of nature, which are also seen 
as the basis of morality. Life succeeds when it is in accordance with these laws of nature. This 
does not only apply to physical life, but also to moral life. Moral life is to be in accordance with 
the laws of physical nature. This follows from general rule of action in Wolff, where one is to do 
that which furthers the perfection of one's condition.771 In this idea Wolff comes very close to an 
769 Cf. 3.1 
110 Cf. 3.2 
771 Cf. 4. 1.2 
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identification of the factual !aws of nature with the source of normativity. This is apparent in his 
notion of nature as the source of obligation. Even if it may be argued that there is a double concept 
of obligation in Wolff, i.e. a passive and active obligation,772 Wolff does argue for the obligation 
of nature to such an extent that the nation of the freedom of the human being becomes 
problematic.773 The laws of physical nature are also the laws ofnormativity. Consequently, even 
if Wolff does not use a precise terminology, demonstrating the indentification of is and ought, nor 
is careful to argue why the moral good must be defined on the basis of nonmoral qualities, it is 
clear that he is in conflict with Hume' as well as the Moore's theory. 
In Luther we found yet another example of a natura! law theory where the naturalistic 
fallacy is committed. However, here it is only in the wider sense. This is because he does not base 
his understanding of natura! law on a particular concept of nature. Admittedly, his doctrine of 
creation is important to his nation of natura1 law. But this does not entail an ontological basis of 
natura! law. Rather, natura! law is based upon the will of God. 774 However, this may also be seen 
as naturalistic fa!lacy in the wider sense, as Luther hereby argues for the nation of the moral good 
by referring to a nation which nation which is not in itself qualified as morally good. In arder to 
refer to the will of God as the basis ofthe moral good, Luther has to argue why he considers the 
will of God as good. As the reference to the will of God needs this qualification it is clear why the 
immediate reference to the will of God is an expression of the naturalistic fallacy. 
Having demonstrated how most of the included natural law theories in the thesis are 
based upon the naturalistic fallacy, the question must be raised, if this is to be considered as a 
reason for the rejection of these theories. Here, two courses can betak.en. (1) It can be argued that 
the naturalistic fallacy is nota fallacy, after all. Rather tban a fallacy, one should consider it is a 
necessary part of moral reflection, that ane always reflects within given circumstances. One ofthe 
most fundamental of these circumstances is the naturalness of the human being. As a reflecting, 
moral being one cannot escape the natura! condition of human life. Therefore, it is rather to be 
considered a fallacy, when one tries to abstract reasoning from this faet. Being aware of this faet 
772 These two senses of obligation refer to nature and reason as the source of obligation respectively. 
Cf. 4.1.2 fora discussion on this point. 
773 Cf. 4.2.2 
m Cf. 5.1.2 
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and attempting to take that into consideration in one's moral reasoning and arguments for the 
sources of normativity, seems the more plausible course.775 (2) Further, it may be argued, that the 
insights of Hume and Moore still are valid and should encourage one to develop a notion of 
natural law without an identificaition of is and ought and without commiting the naturalistic 
fallacy. This may be done by arguing that reason is the source of normativity and reforrnulating 
natural law theories by isolating the notion of nature and focusing on the moral reasoning which 
is also an important part ofthese theories. Both of these courses, it may be argued, can be found 
in contemporary environmental ethics. Whereas the latter course is taken e.g. by Norton and 
Sagoff (as is demonstrated in chapter 14), the former is clear in Rolston, Callicott and (to some 
extent) Taylor. 
Asa consequence ofhis argument of the necessity of seeing human moral life as an aspect 
offollowing nature, Rolston still maintains the notion ofthe human being as a valuer. But valuing 
is undertaken as part of the ecological web oflife. The human being is not conceived of in abstract 
terms as a moral being, different from the rest of nature. However, the human being has a special 
status. Only the human being is capable of subjective reflection. 776 Rolston maintains the 
doublesided character of the human being as part of and yet different from the rest of nature. But 
even if this is the case, Rolston makes a streng argument for the naturalized ethics. Morality and 
775 Cf. e.g. O'Donovan 1994, 17: "The way the universe is, detennines how man ought to behave 
himself." Fora classical reference to a discussion on Moore's understanding of the naturalistic fallacy, cf. 
Frankena 1939, where it is argued that the naturalistic fallacy is rightly to be understood as a definist fallacy. 
Everything is what it is, not another thing. As such it is a fallacy to confuse or identify two properties, defining 
one property by another. Such a fallacy may, however, be committed without infringing upon the bifurcation 
ofthe ethical and the non-ethical (6f.). "The definist fallacy, then, as we have stated it, does not rule out any 
naturalistic or metaphysical defintions of ethical terms." (7) 
776 This is the course taken by Hoffe ( 1980), when he tries to reformulate the notion of natura! law 
without committing the naturalistic fallacy. Hoffe argues that the structure of such an undertaking is based 
on three steps. Firstly, the genuine moral element is to be founded, i.e. a principle or a criterion on the moral 
good. Secondly, one has to reflect on the circumstances of justice, i.e. the conditions under which problems 
of law are raised. Lastly, the princip le of moral i ty has to be related to the conditions of appropriation for the 
law (I 8f.). ''Das entscheidende Element im Programm eines Naturrechtsdenkens ohne naturalistischen 
FehlschluB liegt in der methodischen Unterscheidung eines sittlichen (nonnativen) von einem nichtnorrnativen 
Element, sowie in der Einsicht, daB sich nur aus der Vermittlung beider Elemente Prinzipien politischer 
Gerechtigkeit gewinnen lassen. Ein Naturrechtsdenken ohne naturalistischen FehlschluB entspricht in seiner 
Grundstruktur einem praktischen Syllogismus: Aus einer normativen Pramisse, dem Prinzip der Sittlichkeit, 
und einer deskriptiven Pramisse, den Anwendungsbedingungen von Gerechtigkeit, wird die nonnative 
Konklusion gezogen, das Prinzip der Gerechtigkeit." (19) 
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ecology exist inaharmonious relationship. Ecology holds normative implications. The biosystemic 
regulation of ecology holds values that are of ethical relevance. Ethics cannot be constructed 
irrespectively of ecology. Therefore, Rolston argues for the necessity of basing the ought on the 
is. One cannot separate ethics from the factual character of the values carried by nature. Ethics 
must incorporate these values. 777 But even if Rolston goes quite far in his attempt to naturalize 
ethics, he still maintains the special role ofthe human being. As it is only the human being which 
is capable of moral deliberation, this ability marks a difference between human beings and 
nonhuman nature. Even if ethics have their genesis in nature, there is still a sense in which the 
human being as amoral agent is a special being within nature. Consequently, Rolston may be said 
not to commit the naturalistic fallacy indiscriminately. Rolston is very much aware that his theory 
is fundamentally at variance with Hume's theory, arguing that one must base the ought on an is. 
One cannot make ethics isolated from the faet ofthe human being as a natural being. The strength 
of Rolston's theory, however, is his emphasis on the special role of the human being. In his 
attempt to naturalize ethics, he does not forget the unique character of the human being. 
In Callicott, on the other hand, this understanding of the human being is apparently 
lacking. Just as Rolston, Callicott argues for the notion of ecology as an integral part of the 
concept of ethics. In this sense ethics are also naturalized in Callicott. But in contrast to Rolston, 
Callicott's theory does not do justice to the question of the normative force.778 Callicott does not 
give a satisfactory account of the role ofthe human being as amoral agent. His theory defends the 
idea of Leopold that the human being is part of the biotic community. Even if he may give a 
detailed account of the genesis of moral i ty, he does not explain how this morality becomes part 
of human responsibility for nonhuman nature. He does argue that the basis is not reason, but moral 
sentiments in a Humean sense and that these sentiments serves as the basis of inclinations in moral 
life.779 However, this leaves out of question the whole moral issue of determining right and wrong. 
lf one is to aet merely on the basis of inclination, this would imply a dismissal of ethics as a 
theological and philosophical discipline. This can hardly be said to be recommended. 
Whereas Rolston and Callicott both argue for the basis of environmental ethics in the light 
777 Cf. 7.1.1 
778 Cf. 8.1.1 
779 Cf. 8.3.1 
239 
Nature as the Basis of Normativity 
of ecology and how this implies a naturalization of ethics, Taylor takes a different course. In 
Taylor the role of the human beings as amoral agent is clear. Taylor argues for the reasonableness 
of the biocentric outlook, the consequent conatus of every living organism and how this raises the 
demand of a respect for nature. This respect for nature encompasses all living beings which 
consequently are to be seen as moral subjects. The human being, however, has a special role as 
amoral agent. The human being has unique powers of deliberation and moral reflection which also 
gives the human being a particular responsibility.780 In Taylor it may be argued both that he does 
and does not commit the naturalistic fallacy. It may be said that his theory is so dependent upon 
his biocentric outlook, that the normative stance of his theory is unthinkable without the factual 
claims of this worldview. In this sense, the descriptive basis of his theory presides over the 
prespcriptive. The ought is deri ved from the is. On the other hand, if one takes the argument as 
such, Taylor is aware of the importance of maintaining the difference between decriptive and 
prescriptive statements. Viewed within Taylor's own theory, he does not commit the naturalistic 
fallacy. 
Having provided an overview of the main arguments of the thesis with respect to the 
naturalistic fallacy, hopefully it has become apparent how one can find a similar argumentative 
pattern in natura! law thought and environmental ethics. Just as the question was raised with 
regard to the natura! law theories, one must ask whether this implies an approval or dismissal of 
these theories. The answer to this question, however, seems to apply to natura! law thought as 
well as to environmental ethics. If it is argued convincingly within theories of environmental ethics, 
that ethics must be naturalized, this also applies to the notion of natura! law. Natura! law may also 
be conceived of as naturalized ethics. Therefore, if one follows the argument of e.g. Rolston, it 
appears that this may serve as the basis of a reformulation of an ontological natura! law theory, 
as in e.g. Melanchthon and Wolff. On the other hand, insights from these theories may also be 
incorporated within e.g. Rolston 's theory, supplying this theory with influential, historical roots. 
78° Cf. 9.2.2 
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Reason as the Basis of Normativity 
Apart from the idea of nature as the basis and source of normativity, the thesis has argued that the 
notion of reason as the basis and source of normativity plays an equally irnportant role in natural 
law thought and environmental ethics. In the present chapter a summary of the findings of the 
thesis is provided while these findings are also appropriated as part of a tentative systematic 
theological outlook. Tue main parts of the chapter will be the focus on the idea of a constructivist 
basis ofnormativity (14.1) and the theological implications ofthis nation (14.2). The chapter is 
concluded with some reflections on the implications ofthis idea for the role of nature (14.3). 
14.1 Morality as Constructivism 
As has been demonstrated throughout the thesis, the notion of the constructivist basis of morality 
is endorsed in various ways in both natural law thought and environmental ethics. Even if this 
rnetaethical position is not advocated explicitly, it rnay be said to constitute the underlying scherne 
of thought. In this sense certain theories of natural law thought and environmental ethics have a 
similar grounding of rnorality. 
In Luther we found an argument of the role of reason which has an affinity to the 
constructivist position. Luther argued that the human being has been endowed with abilities of 
moral reasoning which enables him or her to conctruct new decalogues. This implies that the 
human being is capable of a continuous construction of moral princip les on the basis of natural 
law.781 Luther's understanding is, however, elaborated on in the foliowing paragraph. Even more 
clearly, this constructivist understanding was found in Kant.782 For Kant the rejection of the basis 
of normativity in given moral norms was essential to his argument in favour ofthe autonomy of 
781 Cf. 5.2.1 
782 The foliowing summary ofthe tindings in the chapter on Kant focuses on the aspects of moral 
constructivism. However, as demonstrated in 6.4 this does not entail an exclusion of nature as ethically 
relevant. 
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the moral agent. Tue role ofthe moral agent was not to diseover moral norms and aet aeeordingly. 
Therefore, Kant also rejeets the idea of man's natural being as the source of normativity. The 
emphasis is laid upon man as a rational being. Reason, therefore, is also seen as the souree of 
nomrntivity. This forms the basis ofKant's understanding ofthe positive sense of freedom, i.e. the 
freedom of determining one's action in aceordanee with practieal reason. Kant even identifies 
freedom of the will with praetieal reason. 783 Due to this identification, there is nothing which 
determines moral law apart from the freedom of praetieal reason. The free will is in this respect 
seen as a causality to living, rational beings. The moral law is a law of causality through freedom. 
Consequently, practical reason is understood as being amoral law to itself. This is a point where 
Kant demonstrates notions which may be appropriated in a constructivist interpreatation of his 
moral philosophy. There is nothing but practical reason whieh determines right and wrong. In this 
sense, reason is a law to itself. 
In the analysis of Kant we also critically assessed his understanding of moral law as a faet 
of reason. This idea appears to be a challenge to a constructivist reading of Kant. If Kant is seen 
as a constructivist, how ean the moral law be considered a faet of reason? Here it was argued that 
this factual character of the moral law refers to practical reason. Practical reason eannot be 
isolated from moral law. Without practical reason there is no moral law. In this sense the moral 
law is identified with practical reason. The moral law as a faet of pure practical reason is the 
lawgiving of reason itself and ex presses the unconditionality of the moral law. 784 In this sense, his 
nation of the moral law as a faet of reason does not contradict the construetivist reading of Kant, 
but is rather to be seen as another aspect of this idea. 
This concept of reason as a law to itself also seems to be an essential point in Rawls. In 
his A Theory of Justice Rawls described the procedure of construction with regard to the basic 
principles of justice. Here Rawls developed the classical contractarian theory in the light of 
contemporary ethics. The main idea was that rational persons under a veil of ignorance would 
decide upon principles of justice which would be presumed to attain general approval.785 In this 
783 Cf. 6.2.1 
m Cf. 6.2.2 
785 Rawls 1971, 11: " ... the guiding idea is that the principles of justice for the basic structure of 
society are the object of the original agreement. They are the principles that free and rational persons 
concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the 
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rational decision on the principles ofjustice, we find a similarity to the Kantian notion of practical 
reason. Reason is its own judge on what is to be selected as common principles of justice. 
However, even if this procedure is what Rawls later calls constructivism,786 the term is not applied 
in A Theo,y of Justice. In his later main work, Political Liberalism, Rawls incorporates the idea 
of constructivism, arguing that his early work represented such a constructivist method, even if 
it would have strengthened his earlier theory to limit the discussion to political notion of 
morality.787 Such a political constructivism may be said to be present in Norton. 
In Norton the nation of constructivism appeared on the basis of his rejection of nature 
as a harmonious whole, which can be conceveived of in terms of arder. Therefore, nature cannot 
serve as the basis of a moral order. In Norton, however, nature is still regarded as stable, but this 
is a stability based upon a dynamic understanding of nature. As nature caIU1ot serve as a source 
of morality, this source is rather to be found in reason. But nature is not irrelevant to the 
grounding of normativity. In Norton nature is conceived of as holding a transformative value. 
Understood in this sense, experiences with nature have a formative impact on the construction of 
values. Here, value is understood as a considered preference, i.e. a preference subject to analysis 
and self-criticism. When Norton ascribes this nation of value to nature, it is apparent how he 
conceives of the basis of normativity in constructivist terms. Nature does not hold its value per 
se, but holds a value due to the formative impact it has on reasoning. Reason is considered the 
source of the construction of the values of nature which are to be taken into account in policy 
making. Understood in this sense, values is not something given. Rather value is seen as a constant 
process of construction.788 Therefore, there is not an objective value which is to be recognized. 
Value in Norton is constructed in relation to changing natura} and political conditions. 
This constructivist position in Norton' s understanding of the formation of value is also 
apparent in more explicit considerations of his conception of rationality. Rationality is understood 
in terms of its applicability to the political formation of values. A given viewpoint is seen as 
fundamental te1ms of their association. These principles are to regulate all further agreements; they specify 
the kinds of social cooperation that can be entered into and the forms of govemment that can be established. 
This way of regarding the principles ofjustice I shall call justice as fairness." 
786 Idem 1980. 
787 )dem 1996, 90 (note I ). 
788 Cf. 10.1.2 
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rational when it can be applied to the political value making. Rationality seems to be criteriologi-
cally determined according to its functionalistic expediency in the political construction of values. 
Therefore, Norton also advocates a pragmatic understanding of rationality. Rationality is 
determined by its political expediency. This is a central argument in Norton's thesis of 
convergence, put forward in Toward Unity among Enviromentalists. Rationality is here seen in 
terms of its usefulness in finding the most expedient way of salving political problems with regard 
to environmental issues.789 
In Sagoff a similar constructivist position was endorsed in his argument for nature as a 
reasonable value for the political community. On the basis of a comparison with a mathematical 
concept ofrationality, Sagoff argued that the nation of the deliberative reason encompasses an 
understanding of the political citizen as more than a consumer.790 When one does not focus only 
on preference satisfaction, but rather on values which are of importance to a particular political 
society, ane makes use of a deliberative reason, where relevant political values are determined on 
the basis of a public, political discourse. This is where Sagoff proves to be constructivist. The 
political values, among which are nonhuman nature, are not given values. Rather, they are 
determined on the basis of a mutual, argumentative discourse.791 Thereby they become public, 
intersubjective values of mutual interest to the citizens of the particular politicaI comrnunity. 
As is apparent from these main findings, the notion of constructivism is appropriated in 
natura! law thought and in environmental ethics. In the natura! law thought of Luther and Kant we 
find this notion and in the theories of environmental ethics in Norton and Sagoff. This suggests 
the viability of an appropriation of this mode of thought within both discourses. In the course of 
the argument of the thesis, it has also been demonstrated how Kantian and Rawlsian traits of 
thought are present in Sagoff.792 In Norton this idea is less evident, but is still there. The possible 
appropriation of a Kantian constructivism in environmental ethics is quite clear. Viewed the other 
way, the emphasis on moral reasoning in Norton and Sagoff may also be applied to natura! law 
thought. The same argument in favor of moral reasoning also plays a crucial role to the natura! law 
m Cf. I 0.2.3 
79° Cf. I 1.2.2 
791 Cf. 11. 1. I 
792 Cf. 11.1. l and 11.2.2 respectively. 
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theories of Luther and Kant. In both of these theories, moral reasoning is in itself an expression 
of natural law. For both moral reasoning is not dependent upon a notion of the normativity of 
nature. Moral reason stands alone, separated from nature as a source of normativity. 
This understartding of moral reasoning as an expression of natura! law is important when 
one wants to maintain a dynamic notion of natural law. The idea of natural law is often criticized 
for its static tendencies. This is not a necessary consequence of natural law when understood as 
moral reasoning. lf natura! law is seen is this way it also becomes much more useful as an ethical 
theory. On the other hand, this understanding of natural law also implies that there are no given 
norms which are to be considered as immutable expressions of natural law. The determination of 
the content of natural law is a constant process of construction. The demand of natura! law in this 
sense is always under change, always open for adaption to new circumstances. However, this idea 
of natura! law as an ongoing process of moral reasoning also raises important theological 
questions. We now turn to a discussion of some of these implications. 
14.2 The Theological Qualification of Moral Constructivism 
The idea of a constructivist basis of normatitivity raises important theological questions. How is 
the relation between this construction of normativity and the will of God as the source of 
normativity? In what sense is the will of God to be conceived of as the source of normativity? Is 
the concept of normativity different in a philosophical and in a theological context? 
In Luther we found an understanding of natura! law as having its basis in the will of God. 
Natural law was not part of man's nature as such, but was an expression ofthe continuous will 
ofGod. This was closely related to Luther's understanding of Creation, where God was also seen 
as present. Because of the value of Creation, God continuously gives all that is necessary to 
Creation and to keep up the good life for human beings. Creation is fundamentally permeated by 
the will of God. This forms a constituent insight ofLuther' s doctrine ofthe creatio continua which 
is very important to him. This idea is also part of the basis of his understanding of natura! law. 
Because Creation is continuously maintained by God, God also endows man with abilities of moral 
reasoning in order to equip man to take care of political life. In this sense God endows man with 
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sufficient abilities to become cooperators in political life. 793 Therefore, even if the nature of man 
is corrupted, he is still capable oftaking care of this political role, as natura! law (in the sense of 
moral reasoning) has its basis in the will of God and not in the nature of man. According to Luther 
the human being has full insight in moral law and has the ability to construct new decalogues. Tue 
formulation and construction of the moral demand is an ongoing process, where man has the 
responsibility of finding the most adequate expression of natura! law. The fundamental principles 
of natura] law, i.e. the golden rule and the commandment of charity, are given. But the continuous 
specification ofthe content of these norms are the responsibility of the human being on the basis 
of construction of moral principles. 
Now, where does this leave the will of God? Somewhat in line with Luther, one could 
say that this construction of moral principles is an expression of the Divine will. The moral 
reasoning of man is a God given circumstance. In this sense God leaves a space open for the 
arbitrary and the contingent. The moral principles are in general not conceived of as unchangeable 
and fixed. Rather they are part of a continuous, dynamic process where God expresses His will 
indifferent ways at different times. The will of God is not conceived of in static terms, but is rather 
to be seen as dynamic process. What is an expression of the commandment of charity at one time 
may be expressed in a different way at another time. This is the essential principle of Luther's 
understanding of natura} law as a correction to positive law. Moral constructivism in this sense is 
the pursuit offinding the most precise expression of natura] law. Understood in this way, moral 
reasoning is Divinely sanctioned. Moral reasoning is not seen as contrary to the will of God, but 
rather a way in which God has chosen to let His will forth. Theological constructivism in this sense 
is a continuous endeavour of perceiving the will of God. In concrete moral reasoning (i.e. process 
of construction) there is, however, no actual difference between the philosophical and theological 
constructivism. Both refer to standpoints of reasonableness and both seek mutual understanding 
793 Cf. Andersen 1997b for a discussion of Luther's concept of rationality, as part of a 
reconstruction ofLutheran ethics. Andersen gives an account ofleading contemporary nations of rationality, 
moving on to an exposition of significant features ofLutheran ethics, serving as the basis for concluding 
reflections on the reconstructed notion of a rational ity in Luth er. In this concluding part, Andersen argues that 
reason in Lutheran ethics should be understood as the reason of the Golden Rule. As the golden rule should 
be understood as containing elements of rational political ethics, reason in Luther may be seen in the light of 
Rawls' political philosophy (182f.). 
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and recognition of the soundness of one' s ideas.794 
If we regard this as theological constructivism, one important difference to philosophical 
constructivism does remain, however. In theological constructivism the basis of normativitiy is 
given in the nation of natura! law. In this sense it is realistic. It is the task of the moral agent to 
perceive this basis. Therefore, there is a basis of the theological constructivism, which qualifies and 
validates the truth of the constructed moral princip]es. At this point there is a marked difference 
between theological constructivism and Kantian constructivism. In Luther and Kant, therefore, 
quite different conclusions are drawn from the common pursuit of separating moral reasoning from 
the nation of the normativity of nature. Whereas Luther argues for the autonomy of God (or 
theonomy of moral reasoning, i.e. moral reasoning as permeated by the will of God), Kant 
emphasises the autonomy ofthe human being. Put sharply, one could say that Kant in comparison 
to Luther replaces God with man.795 
Even if Luther has this strong emphasis on the will of God, this does not lead him to an 
endorsement of a theory similar to a Divine Command theory, as we find it in contemporary moral 
theology. According to Frankena, proponents of such a theory would argue that right and wrong 
is detennined by what is commanded or forbidden by God. 796 Any moral question is determined 
by reference to its being comrnanded or forbidden by God. This idea is to be distinguished from 
two other nations. (i) Frankena distinguishes this theory from the idea that God" ... reveals the 
794 In Rawls' Political Liberalism it is an essential idea that reasonable comprehensive doctrines 
of various kinds may establish an overlapping consensus on political justice (1996, l 33ff.). This public 
conception of justice is considered independent of comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines 
(144). As such it is presumed that citiziens ofopposing, reasonable doctrines may agree on political issues. 
In his la test work The Law of Peoples ( 1999) this idea of public reason is developed further, in order to make 
it more plausible that people of various comprehensive doctrines reasonably can endorse this viewpoint 
( 129ff.). 
795 This idea of course raises important theological considerations. However, as a discussion ofthis 
idea would lead the present aim of our argument in a different direction, a further reflection on this issue must 
be laid as ide. This is not to I essen the importance of this question, but to keep the focus ofthe present pursuit 
in mind. 
796 Frankena 19732, 28: ''Proponents of this view [i.e. the the Di vine Command Theory] sometimes 
hold that ·'right" and "wrong" mean, respectively, commanded and forbidden by God, but even if they do not 
define '"right" and "wrong" in this way, they all hold that an action or kind of action is right or wrong if and 
only of and because it is cornrnanded or forbidden by God, or, in other words, that what ultirnately makes an 
action right or wrong is its being comrnanded or forbidden by God and nothing else." 
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moral law to a man.kind otherwise incapable of knowing adequately what is right and wrong ... "797 
Although the moral law may coincide with the will of God, it is not qualified as right because it 
is commanded by God. It may be right anyway. (ii) Even if Frankena' s description of this other 
understanding of the relation between the moral law and the will of God gives a precise account 
of the classical difference between a theological moral realism and voluntarism, a further 
understanding of the will of God also seems to be a possibility. According to this idea, moral 
reasoning has its basis in the will of God. In this sense, one could argue for a theological 
voluntarism as the basis of normativity. However, this does not mean that all actions are viewed 
in the light of their accordance with the command of God. God does not command right and 
wrong in every little detail of every day life. Rather, God wills that man is endowed with abilities 
of moral reasoning, enabling him to approximate to the will of God. This latter understanding 
seems to be the understanding of the will of God that we find in Luther. This also saves Luther 
from some of the difficulties of a traditional Di vine Command Theory. 798 
Even if Luther cannot be seen as representing a Divine Command Theory, he still 
emphasises the necessity of the will of God as the basis of normativity. Luther is still to be 
conceived of as a theological voluntarist. This understanding seems to come close to Samuel 
Pufendorf s understanding of the necessity of a lawgiver, in order fora law to qualify as lmv. 
Pufendorf shares Luth er' s and Kant' s emphasis on the basis of natura! law in reason, even if this 
does not entail an endorsement of natural law as a necessary part of reason. However, Pufendorf 
makes a remarkable point which demonstrates his position between Luther and Kant. For 
Pufendorf it is important that a law must have a lawgiver in order to qualify as law. There must 
be a lawgiving authority. Pufendorf emphasises tbis point in political laws, but argues also in favor 
of this idea in his deliberations on natural law. This implies a common idea with Luther with 
797 Ibid. 
798 Frankena gives an account of some ofthe implied problems ofthe theological vofuntarist idea 
that anything which God commands is right. If what is commanded is only qualified by reference to the will 
of God, could this imply that cruel things could be commanded? According to most theological voluntarists 
this would be seen as an absurd consequence ofthis idea. The idea ofthe goodness of God would prevent such 
consequences. On the other hand, this raises a problem of circularity in the argument. How can one ascribe 
the moral quality of goodness to God, when the only way of knowing the good is determined by the very 
source which it is attemted to qualify as good? Cf. Frankena I 9732, 29f. for further retlections on this 
dilemma. 
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respect to Luther's advocacy ofthe voluntarist basis ofnatural law. In this sense Pufendorf proves 
himself to be a genuine Lutheran. However, hereby he also marks the transition to Kant, as this 
insistence on the necessity of a lawgiver also may be said to be present in Kant's nation of 
autonomy. Kant also argues in favor of the necessity of a lawgiver, only the lawgiver is not 
thought of as an extemal lawgiver. In Kant the human being is its own lawgiver, which forms the 
basis of the imperative character of the law. 799 
Taken that these reflections characterize some main aspects of the concept of moral 
normativity, a following question is, if there is a difference between philosophical and theological 
normativity. In the light ofthe findings of the present thesis, it seems appropriate to argue for the 
similarity and difference at the same time. The similarity may be endorsed with reference to the 
fundamental constructivist basis of normativity which may be found in the philosphical as well as 
the theological sources of the present work. The difference must be kept in mind with regard to 
the understanding of a necessary extrinsic source of normativity. Whereas theological constructi-
vism argues in favour of such an extrinsic source, this is not the case for philosophical 
constructivism. 
14.3 The Expediency ofNature 
These reflections on the constructivist basis of normativity have focused on the concept of reason. 
This does not mean that the notion of nature has been set aside in the grounding of morality. But 
it has played an indirect role. The question is now, if these different understandings of moral 
reason could be said to support an understanding of nature, were we find somewhat similar traits 
in natura! law thought and environmental ethics. I will argue that this is the case in the 
understanding of nature as expedient or the expediency of naturalness. I am aware of the amoral 
implications ofthe nation of expediency. This is precisely a point of mine. It is on the basis ofthis 
nonnormative aspect of nature that nature may be included in a reasonable construction of moral 
values. Precisely because of its nonnormative aspects, nature in this sense is morally qualified on 
the basis of the moral theory of which it is a part, rather than on the basis of an intrinsic value. 
799 For references to Pufendorf's writings, see my forthcoming article on Kant and environmental 
ethics. Apart from a comparison of Sagoff, Taylor, and Kant, the article also contains a brief discussion on 
Luther and Pufendorf in the light of a Kantian standpoint. 
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Furthermore, there is a point in using the concept of expediency rather than utility, as I hereby aim 
at a deontological orientation in the argument. Moreover, by arguing that nature holds a moral 
value on basis of its expediency, I argue that the concem for nature is based on principles of 
responsibility. 
The idea of the expediency of nature has been present in several of the theories of natural 
law and environrnental ethics in the present thesis. In Kant this was clear in his understanding of 
nature as a type ofthe moral law. Here Kant argues that nature does not serve as the basis of the 
moral law. However, as the concem of the practical power ofjudgment is the scheme ofthe law, 
phaenomenal nature serves as an analogy to the moral law on the basis of its corresponding 
scheme of law. The form ofthe laws ofnature in the phaenomenal world serve as a type ofthe 
moral law. This is the main argument in his Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. In Grundlegung zur 
Metaphysik der Sitten his argument of the analogy between the laws of nature and the practical 
formation of the categorical imperative seems to be taking a similar course. Here Kant is endorsing 
the formal similarity in the concept oflawfullness. One's maxim is to be tested in the light of 
universal laws of nature. Only if the maxim of one' s action could be applied as a universal natura! 
law, is one to aet accordingly. Consequently, when the maxims are contrary to the form of the 
natura! laws that constitute the natural order, they are morally impossible. The phaenomenal nature 
serves as a type of the intelligible nature ofthe moral law.800 Essential to this argument, however, 
is Kant's emphasis on the hypothetical, regulative character of this analogy between the laws of 
the phaenomenal world and the moral law. There is no essential identity between the two. It 
merely serves as a hypothetical analogy.801 This is where Kant' s understanding of the nonhuman 
nature as expedient. Nature serves the expedient purpose of being a type of the moral law. It does 
not have a value in itself. In this sense nature is conceived of as amoral. In this aspect of nature, 
its purpose is to serve as an expedient analogy of the moral law. 
The nation of the expediency of nature is also found in Norton. This is the case in his 
argument for the transformative value of nature.802 The value of nature in this sense serves the 
expedient purpose of having a formative impact on the political reasoning of citizens. This 
800 Cf. 6.3. 1 
80 1 Ibid. 
802 Cf. e.g. 14.1 
250 
Reason as the Basis of Normativity 
understanding of the value of nature comes quite cl ose to the Kantian understanding nature as a 
type of the moral law. 
In Sagoff we find a further argument in favor of the expediency of nature. Sagoff does 
speak of an intrinsic value of nature, but his notion of intrincity deviates so much from a more 
common use ofthis term that it would have been more appropriate to use a different terminology. 
When Sagoff gives an account of his understanding of the concept of value, he does this by 
comparing values with preferences. In contrast to preferences, values are considered intersubjecti-
ve. Values express something one has in common with others. Due to the intersubjectivity, values 
are also seen as neutral in the sense that they do not express subjective wants. Rather, they are 
subject to a common public assessment.803 When this understanding is applied to his notion of 
intrinsic values, he argues that the intrinsic value of nature is based upon what nature means to 
humans, not what nature can do for humans. Even if Sagoff endorses this as a notion of intrincity, 
it does not differ essentially from his understanding of nature as a cultural value. In the latter kind 
of value, nature is valued because it expresses who we are and what we stand for. Therefore, 
nature has a formative impact on the shaping of the identity of the citizens. It is as an expression 
of values of a particular nation that nature is valued. 804 
I argue that this is a quite clear demonstration of an understanding of nature as expedient. 
Nature does not hold a value per se, but is valued because it serves the expedient purpose of 
having a formative impact on the identity shaping of the citizens. This identity is the basis of the 
individual to take part in the public discussion on common values which are to be protected. 
Consequently, it is the expediency of nature with regard to its impact on public reasoning which 
serves as the justification of the protection of nature as a political value. 
Whereas these deliberations have demonstrated how an understanding ofthe expediency 
of nature seems to be part ofthe ethical theories ofKant, Norton and Sagoff, they do not conceive 
of moral reasoning itself as expedient. This seems, however, to be the case in Norton and Luther. 
As for Norton this has already been demonstrated in his pragmatic understanding of rationality. 
Rationality here was seen in tem1s of its usefullness in political problemsolving. 805 In Luther there 
so3 Cf. I I. I. I 
804 Cf. 11 .1.2 
805 Cf. e.g. 14.1 
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seems to be a somewhat similar understanding of the purpose of natura! law. An important 
purpose of natura! Iaw is God' s intention to govem the wordly regime through the endowment 
of human beings with the abilities of moral reasoning. Therefore, the purpose of natura! law is 
determined by its efficiency with regard to God's continuous care for creation. Natural law derives 
its legitimacy from this circumstance.806 Very much the same could be said for Luther's 
understanding of practical reason, as practical reason to a far extent is understood as the 
recognition of natura! law. 
Even if these last comrnents focus more on the expediency of moral reasoning than the 
expediency of nature, there is an analogy in the notion of expediency. Within these theories of 
natura! law and environmental ethics, nature and reason are viewed in terms of expediency. 
However, even ifthis appears to entail amoral devaluation of these notions, this is not necessarily 
the case. Rather, this is to be seen as an argument for the moral qualification of natura! law with 
respect to its subject. Natura! law does not serve its purpose in an empty space. Rather, natura! 
law is justified in the light of the respect for its subject. Furthermore, nature should not be 
regarded as morally irrelevant, even if it is not seen as a normative concept. The moral 
qualification of nature does not lie in nature itself, but in its impact on moral reasoning. 
These reflections lead to a suggestion of an appropriation of the notion of responsibility 
in a use of natura! law as the basis of environmental ethics. Etymologically this concept seems to 
be deri ved from the latin respondere or responsum. The original context of this notion was a 
juridical setting, where one was to justify one's acts in the sense that one was to reply to the 
charges brought against you. This meaning of the word is also present in the German Ver-
antwortung and the Danish an-svar. Because of an appropriation of this notion in mediaeval 
Christian theology, the idea of responsibility was also viewed in the light of one' s j ustification 
before God. Hereby the notion became more associated with individual ethical connotations. 807 
In recent philosophy this concept has been appropriated in various ways, also within environmental 
ethics. 808 In the present context this notion may also be said to hold a useful potential. The notion 
806 Cf. 5.1.3 
807 Fora general introduction to the notion of responsibility, cf. e.g. Schwartllinder 1974. 
808 In evironmental ethics, Hans Jonas' Das Prinzip Verantwortung ( 1979) is maybe the most 
wellknown appropriation ofthis notion. Cf. Kvassman I 999, 91-125 for one ofthe more recent discussions 
on Jonas. In this dissertation, Kvassman provides a critical comparison ofthe environmental ethics ofHolmes 
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of expediency has been demonstrated in natural law thought and environmental ethics. This idea 
may also be appropriated in an understanding of the responsibility for nature. When nature is 
considered expdient, it does not hold amoral value in itself. The moral value is determined by tbe 
purpose nature serves. As we have seen in Kant, Norton and Sagoff, nature serves the purpose 
of having an impact on moral reasoning. In other words, moral reasoning is derived from the 
concept of nature, but it is influenced by the moral agent' s encounter with nature. In that sense, 
moral reasoning is a response to the encounter with nature. Consequently, it may be said that 
moral responsibility arises out ofthe human being's encounter with e.g. nonhuman nature.809 This 
irnplies two points: (1) Nonhuman nature is neither morally qualified nor morally irrelevant. The 
moral qualification does not lie in nature itself, but rather in the encounter with nature. However, 
as the encounter with nature gives rise to moral responsibility, this also entails that nature serves 
a moral purpose. (2) As the human being recognizes the moral demand of responding to nature, 
there must be some kind of interrelatedness between the human being and nonhuman nature. 
However, as the demand of moral responsibility is only raised to the moral agent, i.e. the human 
Rolston III, Knud E. Løgstrup and Hans Jonas. This serves as the basis for an outline ofweakly biocentric 
environmental ethics, based upon four conditions, which are considered essential to a viable environrnental 
ethics, i.e. the condition ofprioritizing, consistency, experience and human dignity. 
809 Despite the merits of Jakob WoLrs recent book, Etikken og universet (1997), this work Jacks 
a more detalied discussion on the special moral responsibility of the human being. Wolff argues that an 
important basis of environmental ethics is the encounter with nature. Rather than to see nature as something 
scientifically objective, one should view nature in the light of one's senses. The sensual encounter with nature 
gives rise to a recognition ofthe individual beings ofnature as demanding respect. "Når vi sanser verden 
igennem vore naturlige sanser og forstår verden igennem vort almindelige dagligsprog, så ser vi ikke verden 
og de væsener, der lever i den som objekter, som upersonlige ting og funktioner. Vi ser dem som mennesker, 
dyr og planter. Vi ser dem som personer og levende væsener, der præsenterer sig. De præsenterer sig som 
enestående individer og arter i verdens mangfoldighed. Naturens væsener og vækster viser sig aldrig som 
blotte overlevelsesfunktioner. De viser sig som levende væsener, der udtrykker sig og præsenterer sig, og er 
omgivet af en zone af respekt. Og som sådanne står vi i et etisk forhold til dem." (13) The mutuality between 
nonhuman nature and human beings serves as the basis ofethics (120). However, when Wolffargues forthe 
special role ofthe human being as amoral agent, he seems to deviate from the main ideas ofhis work. Having 
argued throughout the book that the senses serve as the basis of an awareness of the moral relationship 
between human beings and nature, he suddenly argues for the special moral role of the human being. "Dette 
[i.e. the senses as the basis of moral awareness] indebærer alt sammen ikke, at der ikke er forskel på 
mennesker og dyr eller dyrene indbyrdes etisk set. Det er f eks. kun mennesket, der har et etisk ansvar og er 
et etisk handlingsvæsen. Det hænger sammen med, at det kun er mennesket, der har selvbevidsthed. Et dyr 
f.eks. har ingen selvbevidsthed og fri vilje og derfor heller ikke noget ansvar. Dyret kan ikke stilles til ansvar 
for sine handlinger, som mennesket kan." (132) I do not think that he provides a sufficient j ustification of the 
relation between (i) the unity ofnonhuman nature and human beings and (ii) the human beings emergence out 
ofthis relationship, due to his or her special moral role. 
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being, the difference between hwnan beings and nonhuman nature is also implied. Consequently, 
whereas the moral relationship is reciprocal, the moral responsibility is only directed at the human 
being. 
Some of these last cornments have touched upon the interrelatedness of nature and reason 
as the basis of normativity. Having slightly preempted the discussion of the last chapter, we now 
tum to a consideration of this issue. 
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Nature and Reason 
In the two preceding chapters, the normative notion of nature and reason have been assessed. 
Thereby the reflections on the main notions ofthe thesis were concluded. In this last chapter the 
remaining question on the possibility of endorsing an interrelatedness of nature and reason will be 
assessed. This forms the concem of the first part of the present chapter. In the last part of the 
chapter, the tindings of the thesis will be concluded in the light of the two theses of the study. 
Rather than providing a summary of the results of the thesis, it will be attempted briefly to 
comment on the main tindings. 
15.1 Natural Reason Reshaped 
The thesis was commenced with a quotation which identified nature and reason. On the basis of 
this identification, it was asked if such an idea could be endorsed in a contemporary setting. Until 
now, the thesis has argued that it is possible to reshape the notion of the normativity of nature and 
reason respectively in natura! law thought on the basis of insights from environmental ethics. The 
question which follows from there is, if nature and reason can serve as a mutual basis of 
normativity. Is it necessary for nature and reason to be treated isolated from each other? In what 
sense can one speak ofnatural reason? Even ifthe thesis has provided an argument for anormative 
concept of nature and reason, the idea of the interrelatedness between nature and reason may be 
seen as a hallmark of natura! law. Therefore, the thesis is concluded with tentative reflections on 
this notion. 
It appears that a normative conception of natura! reason can be endorsed on the basis of 
two arguments which may be extracted from the analysis of the thesis. According to the first of 
these arguments, the human being's abilities of reasoning are not seen as being in conflict with the 
understanding of the human being as a natura! being. Rather, moral reasoning is seen as an 
expression of the human being as a natura! being. This was the case in the natura! law thought of 
Melanchthon and Wolff. In Melanchthon this was apparent in his understanding of the light of 
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nature in human reason. This light of nature was understood as rays ofDivine wisdom which also 
permeated nature. Therefore the natura} law which was recognized as moral law was essentially 
identical to the Iaws of nonhuman nature. In this sense the laws of reason and the laws of nature 
were seen as analogous.81 0 In Wolff a similar notion was endorsed. Wolffs understanding ofthe 
interrelatedness of nature and reason became apparent in his notion of obligation. In Wolff nature 
is considered as the source of obligation along with reason. Whereas nature can be seen as passive 
obligation, reason may be considered as the more active obligation.811 However, in Wolff a tension 
remains in his understanding ofthe relation between nature and reason as the basis of normativity. 
When Wolff recognizes the idea of the freedom of the human being, he still maintains the notion 
of nature as the determinative basis af moral life. 812 Among the theories of environmental ethics 
which have been discussed in the present study, this idea is also found in e.g. Rolston. Rolston 
represents a clear example of this understanding, when he argues in favor of a naturalized ethics. 
Rolston explicitly argues that the homeostatic laws of ecology prescribe ethical duties. On the 
basis of an ecological consideration one must endorse the unity of nature and ethics. However, 
even if there is such a unity ane must still maintain morality as something characteristic of human 
beings as distinct from nonhuman nature. Human beings have a special ability to reflect on moral 
issues, even if nature is still considered as the womb that humans never really leave.81 3 
According to the second argument, the nation of natura! reason may be endorsed on the 
basis of an exposition of the notion of community. Just as it was argued in the theories of land 
ethics that morality could not be separated from the biotic community, likewise it was argued in 
Norton and Sagoff that the political community had a formative impact on moral reasoning. 814 
Foliowing this argument, the notion af comrnunity may be appropriated in a reformulation of 
natura! reason. Reasoning always takes place within a given community, whether biotic, political, 
or other kinds of communities. Therefore, one possible course of reformulating the notion of 
natura! reason would be a political philosophical reformulation of this notion. Natura! is here seen 
81° Cf. 3.2.1 
811 Cf. 4.2.1 
812 Cf. 4.2.2 
81 3 Cf. 7.2.1 
814 Cf. I 0.2.2 and 11.2 
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more figuratively in the sense of a symbol hinting at the contextuality of moral reasoning. In the 
natura! law theories of e.g. Luther and Melanchthon there is a close link between natura! law and 
political reasoning. Their theories of natura! law are closely related to their understanding of the 
politi ca! realm. 81 5 This suggests the viability of undertaking a reformulation of natura! law in the 
light of political philosophy or theology. Such a reformulation would replace a traditional nation 
of natura! arder with amore dynarnic concept of community. Both of these ideas emphasize the 
formative impact of a given context on moral reasoning. The advantage of the nation of 
community is the enhanced potential of adaption in reflection upon moral issues. Whereas a 
traditional nation of arder could imply a stagnant tendency, this tendency would be lessened with 
the appropriation of the idea of a cornrnunity. 
Common to both of these arguments is the understanding that the human being as a 
rational moral agent is not an isolated being, but rather a relational being. Moral reflection always 
tak.es place within a given context. In the case of the first argument, the human being remains a 
natura! being, even when reflecting on moral issues. In the second argument, the moral agent 
remains a member of polis when reasoning on ethical questions. Therefore, one could say that the 
context which one is a part of is the objective reality, whereas moral reasoning is the subjective 
reality. This context may be understood as nature in a concrete sense (i.e. natura! order og biotic 
cornrnunity) or more figuratively (i.e. the political comrnunity). As part of nature in either one of 
these two senses, the human being is a natura! and reasonable being at the same time. Nature and 
reason are imbedded in each other. Retuming to the quotation with which the thesis was 
commenced, it appears that it is still possible to argue for reason as part of nature. beings among 
the theories analyzed in the thesis, this question 
15.2 Nature and Reason Concluded 
Throughout the thesis the main concems have been a critical analysis ofthe nations of nature and 
reason. This analysis has focused on select theories of natura! law and environmental ethics. The 
aim of the thesis has been to establish a tentative reconstruction of nature and reason as normative 
concepts. This work can now be concluded. As the two chapters preceding the present (i.e. 
815 Cf. 5.2. 1 and 3.3.2 
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Chapter 13 and 14) have summarized the main findings of the thesis by means of a constructive 
summary, such a summary will not be repeated here. Instead the focus will be a conclusion on the 
two theses of the study. 
In the two preceding chapters, it was demonstrated how a similarity in the justification 
of moral normativity in natural law thought and environmental ethics may be endorsed on the basis 
of the results of the present study. In both natural law thought and environmental ethics the idea 
of the human being as a natural being plays a central role. Tue human being is not just embedded 
in nature. Rather, the human being is nature. Therefore, there is no ontological difference between 
nonhuman nature and the human being. This idea of the naturalness of the human being lays the 
foundation of the claim of both discourses that the human being is to live in accordance with 
nature. Characteristically, both natural law theories and theories of environmental ethics are 
therefore also challenged by the critique of committing a naturalistic fallacy. Whether this implies 
a rej ection of these theories was discussed briefly. 
In the theories of natura! law and environmental ethics where the focus is on the concept 
of reason, it was also argued that one finds a similar argument of the justification of moraJ 
normavitity. lt was demonstrated how a constructivist scheme of thought characterized Luther, 
Kant, Norton, and Sagoff. As this idea implies a challenge to theological ethics, it was also 
demonstrated how one could understand a theological constructivism. Lastly, it was argued that 
within these theories nature seems to be regarded in terms of expediency. 
Tue demonstration of these similarities in the underlying justification of the theories of 
natural law and environmental ethics have an essential bearing on the two theses which have 
formed the assumption of the study. The first thesis had an analytical character. Here it was 
presumed that one could find a metaethicaJ resemblance in natural law thought and environmental 
ethics, and that two modes of argumentation could be found, namely (i) a naturalist, ontological 
mode of thought and (ii) a constructivist, voluntarist scheme of argumentation. Furthermore, it 
was presumed that this common basis could provide the basis of an appropriation of mutual 
insights. This thesis can now be concluded affirmatively. Throughout the thesis, but in particular 
in the chapters 13 and 14 this common basis was described. In natura! law thought and 
environmental ethics we find common justifications of the normativity of nature and reason. 
Furthermore, a tentative use of the mutual insights in the normativity of nature and reason 
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suggested the viability of viewing these theories in the light of each other. 
This leads on to the second thesis of the study, where it was assumed that a metaethical 
reevaluation of natural law thought in the light of environmental ethics might prove worthwhile 
for a renewed use of this ethical theory within ethics in general and in environrnental ethics in 
particular. Along with the first thesis, this second thesis may also be concluded affirmativeiy. 
However, the affirmative conclusion is not as obvious here as with regard to the fonner thesis. 
Thus, it has been demonstrated that the metaethical reevaluation of natural law in the light of 
environmental ethics has proved usefull fora renewed assessment of this theory. It has also been 
demonstrated that this metaethical reevaluation may provide environmental ethics with a natura} 
law basis. However, with regard to the use ofthis moral theory in ethics in general, the affirmative 
conclusion is more hesitant. The plausible appropriation of natural law in ethics in general has been 
argued more indirectly. As a theory of moral reasoning it certainly can be applied to other fields 
of ethics. However, a substantial account of such an appropriation of natura! law lies beyond the 
present thesis. 
Having concluded the present study, the question must be raised, what perspectives do 
these findings imply? As remarked in the introduction to the thesis, the discussion on the relation 
between nature and reason as the source of normativity has been an ongoing dispute within 
Western theology and philosophy. The present thesis may be seen as yet another contribution to 
this field of inquiry. Taken as such the thesis is merely a footstep on this path. Even ifthis may 
tum out to be an endless journey, the theological and philosophical importance of these issues 
necessitates a continuous reflection on the notions of nature and reason as normative concepts. 
The stance which is taken on these concepts has a fundamental bearing on almost all ethical issues, 
whether e.g. biomedical or political. The thesis has only accomplished a tentative contribution to 
a reformulated notion of the normativity of nature and reason. Ifthe understanding ofthe relation 
between nature and reason as sources of normativity is to be developed further, one possible 
course of such an enterprise could be an engagement in the discussion on the relation between 
biology and ethics. Apart from the fundamental theological challenges implied in this field of 
discussion, the ethical aspects are also absolutely essential. This field is already heavily burdened 
with a continuous flow of literature, which has been the most important reason for a delimitation 
of this discussion from the present study. The affinity of this field with the present study, could, 
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Anliggendet med nærværende ph.d. afhandling har været at redegøre for forståelsen af natur- og 
fornufts begrebet indenfor en luthersk naturretstradition og nutidig miljøetik. Idet disse begreber 
gennemgående har været de centrale foci for undersøgelsen og bl.a. er blevet belyst ud fra et 
metaetisk begrebsapparat, er det blevet vurderet, hvorvidt der består en lighed i begrundelsen for 
normativitet indenfor disse to forskellige diskurser, ligesom spørgsmålet er blevet stillet, hvorvidt 
disse to diskurser kan bringes i et konstruktivt forhold til hinanden. Resultatet af arbejdet med 
denne problemstilling sammenfattes hermed. 
Afhandlingens indledende hoveddel udgøres af to kapitler. Kapitel 1 giver en 
introduktion til problemstillingen. Denne introduktion sætter afhandlingens genstandsområde i 
perspektiv ud fra dels spørgsmålet om den fortsatte relevans af forestillingen om en naturlig lov, 
dels en diskussion af den nutidige miljøetiks forhold til klassisk teologisk og filosofisk tænkning. 
Dette giver grundlag for formuleringen af afhandlingens to hovedteser. Den første af disse antager 
en metaetisk lighed i grundlaget for (i) en før-moderne og tidlig moderne protestantisk 
naturretstænkning og (ii) en nutidig miljøetik. Videre antages det, at to distinkte argumentations-
måder kan demonstreres indenfor disse diskurser, nemlig en naturalistisk, ontologisk forestilling 
på den ene side og en konstruktivistisk, voluntaristisk på den anden. Dette forventes at bringe 
retfærdiggørelsen af disse to diskurser så tæt på hinanden, at det er muligt at anvende gensidige 
indsigter som grundlag for henholdsvis en naturretstænkning og en miljøetisk teori. Den anden 
af teserne antager, at det på baggrund af en revurdering af en luthersk naturretstænkning i lyset 
af miljøetiske indsigter må være muligt at argumentere for en genanvendelse af denne naturretstra-
dition i etik generelt og i miljøetik i særdeleshed. Dette indledende kapitel giver dernæst en 
oversigt over afhandlingens argumentationsgang, ligesom der anføres nogle bemærkninger om 
metode og terminologi. Slutteligt gives en forskningsoversigt, hvor afhandlingens forskningsbidrag 
søges påvist. 
Kapitel 2 giver et overblik over de væsentligste metaetiske hovedbegreber, der inddrages 
i afhandlingen. Denne oversigt deles i to underdele, der korresponderer med afhandlingens 
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antagelse om to hovedbegrundelsesmønstre. I den første del defineres realismebegrebet idet dette 
sættes i forhold til en metaetisk naturalisme. Dette sammenlignes endvidere med ideen om en 
ontologisk begrundelse af etikken. I anden underdel redegøres først for Humes og Moores 
forståelse af henholdvis det problematiske i en slutning fra er til bør og problemet i den såkaldte 
naturalistiske fejlslutning. Dernæst redegøres for forståelsen af konstruktivismebegrebet indenfor 
metaetikken og forestillingen om et voluntaristisk grundlag for etikken. 
Afhandlingens anden hoveddel består af fire kapitler, hvori naturretstænkningen gøres til 
genstand for nærmere diskussion. I de to første kapitler ( der udgør denne hoveddels første 
underdel) gøres der rede for forståelser af den naturlige lov, hvor der er en vægtlægning af 
naturbegrebet som kilde til normativiteten. Kapitel 3 giver en redegørelse for Philipp Melanch-
thons forståelse af forholdet mellem natur og fornuft i hans begrundelse for den naturlige lov. Det 
angives indledningsvis, at der er en indre udvikling fra den tidlige til den sene Melanchthons 
forståelse af den naturlige lov. Forestillingen om en naturlig lov bliver en stadigt mere indarbejdet 
del af hans teologi. Grundlaget for Melanchthons forståelse af den naturlige lov er hans 
skabelsesteologi. På grundlag af den orden, der gør sig gældende i skaberværket, argumenterer 
Melanchthon for, at den naturlige lov viser sig som en erkendelse af denne orden ( der også viser 
sig som en etisk orden). Særligt hos den senere Melanchthon argumenteres for denne erkendelses 
fremtræden for fornuften som et naturens lys. På denne baggrund bestemmes Melanchthons 
begrundelse for den naturlige lov som naturalistisk. Dette sammenlignes videre med hans forståelse 
af forholdet mellem menneskets natur og den naturlige lov. Her påvises det også, hvorledes denne 
naturalistiske begrundelse implicerer tanken om, at den menneskelige natur stemmer overens med 
fordringen fra den naturlige lov. 
Kapitel 4 gør rede for Christian Wolffs forståelse af samme begrebspar i spørgsmålet om 
begrundelsen for den naturlige lov. Også Christian Wolff gør den opfattelse gældende, at der 
består en nær sammenhæng mellem natur og moralsk normativitet. Wolffs moralfilosofi har en 
meget systematisk karakter, hvor kapitlet indledes med en gengivelse af hans metode samt nogle 
grundlæggende begreber. Blandt disse grundlæggende begreber gør bl.a. forestillingen om 
fuldkommenhed sig gældende. Denne ide indtager en central rolle i etikken, hvor det er et mål for 
ens handlinger, at de skal bidrage til at gøre ens tilstand mere fuldkommen. Samtidig argumenterer 
Wolff dog for, at det er naturen, der forpligter mennesket på denne handlingsregel om tilstræbelse 
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af fuldkommenheden. Denne forestilling er indeholdt i begrebet om det gode. Det er ikke defineret 
af nogen udefra kommende norm, som f.eks. Guds vilje. Således forestiller Wolff sig naturen som 
kilden til det gode. Naturen forpligter mennesket til den etiske gode handling. Herved viser Wolff 
sig som et klart eksempel på dels en slutning fra er til bør, dels en naturalistisk argumentation. 
Denne opfattelse er videre begrundet i hans forestilling om analogien mellem det fysiske og 
moralske gode. Således forpligter den naturlige lov også mennesket til perfektionering af den 
menneskelige natur. Dette rejser nogle afgørende problemer for Wolff ved hans opfattelse af 
menneskets frihed. Kan han undgå en deterministisk opfattelse af menneskets handlingsliv? Selv 
om hans opfattelse af den naturlige lovs nødvendighed og uforanderlighed hænger sammen med 
hans ontologi, hvorfor mennesket ikke kan undtages fra denne naturlige forpligtelse, er han selv 
af den opfattelse, at han fastholder rum for det enkelte menneskes frihed. Hvor naturen udøver en 
passiv forpligtelse af mennesket, gør fornuften en aktiv forpligtelse gældende. På dette punkt 
kommer natur og fornuft i et tæt forhold til hinanden. 
I de to sidste kapitler i denne hoveddel (der udgør denne hoveddels anden underdel) 
fremhæver de inddragne naturretstænkere fomuftsbegrebet som centralt i spørgsmålet om 
normativitetens begrundelse. I kapitel 5 gives der således en redegørelse for Martin Luthers 
vægtlægning af rationalitetsbegrebet i hans forståelse af den naturlige lov. Til forskel fra 
Melanchthon argumenterer Luther for en forståelse af den naturlige lov, hvor vægten ikke bliver 
lagt på sammenhængen mellem natur og fornuft. Selv om Luther i lighed med Melanchthon forstår 
den naturlige lov i lyset af sin skabelseslære, hvor også Luther fremhæver den protestantiske tanke 
om Guds nærvær i skaberværket, indebærer dette ikke, at der bliver en lignende sammenhæng 
mellem en naturlig orden og en naturlig lov. Dette til trods for, at der er træk ved Luther, hvor han 
synes at argumentere for en forståelse af naturen som grundlag for den moralske orden. For Luther 
er et af de væsentlige træk i hans skabelsesforståelse tanken om Guds fortsatte skabelse. Dette 
indebærer, at også den naturlige lov forstås i dette lys. Selv om han kan adskille sin forståelse af 
menneskets natur og dets erkendelse af den naturlige lov. Som følge af sin forståelse af 
syndefaldets indvirkning på menneskets natur kan Luther tale om fordærvet af menneskets natur 
samtidig med, at han fastholder dets erkendelse af den naturlige lov. Den naturlige lov beror ikke 
på menneskets natur, men på Guds vilje. Menneskets erkendelse af den naturlige lov er udtryk for 
Guds fortsatte opretholdelse af skaberværket, hvorfor Han udruster mennesket med denne 
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erkendelse og dermed dueligheden til at tage vare om det politiske regime. Udrustningen af 
mennesket med erkendelsen af den naturlige lov kommer til udtryk ved, at Gud indskriver den 
naturlige lov i menneskets fornuft. Den naturlige lov er hos Luther således primært en fornuftslov. 
Det er i kraft af denne forestilling om fornuften som sæde for den naturlige lov, at Luther kan tale 
om den naturlige lovs universalitet. I kraft af sin karakter som fornuftslov skal positive love (både 
bibelske og politiske) således vurderes i lyset af denne med henblik på bestemmelse af deres 
normative gyldighed. I sammenhæng med denne opfattelse siger Luther endvidere, at mennesket 
kan konstruere nye og klarere dekaloger. Indholdsbestemmelsen af den naturlige lov er med andre 
ord en fortsat, åben proces. Det er ikke mindst dette punkt, der giver anledning til afhandlingens 
læsning afLuther som teologisk konstruktivist. Indholdsbestemmelsen af den moralske fordring 
viser sig ved fornuftens fortsatte, kritiske formulering af dette. Endelig påvises Luthers forståelse 
af spørgsmålet om forholdet til den naturlige lov. Her gør Luther den opfattelse gældende, at alene 
det kristne menneske har et forhold til den naturlige lov som Guds kærlige vilje. For det ikke-
kristne menneske vil den fremtræde som en lovens fordring. 
Kapitel 6 giver en fremstilling af Immanuel Kants fremhævelse af rationalitetsbegrebet 
som det centrale i diskussionen om normativitetens kilde. Indledningsvis forklares det, hvordan 
forholdet mellem natur og fornuft kan siges at være et helt central spørgsmål for Kants etik. Dog 
indebærer hans forståelse af dette forhold også, at han ofte ikke anses for repræsentant for ideen 
om en naturlig lov. Kapitlet forsøger dog at påvise, at Kants moralfilosofi grundlæggende er at 
opfatte som en naturlig lov teori . Først gives der en redegørelse for Kants forståelse af forholdet 
mellem kausalitet og frihed. Idet Wolffs position fremhæves som modsætningen til Kant, redegøres 
der for Kants forståelse af den tredje antinomi. Med henblik på menneskets handlingsliv antager 
denne menneskets nødvendige frihed fra naturlovene. Da handlingerne dog finder sted indenfor 
naturverdenens årsagssammenhæng, ender vurderingen af forholdet mellem natur og frihed i en 
selvmodsigelse. Idet dette danner udgangspunktet for redegørelsen for Kant, rettes opmærksomhe-
den dernæst mod hans forståelse af fornuften som grundlag for etikken. 
Som første punkt gøres der rede for hans forståelse af frihed og autonomi. Frihedsbegre-
bet sættes her i relation til de naturlige love. Dette indebærer et dobbelt frihedsbegreb for Kant, 
nemlig den negative (friheden fra de naturlige love) og positive (friheden til at handle efter 
moralloven) betydning. Frihedsbegrebet tager højde for begge, eftersom mennesket både er et 
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naturligt og intelligibelt væsen. Det må således antages, at der ikke er noget sandt modsætnings-
forhold mellem natur og frihed. Ligeledes må den moralske frihed forudsættes for det rationelle 
væsen. Denne frihed hænger nøje sammen med Kants forståelse af viljens autonomi, der forstås 
som en frihedens kausalitet, hvor den praktiske fornuft er sin egen lovgiver. Således priser Kant 
også den gode vilje. Alene den gode vilje kan uden reservation kaldes god. Denne forståelse af 
frihedens kausalitet rejser spørgsmålet om forholdet mellem moralloven og den praktiske fornuft. 
Moralloven har et a priori grundlag. Dette hænger nært sammen med hans forståelse af den 
praktiske fornuft, der bestemmer viljen uafhængigt af det empiriske. Det moralsk værdifulde er 
således, hvor moralloven alene forholder sig til sig selv. Denne ubetingethed har sit grundlag i 
morallovens fakticitet, hvilket også fordrer agtelsen for moralloven og dermed pligten til at 
efterleve den. 
Hvor Kant hermed gør rede for hans forståelse af den praktiske fornuft, er det i 
forbindelse med udlægningen af hans moralfilosofi som en naturlig lov teori også nødvendigt mere 
udførligt at inddrage hans forestillinger om, hvorledes naturen indgår heri. Dette forsøges gennem 
en redegørelse for teleologiske træk i hans moralfilosofi. Således redegøres for hans forståelse af 
naturen som type for den rene praktiske bedømmelsesevne. Den rene praktiske bedømmelsesevne 
vedrører handlingens mulighed indenfor sanseverdenen. I denne bedømmelse forholder den sig dog 
alene til lovens skema. Idet de naturlige love ligeledes korresponderer med et skema, kan lovens 
form for den naturlige lov tjene som type på den moralske lov. De naturlige love er ikke 
bestemmende for moralloven, men den fænomenale natur kan tjene som type på morallovens 
intelligible natur. Vigtigt er det dog, at denne analogi alene er en fornuftside. Dette gælder også, 
når Kant taler om, at moralloven konstituerer en intelligibel verden med analogi til den fysiske 
verden. En lignende forestilling gør sig endeligt gældende ved hans ide om konstitueringen af et 
formålenes rige. Ved at menneskene altid betragter det andet menneske som formål i sig selv, 
konstitueres et formålenes rige, der bærer en analogi til naturens rige. Som afsluttende del i 
redegørelsen for Kants forståelse af forholdet mellem natur og fornuft, argumenteres der for en 
mulig opfattelse af fornuften som kilden til en naturlig moral hos Kant. 
I afhandlingens tredje hoveddel koncentreres :fremstillingen omkring udvalgte, nutidige 
miljøetikere. Ligesom det var tilfældet ved anden hoveddel, således rettes blikket også her først 
mod opfattelser, hvor naturbegrebet fremhæves som grundlag for normativiteten, dernæst 
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fremhæves miljøetiske teorier, hvor rationalitetsbegrebet gives større vægt. Den første underdel 
af denne hoveddel koncentrerer sig følgelig om personerne Holmes Rolston III, J. Baird Callicott 
og Paul W. Taylor. I kapitel 7 udgør Holmes Rolston III's miljøetiske teori grundlaget for 
afhandlingens undersøgelse af forholdet mellem natur og fornuft som grundlag for den etiske 
normativitet. Rolston repræsenterer i denne henseende en opfattelse af naturbegrebets 
normativitet, der leder frem til flere træk, hvor der synes at kunne påvises ligheder med en 
naturalistisk forståelse af den naturlige lov, som vi mødte den hos Melanchthon og Wolff. 
Undersøgelsen af Rolston spørger først til hans værdibegreb. En i den forbindelse central 
forestilling hos Rolston er dels naturen som bærer af værdier, der er uafhængige af mennesker, dels 
tanken om nødvendigheden af mennesket som værdisætter (valuer). I sin redegørelse for 
værdibegrebet, argumenterer Rolston for, at naturen kan have en række forskellige værdier. 
Begrebet om den intrinsiske værdi angår den enkelte organismes gode. Hver enkelt organisme har 
et eget gode. I lyset af dette værdibegreb er der en nær sammenhæng mellem er og bør. 
Forestillingen om den systemiske værdi angiver den enkelte organismes betydning som en del af 
det økosystemiske hele. Det enkelte væsen er vurderet indenfor et hele. Videre forestiller Rolston 
sig en række værdier, der er båret af naturen. Disse værdier værdsættes også af mennesket. De 
kræver en menneskelig værdisætter (valuer), selv om de er der forud for en værdsættelse af dem. 
På dette punkt blev der påvist et epistemologisk problem hos Rolston, hvor det blev argumenteret, 
at han ikke redegjorde overbevisende for forholdet mellem dels mennesket som en del af naturen, 
dels som en udhævet værdisætter i forhold til naturen. Dette punkt viser en af lighederne med 
teorierne om en naturlig lov, idet det også her var et problem at redegøre fyldestgørende for 
forholdet mellem den natur(lige orden), som mennesket er en del af og tanken om menneskets 
særlige væsen. Videre vises der sig en lighed til teorierne om en naturlig lov ved Rolstons af givne 
etiske værdier. Rolston angiver hermed en metaetisk realisme, som vi også kunne finde den hos 
f.eks. Melanchthon og Wolff. Når Rolston videre diskuterer nødvendigheden af mennesket som 
værdisætter, gør han rede for, at skønt dette må antages som en nødvendighed, er selve denne 
værdisættelse dog en del af den økologiske proces. Mennesket er i denne værdisættelse 
nødvendigvis samtidigt en del af naturen. Dette indebærer dog ikke, at menneskets særlige status 
opgives. Mennesket anses for mere end naturlige processer og økologi. Mennesket er det eneste 
væsen med samvittighed. Sammenhængen mellem dette forhold, at mennesket dels er en del af det 
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økologiske system, dels er et særligt etisk væsen, leder Rolston frem til overvejelser om 
naturaliseringen af etikken. Dette viser sig bl.a. ved hans forståelse af den økologiske moral, hvor 
han hævder, at der består et harmonisk forhold mellem økologi og etik. Eftersom de økologiske 
love foreskriver etiske pligter, er det nødvendigt at slutte fra, hvorledes naturen er baseret på disse 
love og til, at etikken bør stemme overens med disse love. På dette punkt viser Rolston endnu en 
analogi til teorierne om den naturlige lov. Ligesom det der blev hævdet, at der var en nær 
sammenhæng mellem de konstitutive principper for naturen og etikken, således gør også Rolston 
denne pointe gældende. Rolston fastholder her ikke blot legitimiteten, men ligefrem nødvendighe-
den af at slutte fra er til bør. Et afsluttende punkt, hvor Rolstons overensstemmelse med tidligere 
teorier om en naturlig lov også kommer til udtryk, er hans argumentation for, at mennesket i sit 
handlingsliv skal følge naturen. Rolston redegør for en række måder, hvorpå dette forekommer. 
Hvor kapitlet om Rolston viste en række forestillinger, hvor der gjorde sig en lighed 
gældende i forhold til en klassisk forståelse af den naturlige lov, gør dette sig også gældende hos 
J. Baird Callicott, der på flere måder minder om Rolston. Kapitel 8 koncenterer sig om Callicotts 
miljøetik. Callicott regnes for den ledende repræsentant for den såkaldte landetik, som også 
Rolston i nogen grad kan henregnes under. Grundlaget for denne form for miljøetik er en 
inspiration fra Aldo Leopolds forestillinger om mennesket som en del af et biotisk fællesskab. Som 
udgangspunkt for vurderingen af Callicott giver dette kapitel derfor en summarisk redegørelse for 
landetikkens teoretiske grundlag. Ud over økologiske og evolutionsteoretiske forestillinger gør 
også en inspiration fra David Hume sig gældende. Denne redegørelse for landetikken leder frem 
til en diskussion af Callicotts argumentation for en etisk holisme. I denne diskussion argumenteres 
der for, at der her gør sig tankegange gældende, der har stor lighed med grundtræk fra 
Melanchthons og Wolffs forståelse af den naturlige lov. I sin forståelse af den etiske holisme 
fremhæver Callicott tanken om mennesket som en det biotiske fællesskab (biotic community). Det 
er i kraft af at være medlem af dette fællesskab, at mennesket har moralske følelser. Callicott 
afviser nemlig forestillingen om fornuften som grundlaget for den etiske normativitet. Denne 
henregner han til et kantiansk paradigme, hvor hans egen fremhævelse af moralske følelser er 
inspireret af David Humes moralfilosofi. Skønt afvisningen af fornuften ikke lægger op til en 
sammenligning med den naturlige lov, indebærer tanken om mennesket som en del af et overordnet 
hele en grundlæggende lighed med en naturalistisk eller ontologisk forståelse af den naturlige lov. 
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Callicotts fremhævelse af dette hele indebærer også, at han ikke kan tilslutte sig en etisk 
pluralisme. Derimod argumenterer han for en etisk monisme, hvilket han forstår som etikkens 
afl1ængighed af en bestemt metafysik. Hos Callicott er dette kommet til udtryk ved hans 
redegørelse for det teoretiske grundlag for landetikken. En følge af dette teoretiske grundlag er 
den nævnte fremhævelse af det biotiske fællesskab som grundlag for etikken. Dette leder Callicott 
frem til en diskussion af forholdet mellem er og bør. Callicott argumenterer her på baggrund af 
Humes filosofi for legitimiteten af en slutning fra er til bør. Legitimiteten af denne slutning 
indebærer også, at Callicott ikke mener, at man kan skille kendsgerninger og værdier fuldstændigt 
fra hinanden. I forholdet mellem disse gør der sig en gensidighed gældende. Også disse afsluttende 
overvejelser viser ligheden med Melanchthons og Wolffs forståelse af den naturlige lov. Ligesom 
der i disse teorier er en nær sammenhæng mellem det som er og det som bør være, således gør det 
sig også gældende hos Callicott. 
Det sidste kapitel i denne underdel retter opmærksomheden mod Paul W. Taylor. I 
kapitel 9 gives der således en kritisk fremstilling af hans kantiansk inspirerede teori om respekt 
for naturen. Inspirationen fra Kant viser sig bl.a. ved en karakteristisk fremhævelse af rationaliteten 
ved den biocentriske opfattelse, der ligger til grund for hans teori. Taylors biocentriske opfattelse 
er baseret på fire grundlæggende forestillinger. For det første fremhæves tanken om mennesket 
som en del af ''the Earth's Community of Life". Denne forestilling indebærer, at mennesket er at 
forstå som et naturvæsen, der deler fælles livsvilkår med alle andre levende organismer. Denne 
tanke har stor grad af lighed med Rolstons og Callicotts forståelse af fællesskabsbegrebet, skønt 
Taylor ikke deler deres landetiske udgangspunkt. For det andet argumenterer Taylor for, at den 
naturlige verden er at forstå som et system af interdependens. Alle parterne, der indgår i det 
nævnte naturlige fællesskab, lever i en fortsat gensidig afhængighed. For det tredje indebærer hans 
biocentrisme, at den enkelte organisme må betragtes som et teleologisk livscenter. Hermed 
fremfører Taylor den opfattelse, at der gør sig en efterstræbelse af trivsel (well-being) gældende 
for alle levende organismer. Dette forhold giver grundlag for en respekt for disse organismer og 
anerkendelse af deres inherente værd. For det fjerde pointeres det, at dette biocentriske syn må 
indebære opgivelsen af tanken om menneskets fortrin frem for andre organismer. Der gives ikke 
nogen rationel grund for antagelsen af mennesket som overlegent. Dette indebærer dog ikke en 
opgivelse af tanken om, at mennesket har et særligt ansvar. Idet dette udgør de afgørende træk i 
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Taylors biocentrisme, gøres hans redegørelse for rationaliteten af denne opfattelse dernæst til 
genstand for kapitlets undersøgelse. Det påvises her, at rationaliteten som kriteriologisk betingelse 
ikke er fulgt op af en tilsvarende klar bestemmelse af, hvad han forstår med begrebet rationalitet. 
Dog synes der ikke at være tale om noget normativt rationalitetsbegreb, men snarere et teoretisk. 
Det, der kvalificerer rationaliteten, er viden og information om naturen. Dette rejser dog nogle 
problemer med henblik på den praktiske fornuft, hvilket også viser sig ved hans tilsyneladende 
sammenblanding af forståelsen af the rational og the reasonable. Dette leder frem til den 
antagelse, at skønt Taylor fremhæver rationalitetsbegrebet, er det biocentriske grundlag dog det 
bærende for hans teori. Som grundlag for den etiske normativitet, udgør rationaliteten umiddelbart 
noget sekundært. Dette kommer også til udtryk ved Taylors forestilling om betydningen af den 
etiske ide om en harmoni mellem mennesket og naturen. Taylor argumenterer her for, at hans 
biocentriske teori i en række situationer udgør grundlaget for den moralske stillingstagen. 
Spørgsmålet melder sig i den forbindelse, hvorvidt dette implicerer en naturalistisk fejlslutning hos 
Taylor. I lyset af hans afvisning af en organisk forståelse af naturen, hans explicitte redegørelse for 
forestillingen om respekt for naturen og hans vurdering af, hvorvidt naturen har rettigheder, 
konkluderes det, at skønt han er meget bevidst om at skelne mellem konceptuelle og normative 
udsagn, undgår han ikke den naturalistiske fejlslutning. Dette begrundes ikke mindst i hans 
fremhævelse af hans biocentriske teori som grundlaget for respekten for naturen. Dermed 
konkluderes også, at hans teori er naturalistisk til trods for hans fremhævelse af rationalitets begre-
bet. 
Den anden underdel koncentrerer sig om tre miljøetiske teorier, hvor der i forhold til 
Luther og Kant tilstræbes en påvisning af lighed i begrundelsen af normativitet. I denne del rettes 
blikket således mod Bryan Nortons, Mark Sagoffs og Robin Attfields miljøetiske teorier. 
Kapitel 10 koncenterer sig om Bryan Norton. Hos Norton står rationalitetsbegrebet helt 
centralt ved hans teori om grundlaget for miljøetikken. Tanken om en intrinsisk værdi for naturen 
træder derfor også tilbage. Da Norton imidlertid betragter beskyttelsen af naturen som meget 
væsentligt, betegner han derfor sin egen position som svag antropocentrisme. Han stiller sig kritisk 
overfor en traditionel antropocentrismes antagelse af, at alene mennesket har intrinsisk værdi og 
at alle andre genstande har alene værdi i kraft af deres bidrag til menneskets værdier. Hans kritik 
af flere træk ved nonantropocentrismen leder ham imidlertid frem til den medierende position, han 
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søger at indtage. Denne medierende strategi leder ham også frem til en kritik af en miljøetisk 
monisme. Miljøetikken kan ikke baseres på antagelsen af en enkelt teori som den alt forklarende. 
Norton advokerer derimod en pluralistisk tilgang til det etiske grundlag for beskyttelsen af naturen. 
Bl.a. på denne baggrund argumenteres det, at Norton ikke deler realismen, som der var blevet 
demonstreret hos de tre forgående miljøetiske teorier. Norton bør snarere betragtes som 
konstruktivist, idet naturens værdi konstrueres. Den er ikke noget givent. Tanken om naturens 
værdi som konstrueret viser sig tydeligere ved hans forståelse af naturens transformative værdi. 
Her argumenteres det, at naturens værdi beror på den indflydelse, erfaringer med naturen kan have 
for dannelsen af præferencer, der kan danne grundlag for en politisk beslutning om beskyttelse af 
disse værdier. Herved demonstrerer Norton sin konstruktivistiske position, hvilket han selv 
fremhæver. Værdierne konstrueres gennem en politisk beslutningstagen. Denne konstruktivisme 
viser sig også ved hans forståelse af fornuften. På baggrund af en sondring mellem hans forståelse 
af den videnskabelige, politiske og pragmatiske fornuft anskueliggøres det, at Nortons 
rationalitets begreb i etisk henseende lader meget tilbage. Norton betoner den pragmatiske fornuft 
og lader forestillingen om praktisk, etisk fornuft træde tilbage. Det væsentlige for Norton er 
fornuftens evne til på pragmatisk vis at bestemme de væsentlige områder for beskyttelse af naturen 
og dernæst beslutte sig for den mest hensigtsmæssige måde at løse disse udfordringer på. Ganske 
bevidst stiller han således praksis foran teori. Norton argumenterer således ikke først og fremmest 
for et normativt fornuftsbegreb, men derimod fornuftens evne til at konstruere politiske værdier. 
Hvor Nortons miljøetiske overvejelser tog udgangspunkt i den politiske beslutningsproce-
dure, knytter Mark Sagoff mere til ved økonomiske overvejelser. Sagoffs miljøetik, der udgør 
grundlaget for kapitel 11, tager også sit udgangspunkt i forestillingen om naturens intrinsiske 
værdi. Ligesom Norton forholder også Sagoff sig kritisk overfor denne ide. Sagoff fastholder dog 
begrebet, idet han bestemmer dette på en ny måde. For Sagoff er det afgørende at relatere værdi-
og præferencebegrebet til hinanden. Hvor det sidste rummer en tendens til at reducere mennesker 
til konsumenter, er det en af fordelene ved værdibegrebet, at det giver mulighed for at respektere 
menneskene som politiske borgere. Ifølge Sagoff indgår de politiske borgeres værdier i den 
politiske beslutningsproces, derved at de tilstræber, at de politiske love skal udtrykke deres 
værdier. Naturens intrinsiske værdi forstås følgelig som, at den ikke tjener et instrumentelt forhold 
men udtrykker noget om den politiske borgers identitet og værdier. Værdibegrebet hos Sagoff er 
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således intersubjektivt. Det har sit grundlag i det politiske fællesskab. Som medlem af dette 
fællesskab kan den enkelte borgere reflektere over det rimelige i de politiske værdier. Fornuftsbe-
grebet indtager således en central plads hos Sagoff og har et mere normativt indhold end hos 
Norton. Særligt Sagoffs forestilling om en refleksiv rationalitet tydeliggør dette normative 
fornuftsbegreb. Som en del af den politiske proces kan fornuften i kraft af denne egenskab 
konstruere værdier af væsentlig politisk betydning. Gennem en sammenligning med Rawls' tanker 
om en politisk fornuft anskueliggøres det, hvordan Sagoff kan forstås i lyset af en metaetisk 
konstruktivisme. 
I denne dels afsluttende kapitel fokuseres der på Robin Attfield's miljøetik. Kapitel 12 
giver således en redegørelse for en teori, hvor der dels argumenteres for ideen om naturens 
intrinsiske værdi og menneskets rationalitet som grundlaget for etikken. Attfield forholder sig 
kritisk overfor den holistiske forståelse af miljøetikken, som den bl.a. er kommet til udtryk hos 
Callicott. For Attfield er det derimod væsentligt at foretage en slutning fra nogle moralske 
kriterier, der kan opnås enighed om. I følge Attfield gælder dette behov, interesser og ønsker. For 
så vidt en organisme i lyset af disse kan skades, rejser det i forhold til moralske agenter den 
fordring, at den kan blive vist godgørenhed eller ej. Disse kriterier danner grundlag for 
bestemmelsen af organismers moralske betydning (moral consideration). For ikke at ende med en 
uigennemførlig teori argumenterer Attfield også for en bestemmelse af moralsk vigtighed (moral 
significance). Begge sæt af kriterier har imidlertid deres grundlag i Attfield's naturalistiske 
udgangspunkt. Attfield betegner sig selv som naturalist, hvorfor han også nøje overvejer problemet 
omkring den naturalistiske fejlslutning. Skønt Attfield fremhæver legitimiteten af slutningen fra 
kendsgerninger til værdier, indebærer denne opfattelse dog en fejlslutning ud fra Moores forståelse 
af denne. Selv om denne naturalistiske position er grundlæggende for Attfields teori, betoner han 
dog samtidig refleksionen. Denne leder ham imidlertid ikke frem til en begrundelse for en moralsk 
fornuft som kilde til normativiteten. Dog argumenteres det, at Attfield ikke bestemmer 
fornuftsbegrebet tilstrækkelig klart, hvorfor det er uklart, hvilken rolle fornuften spiller som 
grundlag for den etiske normativitet. 
Afhandlingens fjerde og afsluttende hoveddel forsøger at bringe afhandlingens resultater 
sammen, idet det samtidig tilstræbes at foretage en konstruktiv bearbejdelse af disse. Skønt der 
har været summariske perspektiveringer imellem de forskellige etiske teorier undervejs i 
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afhandingens fremstilling, er en egentlig sammenligning henlagt til disse sidste afsluttende kapitler. 
Ved denne konstruktive sammenfatning og sammenligning tilstræbes det dels at give en 
systematisk teologisk vurdering af natur- og fornuftsbegrebets normative implikationer, dels at 
foretage konkluderende betragtninger i lyset af afhandlingens indledningsvis skitserede 
hovedspørgsmål. I kapitel 13 inddrages først de forskellige opfattelser af mennesket som et 
naturligt væsen, der har vist sig i løbet af afhandlingen. Dette leder frem til en redegørelse for, 
hvorledes det er blevet gjort gældende, at mennesket skal leve i overensstemmelse med naturen. 
Til sidst diskuteres de forskellige naturalistiske fejslutninger i lyset af enkelte nyere kritiske 
overvejelser over denne problemstilling. Hvor dette kapitel således har angivet tentative 
overvejelser med henblik på etableringen af et normativt naturbegreb, der kan danne grundlag både 
for en reformulering af forestillingen om den naturlige lov og en brug af den naturlige lov indenfor 
miljøetikken, koncentrerer det følgende kapitel sig om rationalitetsbegrebet. 
Kapitel 14 giver en afsluttende konstruktiv sammenfatning af de konstruktivistiske 
begrundelser for etikken, som afhandlingen har påvist. Dernæst udvikles der en teologisk 
kvalificering af forestillingen om etikkens konstruktivistiske begrundelse. Denne tager særligt 
udgangspunkt i Luthers forståelse af den praktiske fornuft. Det hævdes, at denne giver grundlaget 
for tanken om menneskets ansvar for en fortsat konstruktion af moralske principper. Den 
afgørende forskel fra den filosofiske konstruktivisme er imidlertid teologiens afhængighed af en 
ekstrinsisk kilde til den etiske normativitet. Afslutningsvis skitseres forestillingen om naturens 
hensigtsmæssighed som grundlag for den naturlige lov og miljøetikken. Ligesom i det foregående 
kapitel har det også her været intentionen at foretage en konstruktiv bearbejdelse af afhandlingens 
resultater. 
I Kapitel 15 bringes afhandlingen til afslutning. Først reflekteres der summarisk over 
mulighederne for en nutidig etablering af en gensidighed mellem naturen og fornuften som 
normative begreber. Dernæst knyttes der til ved afhandlingens indledningsvis angivne teser, hvor 
der konkluderende spørges til afhandlingens belysning af disse. Det konkluderes for det første, at 
der er blevet påvist grundlæggende overensstemmende måder at begrunde etisk normativitet på 
indenfor teorierne om naturlig lov og miljøetik. For det andet konkluderes det, at afhandlingen har 
fremlagt potentialer til en reformulering af den naturlige lov, ligesom der også er etableret 
grundlag for anvendelse af den naturlige lov som grundlag for miljøetikken og til dels indenfor etik 
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generelt. Til sidst skitseres nogle perspektiver, der rejser sig på baggrund af afhandlingens 
resultater. 
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